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The objective of this thesis is to provide advice on how to establish a reliable system of 
financial accountability in Serbia, as a condition for EU membership. The creation of a 
functional  financial  accountability  system  in  Serbia  is  important  not  only for  further 
Serbian development, but also to secure efficient and effective use of the EU/Member 
States monies, which are already being used in Serbia. 
The acquis communautaire prescribe certain obligations for the aspiring Member States 
in  the  area  of financial  accountability.  However,  as  these  requirements represent just 
basic elements of  a system of financial accountability, there is a need to analyse other EU 
Member  States  financial  accountability  frameworks  in  order  to  get  inspiration  and 
provide options for further development of financial accountability in Serbia. 
In  this light,  this  thesis  analyses  financial  accountability systems of two  EU Member 
States: UK and France and a supranational EU system, which are then compared with the 
Serbian  system.  The legal frameworks of these systems of financial  accountability are 
analysed against their socio-historical backgrounds, focusing on the key challenges they 
face in both their strategic developments and everyday work. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that Serbia has still not met the financial  accountability 
conditions for  EU membership outlined in the acquis communitaure. The comparative 
socio-Iegal  analysis  has  demonstrated  that  the  application  of pure,  more  advanced 
Western  European  models  of financial  accountability  would  not  be  possible  in  the 
transitional  Serbian  environment.  However,  specific  elements  of  these  systems, 
exemplified in the emerging European system of financial accountability, could be well 
applied in the Serbian context. A creation of a sound financial accountability system in 
Serbia will take a significant amount of effort on the part of all  financial  accountability 
actors in Serbia whose roles need to  be enhanced simultaneously so  that the balance of 
the financial accountability system is achieved and maintained, both in the pre-accession 
phase and, hopefully, upon obtaining membership. 
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Introduction 
Objective of the study 
This  thesis  is  a contribution to  a  debate  as  to  how to  establish an  effective  financial 
accountability system in Serbia, which would facilitate Serbian integration into the ED. 
The creation of a sound financial accountability system is one of the key elements for 
further  progress  in  economic  and  social  reform  in  Serbia.  The  establishment  of an 
effective  system  of control  and  audit  powers  over  spending  of public  money  should 
prevent the  misuse of public  funds  and combat the high  incidence of corruption that 
plagued the  Serbian public  administration  in  the  1990s  and  provide  better  value  for 
money of use of public funds.  Sound financial accountability is also a precondition for 
setting up  closer relations  with the  EU,  as  one of the main objectives of the  Serbian 
Government. Therefore, reforming the financial accountability system will be a key part 
of the reform agenda in the years to come. 
This study must be seen against the background and in the context of Serbian efforts to 
become a member of  the ED. After the democratic changes in 2000, important steps have 
been taken in this regard. The Copenhagen Council in December 2002 and Thessaloniki 
European Council of June 2003  confirmed the European perspective of state  union of 
Serbia and Montenegro and underlined the European Union's determination to support its 
efforts to move closer to  the European Union. 
1 In April 2005 the European Commission 
approved  a  Feasibility  Report  that  assessed  positively  the  readiness  of Serbia  and 
Montenegro  to  negotiate  a  Stabilisation  and Association Agreement.  The negotiations 
IThe Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of  the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf Presidency Conclusions of  the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003. 
1 process started in October 2005,2 but was suspended in early May 2006 due inadequate 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
in  the  Hague.  Shortly  after  the  suspension  of the  negotiations,  the  majority  of the 
Montenegrin population voted  for  independence  on the  referendum  of 21  May 2006, 
which resulted in the creation of two  fully sovereign states of Serbia and Montenegro. 
Both countries have shortly gained recognition of the international community and will 
naturally continue European Union accession process as two fully independent states. 
The accession of Serbia and other countries of the Western Balkans to the EU constitutes 
a particular challenge for the EU. The overall EU enlargement policy is put to the serious 
test of  whether it is able to transform the region of states of  weak governance and divided 
societies,  with recent history of armed conflicts? A  clear political perspective for  EU 
accession is one of the key drivers for continuity of reforms in these countries. But it is 
also clear that Serbia and other Western Balkan countries can join only once they meet all 
EU membership criteria, including conditions regarding financial accountability. 
The concept of financial accountability is the key concept of  this thesis. Accountability is 
defined through operationalisation of 4 key questions: "of  whom", "for what" "to whom" 
and "how". Financial accountability is primarily understood as the relationship between 
the citizens, as accountors, and the Government, as an accountee, where the citizens hold 
the Government to account for the stewardship of public money. The essence of financial 
accountability is  an obligation of the Government to  assure the citizens that money is 
spent in the best possible and effective way. The Government has to provide answers and 
justifications for its actions and to regularly inform the public on how it spends the public 
funds.
4 
2 The commencement of  negotiations for Stabilisation and Association Agreement in October 2005 has 
symbolically marked 5 years from democratic change in Serbia. 
3 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission: 2005 enlargement strategy paper. Brussels, 
November 2005, COM(2005)561, www.europa.eu.int, p. 2. 
4 Cf S. Redlynch, "Holding to Account, The Review of  Audit and Accountability for Central 
Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk . 
2 The next level  of analysis of financial  accountability  encompasses  the  complexity of 
government's  institutions,  rules  and  procedures,  which  provide  an  accountability 
framework at the central government level. Financial accountability is exercised typically 
between numerous actors within the government, and in particular between the executive 
and  the  parliament.  Legally  speaking,  the  financial  accountability  relationship  is 
embedded  in  the  parliament's  authorisation  of the  public  expenditure by legislation.
5 
Expenditure legislation provides a framework of law, which is the basis for calling the 
Government to account for its actions. Therefore, our analysis will focus on the financial 
accountability relationship established after the parliament's approval of the expenditure, 
i.e.  parliament's  entrustment  of the  public  money to  the  government.  We  shall  also, 
however, analyse the process of Parliamentary approval of the expenditure, as one of the 
key aspects of ex-ante financial  accountability.
6  We  shall  then  examine the variety of 
accountability  mechanisms  to  ensure  that  money  is  spent  in  accordance  with 
parliamentary  wishes.
7  In  this  sense,  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  legal/regulatory 
framework and accountability mechanisms inside the executive (internal accountability 
mechanisms) and external accountability devices  (external  accountability mechanisms), 
which are to support and secure the stewardship of  public money.
8 
Furthermore,  it is  important to  stress that financial  accountability mechanisms are not 
isolated  phenomena,  but mutually  interrelated  elements,  which  are  in  the  process  of 
constant interaction, mutually supporting their structures and functions.  For this reason, 
we introduce the concept of  a financial accountability system,9 which consists of different 
mutually related elements/mechanisms of financial  accountability. The effectiveness of 
financial accountability as a system depends mostly on the existence of a proper balance 
5 Appropriation Act in UK and Budget Act in France and Serbia as well as permanent legislation 
authorising conditions and purposes of expenditure. 
6 Cf D. Coombes et aI,  The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976. 
7 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit. Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999) 
p.3. 
8 The World Bank, Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia,  Country Financial Accountability Assessment, 2002. 
9 Cf L. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (George Braziller Publishers), 1969. 
3 between its different supporting mechanisms, so that weaknesses in one form of financial 
accountability can be compensated for by controls through other mechanisms.  10 
In  this thesis financial  accountability is analysed through two key levels - the national 
level  and  supra-national  level  of  the  EU.  Whereas  the  financial  accountability 
relationship  established  at  the  national  level  is  rather  straightforward,  the  financial 
accountability created at the supra national level of  the EU is more complex and requires 
further theoretical discussion, as will be elaborated in Chapter IV.  Special attention shall 
also be paid to the EU requirements for the acceding countries in the area of financial 
accountability, i.e., internal financial control, internal audit and external audit. 
It is  not in dispute that the EU has  a  keen interest in building and strengthening the 
financial accountability system in Serbia and other acceding countries, as potential future 
members of  the enlarged European Union. The EU has already been investing significant 
funds  to  strengthen  the  Serbian  Government  institutional  structure  and  revive  its 
economy. Only the establishment of an effective financial  accountability system would 
be  able  to  guarantee  that the  provided money has  been  spent  in accordance  with  its 
intended purpose and in the most efficient and effective way.  An ineffective system of 
financial  accountability may also  be costly  for  the  EU  as  it may generate  additional 
burdens  on  the  control  institutions,  such  as  the  European  Court  of Justice  and  the 
European Court of  Auditors. This is why it is of  utmost importance to prepare Serbia and 
other potential candidate countries to manage EU funds - both during the pre-accession 
phase and upon achieving membership. 
The issue of the candidate states' financial accountability has not been only the concern 
of the  EU  institutions,  but  also  of the  current  Member  States,  especially those  who 
significantly contribute to the EU's budget. Bearing in mind that about 80 % of the EU's 
budget is managed and implemented solely by the Member States, both the EU and the 
10 Cf T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Refonning public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in a 
comparative perspective", International Review of  Administrative Sciences, [1998], p. 98. 
4 Member States are worried about the ability of aspiring Member States to  protect the 
European Union's financial interests when managing EU funds. 
Serbia has  recognized the  importance of establishing a  sound financial  accountability 
system and although many important reforms in this area have been started, results are 
still far from satisfactory. In the Serbian Government's view, the financial accountability 
framework  should  rest  on the  three  key  pillars:  a  strong  Treasury,  efficient  internal 
controls  and  independent  external  audit,  as  a  basis  for  the  efficient  democratic, 
Parliamentary control of the public finances.  However, the attention of the Government 
given to  these three elements has not been equal. Greater emphasis has been placed on 
the establishment of  a functional Treasury system, expected to be a vital Government tool 
for managing resources, monitoring their use and supporting line managers in programme 
delivery. 
1  1 Internal control and audit systems, on the other hand, have just started to  be 
developed and will require a long time until  their proper functioning can be expected. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, mechanisms of external audit are still missing, six 
years  after  the  democratic  changes.  For  this  reason,  annual  consolidated  financial 
statements have not been audited and presented to the Parliament since 2002.
12 Therefore, 
there is currently no official record of Government expenditure for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 
2005  and no  external oversight of Government accounts. As a result, the Parliamentary, 
democratic scrutiny of  the public money spending has been ineffective and disappointing. 
This  all  gives  a  rather  bleak  general  picture  of the  current  system  of  financial 
accountability in Serbia. 
The key question which this thesis asks is how to build an efficient and effective financial 
accountability  system  in  Serbia.  The  EU  Treaty does  not  specify  any predetermined 
model of financial  accountability and control to be applied by the Member States. The 
European Commission could in no  way impose a specific model of public expenditure 
II Cf The World Bank, Republic of  Serbia - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, Volume Two, 
February 2003., available at http://www.worldbank.org.yu 
12  Consolidated accounts for 2001  were audited by a private firm, in the absence of  a supreme audit 
institution. 
5 control on any Member/Candidate State. J3  In fact, there are a number of different systems 
of financial accountability, varying from one Member State to another. All of them have 
their own specificities and are  strongly embedded in their overall institutional context. 
Although  the  acquis  communautaire  prescribe  certain  obligations  for  the  aspiring 
Member States  in the area of internal  control,  these requirements represent just basic 
elements of a complex system. Therefore, although Serbia is urged to build an effective 
financial  accountability system and has been given the suggestions in that respect, it is 
still left to find its own way towards this aim. 
The objective of this thesis is to provide possible solutions for creating an efficient and 
effective system of financial accountability that would best serve the Serbian case. It is 
not in dispute that each country needs to find its own financial accountability system, best 
suited to the local institutional environment and culture. However, in order to achieve this 
aim,  insights into financial accountability systems of other countries can be a powerful 
source of  inspiration. 
This thesis analyses financial accountability systems of two EU Member States: UK and 
France  and  a  supranational  EU  system,  which  are  then  compared  with  the  Serbian 
system. Notwithstanding the difficulties to assign various European countries models of 
financial  accountability  into  separate  categories,  due  to  refined  distinctions  that 
characterise  each  of them,  we  have  chosen  the  UK and  French  system  of financial 
accountability as  representatives of two  models of financial  accountability,  which can 
broadly be defined as the Anglo-Saxon and the continental (Roman) system. The Anglo-
Saxon  model  is  characterised  by  an  existence  of an  audit  office  without  a  judicial 
function,  headed by a sole head, usually an Auditor General.
14  Instruments of internal 
13  R. Koning, "Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) in the context of  European Union enlargement", 
Public Management Forum, vol. Y, No.6, 1999, ppA-5. 
14 The model of an audit office headed by an Auditor General exists in the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark and in the USA. There are four main types of supreme audit institutions within the European 
Union, namely the 'court' with ajudicial function; the 'collegiate' body without a judicial function; the 
independent audit office headed by an Auditor General; and the audit office headed by an  Auditor General 
within the structure of  the Government. (In addition Austrian Rechnungshofis a distinct model headed by a 
6 financial control, on the other hand, are devolved from the Ministries of Finance to heads 
of line  ministries  or  officials  in the  budget  and  finance  departments  of these  public 
bodies,  where the  role  of the  Ministry of Finance is  one of coordinator.  The Roman 
model,  in  tum,  is  characterized by the  existence  of an  external  auditor  with judicial 
functions
15  and more centralized internal financial  control exercised by the Ministry of 
Finance itself. It may be argued that the devolved Anglo-Saxon approach is more focused 
on ensuring that priorities and objectives of an agency are achieved, while the centralized 
continental  approach  emphasizes  respect  for  legality  and  regularity  of expenditure. 
However,  in the last two  decades,  financial  accountability systems  of both groups  of 
countries have experienced gradual harmonization, mainly towards greater devolution of 
internal control functions to  agency's management and insistence on achieving value for 
money  in  the  use  of the  public  funds.  The  EU  system  of financial  accountability 
represents a unique mixture of these two basic models of financial accountability, which 
faces  additional challenges in the context of shared financial  management between the 
EU institutions and the Member States. 
The  analysis  of UK,  French and EU  system  is  taken  as  a  source of information  and 
knowledge  which  can  be  used  for  building  the  Serbian  accountability  system. 
Possibilities  of incorporating  strengths  of particular  systems  into  other  systems  of 
financial accountability are thus carefully considered and weighed and recommendations 
for further development of  the Serbian financial accountability system are given. 
President and auditing at central, regional and local level}. Cf UK National Audit Office, State Audit in the 
European Union, December 2005, available at http://www.nao.org.uklpublications/stateaudit/state.htm 
15  Supreme audit institutions in six EU countries (in France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) 
can loosely be grouped together as 'courts', which exercise judicial functions. The similarities in structure 
and functions stem from the spread of  French administrative practice across Europe after the French 
revolution and in the nineteenth century. In Greece and Portugal, for example, the SAl is the part of  the 
judiciary and is constitutionally equal with other courts. The Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg, in 
tum, have 'collegiate' structure, but no judicial functions, which brings them closer to the Anglo-Saxon 
system. It is interesting to note that Sweden and Finland's external audit institutions are part of  the 
Government structure, and therefore represent a specific model of external audit. Cf UK National Audit 
Office, Ibid. 
7 Methodology 
In  our  research,  we  have  combined  several  methods:  normative  method,  socio-Iegal 
method, comparative legal method and historical method  . 
...... 
Normative method is used to  examine normative framework of financial  accountability 
and its mechanisms in different countries and in the EU. Analysis of  normative legal texts 
has provided us with a good basis for understanding of what are the standards that one 
financial  accountability  system  aims  to  attain.  However,  as  institutions  and  norms 
represent just a part of the broader social background, they cannot be analyzed isolated 
from  their social context.
16  Therefore, in order to  provide a better understanding of the 
adopted financial accountability mechanisms, we have devoted considerable attention to 
analysis  of respective  social  environments  through  the  employment  of socio-Iegal 
method. 
The use  of the  socio-Iegal method has brought about a special dimension to  our legal 
research, providing a greater understanding of researched phenomena through analysis of 
their empirical settings.
17  The object of the socio-Iegal analysis is to provide knowledge 
about  administrative bodies  and processes:  their structure  and  organization,  how  they 
work in  practice,  the effect on legal  rules  and  doctrines  on them,  and the  nature  and 
effectiveness  of  methods  of  regulation,  control  and  recourse. IS  The  sociological 
interpretation has also provided a ground for critical assessment of the adopted financial 
accountability mechanisms and has helped opening up debate for challenging the existing 
frameworks. 
16  Cf O. Kokkini-Iatridou "Some Methodological Aspects of Comparative Law", Netherlands International 
Law Review,  1986, pp. 166-167. 
17  Cf R.  Cotterrell, "Why Must Legal Ideas Be Interpreted Sociologically?", Journal of  Law and Society, 
Volume 25, Number 2,1998, pp. 185-187. 
18 OJ. Galligan (ed.), "Introduction: Socio-Legal Readings in Administrative Law", A Reader on 
Administrative Law, (Oxford University Press), 1996, pp. 1-8. 
8 Although  the  use  of socio-Iegal  research  is  invaluable  for  understanding  the  legal 
phenomena and their critical analysis, it is doubtful whether it can provide solutions for 
the posed problems.
19  This limitation of the sociological method, in our opinion, can be 
overcome by mutual application of  comparative research methodology. 
The  comparative  analysis  of different  systems  of financial  accountability  provides 
information on variety of ways, institutions, mechanisms and processes that are used to 
support the establishment of a sound system of financial accountability in different social 
settings. The comparative method is thus of critical importance for our research, which 
aims at providing different options for development of the Serbian system. 
Furthermore, the employment of comparative law methodology also plays an important 
role in the process of harmonization of Serbian law with the EU law. The application of 
the comparative law methodology should facilitate the process of alignment of Serbia's 
financial  accountability mechanisms with the acquis communautaire.  In  that sense,  the 
comparative law methodology also serves a function of  legal unijication.
20 
The employment of normative,  socio-Iegal  and comparative method has  been coupled 
with the use of historical method, which has helped us to understand the development of 
different  financial  accountability systems throughout time,  and  explain why they have 
evolved in different directions. In that sense, it is interesting to see and compare how the 
different  cultural-political  and  legal-tradition  backgrounds  have  influenced  the 
establishment and changes in the  financial  accountability legal  framework  (the  social-
historical change in this  case is taken  as  an  independent variable and legal  change  as 
19 Cf D. Nelken, "Blinding Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law", Journal of  Law and 
Society, Volume 25, No.3, 1998, pp. 422-423. 
20 For more about functions of comparative law methodology see: R. Dehousse, "Comparing National and 
EC Law: The Problem of  the Level of  Analysis", [1994] 42, American Journal of  Comparative Law, pp. 
762-764; J.H. Merryman, "Comparative Law and Scientific Explanation" in Law in the USA  in Social and 
Technological Revolution, pp. 85-86; E. Orucu, Comparative Law and Methodology, University of 
Glasgow handout, 2000. 
9 dependent variable).21 Thus, we have tried to explain why certain financial accountability 
mechanisms have been established in the UK and not in France and vice versa and which 
factors have influenced the development of the EU financial accountability system. This 
explanation coupled with an in depth analysis of  the current social institutional context in 
Serbia  provided  us  with  a  sound  basis  to  predict22  which  of the  analysed  financial 
accountability mechanisms may be most suitable for Serbia. 
Finally,  for  the purposes of our research,  we have conducted a number of interviews, 
primarily with the members of staff of the French Cour des  Comptes,  Serbian officials 
working  on  financial  accountability  issues  and  other  practitioners  in  this  field.  The 
interviews  with  French  colleagues  served  to  elucidate  important  points  about  the 
operation of  the French financial accountability system, while the interviews with Serbian 
officials have helped us to understand peculiarities of the Serbian transitional model and 
very much contributed to formulation of conclusions presented in the final chapter. The 
list of  persons interviewed is attached in Annex 2. 
Structure of the dissertation 
In  conducting  our  research  on  financial  accountability,  we  have  undertaken  several 
distinctive steps. 
Firstly, our focus  is on conceptualization of the notion of financial accountability. This 
has provided us with a basis for carrying out a comparative research, as  a comparative 
legal analysis cannot be undertaken unless we have a clear picture of what is going to be 
compared.  In that sense,  we have born in mind the important principle of comparative 
methodology - the principle ofjunctionality, which assumes that only things which fulfil 
the same function in a society can be compared.23  Therefore, the task of our preliminary 
comparative inventory is the identification of various mechanisms which have a role of 
21  Cf J.H. Merryman, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
22 Cf D. Kokkini-Iatridou, op. cit., pp. 187-188. 
23  Cf K.  Zweugert, H. Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), 1987, p. 3l. 
10 securing  financial  accountability  in  different  European  states.  In  this  way  we  have 
determined the  tertium  comparationis,  as  a precondition for  any comparative research 
undertaking.
24 The identification of the object of our comparative research has led us to 
several financial control mechanisms, which are used to secure financial accountability in 
modem states. These are: the mechanisms of  securing democratic accountability of use of 
public  funds,  discerned through budgetary control  of Parliaments;  the  mechanisms  of 
internal financial control within the administrative structures of the Government and the 
mechanisms  of external  financial  control,  provided by specialized  independent  audit 
insti  tu  ti ons. 
In  order to  provide  Serbia with  ideas  on how to  build a  reliable  system of financial 
accountability, the second chapter is devoted to an analysis of  the UK system of financial 
accountability. Diverse mechanisms of financial accountability are analysed, with special 
emphasis on the internal Treasury mechanisms, the Public Accounts Committee and the 
National Audit Office in holding the executive to account for spending of  public money. 
The  third  chapter  exammes  the  financial  accountability  system  of France,  as  the 
representative of a continental legal tradition. Special emphasis is laid on the specificities 
of internal financial control in France, the role of the Cour des Comptes and an emerging 
focus on Parliamentary accountability to secure effective spending of  public funds. 
The fourth part of our research is devoted to an analysis of the financial accountability 
system of the EU.  We have first focused on the examination of an interplay of various 
EU financial accountability mechanisms and their overhaul over the last couple of years. 
This is followed by an analysis of  the concept of  financial accountability in the EU supra-
national  context.  After that,  we have focused  on the specific requirements for  internal 
financial control, internal and external audit stipulated by the acquis communautaire and 
presented in negotiations Chapter 32  on financial  control.  We have tried to  reveal  the 
logic  behind  these  requirements,  provide  their  legal  justification  and  explain  their 
importance for the process of accession. 
24 Cf D. Kokkini-Iatridou, ibid, pp.  158-161. 
11 The  fifth  chapter  shall  focuses  on the  current  problems  experienced  by the  Serbian 
Government  in  securing  financial  accountability.  This  chapter also  analyses  in  more 
depth  the historical  development of financial  accountability mechanisms in Serbia,  in 
order  to  provide  insights  into  traditional  approaches  to  the  financial  accountability 
problems. 
The final part of the dissertation focuses on identification of differences and similarities 
between the  described  financial  accountability  systems,  conditioned by their  different 
historical developments. We have pointed out what changes Serbia will need to make in 
its  legal  frameworks  as  well as  within institutional  structures,  for  adhering to  the  EU 
financial accountability standards. We have further explored the possibilities of adoption 
of some of the UK, France and EU's financial accountability mechanisms in the Serbian 
environment. Bearing in mind that legal rules, principles and institutions cannot simply 
be transplanted from one legal system to another,25  the ways in which modem Western 
standards  of financial  accountability  could be  applied  within  the  still  fragile  Serbian 
transitional context are carefully analysed. 
Lastly, we would like to  note that the enlargement is a costly and lengthy undertaking 
that requires sacrifices on both candidate countries and the EU.26  Lots of investment that 
will only later be paid off is needed in order to secure peace and stability in Europe on a 
long-term basis. This dissertation is a small contribution aimed at achieving this goal. 
25 Cf 1. Bell,  "Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe", in 1.Beatson, T. 
Tridimas New Directions in European Public Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford), 1998, p.  147; S. Cassese, 
"Toward a European Model of  Public Administration", in D. Clark ed., Comparative and Private 
International Law, (Duncker & Humblot), Berlin, 1990, pp. 361-362. 
26 E. Brok, "The EU after Enlargement: Managing Coexistence of  Newcomers and Veterans in a United 
Europe", Public Management Forum, Vol. VI, No 1,2000. 
12 Chapter I 
Financial Accountability - Concept and Securing Mechanisms 
Concept of Accountability 
Accountability is one of the most often found tenns in current administrative law and 
public policy theory and practice. It is therefore quite surprising to note that just a few 
decades  ago  this  word was  used in a very restrictive sense and still has,  interestingly 
enough, no  equivalent in any European language other than English.
27  The concept of 
accountability has gradually evolved and encompassed a number of different meanings, 
which often call for further clarification of  its genuine sense.28 
Linguistic  analysis  of  the  words  'accountability',  'accountable',  'account'  and 
'accounting' demonstrates the common roots of all these tenns. They go back through 
Old English and Old French to  Latin - computare, which is also the root of the verb "to 
compute".29  Computare  is  the  compound of com,  which means  together,  and putare, 
which means to count, reckon, consider, as well as to settle (an account).30 Therefore, the 
tenn accountability undoubtedly  draws  its  origin  from  financial  accounting,  which  is 
focused on checking the way the books are kept and how the money is spent. It is quite 
interesting that during the time the concept of accountability has been spread to  other 
disciplines  and  gained  a  much  broader  meaning.  In  order  to  understand  the  full 
complexity of the  contemporary meaning  of the  concept  of accountability,  we  shall 
27 Cf M. Dubnick, "Clarifying accountability: an ethical theory framework", in C.  Sampford and N. 
Preston (eds.) Public Sector Ethics (London, Routhledge), 1998, pp. 68-81. 
28 Cf R Mulgan, "Accountability: an Ever-expanding Concept?", Public Administration, No 3/2000, 
pp.555-573. 
29 Cf R. Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brooking Institution Press, 2001. 
30 Ibid., Oxford English Dictionary. 
13 explore its usage through current academic literature. Only then will we be able to fully 
define the concept of financial accountability, which will provide a basis for our overall 
research. 
The traditional dictionaries define the concept of accountability in different ways, mainly 
through a notion of the attribute "accountable". Oxford dictionary defines "accountable" 
as one required or expected to justify actions or decisions; explicable or understandable. 
Other sources interpret "accountable" as subject to giving an account - "answerable" and 
capable of  being accounted for - "explainable".31 
On the basis of the provided definitions and at the most general level of understanding, 
accountability could be defined  as  answerability or justification for  one's actions  and 
behaviour. Therefore, accountability presupposes the existence of at least two key actors 
- an accountee, who is obliged to provide answers and/or justify hislher behaviour, and 
an accountor, who has the right to ask questions, require explanations, justifications etc. 
Although this  seems to  be a straightforward relationship, the question which naturally 
arises is why an acountee has to provide answers or justify his/her behaviour/actions to an 
accountor? What is the underlying logic behind this concept? 
It may be argued that delegation  of duties and responsibilities lies at the heart of any 
accountability relationship.  An accountor delegates his/her authorities to  an accountee, 
who is being entrusted with certain tasks and activities and is obliged to report back on 
hislher actions, so that his/her ultimate principals/accountors can be sure the job has been 
done  in  the  way  it  was  intended.  Thus,  for  example,  Romzek  and  Dubnick  define 
accountability as  "a relationship in which an individual or agency is held to answer for 
performance that involves some delegation of authority to act".32  In a similar vain, Lord 
Sharman  states  that  "Accountability  is  needed  wherever  there  are  hierarchical 
31  Cf J.M Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of  American Government and Politics (Dorsey Press, 1988). 
32 Cf B. Romzek, M. Dubnick, "Accountability" in J. M.  Shafritz, The International Encyclopedia of 
Public Policy and Administration, (West-view Press, 1998), p. 6. 
14 relationships,  or  where  delegation  of  duties  or  responsibilities  takes  place."  The 
establishment of any accountability relationship hence presupposes a delegation of tasks 
and duties between an accounter and accountee or the existence of an already established 
hierarchical  framework,  which is  also  based on prior entrustment of certain tasks  and 
authorities. 
The  content  of the  accountability  relationship  compnses  two  mam  mutually  related 
elements - the obligation of an accountee to provide information about the discharge of 
hislher duties (that have been delegated by the accountor) and the right of an accountor to 
require such information. However, it should be noted that the first element entails not 
only the obligation of an acountee to provide information for carrying out certain conduct 
or duty to the accountor,33 but also a duty to explain why tasks and responsibilities have 
been exercised in a certain way, to justify the way the things have been done so  far as 
well as to reveal further plans and assure the accountor that activities are being performed 
in  the  way  he/she  wishes?4  The  content  of the  second  element  of the  notion  of 
accountability  is  the  accountor's  right  to  request  information  and  answers  from  an 
accountee. However, most authors agree that accountability cannot be solely identified 
with  answerability.35  Accountability  seems  to  be  a  "stronger"  concept,  which 
encompasses not  only the right to  get answers, but also  the possibility to  sanction or 
reward taken actions or behaviour, depending on the performance.36  If the accountor is 
happy  with  the  accountee's  performance,  he/she  may want to  reward  the  accountee. 
However,  if this  is not the  case,  the  accountor has  the right to  criticize the  acountee, 
33  Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999), 
p.6. 
34 Cf L. Normanton, "Public Accountability and Audit: A Reconnaissance", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C. 
Hague (ed.), The Dilemma of  Accountability in Modern Government - Independence versus Control, 
(Macmillan, 1971), p.  31 1. 
35 Cf M. Geoffrey, Constitutional Conventions.  The Rules and Roles of  Political Accountability, 1986, 
(Oxford, Clarendon); R. Pyper, "The Parameters of  Accountability", in Robert Pyper (eds.), Aspects of 
Accountability in the British System of  Government, 1996, (Tudor Business Publishing Ltd.). 
36 R.  Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability, Brooking Institution Press, 2001. 
15 direct the accountee's act in a particular way, require faults be remedied orland impose 
sanctions. It should be noted that the meaning of "sanction" is taken here in its broadest 
sense,  encompassing in  some  situations  only the  right to  criticize,  while  in  others  it 
involves  more  severe  measures,  such  as  the  right  to  dismiss  the  accountee,  impose 
.  fi  d  I'  37  vanous  mes an  pena tles. 
The concept of accountability is mainly understood as an ex-post category, meaning that 
the  relationship  between  accountor  and  accountee  is  established  only  after  the 
performance  by  the  accountee  has  taken  place.  This  feature  of accountability  has 
provoked many critics, who argue that ex-post control alone is not sufficient to ensure the 
proper performance of delegated tasks. If the accountor has no means of influence over 
the accountee before and during the performance, it is likely that errors and omissions 
will eventually be made.
38 Thus, all the ex-post observations and criticisms will come too 
late, which makes the accountability relationship ineffective. 
The  mam  answer  to  these  critics  IS  that  accountability,  although  almost  always 
established ex post, has an immense ex ante impact. The awareness that the action will 
come under scrutiny may be a very strong deterrent of an accountee's ex ante action and 
therefore strongly prevent carelessness, negligence or any kind of  abuse of  power.  39 
The question, however, remains whether expectance of scrutiny is enough to  ensure the 
accountee's compliance especially when accountability is exercised in a highly complex 
environment, such as that of the contemporary state. It could be furthermore argued that 
strong emphasis on the ex post nature of accountability has quite a negative effect on the 
accountee's creativity and willingness to take any kind ofrisk.
4o A number of authors are 
37 Cf F. White, K.  Hollingsworth, ibid. 
38 Cf E.L. Normarton, The Accountability and Audit of  Governments - A Comparative Study, (Manchester 
University Press, 1964), p. 83. 
39 Ibid. 
40 A.  Lovell, "Notions of Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability & 
Management, 12(4), 1996, pp. 267-268. 
16 therefore of the opinion that accountability should not be comprehended only as ex post, 
but also  as  ex ante category,  where accountability processes operate before or at least 
during the performance of an accountee.
41  Besides its preventive function, accountability 
thus defined enables the performance of an accountee to be continuously scrutinized and, 
if necessary, his/her actions appropriately directed in a certain way. Another argument in 
favour of using broader understanding of accountability is  that it is undoubtedly more 
suitable for comprehending the complexity of a contemporary state, which is based on 
numerous both ex post and ex ante accountabilities. Having all these arguments in mind, 
we shall base our research on the concept of accountability perceived in both the ex ante 
and ex post sense. 
Every accountability relationship implies the existence of a certain social framework, as a 
basic  setting  for  the  defining  the  accountability  relations.  Accountability  may  be 
established between two or more individuals as well as different organizational structures 
of  various degrees of complexity. In any case, it is essential that accountor and accountee, 
whether  they are  individuals  or institutions,  accept  their  obligations  and  duties/rights 
stemming from the accountability relationship, as well as share the expectations about the 
respective activity and the sense of  justifiable reasons for the need for an explanation of 
conduct.
42 If participants have different expectations and do not share the same reasoning 
in terms of  justifications, it is difficult to talk about accountability, but rather of different 
kinds of  relationships, based on unclearly defined settings.
43 
41  Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 6; M. Power, The Audit Explosion, (Demos, 1994); M. 
Harmon, Responsibility as Paradox: A Critique of  Rational Discourse on Government (Sage Publications), 
1995. 
42 Cf P.  Day, R. Klein, Accountabilities - Five Public Services, (Tavistock Publications, London and New 
York), 1987, p. 5. 
43  Ibid. 
17 The distinction between accountability and other similar concepts 
The  concept  of accountability  should  be  differentiated  from  other  closely  related 
concepts, such as responsibility and liability. Although these concepts are fairly similar, it 
is possible to delineate between them, by placing an emphasis on key features of these 
distinct notions.  To be responsible is  usually described as to  have the  authority to act, 
power  to  control,  freedom  to  decide  (so-called  responsibility  as  "capacity,,)44,  but 
foremost "to behave rationally and reliably and with consistency and trustworthiness in 
exercising  internal  judgment".45  Therefore  the  concept  of responsibility  (sometimes 
called moral, professional accountability)46 refers primarily to the professional capacity 
and internal personal values of officials related to  discharge of professional duties,  in 
contrast to accountability whose focus is placed on external pressure to provide answers 
and justifications for one's actions.  It  could further be argued that responsibility is  an 
utterly  personal  concept,  always  related  to  an  individual,  while  accountability  is 
principally an institutional concept, which denotes relations between different institutions 
and between institutions and the general public and only to a lesser degree also a personal 
concept. 
The concept of liability, on the other hand, assumes the duty of making good, but even 
more so "to restore, to compensate, to recompense for wrongdoing or poor judgment". It 
generally  implies  the  existence  of a  malpractice  or misconduct,  which  needs  to  be 
remedied. Although the concept of accountability shares some of the features of liability, 
it does not presuppose the existence of the wrongdoing and compensation, but merely 
44 Cf A. B. Cendon, "Accountability and Public Administration: Concepts, Dimensions, Developments", in 
Openness and Transparency in Governance: Challenges and Opportunities, (NISPAcee and IEPA), 1999, 
pp.24-25. 
45 Cf a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. Jabbra, "Public Service Responsibility and Accountability" in a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. 
Jabbra (eds.) Public Service Accountability - A Comparative Perspective, (Kumarian Press, Inc., 1989), pp. 
24-25. 
46 Cf A.  Sinclair (1995), "The Chameleon of  Accountability: Forms and Discourses", Accounting, 
Organization and Society, 20. 219-237; a.p. Dwivedi, J.G. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
18 points  out  the  duty  to  provide  answers,  justifications  and  provide  assurance  of an 
appropriate running of  the entrusted affairs. 
The complexities of a precise definition of the concept of accountability is  even more 
apparent  in  the  comparative  context,  mainly  due  to  an  absence  of a  concept  of 
accountability  in  other  countries  and,  hence,  the  lack of adequate  translation  of the 
concept of accountability in other languages. For example, in French language, only one 
term "responsilibite" is used to  denote the meaning of 3 different English concepts of 
accountability,  responsibility  and  liability.47  A  similar  situation  can  be  found  in  the 
Serbian  language,  which  also  contains  only  one  word  "odgovornost"  for  all  three 
mentioned terms. The meaning of "responsabilite" and  "odgovornost" is narrower than 
one of accountability and is quite close to English term of "responsibility", which, as we 
could  see,  is  much  more  a  personal,  individual  concept  than  institutional. 
"Responsabilite" and "odgovornost" definitely refer to  one's capacity to act and decide 
(above mentioned responsibility as  'capacity'), but also include the notion of liability.48 
Therefore, these terms may also have a rather negative connotation,  as  they generally 
contain  an  inherent  element  of  a  wrongdoing  and  subsequent  punishment.49  As 
accountability concept does not exist, it is not represented in the academic writing and 
practice.  Instead,  researchers  prefer  to  use  similar,  but well-established  concepts,  in 
particular the concept of  "control". 
Attempts to differentiate the concept of accountability and control are again complicated 
by different meanings these concepts have in various national settings and languages. In 
the  English language,  the  meaning  of control  tends  to  be rather broad,  starting  from 
influencing  and  guiding  to  restraining  and  inspecting.5o  In  the  French  and  Serbian 
languages, on the other hand, the meaning of control (controle) is much more restrictive 
47 Cf P.  Avril, "Responsabilite et accountability", in O. Beaud, I.M. B1anquer (eds.), La Responsabilite des 
Gouvernants, (Descartes & Cie, SODEM), Paris, 1999. 
48  Ibid. 
49 Cf A. B. Cendon, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
50 Cf D. Coombes et aI,  The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976, pp. 16-17. 
19 and precise than in English and refers to inspection, verification, examination, checking 
against fixed standards,  51  which is close to the English meaning of accountability. At first 
sight,  it  may  seem  that  control  is  a  looser  concept  than  accountability,  since 
accountability refers only to one type/means of control where persons are actually called 
to account and have to provide answers for their actions and accept possible sanctions. 
However, the main distinction between the concepts of accountability and control is an 
existence  of delegation  of functions,  as  the  key  element  of accountability.  Whereas 
accountability  assumes  delegation  of functions  between  an  accountor  and  accountee, 
control does not imply any entrustment of tasks. Control is primarily a tool for ensuring 
that things are done in the way it was required and that expected standards have been 
met.  Thus,  control  could  be  defined  as  a  process  "designed  to  provide  reasonable 
assurance regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of reporting 
and  compliance with  applicable laws  and regulations.,,52  Therefore,  control  may very 
well be used as a mechanism for ensuring accountability and a basis for calling someone 
to account, as will be explained in more detail later. 
Dimensions of accountability 
In  order  to  comprehend  the  notion  of accountability  further,  it  will  be  useful  to 
distinguish between its several dimensions. These are: 
1.  who is accountable; 
2.  to whom; 
3.  for what; 
51  Cf Cassell's French Dictionary, (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1981); Concise Oxford Hachette 
French Dictionary, (Oxford University Press), 1998. Z. Tomic, Upravna kontrola uprave, (Draganic) 
Belgrade, 1995. The word controle, is a compound of  the words "contre" and "role". "Role" is a official 
registry which contains certain important facts, while "controle" is another parallel registry which is being 
run for the purpose of  checking the data of  the first registry. 
52 OECD Policy Brief, "Public Sector Modernising Accountability and Control", (OECD Observer), 2005. 
20 4.  how it is secured and measured.  53 
The who-dimension provides the answer to the question of who is/are the accountee/s of 
the accountability relationship.  Is  it an  individual who  is  performing a  task,  or is it a 
group of people? Is it a sub-unit of  an organization or the whole organization, from those 
with rather simple organizational  structures to  very complex ones,  such  as  that of the 
state? 
The to-whom-dimension refers to  the  accountor/s (principal/s)  of accountability in the 
accountability relationship. The accountor is the locus of accountability who determines 
the mandates and the resources of  the agent. 
The simplest categorization of the to-whom dimension of accountability is  one which 
distinguishes  between  the  internal  and  external  loci  of  accountability.  Internal 
accountability is established between persons and/or units which operate within the same 
organization. External accountors/principals, on the other hand, are those outside of the 
agent organization, such as a customer or a group of customers, tax payers in general (as 
an electorate), one's political party, union, governmental auditors etc. 54 It should be noted 
that external and internal accountability are closely related, since organizations can fulfil 
their external accountability responsibilities only if they are performing efficiently and 
effectivel y their internal duties.  55 
Similarly  to  this  conception,  public  administration  theory  distinguishes  between 
traditional  "upward" - political or parliamentary accountability  and the more  recently 
developed image of "outward" or direct public accountability to clients and the public.
56 
53  Cf T. Virtanen, Financial Autonomy and Accountability of  Public Managers, European Group of  Public 
Administration Leuven, Belgium, September 1997. 
54 Cf D. Fuller, B. Roffey (1993), "Improving Public Sector Accountability and Strategic Decision-
Making", Australian Journal of  Public Administration, 52, 149-163. 
55  Ibid. 
56 Cf A.  Sinclair, op. cit., pp. 219-237. 
21 In most cases, the accountor/principal in the accountability relationship has the ability to 
directly scrutinise the behaviour of the accountee. However, there are some instances in 
which the accountor/principal, for various reasons, cannot supervise the accountee,  and 
therefore needs help of some third actor.  In that sense,  it is  possible to  imagine many 
various combinations, of which two shall be of  our closer interest: 
1)  The structure where the accountor/principal cannot exercise direct power over the 
accountee and therefore delegates his/her authorities to the third actor, who will 
carry out the supervision on his/her behalf; 
2)  The  structure  where  the  accountor/principal  exerCIses  direct  power  over  the 
accountee,  but does  not have  enough knowledge to  successfully scrutinize the 
accountee's work, and therefore hires a third person or a body, who/which helps 
him/her make the right assessment of  the accountee's work.
57 
The for-what-dimension has to  do  with the object of accountability:  particular tasks or 
organizational action including both its aims and consequences. There have been quite a 
few classifications of  accountability notions according to this dimension. 
Smith (1971), thus, distinguishes between fiscal, programme and process accountability. 
While fiscal/regularity accountability is concerned whether the money has been spent as 
agreed, according to appropriate rules, programme/effectiveness accountability addresses 
the  question  whether  the  defined  results  have  been  achieved.  Process/efficiency 
accountability, furthermore refers to employment of general processes and operations, so 
that value for money is achieved in the use of  resources.  58 
57 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
58 Cf B. Smith "Accountability and Independence in the Contract State", in B.Smith and D.C. Hauge (eds.), 
The Dilemma of  Accountability in Modern Government, (Macmillan, 1971), p. 29. 
22 Day and Klein's (1987) framework for analysis of accountability rests on the distinction 
between political and managerial accountability.  While political accountability is about 
those with delegated authority being answerable to the people, managerial accountability 
is  mainly  a  neutral  technical  process  aimed  to  make  those  with  delegated  authority 
answerable  for  carrying  out  agreed  tasks  according  to  politically  agreed  criteria  of 
performance. On the basis of that definition, Day and Klein tried to build a hierarchical 
model of accountability,  with political accountability,  which sets  the policy objectives 
and generates the criteria used in the technical process of managerial accountability, on 
the top of the accountability chain.  However, the authors are aware of the number of 
arguable assumptions on which this model is built (for example, the model presupposes 
that  there  are  effective  institutional  and  organizational  links  between  political  and 
managerial  systems  of  accountability,  which  may  be  indeed  questionable  in  the 
conditions of the 21 st  century service delivery state; that political process does generate 
precise, clear-cut objectives etc.).59 Day and Klein also distinguish a category of  financial 
accountability,  as  a  merely  neutral,  technical  activity  of keeping  true  and  accurate 
accounts, which does not have any direct links with democratic government.  Financial 
accountability, in their opinion, thus exists both in despotic and democratic regimes, with 
the  distinction that in the despotic  regime the principal  of accountability is  the ruler, 
while in democratic regime it is the citizen.6o 
Dwivedi  and  labbra  (1989)  separate  out  the  following  accountability  categories: 
administrative/organizational, legal, political, professional and moral accountability.61 
59 Cf P. Day, R.  Klein, op. cit., pp.6-7. 
60 Ibid. 
61  Cf a.p. Dwivedi, 1.G. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. While organizational accountability is linked to strict 
hierarchical relationships within the organization and relies on internal means of control, legal 
accountability "relates actions in the public domain to the established legislative and judicial process". The 
main task of  political accountability, on the other hand, is to assure the legitimacy of  a public programme. 
Professional accountability, furthermore, is about balancing the professional interests with the wider public 
interests, which, in their opinion, need to have precedence over the former. Lastly, the aim of  moral 
23 In  similar vein,  Sinclair  (1995)  distinguishes  between  five  types  of accountabilities-
political,  public,  managerial/administrative,  professional  and  personal.  62  Similar 
classification  of  accountability  could  also  be  found  with  Cendon  (1999),  who 
differentiates political, administrative, professional and democratic accountability.63 
Behn  (2001)  provides  a  slightly  different  classification,  which  recogmzes  four 
accountability types:  accountability for finances,  for  fairness,  for the use (or abuse) of 
power and performance.
64  For Behn, the substance of financial accountability is rather 
straightforward and is provided in the answer to a question "whether the organization and 
its officials have been wise stewards of the resources with which they were entrusted". 
Accountability for fairness, on the other hand, deals with the issue of respect of ethical 
standards. Accountability for the use (or abuse) of  power encompasses the earlier defined 
accountabilities  for  finances  and  fairness,  while  the  accountability  for  performance 
provides information on the effectiveness of  Government's programmes.
65 
accountability is to combat political and bureaucratic corruption and bring about the highest standards of 
personal integrity, honesty and fairness within the state structure. 
62  Cf A.  Sinclair (1995), op. cit. pp. 219-237. Sinclair defines political accountability as a direct line of 
accountability where a public servant is accountable for the exercise of  its public authorities to the 
Permanent Head, who is in tum accountable to the minister, to the executive of cabinet, to Parliament and 
hence to the electors. Public accountability is more informal, but direct accountability of  the state to the 
public, interested community groups and individuals, is expressed through the requirement that 
Government, through various channels (debates, hearings), gives responses to public concerns about 
administrative activity. The managerial model of  accountability requires that those with delegated authority 
are answerable for producing outputs or the use of  resources to achieve certain ends. Very similar to 
managerial accountability is administrative accountability, where the emphasis is not on monitoring 
outputs, but the processes by which inputs are transformed. Professional accountability, furthermore, 
invokes the sense of duty that one has as a member of a professional or expert group. Finally, personal 
accountability is seen as faithfulness to personal conscience in basic human and moral values. 
63 Cf A. B. Cendon, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
64 Cf R. D. Behn, op. cit., pp. 6-10. 
65  Ibid. 
24 These  classifications  of  accountability  are  useful  SInce  they  highlight  vanous 
accountability  relationships  established  within  the  democratic  state.  Day  and  Klein's 
framework of accountability seems to be particularly helpful, since it attempts to provide 
a  coherent  structural  design  of different  accountability relationships  within  the  state-
society sphere.  However, their model may be criticized for  its  problematic  underlying 
assumptions  as  well  its  emphasis  on  strictly  hierarchical  relations  between  different 
dimensions of accountability. The other classifications, Dwivedi, Jabbra's and Sinclair's 
can be further criticized for their foundation on over-expanded concept of accountability, 
which is  at times  based  exclusively on  internal  values  (i.e.  in  the  case of moral  and 
personal  accountability),  instead  of external  scrutiny,  mixing  it  with  a  concept  of 
responsibility.  However,  in  spite  of  inherent  deficiencies  of  possible  for-what 
classifications of accountability,  their value should not be underestimated.  Mapping of 
different  public  sphere  accountability  relationships  can  greatly  enhance  our 
understanding  of the  complexity  of the  contemporary  state  and  provide  a  basis  for 
building more specific concepts of  accountability, such as that of financial accountability. 
The final  dimension of accountability refers to ways it can be assessed and ensured.  It 
provides  answers  to  the  question  of possible  channels  and  securing  mechanisms  of 
accountability.  66 
This dimension of accountability may be the most controversial, as it widens the concept 
of accountability  and  relates  it  to  other  concepts,  such  as  rules,  procedures,  control, 
institutions  etc.  The basic  assumption is  that in  order to  hold someone to  account for 
something, there is  first  a need to  determine our expectations and values that we want 
individuals and organizations to uphold.
67  Furthermore, there is a need for specification 
of those expectations through rules, procedures and standards. Given the complexity of 
the  modem  state,  it  is  necessary  to  create  controlling  and  reporting  mechanisms  to 
demonstrate that determined rules, procedures and standards have been followed.  Only 
66 Cf R.  Pyper, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
67 Cf R. D. Behn, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
25 creation  of such  a  reliable  structure  of accountability  mechanisms  would  enable  an 
accounter to assess whether the entrusted tasks are being carried out in accordance with 
his/her wishes and would provide the basis for holding someone to account. In this sense, 
all the rules, regulations, institutions in support of specific accountability relationship are 
understood as accountability mechanisms/devices. 
Some  authors  are  of  the  OpInIOn  that  an  introduction  of  diverse  accountability 
mechanisms  as  elements  of  accountability  brings  about  over-extension  of  the 
accountability concept.
68  Namely, encompassment of all rules, institutions and methods 
of  constraining  public  organizations  other  than  through  calling  them  to  account 
significantly broadens the concept of accountability, bringing about more confusion in 
academic writing and practice than clarification.
69  In order to  avoid this,  accountability 
should be associated only with the process of being called to account to some authority 
for one's actions, as the original or core sense of "accountability" and not be related to 
other broader concepts of control and regulation in genera1.
70 
Although  we  do  understand  the  wornes  of the  over-extension  of the  accountability 
concept,  we  are  of the  opinion that  accountability  could not be  well  understood  and 
exercised without the  existence of numerous  accountability  supporting  structures,  i.e. 
mechanisms  and  devices,  which  do  not  have  to  be  accountability  relationships 
themselves.  There  is  certainly  a  possibility  that  all  the  rules  aimed  at  constraining 
individual and organizational functioning would get an attribute of accountability device 
and  this  risk  should  undoubtedly  be  taken  into  account.  Nevertheless,  it  should  be 
stressed that (democratic) accountability, watched through the prism of  the contemporary 
state, is a fairly complex concept, which assumes the existence of a number of different 
securing mechanisms, embodied in numerous rules, regulations, procedures. Only after a 
68 Cf R.  Mulgan, op.cit., pp. 555-573. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
26 careful identification and analysis of all  these elements of accountability would we be 
able to understand the full meaning of  this elusive notion. 
In the context of  the democratic state, two broad categories of  accountability mechanisms 
can be discerned,  based on  different  to-whom  dimensions  of accountability.  The  first 
category relates to internal accountability mechanisms, such as administrative/managerial 
accountability.  Administrative/managerial  accountability  assumes  numerous  channels 
focused  on  the  need  to  secure  the  accountability  of  officials  to  their 
administrative/managerial superiors. This primarily refers to rules of  defining the goals of 
officials,  budgeting  resources,  the  qualitative  and  quantitative  measurement  of goal 
achievement, and formal and informal interaction between the superiors and officials in 
the  process  of assessment.  71  The  second  category  provides  external  accountability 
mechanisms, i.e.  means of holding the Government to  account to  Parliament and other 
institutions outside of  the administration, such as the Ombudsman and external audit. The 
main  mechanisms  of  this  category  are  scrutiny  by  legislative  and  investigatory 
committees, various public debates and, in the last resort, parliamentary elections. 
The Concept of Financial Accountability 
In the most simple terms, financial accountability is about responsible stewardship for the 
use of public money. Financial accountability is a means of ensuring that public money 
has been used in a responsible and productive way. It is about verification of legality and 
regularity of financial  accounts, but also  about making sure that value  for  money has 
been achieved in the use of  resources.  72 
These definitions  of financial  accountability provide the  answer to  one of the  crucial 
dimensions  of  accountability  - for  what.  They  define  the  object  of  financial 
71  cf T. Virtanen, op. cit. p. 7. 
72 Cf Lord Sharman of Redlynch, "Holding to Account, The Review of  Audit and Accountability for 
Central Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. pp. 9-25. 
27 accountability:  organizational  actions  undertaken  with  the  aIm  of stewardship  and 
productive use of  public money. 
The outlined definitions of financial accountability further trigger a number of questions. 
What is  public  money?  What is  stewardship  of public  money?  What is  meant by its 
proper and productive use? 
Although the concept of public money seems to be clear, there are a number of ways of 
defining it, depending on the interest from which it is approached.
73  One of the possible 
definitions of public money is that it is  all the money raised by the Government in the 
form  of taxes,  fees  and  charges,  or  under  other  Government  statutory  powers,  or 
borrowed  by  the  Government  and  used  for  the  purposes  of funding  governmental 
activities. Once public money is allocated to be spent, it is possible to talk about another 
complex and mainly economic concept of "public expenditure". Public expenditure could 
be defined as simply everything that is currently spent in the government's name, as well 
as its future obligations and liabilities.
74 
Things are, of course, not as  simple as  that. However, it is very difficult to provide an 
accurate  and  extensive  definition  of public  money  and  public  expenditure,  especially 
since there is still no universally accepted definition of what is the scope of the public 
sector,  especially in a comparative context. The definitions of public expenditure have 
been changing and developing over time
75  and are often found to be biased, to  suit the 
objectives of the research being undertaken.  Therefore,  we shall not attempt to  give  a 
comprehensive definition of either the concept of public money or public expenditure, 
73  Ibid. 
74 Cf S.  Watson, "What should count as Public Expenditure", in D. Corry (eds.), Public Expenditure, 
Effective Management and Control, 1997, (Harcourt Brace & Company Limited), 41-62. 
75 Ibid.; A. Likierman, Public Expenditure, 1988, (Penguin books); D. Heald, Public Expenditure, 1983, 
(Martin Robertson, Oxford); P. Else, "The Scope and Content of  Govemment Expenditure", in D. Coombes 
et al (eds.), op. cit. 22-35. 
28 but  will  operate  with  them  as  defined  earlier,  restricting  their  scope  to  central 
Government level funding. 
In a democratic state, the standards of public money stewardship are normally expected 
to be higher than in the private sector. The main reason for this lies in the fact that there is 
often an element of coercion involved in raising public money, which should oblige the 
Government to take a very good care on how to use it.76  What is more, the fact that most 
public services are not subject to competition should bring even more pressure to bear on 
the Government to apply high standards of  public money stewardship.77 
Although there is no generally accepted definition of stewardship of public money, it is 
possible  to  discern  several  elements  of this  concept,  which  are  represented  in  most 
Western democracies. 
The lowest common denominator of public money stewardship is the requirement that 
public  money  is  spent  in  accordance  with  existing  laws,  regulations  and  principles. 
Depending on the country in question, we can talk about legality, regularity and propriety 
of expenditure. The requirements of legality and regularity generally mean that public 
money could only be used for the purposes intended by authorising legislation (including 
delegated legislation,  i.e.  secondary legislation) and other Parliamentary authority.78  In 
some countries (e.g. UK) requirement of probity, on the other hand, refers to compliance 
76 Cf L. Sharman of  Redlynch, op. cit, p.  15. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Such as for example Appropriation Act in the UK and budget law in France (loi definances) and Serbia. 
It should further be noted that parliamentary authorisation of expenditure provides a basis for two elements 
of control. The first is that expenditure must conform with the ambit of  the relevant Parliamentary Vote for 
appropriations (Appropriation Act in UK, Budget Law in France and Serbia), which represents a qualitative 
allocation of  money between Government's priorities. The second is that public money has to be spent in 
accordance with its, perhaps even more important, qualitative framework, provided in the permanent 
legislation. Permanent legislation lays down the purposes to which government can spend requested money 
and provides the basis for quantitative allocation of  public money, provided in appropriations. 
29 with  other  rules,  procedures,  principles  and  standards  of behaviour,  which  are  not 
governed by statutory authority, as will be explained in more detail in the chapter II. 
A more advanced feature  of the public money stewardship  concept is  achievement of 
"value for money" for the use of  resources. Value for money could be defined in different 
ways, but generally denotes the obligation of public bodies to make the best use of the 
resources at their disposal and obtain three Es - economy, efficiency and effectiveness. In 
this sense, "economy" is concerned with minimising costs, "efficiency" with achieving 
the maximum output from  a given input,  while "effectiveness"  is  concerned with  the 
extent to which policy objectives have been achieved. 
On  the  basis  of the  outlined  standards,  we  may conclude  that  the  key  objective  of 
financial  accountability is  to  attain stewardship of public money through securing  the 
principles of legality,  regularity,  propriety and  value  for  money for  the  use  of public 
funds. 
The next question to be raised is  the definition of the first dimension of accountability-
who  is  the accountee in the financial  accountability relationship? Who is  the one who 
undertakes the action and spends the public money? Who is the one to be held to account, 
to provide information, explanation and be the subject of  possible sanction? 
It may be argued that the state/Government as  an  entity is  the accountee of financial 
accountability. At a lower level of generalization, it is the executive who is authorized to 
spend public money and which is,  therefore,  called to  give  an  account of its  actions. 
Lastly, financial accountability accountees are the officials who deal with public funds, 
and who, therefore, can individually be held accountable for dealing with public funds. 
The  question  which  naturally  follows  IS  what  do  we  understand  by  the 
'state'  /Government/executive?  Not attempting  to  get  into  details  of the theory of the 
30 state, we shall just point out the key elements of these concepts, necessary for  carrying 
out our comparative research. 
In  the  continental  law  tradition the  concept of the  state  is  a  key notion of legal  and 
political theory. The state is perceived as an autonomous actor supreme to  its citizens.
79 
The state is  thus defined as an "abstract identity bearing inherent responsibility for  the 
performance of  public functions". 80 
In contrast, in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition the clear state conception is missing and 
reference is  usually made to the term 'Government'  .81  The term state is generally used 
only  at  the  level  of international  relations  or  in  the  terms  of welfare  state.  This  is 
explained  by the  lack  of the  ideological  barrier  between  the  state  and  its  citizens, 
developed during centuries of authoritative rule on the continent.  82  It  should further be 
noted  that the  Government can  have a  narrow  meaning  in  the  sense  of only elected 
politicians holding office, that is, ministers; or it can have a broad sense and include not 
only ministers but also the whole range of public organizations,  such as  departments, 
agencies, along with the civil servants and other officials. 
For the purposes of our research, we shall use the Anglo-Saxon term Government in its 
broader sense (unless being more strictly specified), encompassing the variety of entities 
or  units  that  in  addition  to  fulfilling  their  political  responsibilities  and  their  role  in 
economic  and  social  regulation  "deliver  public  services  for  individual  or  collective 
consumption  and  redistribute  income  and  wealth.,,83  Furthermore,  we  shall  at  times 
79 Cf B. Connaughton, "Teaching Ideas and Principle of Public Administration: Public Education in 
Europe", paper presented at EPAN conference in Granada, 2002. 
80 Cf C. Knill, The Europeanisation of  National Administrations, (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 
73. 
81  Cf R.J. Stillman, Preface to Public Administration, (New York: St. Marint's), 1991. 
82 Cf C. Knill, op.cit, p. 73. 
83  Cf R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), Managing Public Expenditure, A Reference Bookfor Transitional 
Countries, SIGMA, OECD, 2001, p. 44. 
31 interchangeably  use  the  terms  "state"  and  Government,  as  concepts  with  the  same 
meaning  of encompassing  the  variety  of organisations  of a  country's  public  sector. 
Nevertheless, we shall attempt to be consistent throughout our research and base it on the 
concept of  the Government as explained above, in order to avoid possible confusion. 
There exist several possible levels of Government operations: general, central, regional, 
local and supranational. 'General Government' is a term used to describe all government 
entities  at  whatever level,  central,  regional  or local.  'Central  Government'  is  used  to 
denote  entities  responsible  for  those  functions  that  affect the  country as  a  whole:  for 
example, national defense,  conduct of relations which other countries and international 
organizations, establishment of legislative, executive and judicial functions that cover the 
entire country, and delivery of public services such as healthcare and education.84  'Local 
Government', in tum, is a collection of  public bodies with authority over a subdivision of 
a  significant  area  of  country's  territory.  'Regional  Government'  has  independent 
authority for certain functions in a significant area of country's territory.85 Supranational 
level  of  Government  operates  beyond  all  above  mentioned  national  Government 
institutions and represents a particular international layer of administration, such as,  for 
example, the European Union. 
Due  to  the  great  complexity of the  contemporary  state  and  its  possible  operation  at 
several  different  levels,  we  shall  restrict  our  research  to  financial  accountability 
arrangements  established at  the  central  Government level.  This  means  that  local  and 
regional levels of governance shall be excluded from our area of interest, since they raise 
specific  financial  accountability  issues  and  require  separate  treatment.  Financial 
accountability established at the supranational level of Government will be a subject of 
our special interest and will be analysed in more depth in the chapter IV. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
32 The following crucial dimension of accountability, which needs to be addressed is  the 
one which defines the principal of the financial  accountability relationship.  In order to 
provide the  answer to  this  question,  it  is  necessary to  draw  a  conditional  distinction 
between two main types of  political regimes - despotic and democratic. It may be argued 
that financial accountability relationships exist in both kinds of  regimes. Officials in both 
despotic and democratic regimes are held accountable for dealing with public funds by 
their superiors.86 However, while in despotic regimes the highest superior, and therefore 
the  main principal  of financial  accountability  is  the  ruler,  in democratic  regimes  the 
ultimate principals/accountors of the financial accountability relationship are citizens.87 
As our financial accountability research is focused on the analysis of  the democratic state, 
we  may conclude  that  the  ultimate  accountor's  power in  the  financial  accountability 
relationship belongs to citizens. 
It should be stressed that the financial accountability relationship established between the 
Government and the citizens is in many ways problematic. The main reason for this is the 
practical impossibility of close and detailed scrutiny of the Government's actions by the 
citizens. Such a situation has brought about a need for the introduction of the mentioned 
third actor/s  in the accountability relationship - representative or professional body/ies, 
which would, on the citizens' behalf, provide "indirect" supervision of the executive.88 
Therefore, it is possible to talk about several 'levels' of  financial accountability. 
Financial  accountability  in  its  core  sense  is  a  "democratic"  accountability,  as  a 
relationship established between the Government and its citizens, where citizens, through 
direct (elections) or more often indirect means and institutions (representative institutions 
and  other bodies),  are  holding the  Government to  account  for  stewardship  of public 
money.  The core financial  accountability relationship assumes that citizens need to be 
assured that possible public wrongdoing is minimized within government at all levels in 
86 Cf P. Day, R.  Klein, op. cit. pp. 8-9. 
87  Ibid. 
88 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 7-8. 
33 the chain of command. This implies the reassurance that sufficient internal and external 
checks exist so that reliable outside judgment can be made on Government operations.
89 
It is obvious that the core financial accountability relationship relies on a number of more 
specific  financial  accountability  relationships  and  controlling  devices  as  its  securing 
mechanisms.  These  supporting  accountabilities/  accountability  mechanisms  are 
established between key state institutions and can be initially classified as  external or 
internal to the executive. It may be argued that the main loci of financial accountability is 
external,  since  key  accountability mechanisms  are  established  outside  the  executive's 
structure (with parliament, external audit institution, judiciary etc.).  However, since the 
executive can fulfil its external accountability responsibilities only if it is efficiently and 
effectively performing its internal duties, the financial accountability relationship is  also 
established  within  its  internal  structure,  between  public  officials  dealing  with  public 
funds  and their administrative/managerial superiors, through establishment of a number 
of  controlling  mechanisms.  Therefore,  we  can  see  that  financial  accountability 
encompasses  features  of various  previously  mentioned  types  of accountabilities  -
external  political  and  public  accountability  on  the  one  hand  and  internal 
managerial/administrative on the other hand, which are all  connected by one common 
denominator - the aim of securing and safeguarding of  public money. 
Before making the final  specification of the concept of financial  accountability and its 
securing mechanisms, we should further examine the historical origin and nature of the 
financial accountability relationship, which will help us draw the final conclusion on the 
concept of financial accountability in the remainder of  this chapter. 
Origins of financial accountability 
Accountability for the use of public money has always been at the centre of attention of 
politicians, philosophers, lawyers, economists as well as ordinary people. In the old ages, 
89 Cf a.p. Dwivedi, lG. Jabbra, op. cit., pp. 5-7. 
34 the  Greek philosophers  devoted  considerable  attention  to  handling  of public  money. 
Aristotle, thus, wrote: 
"Some officials  handle large sums of  public money;  it  is  therefore  necessary to  have other officials  to 
receive and examine the accounts.  These  inspectors must administer no funds themselves.  Different cities 
call them examiners, auditors, scrutineers and public advocates ".90 
During  history,  the  notion  of financial  accountability  was  developing  and  gammg 
different meanings, depending on the nature of  the Government itself. 
During  medieval  history,  the  key  pattern  of  accountability  was  expressed  in 
accountability of a servant to a ruler.
91  This pattern of accountability was complicated by 
the growth of the  state,  when the servant was no  longer able to  render account to  the 
ruler,  but had to  deal with the royal  auditors.
92  The nature of financial  accountability, 
however, was not changed in this way,  as  the ruler remained the main accountor.  The 
same remained true under the absolute monarchies of the Renaissance and the Baroque 
Age.
93  The other main feature of such  accountability was its  secrecy of operation,  far 
from the eyes of citizens. The ruler had to learn what his servants had been doing, so that 
he would be able to promote or punish them. Private persons, on the other hand, did not 
need to know about the functioning of administration and in most of such regimes were 
not allowed to do so. 
The broadest trend of the  state  development from  the  seventeenth until  the  twentieth 
centuries was to  break the hierarchy of the medieval history down and distribute power 
more widely. A very important part of this movement was to  distinguish a law-making 
function  from  an  executive or administrative function  and to  entrust them to  different 
90 Cf Aristotle, The Politics and Constitution of  Athens, S. Everson (eds.), (Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
91  Cf E.L. Normarton, op. cit. p.  3. 
92 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
93  Ibid. 
35 elements  of the  state.  This  was  the  idea  of the  separation  of powers,  expressed  by 
Montesquieu.
94  In that sense, the legislative power was dissociated from the executive 
and judicial power.  Legislative power rested with a democratically elected parliament, 
which obtained one of the most important functions - voting the money to the executive 
power.
95 
The first elements of a democratic financial  accountability were developed in medieval 
England, in a struggle between the Parliament and monarch over finances.
96  In fact,  the 
English Parliament owed its origin and existence almost entirely to  the English age-old 
determination not to be taxed without consent (see Annex 1).97  Interestingly enough, it 
was through the achievement of this end that British representative institutions secured 
political freedoms  for British citizens much earlier and much more effectively than the 
Parliaments which had originated through fight for political freedoms.
98 
The  earliest  financial  demand  was  for  legislative  control  of taxation;  the  control  of 
expenditure gradually followed, with the requirement of proper accounts.
99 These had to 
be public documents, so  that the spirit of secrecy in financial  administration had to  be 
broken.  The  idea  of finance  as  a  private  dynastic  secret  was  incompatible  with  the 
constitutional  state.  Therefore,  ideas  of  democratic  financial  accountability  were 
spreading to most newly established constitutional states. 
94 Cf Montesquieu, The Spirit of  Laws, (University of California Press, London), 1977. 
95 Cf D. Coombes (ed.), op. cit., pp. 13-21. 
96 S. Walkland, "Parliamentary control of  public expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes, The Power of  the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), p. 179-198. 
97 P.  Einzig, The Control of  the Purse - Progress and Decline of  Parliament's Financial Control, (London, 
Secker & Warburg), 1959, p.  17. 
98  Ibid. 
99 E.L. Normarton, op. cit. p.  5.; lE.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92, 
(Oxford Clarendon Press), 1958, pp. 4-5.; I.E. O'Brien, The Scottish Parliament in the 15
th  and 16
th 
Centuries, Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1980), 180. 
36 Thus, the United States Constitution states that: 
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in  Consequence of  Appropriations made by Law; and a 
regular Statement and Account of  Receipts and Expenditures of  all public Money shall be published from 
time to time. ,,]00 
The  French  Revolution  went  much  further  and  proclaimed  a  doctrine  of popular 
sovereignty over finance: 
"All citizens have the right to ascertain, either in person or through their representatives, the necessity for 
public taxation, to consent freely thereto, to observe its expenditure and to determine its apportionment, its 
assessment, its collection and its duration. ,,]0] 
Establishment of the constitutional state has changed the pattern of accountability. Now 
accountability  started  being  exercised  between  the  executive  and  citizens,  which,  in 
.  h  l'  102  practlce, meant, to t  e par lament. 
In  order  to  be  fully  implemented  in practice,  financial  accountability  demanded  the 
development  of an  appropriate  securing  mechanism,  starting  from  the  structure  of 
financial planning, accounting and banking to  the establishment of auditing institutions. 
In that respect, the introduction of financial law, by which the legislature reinforced its 
control  over  finance,  was  of  immense  importance.  The  role  of  the  budget  for 
accountability was that it provided quite precise standards by which annual accounts were 
judged. Accountability thus became a comparison of  the accounts submitted at the end of 
the cycle with the authorization of expenditure laws made at the beginning.  103 
100 Article I, Section 9 of  the USA Constitution. 
101  Article 14, Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and Citizen, 1791. 
102  Cf E.L. Normarton, op. cit. pp. 7-8. 
103  Ibid, pp. 10-11. 
37 Although the executives retained strong powers of  leadership within most legislatures, by 
the end of the XIX century, the legislature had an absolutely prime interest in effective 
accountability.104  This  was  not  simply a  matter of preventing  financial  scandals,  but 
mainly the question of power itself.  Firm restrictions on the executive to the financial 
limits set by law was the key element of legislative influence over policy, as well as over 
the cost of everyday administration. 105 
Since the First World War,  however, the state itself has tremendously changed.  Public 
spending has vastly increased in most European countries, including those of Central and 
Eastern Europe.
l06  The state has taken over a number of the activities reserved in the 
previous  period  only  for  the  private  sector.  The  number  of state  employees  has 
continually grown from  one year to  another. The imposition of vast operations, which 
Government has taken over from the private sector, upon the relatively small and fragile 
state machinery has had two clear results. There has been a crisis of  planning and a crisis 
of accountability. 107  This amounted to a crisis of the whole system of financial control, 
experienced in all advanced countries.108 
The subordination of administrative bodies to  the  traditional  political powers  became 
more and more difficult to achieve as the number of  civil servants grew, together with the 
problems with which they had to handle in everyday life. The commonest reaction to "big 
government" has been merely to expand old public bodies. But the expansion has often 
104 P. Einzing, The Control of  the Purse, (London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959); B. Chubb, The Control of  the 
Public Expenditure, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1952) pp. 42-71. 
105 Cf E.L. Nonnarton, op. eit. p 8. 
106 P. Else, "The Seope and Content of  Govemment Expenditure", in D.Coombes, The Power of  the Purse, 
(London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), pp.22-45; P. Enzing, The Control of  the Purse, (London, Seeker & 
Warburg), pp. 223-232. 
107 E. L. Nonnarton, ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
38 upset the arrangements for the democratic financial  accountability, bringing about new 
challenges for keeping its proclaimed democratic nature. 109 
Nature of the financial accountability relationship 
The question which arises from the above discussion is whether the "democratic" notion 
of financial accountability as we described above, the accountability established between 
the state and the  citizens, does accurately describe reality,  or whether the elements of 
financial accountability relations in despotic states still remain visible in a modem state. 
Putting it the other way around, is  spending of public money by the state still in many 
ways based on power and coercion, or does it represent a sole reflection of  the unwritten 
social  contract,  where  both  parties  have  given  their  consent  to  enter  the  financial 
accountability relationship, maintained through regular elections? 
This question leads us  to  another key issue which needs to be addressed when talking 
about financial  accountability.  It  is  the question of the nature of the basis of financial 
accountability. 
Any serious  search for  providing the  answer to  this  question necessarily leads  to  the 
writings of constitutional philosophers. Although the concept of financial  accountability 
is  rarely, if ever, mentioned in their writings, the nature of the financial accountability 
relationship cannot be comprehended without understanding broader concepts, primarily 
the  concept  of political  and  public  accountability.  As  we  could  see,  the  concept  of 
financial  accountability has  many common  features  with  the  notions  of political  and 
public  accountability.  This  should  not  be  surprising,  bearing  in  mind  that  the 
development of a constitutional theory of political accountability went hand in hand with 
the  development  of the  public  financial  accountability  and  substantial  efforts  of 
parliaments to overtake control of finance from the monarchs. 110 
109 Ibid. 
110 Cf P. Day, R. Klein, op. cit., pp.l2-l3; 
39 The  key  theorists  providing  the  theoretical  basis  for  the  development  of the  public 
accountability  concept  are  certainly  Thomas  Hobbes,  John  Locke  and  Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau. The main idea presented in writings of all the three philosophers is that of a 
social  contract.  Government is  established by the "social contract" between those who 
exercise public power and those who are expected to obey public power. The former hold 
authority and exact obedience only in  so  far  as  they pursue the interests of the  latter. 
Should  officials  substitute  their  own  interests  or  misinterpret  common  interests,  the 
public is no longer bound by the social contract and could withdraw its support and find 
other officials who would respect its wishes. In short, public officials are responsible and 
accountable to the people on whose behalf they exercise public power.
lll 
The  theory  of social  contract  can  easily  be  applied  to  the  financial  accountability 
relationship.  In  this  sense,  it  may  be  argued  that  a  basis  of financial  accountability 
relationship  is  a hypothetical agreement concluded between the  state  and the citizens, 
where the citizens have  entrusted their monies  to  the  Government,  which  has  in  tum 
taken the responsibility of using the respective funds  in the pursuit of the public good. 
Looking from the level of statal institutions, it may further be argued that the Parliament 
has entrusted the money to the Executive, and is holding it to account for its spending. 
The basis of the financial accountability relationship can further be located in the theory 
of democracy, which plainly claims that:  "power emanates from the people and is to be 
exercised in trust for the people". I 12 Putting this the other way around, we may well argue 
that money emanates from the people and therefore has to be exercised in trust for the 
III Cf 1. Locke, Second Treatise o/Government, (1.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, London, 1924); 1.1. Rousseau, The 
Social Contract, (Penguin books, London), 1968; D. Gauthier "Hobbes's Social Contract", in C.W. Morris 
(ed.), The Social Contract Theorists, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc), 1999. 
112 Cf B.L.R. Smith "Accountability and Independence in the Contract State", in B.L.R. Smith and D.C. 
Hague (ed.), The Dilemma 0/  Accountability in Modern Government - Independence versus Control, 
(Macmillan, 1971), p. 26. 
40 people.  The  state  is  responsible  for  the  proper handling  of public  money  and  has  to 
continually give an account of  its actions to the public. 
Turning to the question of the nature of the financial accountability relationship, we are 
of the opinion that the social contract theory is quite a valuable means in explaining the 
essence  of the  financial  accountability  relationship.  Furthermore,  the  social  contract 
theory  definitely  provides  a  good  theoretical  basis  for  understanding  the  nature  of 
financial  accountability.  The problem which may,  however,  arise while relying on  the 
social  contract  theory  is  its  obvious  falsity.  The  contract  between  the  state  and  the 
citizens in general has never actually existed. Are we not then relying for our theoretical 
understanding on something for which we are sure has nothing to do with the reality? 
The answer to  this  question is  that  social  contract theory should not,  at  any point, be 
interpreted literally, but metaphorically.ll3 In that sense, it may be argued that the main 
idea  of social  contract  theory  is  that  societal  institutions  and  arrangements  are  the 
creation of  people and cannot be sustained without their support for a long period of  time, 
even in the case of the most severe despotic regimes.  Henceforth, we would argue that 
the basis of financial accountability needs primarily to be searched for in the willingness 
of people to transfer part of  their private funds to the state, expecting the proper handling 
of those funds in return. 
Quite a separate issue worth discussing is whether the concept of financial accountability 
as described and explained above accurately depicts the contemporary reality, reflected in 
often found feelings of the citizens that the state is taking more than it is actually giving? 
Furthermore,  citizens  may  experience  immense  difficulties  in  trying  to  hold  the 
Government to  account for the spending of public money and there is  almost no doubt 
that  any  individual  effort  in that respect will  be  in  vain.  Citizens  may also  feel  that 
entering the  financial  accountability relationship with the state is the corollary of state 
coercion rather than their own will. 
113  Cf C.W. Morris (ed.), The Social Contract Theorists, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc), 1999. 
41 All  these criticisms of the concept of financial  accountability outlined above certainly 
have their relevance.  However, they still cannot override the general framework of the 
financial  accountability relationship,  which is,  in our opinion,  primarily based  on  the 
special kind of  contractual relationship existing between the citizens and the state. 
Specification  of  the  Concept  of  Financial  Accountability  and  its  Securing 
Mechanisms 
After attempting to  define the nature of financial  accountability and trace its historical 
origins,  it is  necessary to  define  more precisely the  scope  of financial  accountability 
concept that will be used in our research. 
It  could  be  argued  that  the  financial  accountability relationship,  in  its  widest  sense, 
encompasses  two  broad processes:  1)  adequate  taxation,  i.e.  raising  and  collection of 
money from citizens in an appropriate manner and 2) adequate allocation and use of  these 
resources.  Although  there  is  undoubtedly  an  integral  relationship  between  these 
processes,114  financial  accountability  in  our  understanding  refers  only  to  the  second 
process, where the  emphasis is placed on the responsible and productive use of public 
money, i.e. public expenditure. The process of taxation and collection of public money, 
i.e., taxes, charges etc. represents a special area of  research, which requires particular and 
extensive attention and exceeds the limits of  our research. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to specify the concept of financial accountability in relation 
to  the  overall process of public  expenditure management.  In  this  sense,  it  is  useful  to 
distinguish between several key stages of  public expenditure management: 
1)  Expenditure planning by the executive 
2)  Parliamentary debate and approval 
114 R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p.  19. 
42 3)  Spending of  the money voted 
4)  A  .  c:  h  115  ccountmg lor t  e money spent. 
The  public  expenditure  management process  could  thus  be depicted  as  follows.  The 
Executive  first  plans  the  expenditure  and  then  asks  Parliament  for  authorisation  of 
expenditure of public funds.  The necessity of Parliament's authorization of expenditure 
(as well as taxation), called in British constitutional tradition as the "power of  the purse", 
is  a  focal  point of Parliament's  authority  to  hold the  Government  to  account.  If the 
authorisation is denied, the Government of the day is  forced to  resign.  If,  on the other 
hand, the approval is granted, it means that the Parliament has entrusted public money to 
the  Government,  who  is  responsible  for  ensuring  that  arrangements  are  in  place  to 
safeguard these funds and is held accountable for how it has used the money. 
The  essence  of  the  financial  accountability  relationship  lies  in  the  Parliament's 
authorisation  of the  public  expenditure  plans  (as  well  as  revenue)  by  legislation. 
Authorising expenditure legislation provides a framework of law, which is the basis for 
calling the Government to account for its actions. Statutory approval of expenditure thus 
provides a good foundation for exercising financial accountability, which in most basic 
form consists of  a comparison of  the submitted accounts to those initially approved. I 16 
115  Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p.  I. It should be noted that in the UK and many other countries, 
draft laws on public expenditure proposals and tax changes are presented to parliament separately. The 
spending side of  the budget is provided in supply estimates, which subsequently lead to the Appropriation 
Act. The tax side of  the budget eventually leads to the Finance Act. From 1993-1996, the British 
Government started to present to Parliament its expenditure decisions along its tax proposals in a 'unified 
Budget', but afterwards got back to the earlier practice of separate presentation of  revenue and expenditure 
side. In contrast, in most continental law tradition countries (including France and Serbia), revenues and 
expenditures are always presented jointly in the budget law. Therefore, continental law public finance 
theory generally distinguishes between 4 key stages of  budget management: planning of  the budget, 
approval of  the budget, execution of  the budget and budget control. Cf. G.Paovic-leknic, Kontrola budzeta 
~  jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo, Podgorica, 1999.  B. lelicic, Nauka °  jinancijama ijinancijsko pravo, 
(Narodne novine, Zagreb), 1990. D. Aleksic, Finansije i jinansijsko pravo, (Informator, Zagreb), 1982. 
116 Cf L. Normanton, op. cit. pp. 6-7. 
43 Henceforth, it may be concluded that only after the expenditure has been appropriately 
planned  and  authorized  is  the  accountability  relationship  established  between  its 
numerous actors. Although it may be argued that the initial stage of expenditure planning 
subsumes some elements of ex-ante accountability, our financial accountability research 
will  not  encompass  this  preliminary  phase.  Instead,  our  analysis  shall  comprise  the 
second phase of Parliamentary debate and approval of expenditure (as the key aspect of 
ex-ante  financial  accountability),  but will  primarily focus  on the third  and  the  fourth 
phase of public expenditure management, when the public money is being spent and after 
it is spent and is being accounted for (as ex-post financial accountability). 
Variety of Financial Accountability mechanisms 
The  Government  can  be  held  accountable  by the  Parliament  and,  in  the  last  resort, 
citizens, only if there are appropriate accountability mechanisms to ensure that money is 
spent  in  accordance  with  Parliamentary  wishes.
ll7  The  Government  thus  has  an 
obligation to the citizens for providing a credible legal/regulatory framework which will 
be able to support and secure the stewardship of  public money.  118 Furthermore, numerous 
accountability  mechanisms  must  exist  outside  of the  Government  structure  to  enable 
citizens to hold the Government to account for the stewardship of  their money. 
The  ultimate  financial  accountability  mechanism  is  established  directly  between  the 
Government and citizens. Taxpayers hold the state to account for management of monies 
which they have  entrusted to  it.  The  state has  to  give  an  account for  its  spending to 
citizens assuring the taxpayers that their money has been spent not only in a proper but 
also in a productive way. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the Government of the day will be 
put  in  question.  If the  citizens  are  not satisfied with the  way their  money has  been 
handled the sanction they may impose is the change of Government at the next elections. 
117 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 3. 
118 The World Bank, Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia,  Country Financial Accountability Assessment, 2002. 
44 Therefore,  it  may be  argued  that  elections  represent  the  ultimate  and  direct  financial 
accountability securing mechanism within a system of  representative democracy. 
Transferred to the terrain of statal institutions, the basic framework for accountability has 
in  most  parliamentary  democracies  been  provided  by  the  concept  of  ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament. The minister is obliged to give account for  the exercise of 
power  within  his/her  department  and  provide  explanations  and  justifications  for  the 
undertaken  course  of action.119  Although  having  undisputable  constitutional  value, 
ministerial  responsibility  to  Parliament  represents just one  and  perhaps  not  the  most 
important mechanism for securing financial accountability of the Government. Financial 
accountability is  primarily safeguarded by a  number of different  forms:  Parliament's 
activity, work of parliamentary investigatory committees, internal controls and reporting 
mechanisms within departments and external audit.
120 
It should further be noted that traditional  emphasis placed on Parliament's key role  in 
securing financial accountability (especially in the UK, but also on the continent) has for 
quite  some  time been questioned.  121  The general  opinion has  been that parliamentary 
control over public expenditure is rapidly declining and that traditional concepts which 
place Parliament at the centre of  the financial accountability mechanisms may bring more 
confusion  than  clarification.  122  It  has  further  been  argued  that  many  procedures 
established  for  the  purposes of parliamentary control  over public  funds  remain  under 
heavy influence of the Government  123.  Bearing in mind the importance of parliamentary 
119 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 4; Z. Loncar, Ministarska odgovornost [Ministerial 
Responsibility], PhD Dissertation, Novi Sad, 1999. 
120 Cf Lord Sharman of  Redlynch, op. cit. pp. 9-25. 
121  Cf G. Reid, The Politics of  Financial Control, (Hunchinson & CO),  1966, p.62; Heclo H., Wildavsky 
A., The Private Government of  Public Money (2
nd edn, Macmillan, 1981), 1.  Harden, "Money and the 
Constitution: Financial Control, reporting and audit", [1993], Legal Studies, 16. 
122 Cf D. Coombes et aI., The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976. 
123  Cf 1. McEldowney, "The Control of  Public Expenditure" in J.Jowell, D.Oliver ed., The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press), 2000. 
45 control  over  public  expenditure,  as  a  democratic  means  of holding  the  Government 
financially accountable to the public, many voices have been raised for the establishment 
of more effective procedures helping the Parliament to hold the Government to account 
for the use of public money.124 Due to obvious crises in the current post-modem political 
systems,  many  authors  are  calling  for  the  introduction  of  more  effective  extra-
parliamentary pressures  in  both constitutional  systems  as  a  whole  and  area  of public 
d·  1125  expen  Iture contro . 
In  most parliamentary democracies, external audit provides a key mechanism which on 
behalf of the taxpayer scrutinizes how Government uses the money voted to it and holds 
Government  to  account.  Throughout  the  world,  national  audit  bodies  have  been 
established with the task of examining the regularity and efficiency of use of  public funds 
and reporting their findings. 126  Although the organizational arrangements and practices 
widely  differ  from  country  to  country,  reflecting  various  administrative  cultures  and 
traditions, their work is based on the same general principles: organizational and financial 
independence of  the audit office, ability to decide its own work programme as well as the 
right to freely report the findings of  their work. 127 
Although  the  external  audit  over  public  finances  provides  the  substantive  basis  for 
effective financial  control,  its  limitations as  a  sole instrument of financial  control  and 
accountability remain obvious. One of the main criticisms of audit processes is that they 
make public officials risk averse, constraining development of innovative ideas and new 
124 Ibid; 1. Garrett, "Developing State Audit in Britain", Public Administration Vol. 64, 1986. 
125  Cf P. Barberis, "The New Public Management and a New Accountability", Public Administration Vol. 
76, 1998.451- 469; Smith, "Post-modem Politics and the Case for Constitutional Renewal", Political 
Quarterly 65,1994, pp. 128-37. 
126  In most Central and Eastern European countries, external audit institutions have been established after 
the fall of  the Berlin Wall and are slowly building their capacities for auditing of  public funds. 
127 Cf Lima Declaration of  Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, available on the INTOSAI web site, 
www.intosai.org . 
46 approaches to  service delivery.128  Audit procedures have also  been criticized  for  their 
opacity and lack of transparency. 129  However, the key complaint against audit is that its 
observations and remarks are too late,  that the errors and waste of money has already 
occurred at the time the audit is taking place and that nothing has been done in order to 
prevent it. Although, it may be argued that audit has certainly a preventive function in a 
sense that plain knowledge that the accounts will come under scrutiny at some point of 
time will  discourage negligent behaviour,130  it is  obvious that external control can not 
bring about great results if it is  not underpinned by active,  internal  financial  controls, 
exercised by the Government itself. 
The widely held opinion is that sound financial accountability depends on a combination 
of both strong internal, managerial accountability and independent external audit. 131  It is 
not disputed that internal, mostly preventive, control of  public spending is a necessity of a 
modem,  financially  accountable  state,  as  much  as  external,  ex-post  control  by 
independent auditors.  Responsibility for safeguarding of public funds rests undoubtedly 
with  the  management  of  the  Government  bodies  receiving  the  money,  who  are 
responsible  for  establishing  effective  arrangements  for  control.  Such  arrangements 
include the measures taken to verify the legality and regularity of expenditure before it is 
made (ex ante accountability) and those which occur after the expenditure is  made (ex 
post accountability). 
Internal accountability systems in Europe vary from  country to  country,  depending on 
different traditions and socio-Iegal backgrounds. Broadly speaking, two main approaches 
to  internal  financial  accountability  can  be  discerned.  The  first  one  can  be  found  in 
countries  of continental  Europe  (France,  Portugal,  Spain)  where  the  controls  are 
exercised by a third  party organization,  often  an  agency  of a  ministry  of finance.  A 
128 Cf A. Lovell "Notions of  Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability 
& Management, 12(4), November 1996. 
129 Cf M. Power, The Audit Explosion, (Demos, 1994), pp. 48-49. 
130 Cf E.L. Normanton, op. cit. p.  83. 
131  Cf Lord Sharman of  Redlynch, op. cit. 9-25. 
47 second  approach,  which  can  be  found  in  the  UK,  Netherlands  and  the  Scandinavian 
countries, is based on decentralization of financial control from the Ministries of finance 
to  heads of line ministries or officials in the budget and finance  departments of these 
public bodies, where the role of the Ministry of finance is  one of the coordinator, who 
remains  responsible  for  the overall  effectiveness  and consistency of the  systems.
132  It 
may be argued that the centralized continental approach emphasizes respect for legality 
and regularity of expenditure, while the devolved system is  more focused on  ensuring 
that priorities and objectives of  an agency are achieved.
133 
In  the  past  two  decades,  internal  control  systems  of both  groups  of countries  have 
experienced gradual harmonization, mainly towards greater devolution of internal control 
functions  to  agency's  management,  which  is  taking  overall  responsibility  for  the 
management of funds,  and abolition of controls exercised by a third party organisation. 
With  increasing  devolution  of  managerial  discretion  and  financial  responsibility, 
ministries,  departments  and  agencies  face  increasing  pressures  to  show  that  their 
managers have used their money and other resources in a way that accomplishes their 
functions  efficiently.  The question that remains,  however,  is  which type of system of 
internal  control  would  be  most  suitable  for  transitional  countries,  who  are  facing 
numerous challenges in building new systems of  financial accountability. 
There are number of types of internal control, whose aim is to improve performance and 
reinforce financial accountability in the public agencies and bodies. Those are:  financial 
accounting and reporting,  accounting controls, procurement controls, physical controls, 
performance measurement, internal audit. 134 
I32 Cf R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), op. cit. pp. 260-261. 
133  OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, (OECD 
Observer), 2005. 
134 Ibid. 
48 Establishment of appropriate accounting systems has an increasingly important role in 
securing financial accountability. Once the authorized money has been spent, it has to be 
firstly  accounted  for  and  then  audited  subsequently.  There  are  two  key  accounting 
techniques relevant for current public sector: cash and accrual accounting.135  Under cash 
based accounting, transactions and events are recognized when cash is received or paid. 
Furthermore, there is no accounting for assets and liabilities. Accrual-based systems, in 
tum, recognize transactions or events at the time economic value is created, transformed, 
exchanged, transferred or extinguished and when all, not only cash flows, are recorded.136 
This means while the  cash accounting measures  only flow  of cash resources,  accrual 
accounting  includes  all  the  revenues  and  expenses  (including  depreciation)  137,  assets 
(financial and physical, current and capital),  liabilities and other economic flows. 138  It 
may therefore be argued that accruals accounting presents a truer picture of the financial 
costs of an organization. Furthermore, accrual accounting basis are believed to encourage 
good stewardship of public money.139  However, cash accounting also has its advantages 
over  accrual.  It is  simpler,  cheaper  (since  it  requires  less  work  and  expertise),  less 
subjective and comparable to monetary data. 140  It should be noted that accounting bases 
in many countries are not based solely on cash or accrual accounting, but most of the 
time represent a mixture of  the two systems, with different variants. 
Internal audit is another valuable tool in securing financial accountability. Internal audit 
could be defined as "independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to 
135 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 15-25. 
136 R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p. 437. 
137 Depreciation techniques are those which spread the costs of  assets over their lifetime. Expenses in 
accrual accounting, therefore, reflect the amount of  goods and services consumed during the year, whether 
or not they are paid for in that period. 
138  R. Allen, D. Tommasi, op. cit, pp. 291-292. 
139 Cf F.  White, K.  Hollingsworth, ibid. 
140 Ibid, R. Allen, D. Tommasi, ibid. 
49 add value and improve an organization's operations.,,141  Historically,  internal  auditing 
has  solely focused on financial  systems and financial  controls within an  organization. 
However, the role of internal audit has been changing and widening over time. Thus, in 
the past few decades, the internal audit function extended to examination of  various kinds 
of risks to  the organization and reviewing the adequacy of the underlying activities to 
manage those riskS. 142  Nevertheless, the role of the internal audit in financial matters has 
remained quite valuable and very important for building reliable new transitional systems 
of financial accountability. 
Conclusion 
The concept of financial  accountability,  as  a  relationship  in which  citizens  hold  the 
Government  to  account  for  the  stewardship  of public  money  is  fairly  complex  and 
intricate.  Establishing  and  securing  an  effective  financial  accountability  relationship 
requires  setting  up  of a  network  of internal  and  external  financial  accountability 
mechanisms, including adequate accounting, reporting and internal and external auditing. 
However,  it  needs  to  be  emphasized  that  financial  accountability  is  not  only  about 
establishing and maintaining accounting and auditing systems and checking the legality 
of public expenditure. Financial accountability goes further, requiring the Government to 
manage finances prudently and regularly inform the public what has been achieved with 
the use of  public funds. 143  Therefore, in procedures of  both internal and external financial 
accountability, the emphasis is gradually shifting from the classical concern of  regularity 
and propriety of public expenditure, to "value for money" investigations, which examine 
141  The Institute ofInternal auditors, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries, Volume 2, SIGMA, 
OECD,2004. 
142 Ibid; Cf N. Hepworth, "Is the modem UK/US approach to internal audit appropriate in all 
circumstances and especially for countries with less developed systems and less well trained public 
officials", unpublished manuscript, 2004. 
143 Cf The World Bank, "Clean Government and Public Financial Accountability", OED Working Paper 
Series, No.17, Summer 2000. 
50 whether economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources has been attained. 
Growing  attention  has  furthermore  been  paid  to  the  establishment  of systems  of 
performance measurement144  within Government departments, which should enable the 
Parliament and the public to assess how well public money is spent and what has been 
achieved with it. Finally, increasing attention has lately been paid to the regular reporting 
on the financial control findings to the public, which should attain greater transparency in 
the conduct of public finances and reinforce the level of trust between state and citizens 
when spending of  public money is in question. 
Finally, it should be stressed that financial accountability mechanisms cannot be analysed 
as isolated phenomena, but as mutually interrelated elements, which are in the process of 
constant interaction,  mutually supporting their structures  and functions.  Therefore,  we 
can easily talk about financial  accountability in terms of a system,145  which consists of 
different mutually related elements/mechanisms of financial accountability. It should be 
stressed that the effectiveness of financial accountability as a system depends mostly on 
the existence of a proper balance between its different supporting mechanisms, so  that 
weaknesses in one form of financial accountability can be compensated for by controls 
through other mechanisms.  146 
There are  a number of different systems of financial  accountability,  varying from  one 
country to another. As pointed out in the introduction, our research shall be based on the 
analyses  and  comparison  between  three  different  national  systems  of  financial 
accountability: British, French and Serbian and one supranational system of  the European 
Union, aiming at providing possible recommendations for improving the Serbian system 
in  order  to  achieve  standards  necessary  for  the  EU  membership.  The  first  national 
financial accountability system to be analysed in the next chapter is the UK system. 
144 Perfonnance measurement can briefly be described as the use of  measure and targets to assess 
objectively the perfonnance of a body. 
145  Cf L. Bertalanffy, General Systems Theory, (George Braziller Publishers), 1969. 
146 Cf T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Refonning public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in 
a comparative perspective", International Review of  Administrative Sciences, 1998, p. 98. 
51 Chapter II 
Financial Accountability in the United Kingdom 
As  we  saw  in  the  first  chapter,  financial  accountability  is  a  relationship  established 
between the citizens, as accountors, and the state, as  accountee, where citizens hold the 
state  to  account  for  the  stewardship  of entrusted public  money.  This  rather  abstract 
definition involves three main aspects of the accountability notion - who is accountable, 
to  whom  and for what.  Understanding financial  accountability in the United Kingdom 
necessitates operationalisation of this definition and clarification of its elements in the 
British context. As the to whom dimension of financial accountability seems to be rather 
clear and, in our opinion, does not require further elaboration, we shall devote our closer 
attention mainly to two/three other categories of financial accountability. Firstly, we shall 
discuss the meaning of the accountee/agent of the financial accountability, i.e. the British 
central Government. Secondly, we shall analyse in more detail the for what dimension of 
financial accountability, aiming at the provision of a framework for the understanding of 
the concept of "stewardship" of public money in the British Government context.  The 
focus of our inquiry,  furthermore,  will be placed on the fourth financial  accountability 
dimension - mechanisms through which the accountability relationship operates. As the 
effectiveness of a financial accountability depends mostly on the existence of a proper 
balance  between  the  different  mechanisms,  so  that  weaknesses  in  one  form  of 
accountability can be compensated for by controls through other mechanisms, 147 we shall 
identify the key financial accountability mechanisms in the UK focusing on their role in 
the overall British system of  financial accountability. 
147 T. Verheijen, M. Millar, "Reforming public policy processes and securing accountability: Ireland in a 
comparative perspective", International Review of  Administrative Sciences, 1998, p. 98. 
52 A Highly Complex Accountee - the British Central Government 
The British Governmentl48  operates within a political system of constitutional monarchy, 
without  a  written  Constitution.  Ministers  of the  Crown  govern  in  the  name  of the 
Monarch, who is both the Head of the State and head of the Government. Sovereignty, 
however,  is  vested  in  the  UK  Parliament.  In  constitutional  terms,  the  Westminster 
Parliament  consists  of the  directly  elected  House  of Commons,  the  House  of Lords 
(traditionally unelected) and the monarch. 
It should be noted that in recent years, the British Constitutional arrangements have been 
subject to substantial changes aimed at making a clear separation between three powers: 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial.  These  reforms,  introduced  by  the  Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, involve the modification of  the office of Lord Chancellor,149 detaching 
the UK highest court  from  the  Upper House of Parliament and the  creation of a  UK 
Supreme  Courtl50  and an  independent Judicial  Appointments  Commission,151  to  allow 
greater level of independence of the judiciary from  the executive.  Such  an  ambitious 
reform  agenda  has  prompted intense  academic  and  professional  discussionl52  and  its 
outcomes are yet to be seen in the years to come. 
148 As we saw in the I chapter, the term Government can have a narrow meaning in the sense of only 
elected politicians holding office, that is, ministers; or it can have a broad sense and include not only 
ministers but also the whole range of  public organizations, such as departments, agencies, along with the 
civil servants and other officials. We shall use it in the latter meeting throughout this chapter. 
149 In accordance with Part 2 of  the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the Lord Chancellor is no longer a 
judge nor exercises any judicial function. 
150 Part 2 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
151  Part 4 of  the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The Judicial Appointments Commission was created on 3 
April 2006. 
152 Cf. A. Le Sueur, "New Labour's next (surprisingly quick) steps in constitutional reform", Public Law, 
Autumn, 2003, pp. 368-377. R.  Masterman, "A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom: Two Steps 
Forward, but One Step Back on Judicial Independence", Public Law, 2004, pp. 48-58; V. Lay, "A Small 
53 The executive power in the UK is in the hands of  the government departments, as policy-
making bodies and agencies, whose role is to implement government policy and advise 
ministers. Ministers are individually accountable and responsible for  the work of their 
departments and agencies to Parliament and have a duty to report to Parliament on their 
policies, decisions and actions.
IS3  Britain has a disciplined two party (perhaps now three 
party) system, in which Government has quite a strong power to implement its policies. 
Bearing in mind that our research is focused on the central Government level, we shall 
define the "who is accountable" dimension of accountability by defining the scope of the 
British central  Government level.  This is  not an  easy task,  largely due  to  substantive 
changes which the British public sector experienced under the 18  years of Conservative 
Government (1979-1997), transforming it from a welfare to a contract model.  154 Aiming 
to  reduce public  expenditure,  the  Conservatives  undertook excessive privatisation and 
increased private  and  voluntary provision  of public  services.  In  central  Government, 
executive functions have been largely "hived off' from central departments to Next Step 
agencies.
ISS  At  the  same  time,  in  order  to  attain  their  economic  objectives,  the 
Conservatives  had  to  create  a  strong  central  Government  which  would  be  able  to 
effectively carry out its policies. Therefore,  a whole range of new, non-democratically 
elected public bodies (so called - quangos) was appointed.
IS6  Since 1997 the structure of 
Sense Behind the UK Constitutional Reform", http://ezineartic1es.com; Lord Windelsham, The 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005: Ministers, Judges and Constitutional Change, Public Law, 2005, pp. 806-
822. 
153  It should be noted that the constitutional accountability of  ministers is based on convention of 
ministerial responsibility, which should be distinguished from Ministers' managerial accountability. Cf D. 
Woodhouse: "The Reconstruction of Constitutional Accountability", Public Law, Spring, 2002. pp. 73-90. 
154 S. Horton, D. Farnham, "The Politics of Public Sector Change", in S. Horton, D. Farnham (eds), Public 
Management in Britain (MacMillan Press ltd.), p. 3. 
155  At the moment there are more than 100 such bodies, employing around 75 per cent of all civil servants. 
156 Cf. M. Flinders, M. Smith (eds.), Quangos, Accountability and Reform (Pal grave, MacMillan), 1999; D. 
Farnham, S. Horton, "Managing Public and Private Organisations", in S. Horton and D. Farnham (eds.), 
Public Management in Britain, (MacMillan Press ltd.), 1999. pp.26-29. However, it should also be noted 
54 the British Government has  undergone further profound changes,  since legislative and 
administrative authorities have been devolved to regional institutions of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. The processes of devolution and closer European integration, have 
further  added  to  the  complexity of the  British Government  organisation.
157  All  these 
developments have undoubtedly added to  the complexity of the ways in which public 
services are provided and funded  and therefore have strong implications for  audit and 
financial accountability. 
The term which has  often been used to  embrace the  great diversity of British public 
sector is "public bodies". However, it seems that even this notion is not broad enough to 
encompass all the expanding variety of  organisations. The vast and complex range of  new 
organisations which government has invented to carry out public functions together with 
the great number of private or voluntary bodies which provide public  services are not 
recognised as  public bodies.
158  The picture gets  even more  confused when taking into 
account the mergers of bodies and the change of organisational status of a number of 
bodies  within  the  public  sector  as  well  as  outside  of it.
159  Furthermore,  criteria  for 
classifying public bodies are not straightforward and clear-cut, albeit the Cabinet Office 
has made an effort to  assist departments to identify the likely classification of new and 
existing  bodies  that  fall  within  their  remit,  by instructions  given  in  its  Guidance  on 
classification of  public bodies.
16o 
that the use of ann's length bodies to deliver public services has a long history, for some ofthem dating 
back to XIX century. 
157 N. Burrows, Devolution, (Sweet and Maxwell), 2000; 1. Greenwood et aI., New Public Administration in 
Britain, (Routledge, 2002), p. 19. 
158 S. Weir, W. Hall (eds.), Democratic Audit - Extra-governmental Organisations in the United Kindgdom 
and their accountability, (the Charter 88 Trust, 1994), pp. 6-7. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Cabinet Office Guidance for Departments, Classification of  Public Bodies, August 2005. 
htlp://www.civilservice.gov.uk/other/agencies/pubhcations/pdf/classification  guidance  aug05.pdf 
55 Although  there  is  a  number  of provisional  classifications  of British  public  sector 
organisations,161 the officially accepted one is of  the Office of  National Statistics which is 
done with the reference to ESA95.162  A body is  classified into a public or private body 
depending on who controls the general corporate policy of the body concerned. Once the 
Office of  National Statistics has classified a body as public sector it is then classified to a 
.  I  b  b  d  .  h  ..  163  partlcu ar su  -sector  ase  on Its c  aractenstlcs. 
According to the Office of National Statistics, the UK public sector is comprised of the 
following sub-sectors: 
Central Government (CG): includes Government Departments and their Agencies; 
the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and (when reinstated) Northern 
Ireland,  Non-Departmental  Public  Bodies  and  any  other  non-market  bodies 
controlled and mainly financed by them; 
Local Government (LG):  those types of public administration that only cover a 
specific locality and any non-market bodies controlled and mainly financed by 
them; 
Public Corporations (PC): market bodies controlled by either Central Government 
or  Local  Government.  These  can  include  government-owned  companies  and 
trading funds. 164 
Relying on this definition of  the British public sector, we shall restrict our research to the 
first element of the public sector, which is perceived to constitute a central Government 
level: government departments, government agencies and non-departmental public bodies 
(quangos)  and  any other non-market bodies  controlled and mainly  financed  by them. 
161  S. Horton, D. Farhnam, op. cit., pp.3-4; L. Sharman of Redlynch, "The Review of  Audit and 
Accountability for Central Government", February 2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk; Times Books, 1995, 
Times Guide to the British State, London: Times Books. 
162 European System of  Accounts 1995, 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/dsis/nfaccountlinfor/datalesa95en.htm 
163  Cabinet Office Guidance for Departments, Classification of  Public Bodies, ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
56 However,  the  devolved  administrations  in  Scotland  and  Wales,  shall,  due  to 
distinctiveness of the  financial  accountability mechanisms  operating in this  sphere  of 
governance, be excluded from our research. Local Government institutions shall also be 
left out from our sphere of interest, due to the separate financial accountability regimes 
under which they operate. Public Corporations, on the other hand, shall be the subject of 
our research, provided that they are controlled by the Central Government level. 
Concept of "stewardship" of public money in UK 
There are two main conceptual categories which could be subsumed under the notion of 
"stewardship" of public money in the British context.  Stewardship firstly  encompasses 
basic  financial  requirements  of  regularity,  propriety  and  probity  of  the  public 
expenditure.  Secondly, stewardship involves requirements related to issues of value for 
money in the use of resources and compliance with principles of  economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Although these two categories of public money "stewardship" are usually 
perceived as quite separate matters, one dealing mainly with questions of  conformity with 
relevant rules  and legislation and  another examining productivity of the  use of public 
funds,  there  have  been  some  tendencies  which  have  brought  these  two  categories 
together, not only in everyday practice of auditors and accountants, but also in the terrain 
of administrative law. Before examining this issue further, we shall look closer at each of 
the elements of  the concept of  "stewardship" of  public money in the British Government. 
57 According to the Treasury's Government Accounting Guide,165  regularity is seen as  a 
"requirement for all items of expenditure and receipts to be dealt with in accordance with 
legislation authorising them, including any applicable delegated authority and the rules of 
the Government Accounting.,,166 This means that all expenditure and receipts have to be 
authorised by Parliament in the first place and then also comply with Treasury rules, set 
out  in  the  Government  Accounting  Guide.  When  talking  about  parliamentary 
authorisation of expenditure,  it may be argued that there  are  two  elements of control. 
Firstly, expenditure must conform with the ambit of the relevant Parliamentary Vote of 
the Appropriation Act, which is legally binding. The expenditure, however, does not rest 
solely on the authority of the Appropriation Act. While the Appropriation Act represents 
a quantitative allocation of money between Government's priorities, it may be argued 
that permanent legislation provides a qualitative framework for  the purposes to  which 
government can spend requested money.167  If, however, there is  a conflict between the 
Appropriation Act and permanent legislation, two possible options exist. The first one is 
that the terms of  the Appropriation Act will prevail and spending under the Appropriation 
Act will be regular (although not necessarily proper), notwithstanding that restrictions of 
165 The Treasury's Government Accounting: A guide on accounting andfinancial procedures/or the use 0/ 
government departments, is a large guide on wide variety of  issues relating to the proper handing and 
reporting on public money, which is regularly updated with amendments (London: HMSO, 1989 and 
several amendments 1989-05). While in formal terms the Government Accounting guide represents 
Treasury's own rules (rules made by administration), it also derives support and legitimacy from other 
sources, such as Parliament and especially the Public Accounts Committee. The Government Accounting is 
thus quite wide in scope and encompasses variety oflegislative requirements (much of  the guidance 
concerning the use of the Contingencies funds, trading funds, the role of  the National Audit Office and the 
Comptroller and Auditor General) and practices of  parliamentary procedure that Parliament has adopted 
over the years for handing public money as well as specific agreements reached between the Treasury and 
Parliament (e.g. advice on the 1932 Concordat between the PAC and the Treasury). It further contains rules 
and practices that have been laid down only by the Treasury, which are mainly designed to secure good 
financial control, promote high standards of  propriety, improve value for money throughout the 
administration. Cf http://www.government-accounting.gov.uklcurrentlframes.htm 
166 Government Accounting, supra, n. 3, 6.2.14. 
167 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit. Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1999), 
pp.65-66. 
58 permanent  legislation  are  not  respected.
168  This  understanding,  however,  has  been 
challenged by the Courts, which held that voted funds  in the Appropriation Act cannot 
cure the invalidity of the permanent legislation authorising the expenditure.
169 Therefore, 
it may be inferred that expenditure must conform both to the ambit of the relevant Vote 
and permanent legislation in order to be regular. 
Finally,  regularity requires expenditure be authorised by the Treasury. The principle is 
that no  expenditure or commitment can be undertaken without Treasury approval, even 
after being voted by Parliament and included in an Appropriation Act. This requirement 
has  been put on  a  statutory  footing  by the  Government Resources  and Accounts  Act 
2000.
170 In practice, the Treasury delegates to departments the authority to spend within 
defined limits, as will be discussed in more depth later. 
The next requirements of public money stewardship are propriety and probity. Propriety 
is  defined by Government Accounting as  a  "further requirement that  expenditure  and 
receipts should be dealt in accordance with Parliament's intentions and the principles of 
Parliamentary control, including the conventions agreed with Parliament".17l It could be 
noticed that this  definition is  very similar to  one of regularity.  However,  propriety is 
wider than regularity and is  concerned more with the standards of conduct, behaviour, 
fairness  and  integrity  (avoidance  of  personal  profit  from  public  business,  even-
handedness  in  the  appointment  of staff,  open  competition  in  the  letting  of contracts 
etc.)172  Questions of propriety, as previously mentioned, could be raised when the terms 
168 Cf Public Accounts Committee Concordat, 1932, Government Accounting 8/94, Amendment No.6; T. 
Daintith, "The Legal Effects of  the Appropriation Act", Public Law [1998], pp. 552-557. 
169 Cf. Fire Brigades Union case (R v Secretary of  State for the Home Department. ex parte Fire Brigades 
Union and others, 2 AC 5l3, [1995] 2 All ER 244, [1995] 2 WLR 464). 
www.cicap.gov.uklcase_law/documentslProcedure/r_v  _ secretary  _ of_state  _ ex  ~arte  _ fbu.pdf 
170 Subsection 2(b), section 3 of  the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. 
171  Government Accounting, supra, n. 3, 6.2.14. 
172 Auditing Practice Board's Practice Note 10, Audit of Central Government Financial Statements in the 
United Kingdom. 
59 of  the Appropriation Act are in conflict with permanent legislation. In that case, spending 
will be proper only if  Parliament has been expressly notified of  the intention and effect of 
the vote by an appropriate note in the estimate and if  the strict temporal restrictions on the 
use  of this  device  are respected.
173  Lastly,  the requirement of "probity" appears to  go 
beyond  regularity  and  to  overlap  with  notions  of propriety  to  include  a  standard  of 
honesty and integrity. 
It is quite interesting, especially for a lawyer, to  note that the concept of stewardship of 
public  money  in  the  UK does  not  recognise  the  principle  of 'legality'.  This  raises 
important concerns. There is no doubt that the requirement that spending be authorised by 
legislation is  a legal requirement.
174  Therefore, it does not seem to be plausible that a 
requirement for "all items of expenditure and receipts to be dealt with in accordance with 
legislation authorising them" defined in Government Accounting as  "regularity" is  not 
covered by and generally used as  a principle of "legality". Confusion between the two 
principles can be misleading both to the executive and the public, who may believe that 
shortcomings in safeguarding public funds are of far lesser importance (irregular instead 
of illegal expenditure). Therefore, it would be important to distinguish and clearly stress 
the legality elements in the control of  public expenditure. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  the  public  money stewardship  requirement  of 
legality will soon get the place it deserves. This is due to nature of the control of public 
expenditure,  which  is  mainly  in  the  hands  of accountants  (from  the  National  Audit 
Office)  and only to  a minimal  extent exercised by the  Courts (as  will be pointed out 
later). Therefore, it should not be surprising that the concept of legality has not been fully 
developed  and  that  the  accountancy  term  'regularity'  very  much  prevails  over  the 
lawyers' usual obsession with the 'rule of law' issues. Or as some would argue: "It is  a 
173  T. Daintith, op. cit, pp. 552-557. 
1741. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Value for Money and Administrative Law", Public Law, 1996, 
pp.677-678. 
60 language of the auditor's certificate, not of the judge's opinion".175  Only if Courts start 
playing more important role of control of public expenditure (as is the case with the UK 
local level) could it to be expected that the principle of legality will obtain a much more 
prominent place within the concept of stewardship of  public money. 
The second broad category of requirements of public money stewardship is one dealing 
with  issues  of value  for  money:  economy,  efficiency  and  effectiveness.  Whereas  the 
National Audit Act make explicit reference to  these requirements, it is  silent as  to  the 
exact meaning of these  terms  and to  date no  court has  given  a  legal  definition of it. 
However, academic discussions and audit practices have provided some deeper insight 
into the meaning of  these concepts which could be depicted as follows: 
1)  economy - minimising the cost of  resources used or acquired - spending less. A lack 
of  economy  could  occur,  for  example,  when  there  is  overstaffing  or  when 
overqualified staff or overpriced facilities are used; 
2)  efficiency  - the  relationship  between  the  output  from  goods  or  servIces  and  the 
resources used to  produce them - spending well. Efficiency seeks to  ensure that the 
maximum  output  is  obtained  from  the  resources  devoted  to  a  department  (or 
programme), or alternatively, that only the minimum level of  resources are devoted to 
a given level of  output. 176 
3)  effectiveness  - the  relationship  between  the  intended and  actual  results  of public 
spending  - spending  wisely.177  Studies  which  focus  on effectiveness  look  at  the 
difference between the intended and actual results of public spending and the quality 
of service delivered.
178  Effectiveness indicates whether results have been achieved, 
irrespective of  the resources used to achieve those results. 
175 T. Daintith, A. Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy and Internal Control, 
(Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 172. 
176 1. Glynn, Value for Money Auditing in the Public Sector, (Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales), 1985. 
l77 NAO annual report 1999 - Helping the Nation to Spend Wisely. www.nao.gov.uk 
178 NAO annual report 2000. www.nao.gov.uk. 
61 The  question  which  we  would like  to  raise  at  this  point is  the  relation  between  the 
requirements of value for money and the rule of law. As we have discussed earlier, most 
of the elements of the basic financial  requirement of regularity can be subsumed under 
the principle of legality while requirements of  propriety and probity seem to have broader 
meaning and cannot be identified with strictly legal issues. Should, furthermore, value for 
money principles be perceived as  indicators of legality of public  expenditure?  Should 
public expenditure be deemed illegal if economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use 
of  public funds have not been attained? 
This  question has  rarely been raised  either in practice or in  academic writing,  due to 
traditional non-interference of the common law courts in the process of control of public 
expenditure. However, the challenge of public money spending before the court occurred 
in  the  case R.  v.  Secretary of State for Foreign  Affairs,  ex parte  World  Development 
Movement  Ltd,  the  Pergau  Dam  Case,179  when  the  World  Development  Movement 
(WDM) sought judicial review of the Foreign Secretary's decision to spend money from 
the  overseas development budget on the  Pergau Dam project in Malaysia.
180  This has 
opened a number of controversies when different elements of public money stewardship 
are at issue. 
179 [1995] 1 WLR 886, [1995],1 All ER 611. 
180 The agreement between Foreign Secretary and Malaysian government was made in July 1991. In  1994, 
the Secretary refused to abandon the scheme, despite the negative advice given by the Overseas 
Development Administration. The applicant was challenging both the initial 1991  agreement and 1994 
Secretary's decision. Cf I. Hare, "Judicial Review and the Pergau Dam", The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Volume 54, part 2,  1995, pp. 227-230. Cf. White, I. Harden, K. Donnelly, "Audit, accounting officers and 
accountability: the Pergau Dam affair", 1994, Public Law, 526; P. Cane, "Standing up for the Public", 
Public Law, 1995,276 - 287; Overseas Development Institute, Changing Policies o/the Major Donors: 
UK case study, October 2003. 
62 The Pergau Dam project was funded under the Overseas Development and Co-operation 
Act 1980, which provides that: 
"The Secretary of  State shall have power, for the purposes of  promoting the development or maintaining 
the economy of  the country ...  or the welfare of  its people,  to furnish  any person or body with assistance, 
whether financial, technical or of  any other nature. " 
The judicial review was based on the argument of the applicant that the Act assumed 
sound development purposes, although the word "sound" was not used in the legislation. 
The Court accepted the reasoning, holding that the project was so economically unsound 
that there was no argument in favour of  it. Hence, it declared the decision unlawful. 
There have been two possible interpretations of the judgement. The first,  supported by 
the Government and external auditors, is that the decision in the Pergau Dam project was 
dependent  on  the  particular  statutory  context  of the  Overseas  Development  and 
Cooperation Act 1980 and that there are no more general implications of the judgement. 
The second is that the Pergau Dam case represents the application of a general principle 
of public law that public spending should represent value for money.181  This view finds 
its support in the provisions of  the National Audit Act 1983 and numerous waves of  "new 
public management reforms", which emphasise the importance of  the achievement of  the 
3  Es throughout the public  sector.  Proponents of this  view argue that testing whether 
value for money for use of  public funds has been attained could be done by using familiar 
categories of  judicial review of administrative action, i.e. application of  Wednesbury test: 
proposed expenditure is  unlawful if,  in relation to the object for which the money has 
been provided by Parliament, no reasonable minister could think that it represented value 
for money.182 
1811. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 661-679. 
182  Ibid. 
63 In  our opinion, there is  no doubt that the Court has based its judgement on a broader 
interpretation of the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980.  However, the 
fact that the court has interpreted legislation in such a sense, implies quite a strong case 
for the general application of the value for money principle by the courts in the future. 
The question, again, remains to  which extent the courts will  interfere in the control of 
public expenditure and if they would, whether they are equipped to  make the complex 
economic judgements required to decide whether a particular decision represents value 
for money.  183 
All in all, the Pergau Dam decision has confirmed the importance of value for money 
issues  when stewardship of public money is  in  question and proved that traditionally 
clear lines between the issues of  regularity and propriety of  public expenditure on the one 
hand and value for money on the other hand are being unequivocally blurred. Attainment 
of value for money in the use of public funds is no longer of secondary importance, but 
constitutes an equally significant part of  the public money stewardship requirements. And 
this  is  something  which  all  the  involved  actors  of the  British  system  of financial 
accountability should bear in mind constantly. 
Mechanisms of Financial Accountability 
The British system of financial accountability is  based on parliamentary accountability. 
For several centuries, the British Parliament, assisted with its Committees and, later on, 
greatly supported by professional bodies, such as the National Audit Office (NAO) has 
been holding the executive to account for the stewardship of public money. The National 
Audit Office, as the supreme audit institution of the UK, is headed by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General  (C&AG),  who is  the officer of the House of Commons and thus 
naturally reports to  the Parliament. The key accountability link between the Parliament 
183  Ibid. 
64 and  the  Executive  is  established through  the  work of Parliamentary Public  Accounts 
Committee  (PAC),  which,  supported  by the  work of the  NAO,  detects  irregular  and 
improper  expenditure  and  investigates  achievement  of value  for  money,  by  calling 
government officials to account for the use of  public money. 
In  spite  of  its  strong  focus  on  parliamentary  accountability,  the  UK  financial 
accountability  system  very much  relies  on  strong  interlinks  between  the  internal  and 
external  financial  accountability mechanisms.  The key executive  financial  department, 
the Treasury, holds the departments to  account through numerous internal, managerial 
accountability mechanisms. Notwithstanding its powers of internal expenditure control, 
the Treasury, however, does not have any audit capability and therefore is dependent on 
the C&AG and NAO, to provide assurance on the reliability of departmental accounts. 
The  second  basic  link  between  external  and  internal  accountability  mechanisms  is 
provided in the role of an accounting officer, who is simultaneously involved in several 
accountability relationships.  While his/her civil  service position requires himlher to  be 
loyal  to  the  minister,  hislher  role  of accounting  officer  makes  him/her  accountable 
directly  to  both  the  Treasury  and  the  Parliament.
184  The  whole  system  of financial 
accountability is based on trust and consensus of all the involved institutions and actors, 
which equally share the interest of securing public funds and where additional, external 
means of  control are superfluous.  185 
It is  still interesting to  note that the Courts have only rarely interfered with this long-
lasting "self-contained" system of financial accountability. A direct challenge of public 
expenditure  issues  at  the  central  Government  level  remains  an  exception  to  the  rule. 
184 It is further interesting to note that accounting officers are not any longer personally liable for misuse of 
public funds. The last recorded instance of accounting officials personal liability appeared to have 
happened in 1920, when an accounting officer was called to repay the amount of  misused public money. 
185  I. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 670-671. 
65 There have been only a few  cases of direct challenge of public expenditure decisions
186 
and a few which only indirectly affect public spending.
187 Whereas the scope for judicial 
intervention in public expenditure decisions at the local level has been quite wide,  the 
role of the courts in controlling the public expenditure in Britain has  up  to  now been 
minimal.
188  Major issues of public finance  appearing before the courts have been only 
those of taxation
l89 while the public spending have stayed aside of the court's agenda. 
This is partly a corollary of a long absence of a distinct system of administrative law and 
administrative  courts  in  Britain  190  and  partly  the  consequence  of  constitutional 
understanding of authorisation of expenditure.  191  While the constitutional requirement of 
legislative  authorisation  of taxation  is  based  on  individual  private  rights  that  are 
enforceable through the courts, there is no such correlate when legislative authorisation 
of government expenditure is in question. This has also contributed to the establishment 
of self-monitoring system of financial control in British central government, relying on 
trust between involved actors. 192 
Finally,  it  should be noted  that  the  UK financial  accountability  legal  framework  has 
recently experienced notable changes through the adoption of the Government Resources 
and  Accounts  Act  2000,193  which  the  Treasury considers  as  the  "biggest reform  and 
modernisation programme in the management of the country's public finances since the 
186 Already mentioned Pergau Dam case and case Auckland Harbour Board v.  The King [1924] (A  C 318 at 
pp. 326-327) where it was found that payments made out of  the Consolidated Fund without parliamentary 
approval were illegal. Cf l. McEldowney, Public Law, (Sweet and Maxwell), 3
rd ed., 2003, pp. 371. 
187 For example Metzger and others v. Department of Health and Social Security.  [1978] 1 W.L.R. 1046; 
[1977] 3 All E.R. 444 at 451. 
188 M. Elliott, "The Control of  Public Expenditure", in l. lowell, D. Oliver (eds.), The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.20 1- 203. 
189  Woolwich Building Society v.  Inland Revenue Commissioner (No.2) [1992] 3 All ER 737; Pepper v. 
Hart [1993] 1 All ER 86. 
190 Cf C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, (Butterworths), London, 1997. 
191  Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 670-671. 
192 Ibid. 
193  Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000, available at http://www.hmso.gov.ukiacts/2000/00020--
b.htm 
66 Gladstone era". 194 The importance of this Act is that it has put on a legislative basis the 
governments'  proposals for  introduction of resource (accrual) accounting and resource 
budgeting into central Government.
195  The key objective of the introduction of resource 
accounting  and  budgeting  is  to  improve  the  planning  and  control  of Government 
spending as  well as  to improve departments'  accountability to  Parliament through more 
comprehensive financial information it will provide.
196  However, it is  important to  note 
that the passage of the  Government Resources  and Accounts Act has  not in any way 
disturbed  the  operation  of traditional  financial  accountability  actors  in  the  UK,  as  it 
occurred  in  some  other  systems  in  the  last  couple  of years  by adoption  of the  new 
legislation (notably in  France, by the adoption of the LOLF in 2001; in the EU, by the 
adoption of new Financial Regulation in 2002 and in Serbia, by the Budget System Law 
in 2002, as will be discussed in the following chapters). The expected effect of  this Act is 
rather  only  to  enhance  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of already  existing  balance 
between internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
Internal Financial Accountability Mechanisms 
It may be argued that during the previous century Britain has developed a regular and 
coherent system of financial accountability, primarily based on strengthening the control 
of  the Treasury over spending departments. Thus, some authors claim that, instead of  the 
194 H.M. Treasury News Release 195/99. Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Public finance refonn: The 
Government Resource and Accounts Act 2000", Public Law, 2000, pp. 56-61. 
195 Whereas the nationalised industries and local governments in UK have been using the accruals 
accounting for more than 20 years now, the central Government departments have expressed much more 
resistance to such a change in accounting approach. Cf. J. Perrin, "From Cash to Accruals in 25 Years", 
Public Money  & Management, April-June 1998, pp. 7-10. 
1961. Chan, "Government Accounting: An Assessment of Theory, Purposes and Standards", Public Money 
& Management, January 2003, pp. 13-20. D. Heald, "The Implementation of  Resource Accounting in UK 
Central Government", Financial Accountability & Management, 21  (2),2005, pp. 163-189. 
67 other way around, Parliament became the Treasury's ally in a system of financial control, 
in which Executive largely polices itself. 197 
The  Treasury regulates  the  work of departments  primarily through  its  own rules  and 
regulations,  198  in  particular  through  the  already  mentioned  guide,  Government 
Accounting,  which  is  regularly  amended  and  contains  a  number of financial  control 
.  .  d  199  conventIOns, practIces an  statutory arrangements. 
The  Treasury  holds  government  departments  to  account  primarily  through  a  fairly 
flexible  ex  ante controls of public expenditure.  The first  ex  ante role of the Treasury 
relates  to  the  process  of issuance  of public  funds  to  Departments.  This  process 
commences by the requisition of the Treasury to  the  C  &  AG to  allow monies to  be 
released from the Consolidated Fund and the National Loans Fund.2oo The Treasury then 
has the role to distribute the requested money to Departments.201  At this stage, it is the 
responsibility of both the C & AG and the Treasury to make sure that the issued amounts 
conform to the respective legislative authority.202 The system of ex ante control is further 
197  I. Harden, "Money and the Constitution: Financial Control, Reporting and Audit", Legal Studies 16, 
[1993], pp. 18-19. 
198 These are so-called Rules made by the Administration, Cf. P.P. Graig, Administrative Law, (Sweet and 
Maxwell), 1994, pp. 270-277. 
199 The latest Government Accounting amendments were made in 2005 (No. 4/05). 
http://www.government-accounting.gov.uklcurrentlframes.htrn 
200 The Consolidated Fund, established in 1787, is the government's account at the Bank of England into 
which all public revenues (taxes, duties, etc.) flow and from which all funds for the supply of  public 
services are taken. The National Loans Funds, established in 1968, is the Government's principal 
borrowing account. Both Funds are operated by the Bank of  England and the Treasury. Cf. F. White, K. 
Hollingsworth, op. cit. p.57; NAO, General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-2005, 
www.nao.gov.uk 
201  Cf. Section 13 (for services charged directly to the Consolidated funds), and sections 14 and 15 (for 
issuance of funds for services which are subject of appropriation) of 1866 the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act. 
202 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 117-118. 
68 secured through the earlier mentioned regularity/legality requirement that no expenditure 
or commitments can be incurred without the approval of the Treasury.203  However,  in 
practice the Treasury delegates to departments authority to enter into commitments and to 
spend within defined limits204, as it would be impossible for it to control every detail of 
expenditure.2os  In order to secure some degree of control over departmental spending, the 
Treasury has concentrated on defining the sensitive expenditures which could be subject 
to irregularity and impropriety, such as: exceeding sub-heads within the votes, increase of 
establishment, salary or cost of services and additional works or new services.206  One of 
the main mechanisms of internal accountability in this respect is the virement process, in 
which the Departments are required to  get Treasury's approval for transfers within the 
sub-heads of  the votes. 
The last decade,  however,  has witnessed further reduction of Treasury ex-ante control 
and increase of  the responsibilities of  departments coupled by firmer Treasury monitoring 
over expenditure aggregates and management systems. One of the steps in this direction 
has been the  simplification of estimates by reduction of the number of votes and sub-
heads within the votes which occurred in 1996.207  This resulted in the simplification of 
the virement process and relaxation of the Treasury's powers, as  Treasury approval  is 
now needed only for transfers between expenditure lines and not between numerous sub-
heads as required before the changes.208 Given that there are around 550 expenditure lines 
in  comparison to  earlier existing 2000  sub-heads,  it is  obvious that the  control of the 
203  Subsection 2(b), section 3 of  the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000. 
204 Cf. paragraphs 2.4.3, 2.4.5 to 2.4.11, Amendment No.6, Government Accounting. 
205 Treasury's general view on its authority to control ordinary expenditure has been set out early on in a 
Treasury Minute of April 1868 (Roseaveare 1973: 172-3; Epitome I:  20-1). It's position was that control of 
ordinary expenditure was beyond its functions and that only in exceptional cases it should sanction 
departments. Cf T. Daintith, A.  Page, op. cit. pp. 177-183 
206 Ibid. 
207 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit, pp. 159-164. 
208 Cf. Treasury and Civil Service Committee Fourth Report, Simplified Estimates and Resource 
Accounting, HC 212,1994-1995. 
69 Treasury  towards  departments  has  been  technically  and  substantially  reduced?09 
Although  relaxation  of  ex-ante  Treasury  approval  has  raised  concerns  within  the 
Parliament  on  the  loss  of accountability,  the  Treasury  has  strongly  argued  that  the 
accountability  to  Parliament  will  only  improve,  as  Departments  will  take  over  full 
responsibility for spending of public money and will not be able to place the blame on 
Treasury for making their expenditure decisions.2lo  The potential 'loss of accountability' 
the  Treasury  has  compensated  by  introducing  requirements  on  the  methodology  of 
expenditure decision-making, such as:  checks on the quality of decisions, techniques for 
investment  appraisal,  project  evaluation,  electronic  information  management  and  the 
overall system of  control of  public expenditure through the running costs control.
211 
As mentioned earlier, a key element of accountability for public money is the role of the 
Accounting Officer. The Treasury appoints the most senior official in a department as the 
Accounting  Officer  to  be  responsible  for  departmental  expenditure.  A  departmental 
accounting  officer  is  also  normally  the  permanent  secretary  of the  department.  The 
responsibilities of an accounting officer are defined and promulgated in a document of 
constitutional  importance  - the  Accounting  Officer  Memorandum.212  An  accounting 
officer is responsible for the performance of a number of functions: signing the accounts 
(authorising payments and making commitments),  ensuring propriety and regularity of 
the public finances; keeping proper accounts; for prudent and economical administration; 
the avoidance of waste and extravagance; and for the efficient and effective use of all 
available resources.213  It is also possible that in some departments other senior managers 
responsible for particular activities to be appointed as additional Accounting officers?14 
209 F. White, K.  Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999), 
pp.50-51. 
210 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 178-179. 
211  Ibid. 
212  Government Accounting, Amendment No.4, 411992, HMSO, 1989. 
213  Government Accounting, 6.7, Amendment No 7, 3/97, HMSO, 1989. 
214 Ibid, 6.3. 
70 An accounting officer is under a general duty to ensure that Ministers receive appropriate 
advice on all matters of  financial propriety and regularity as well as regarding economical 
administration, efficiency and effectiveness.
215  Until recently, two distinct regimes were 
applied when provision of advice to Ministers was in question, depending on whether the 
addressed matters  were those  of propriety and regularity  or economy,  efficiency and 
effectiveness of use of public money.  Thus, where a Minister plans a course of action 
which the accounting officer considers would infringe the requirements of propriety or 
regularity, the accounting officer is obliged to  forward his/her objections to the Minister 
in writing. In the case his advice is overruled, the accounting officer has a duty to inform 
the C&AG.  If,  furthermore,  a minister decides to proceed with the expenditure despite 
communicated objections, the accounting officer has to seek written instruction from the 
minister before making the payment. At the same time, he/she has to inform the Treasury 
and C&AG on the developments without undue delay.216  If,  on the other hand, the issue 
in question is  one of economy,  efficiency and  effectiveness,  the  accounting officer is 
under a duty to draw the relevant factors to the attention of the Minister. However, if  his 
advice is overruled, there is no duty that his findings be communicated with the Treasury 
or the C&AG?17 
It is  interesting to  note  that the  Pergau Dam case,  which we analysed in more detail 
earlier, has brought about significant changes when provision of advice to ministers on 
value for money issues is in question. The accounting officer involved in the Pergau Dam 
project did object to the minister's decision to undertake the investment, but treated the 
issue  as  one  of efficiency  and  effectiveness  and  not  of regularity  and  propriety. 
Therefore, there was no requirement for the matter to be addressed to the Treasury and 
the C&AG and hence the case was not subject to wider financial scrutiny. In the wake of 
the  Pergau  Dam  case,  this  stance  has  been  changed  and  the  Accounting  Officer 
Memorandum has been amended requiring an accounting officer to inform the Treasury 
215 F. White, I. Harden, K.  Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 526-534. 
216 Government Accounting, Amendment No.4, 4/1992, HMSO, 1989. 
217 F. White, I. Harden, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 528-529. 
71 and to  communicate to  the C&AG without undue delay the papers relating to  all  cases 
where  ministers  issue  instructions  on  matters  involving  prudent  administration  and 
economical administration, efficiency and effectiveness.218  In this way, the constitutional 
responsibilities of the key actor of managerial  financial  accountability,  the  accounting 
officer, has been increased and the importance of prudent and productive use of public 
money in the British central Government context strongly underlined. 
The question which, however, may be posed is whether a single person at the top of an 
organisation can be really held accountable for every financial activity in a public body? 
Isn't this just a replication of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, which has been 
criticised  on  a  number  of occasions?219  Although  there  is  no  doubt  that  accounting 
officers bear an  extensive burden of the financial  accountability role,  Lord Sharmans' 
report on audit and accountability of Government conducted in 2001  strongly supports 
the  view  that  the  role  of accounting  officers  is  of continuing  salience.22o  In  the 
discussions the Sharman team lead with the accounting officers, the accounting officers 
themselves  found  their  role  as  a  source  of strength  both  in  their  relationships  with 
ministers  and  ability  to  manage  their  departments  and  understood  it  as  a  "personal 
responsibility to  safeguard the  interests of the taxpayer".221  Such a personal nature of 
accountability, or better to say, responsibility for public money stewardship on the part of 
an accounting officer is  regarded as  essential to produce necessary incentives to  ensure 
value  for  money of the  use  of public  funds  is  achieved?22  The  accounting  officer's 
responsibility for stewardship of public funds has also been perceived as vital from the 
parliamentary perspective,  as  it establishes  a  clear line  of accountability between the 
executive  and  the  parliament.  It may be  argued  that  avoidance of political  waters  of 
Ministerial responsibility and the emphasis on comprehensive 'administrative' aspects of 
218 Government Accounting 6.1.5, December 1994. 
219 Cf D. Woodhouse, op. cit, pp. 73-90. 
220 L. Sharman of Redlynch, The Review of  Audit and Accountability  for Central Government, February 
2001, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk. p. 20. 
221  Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
72 accountability for  stewardship of public  funds  entrusted to  experienced civil  servants, 
instead of  politicians, generate much lesser potential for politicisation of issues of public 
spending and bring about much better results in safeguarding the tax-payers money. 
Nevertheless,  it is  understandable that the  accounting  officer cannot carry out his/her 
financial tasks well without support of other actors, such as the internal audit services.
223 
Internal audit services do not constitute part of  the Treasury, but are parts of  departments, 
although their operation  is  regulated by the  Treasury's Audit Policy and Advice  unit 
through  different  guides,  such  as  Government Internal  Audit Standards  and  Internal 
Audit Training and Development Handbook.
224 The main role of  the internal audit units is 
to  provide  advice  and  assurance  to  the  accounting  officer  on  the  adequacy  and 
effectiveness of the  internal control systems, not only in financial  matters, but also on 
other operational  aspects of work.  Over the  last decade,  internal  audit is  increasingly 
shifting its  focus  to  financial  issues  and  development of 'risk management'  approach 
aimed at  examination of various  kinds of risks  to  the  organization and reviewing  the 
adequacy  of the  underlying  activities  to  manage  those  risks?25  In  order  to  provide 
adequate  conditions  for  the  work  of audit  units,  it  is  very important  to  secure  their 
independence  of operation.  Although  their  independent  status  has  not  been  legally 
guaranteed, this does not seem to pose serious problems in their operation.226  One of the 
ways  to  strengthen  their  independence  would  certainly be establishment  of a  closer 
relationship with external auditors and continuous exchange of information between the 
two.  In  recent years,  public bodies have started incorporating audit committees within 
their arrangements,  whose role  is  to  communicate directly to  internal  audit  units  and 
223  It should also, however, be noted that some departments also contract out their internal audit functions, 
Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp.52-53. 
224http://www.hm_ 
treasury.gov .ukl  documentslfi nanci ai_management!  governance_government!  gg_  i ndex.cfm 
225 L. Sharman of  Redlynch, op. cit. p. 23; NAO, General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General 
2004-2005; 2003-2004, www.nao.org.uk 
226  F. White, K.  Hollingsworth, ibid. 
73 Accounting Officers, advising and reporting on audit and internal control issues.227  This 
has further strengthened the overall system of  managerial financial accountability. 
This  analysis  of internal  financial  accountability mechanisms has  underlined the  links 
between the internal and external accountability mechanisms in UK.  In order to  obtain 
the  overall  picture  of the  UK system of financial  accountability,  we  shall  attempt to 
reveal the 'heart' of financial accountability relationship in UK, by turning our attention 
to  external financial  accountability mechanisms which encompass the complex web of 
accountabilities established between the executive and the Parliament. 
External financial accountability mechanisms 
Parliamentary accountability 
Parliament's "power of the purse" is a basic principle of the British constitution and had 
an important role to play in establishment of  the British Parliamentary system (see Annex 
1  ).228  It traditionally consists of three  elements:  the right to  give prior approval to  the 
raising  of finance  through  taxation,  the  right  to  approve  the  total  and  allocations  of 
expenditure of public funds  and the right to  control the execution of the expenditure?29 
Since  Government must have  money in  order to  function,  this  principle theoretically 
provides a powerful way for the House of  Commons to control government spending.
23o 
For a mainland European lawyer, the first interesting feature of the British 'power of the 
purse'  is  a  separation  of procedures  of Parliament's  approval  of the  taxation  and 
expenditure. Whereas the revenue side of the Government plans is presented separately 
227 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. p. 22. 
228 A.v. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of  the Law of  the Constitution (19
th edn, Macmillan, 1960), p. 447. 
229 D. Coombes et aI.,  The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p. 386. 
230 I. Harden, "Money and the Constitution: Financial Control, reporting and audit", Legal Studies 16, 
[1993],pp.16-17. 
74 though the Budget document,  expenditure side is presented in a separate document,  as 
will be explained in more detail later.  231  This is in contrast to the mainland Europe where 
the 'unity' of presentation of  revenue and expenditure (unity of  budget) represents one of 
the key features of  the budgetary process. This, however, does not pose a problem to our 
research, which is, as defined in the first chapter, solely focused on the expenditure side 
of the financial cycle. 
UK Parliament authorises most public money to be spent through the supply process.232 
Each year the  Government's request for  resources  is  presented in the  form  of 'supply 
estimates'.  These set out for  each broad area of planned activity,  the public  funds  the 
Government needs to pursue its policies. The estimates are approved by the Commons, 
but  its  formal  acceptance  is  given  by  the  whole  of Parliament  through  the  annual 
Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Act (usually called Appropriation Act).233 
It is easy to  note that the Parliament's expenditure element of the "power of the purse" 
does not involve its right to actually make spending decisions. On the contrary, the policy 
objectives on which the money is spent are almost solely determined by the Government 
of the day. Parliament is thus unable to initiate its own expenditure on its own behalf, but 
only to reduce it, which again happens very seldom.234 
231  It is interesting to note that from 1993 to 1996 the Government presented a 'unified Budget' comprising 
both planned revenues and expenditures, but the new Labour Government moved back to the old system 
from 1997. 
232 In addition to supply services, there are Consolidated Fund Standing Services, as payments for services, 
which Parliament has decided by statute, once and for all, to be met direct from the Consolidated Fund and 
they are therefore made independently from annual authorisation of expenditure. These are for example: 
issues to the Contingencies fund, payments to European Committees, civil list salaries, salaries and 
pensions of  judges, office of Comptroller and Auditor General etc. Cf. Government Accounting, op. cit. 
Sections 1.1.7.,3.2.8. 
233  T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 156-157. 
2341. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", in 1. lowell, D. Oliver, The Changing 
Constitution, (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 197-198. 
75 In reality little substantial scrutiny is involved in a supply procedure, one of the reasons 
being that exhaustiveness of  the issue makes complete and detailed discussion of  the state 
expenditure impossible. Almost a century ago, the government and the Commons have 
observed a  tacit agreement permitting the  Opposition to  decide  which chapter of the 
estimates  will  be  submitted  to  parliament  to  debate;  the  other  chapters  are  adopted 
without debate or are voted together.
235 Some authors are therefore of  the opinion that the 
chapters  designated  by the  Opposition  are  used  only  as  an  excuse  for  holding  some 
general plenary debates on general policy, since, at the end, state expenditure is approved 
almost automatically.236 The House of Commons has also for many years tried to achieve 
some  control  over public spending through its  Estimates Committees.237  However, the 
work of the Estimates Committees has generally proven to be unsatisfactory and detailed 
estimates control left to the full  executive's command. Furthermore, since 1982 the time 
available  for  discussion  on  estimates  has  been  restricted  to  3  days  between  the 
presentation of the  estimates  and  the  summer recess,  which  has  further  lessened  the 
opportunity  of  the  Commons  to  get  into  serious  discussion  on  the  Government 
expenditure  plans.
238  During  the  XX  century  the  Commons  have  never  rejected  the 
Government estimate. Indeed, the statement that "as far as the control of the estimates is 
concerned,  the  government of Britain  is  a  constitutional  dictatorship,,239  unfortunately 
still appears to be true. 
235  S.  Walkland, "Parliamentary Control of  Public Expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes et aI,  The Power 
of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, pp.  179-197. 
236 J.  Molinier, "Parliament's financial powers: a comparison between France and Britain", in D. Coombes 
et aI,  The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p.  170. 
237 Cf B. Chubb, The Control of  Public Expenditure - Financial Committees of  the House of  Commons, 
(Oxford at the Clarendon Press) 1952; A. Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending, (Heinemann, 
London), 1978; V. Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of  the Commons (Gower) 
1986. 
238 T. Daintith, A. Page, op. cit. pp. 156-157. 
239 P. Einzig, The Control of  the Purse - Progress and Decline of  Parliament's Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959), p.  13. 
76 The most often cited reason for a minimal role of the Parliament in the supply procedure 
is  a strong party control over the members of the House of Commons.240  The general 
influence of Ministers where the government has a majority in the House of Commons 
substantially reduces the House of Commons' powers of control in practice. Although 
this  argument certainly has  some  weight,  the  question  which still remains  is  why the 
debate  on  the  detail  of taxation,  in  spite  of the  mentioned party-political  limitations, 
continues to be lengthy and effective while the debate on the Government spending plans 
attracts so little attention of the MPs and the general public. The answer to this question 
perhaps lies in the higher degree of  political controversy of taxation issues, which have a 
direct bearing on the  citizens,  where the  spending  decisions  on the  already collected 
money are further removed from the interest of the public and from their representatives 
in the Parliament. 
Further concerns over the role of the Parliament in the financial control of the executive 
have  been  raised  in  relation  to  important  exceptions  to  the  constitutional  rule  of 
obligatory authorization of expenditure. An example of a gap in Commons control over 
expenditure is the Contingencies Fund, which Government, without prior Parliamentary 
approval,  may  use  to  finance  urgent  expenditure,z41  The  total  expenditure  of the 
Contingency fund, as a reserve fund intended to meet unforeseen items of expenditure, is 
considerable. However, the control of  the fund is placed strictly on the system of internal 
Treasury control and audit.242  No Parliamentary committee directly monitors the use of 
the  Fund  and  there  are  no  satisfactory  means  to  inquire  into  the  policy  behind  the 
government's use of  the Fund prior to the Fund being used.243 
240 A. Lovell, "Notions of  Accountability and State Audit: A UK Perspective", Financial Accountability & 
Management, 1996, pp. 263-265. 
241  J.  McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", op. cit. pp. 200-201. 
242 Government Accounting: A Guide on accounting and  financial procedures for the use of  Government 
Departments, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1989. 
243  As we have previously seen, the use of  money from the Contingencies Fund has up to now created 
substantive difficulties. In  1994, the fund was used to fund the Pergau Dam project following the decision 
of  the divisional court declaring the aid to be ultra vires. It should be noted that the doubts about the 
77 The above discussion undoubtedly raises the question of possible ways of enhancement 
of key democratic institution in holding the Government to account for public spending. 
In  that  sense,  it  could  be  argued  that the  traditional  rules  on parliamentary financial 
control (the right to give prior approval to the budget, the right to approve allocations of 
expenditure, and the right to control the execution of the budget) are clearly not enough 
on their own to give parliament effective or meaningful influence over the scope, content 
and administration of modem public finance.
244  In  order to  address these longstanding 
issues,  several positive changes have been introduced, such as:  providing the House of 
Commons with better access to information about the assumptions on which budgetary 
decisions are based, in particular by the move towards accrual (resource) accounting and 
supporting its powers of  scrutiny by the work of  parliamentary committees.
245 
Nevertheless,  despite  many  advances  in  the  procedures  of financial  control  through 
improved transparency it remains uncertain to  what extent the Parliament has and could 
enhance its role regarding financial  accountability. A decrease of general Parliamentary 
power against the executive in the previous decades is usually explained by the generally 
dismissive and occasionally contemptuous attitude adopted by the Thatcher as well as, at 
legality of the fund were raised by MPs and members of  the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee 
in  1983, but have been seemingly resolved and the Fund therefore assumed to be legal. Since then, 
Parliament has never raised this issue again. 
244 D. Coombes et aI, op. cit, p. 386; H. Heclo, A. Widlavsky, The Private Government of  Public Money, 
(1973); Hague et a!., Comparative Government and Politics (The MacMillan Press Ltd.), 1992. 
245 Over the years the presentation of  the Estimates has become more attractive and readable and today they 
contain economic information and there are cross-references to the Departmental Report. In March 1998 
the Treasury published The Code for Fiscal Stability, (received statutory authority through the Finance Act 
1998), which provides key information on Government introduction of  new monetary policies, with the aim 
to bring "openness, transparency and accountability" over monetary policy and improve MP's knowledge 
on economic and fiscal assumptions. On the other hand, the role of  the Parliamentary Committees in 
controlling public spending, especially one of the Committee of  Public Accounts, has in the last two-three 
decades substantially improved. Cf. 1. McEldowney, "The Control of Public Expenditure", op. cit. pp. 226-
228. 
78 times, Blair governments towards Parliament.
246 This was undoubtedly facilitated by the 
massive Commons majorities in both cases, which surely had an adverse effect on the 
Parliament's possibilities of effective executive control.  However, previous years have 
witnessed  lessening  of the  Labour  party  unity,  which  could  enhance  more  effective 
Parliamentary control of the executive.  In  order for Parliament to make executive more 
accountable, it should try to  utilize the full  range of different means at its disposal in a 
coordinated  fashion  and  in  this  way regularly demonstrate  its  independence  from  the 
.,  f  h  247  restnctlOns 0  t  e party managers. 
A key weapon of the parliament in securing financial  accountability is  the work of its 
most senior and most fonnidable committee, the Public Accounts Committee. Its role is 
to examine whether public money voted by Parliament has been spent in accordance with 
Parliament's intentions, and with due regard to  issues of regularity, propriety and value 
for money.  Work of the Public Accounts Committee is  substantively supported by the 
external  audit  institution,  the  National  Audit  Office,  without  whose  professional 
assistance the Committee's control would be almost impossible. On the basis of  the NAO 
reports,  the Public Accounts Committee calls officials to  account for  misuse of public 
money and reports its findings to the House of Commons. The Committee's reports and 
the government's responses to them are debated in an annual debate in the Commons and 
may be raised by MP's at other times. 
It should be noted, however, that the debates on the Public Accounts Committee's reports 
are  not  very  popular  parliamentary  occasions,  with  attendance  usually  limited  to 
frontbench  spokesmen,  members  of the  committee  and  members  with  a  constituency 
interest in its reports.
248  Some authors are of  the opinion that this does not undennine the 
importance of parliamentary based scrutiny of  public money spending. An annual debate 
2461. Greenwood et a!., op. cit., pp.  182-183. 
247 Ibid. 
248 1. Bates, "The Scrutiny of  Administration", in M. Ryle, P. Richards, The Commons under Scrutiny, 
Routledge, 1988. 
79 of this sort is considered to be a privilege not granted to other select committees and a 
reflection of  the importance which is accorded to the work of  the PAC.249 
It may,  therefore,  be  concluded  that  the  key  financial  accountability  relationship  is 
established not so  much between the Parliament itself and the executive, but has been 
delegated by Parliament to  PAC,  which,  on Parliament's behalf,  keeps  the  Executive 
accountable for the stewardship of public money. Since the Public Accounts Committee 
and National Audit Office are  the main institutions of the  British system of financial 
accountability, we shall examine their roles and operations in more detail in the following 
discussion. 
Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) 
The PAC is the senior select committee of  the House of  Commons, with almost a century 
and half long tradition (see Annex 1). It was established in 1861  by Standing Order 122 
(now  standing  order  148).  PAC  consists  of fifteen  Members  of Parliament,  selected 
proportionally to the composition of  the House. The work of the Committee is to be non-
partisan.  Impartiality  and  independence  of the  Committee  is  partly  secured  by  the 
constitutional convention that the President of the Committee is always a member of the 
opposition. The Committee's remit covers all central Government departments, executive 
agencies  and NDPBs,  the National  Health  Service  and  a  wide  range  of other public 
bodies?50 The Committee carries out its investigations based on the accounts, reports and 
memoranda presented to  Parliament by the C&AG. After examination of senior public 
officials responsible for the expenditure or income under examination, PAC produces its 
own reports, in which it sets out its recommendations to the public body in question.251 
249 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 123-125; V. Flegmann, "The Public Accounts Committee: A 
Successful Select Committee?", Parliamentary Affairs, Vol 23, No.1, 1980, pp.  166-172. 
250 L. Shannan of Redlynch, op. cit. pp.39-41. 
251  Ibid. 
80 The  majority  of PAC's  hearings  and  reports  are  based  on  value  for  money  (vfm) 
examinations.
2s2  The PAC does not nowadays spend much time on matters of financial 
irregularity or constitutional impropriety. There are not many of  them, and most which do 
occur are not of sufficient seriousness to warrant intervention by the Committee.
2s3 Most 
of the PAC's work is based on the C&AG vfm reports on financial management, which 
are conducted in the areas of trade, industry, agriculture, overseas services, transport and 
health as well as  various other public services. The choice of the study depends on the 
nature  of the  Government's  actual  programmes,  likely  interest  of the  subject  to  the 
Committee and the prospect of useful  recommendations for  improvement arising from 
their inquiries. 
The  PAC  hearings  are  usually based on  an  NAO report,  either on the  accounts  of a 
department or public body or, more often on a vfm study?S4 The PAC usually decides on 
which case it will choose for further investigation on the basis of  the briefing by the NAO 
and any independent research that a particular member may undertake. The members of 
the Committee are not individually in charge for any specific portfolio according to their 
particular  interest  or  expertise,  but  are  responsible  for  every NAO  report.  However, 
personal interest and expertise of members can have important impact on the choice of 
the case examined?SS 
The accounting officer of  the respective public body in question is the main witness at the 
hearing.  In  addition to  an  accounting officer, the PAC  can call  anyone else to  appear 
252 V. Flegmann, op. cit., pp. 166-172. 
253 D. Henley, A. Likierman, 1. Perrin, M. Evans, I. Lapsley and J. Whiteoak, Public Sector Accounting and 
Financial Control, (Chapman & Hall) 1992. 
254 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, p. 49. 
255 The latest PAC reports are: Channel Tunnel Rail Link (4 May 2006), The refinancing of  the Norfolk and 
Norwich PFI Hospital (3  May 2006), Tackling the complexity of  the benefits system (27 April 2006), Inland 
Revenue Standard Report: New Tax Credits (25 April 2006) etc. All of  them can be obtained at the PAC 
website: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cmicmpubacc.htm 
81 before it,  except ministers.256  The PAC also invites the C&AG and Treasury Officer of 
Accounts, or their deputies, to attend every hearing. 
It may be argued that the  proceedings  conducted by the  PAC  are  of a  quasi-judicial 
nature, since witnesses are put in the position of defendants and are called to account for 
their actions.257  However, although the Committee can invoke personal responsibility of 
the  accounting officer,  it has  lost a  formal  power to  impose sanctions  on him/her.258 
Sanctions available to  the PAC are mainly of an  informal  nature,  which,  interestingly 
enough, does not undermine its effectiveness. 
The important question which arises in this respect is what sanctions may be imposed on 
a public official in relation to a PAC hearing? Firstly, if PAC comes across some serious 
irregularities,  the  official  can  become  the  subject  of criminal  investigation  (fraud, 
corruption etc.). Secondly, irregularities in dealing with public funds may have impact on 
the approval of the following year's budget of the public body in question. Furthermore, 
there is a possibility of requiring compensation from the public official for the improper 
handling  of public  money.  However,  the  sanction  of compensation  does  not  have 
sufficient weight,  since the required amounts  are  usually fairly  symbolic?59  Lastly,  it 
seems that the main PAC's sanction from the public official's point of view is the mere 
fact  of being  summoned before the  Committee.  It  has  always  been a  matter of great 
importance to spending Departments to avoid giving an account to PAC on any question 
of regularity or propriety in its stewardship of public money, since it is perceived as an 
indication of misconduct, implying strong criticism on the departmental administration. 
256 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 122-125. 
257 J. Molinier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes, The Power a/the Purse, (London George Allen&Unwin Ltd.), 1976. 
258 The last recorded case when the sanction of  personal liability was imposed on an accounting officer was 
in  1920. 
259 In  1984, NAO investigated the case of fraud in the procurement of  the defence case. The accounting 
officer in charge was obliged to contribute a symbolic 10 pounds. 
82 Moreover, appearance before the Committee requires lots of extra work and, if, repeated, 
may have far- reaching consequences for the career of  the person involved. 
Unanimity in the work of the PAC is seen as very important for its effective work. The 
standard practice is that there must be unanimous support within the PAC for a report 
before it can be published.26o  This is due to the fact that a unanimous report very much 
adds strength to the Committee's influence. In the past, some reports have been held back 
until unanimity was obtained. This means that the timing of the publication of the final 
report after the hearing can vary. The PAC report will encompass the recommendations 
of the Committee, based on the hearing. 
It should be noted that there is no automatic route for the implementation of the PAC's 
conclusions and recommendations.261  The Government responds to the PAC's report in 
the form of a Treasury Minute issued as a White Paper, which explains how it intends to 
follow up the committee's suggestions.262  This is published usually 2-3 months after the 
PAC report and it outlines which of  the PAC's recommendations the government accepts 
and will  act on,  and those which it simply notes (that is,  which will not be acted on). 
Departmental replies to the Committee's reports and recommendations thus provide quite 
a good evaluation of the impact which PAC has on the government administration?63 If 
the  department  or body in  question  does  not  accept  any PAC  recommendations,  the 
Committee can return to the issue at some later point. If the PAC is not satisfied with the 
Government's response,  it may make further investigations and hence produce another 
report, which happens in practice only rarely. 
260 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, p. 50. 
261  S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, "Audit or Evaluation? A National Audit Office VFM Study", Public 
Administration, Vol. 72, 1994. 
262 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 132-132. 
263  Forty-five percent of  departmental replies between 1966 and 1978 contained statements of  the public 
bodies in question that certain actions are taken as a result of  the PAC's recommendations. Cf 
V.Flegmann, op. cit., p. 169. 
83 Although the PAC has the reputation of  being one of the most formidable and successful 
parliamentary committees, its  role in the control of public expenditure is  undoubtedly 
limited and its achievements are not often spectacular.  264 One criticism of  the PAC is that 
ex post facto review may be too late to be effective. The money is spent, the waste has 
occurred and inevitably it is difficult to trace and recover money. Related to that is  the 
problem that  PAC  reports  are published long  after the  event in question,  when those 
responsible are no  longer in the department and,  thus,  cannot be called to  account.265 
Furthermore,  PAC  is  at  times  criticised  for  lack of willingness  to  get  into  the  true 
substance of the presented case,  trying instead to  "grab the headlines" and  attract the 
audience of the MP'S.266  Its reports are therefore at times assessed as  "eccentric, over-
enthusiastic and possibly subversive.,,267 Some officials consider PAC too critical of any 
failures,  however  small,  even  in  cases  when  projects  were  generally  successful. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the fear from PAC's censure discourage officials 
from considering more innovative projects.268 
Although  all  the  mentioned  shortcomings  in  the  work  of PAC  certainly  have  some 
weight, they should not be overestimated. Whereas the ex post nature of  PAC's work may 
be criticised for its ineffectiveness, ex post accountability, as we have seen in a previous 
chapter, always has an important preventive function. Although in general the Committee 
attracts  little  attention  in  Parliament  and  its  modem role  is  not  as  influential  as  its 
nineteenth century role of setting good public-sector accountancy practice, its reports do 
get quite wide publicity and certainly have a strong impact on public bodies' financial 
decision-making and accountability.269  Delays  in reporting could also  not be taken  as 
264 B. Landers, "Encounters with the Public Accounts Committee: a Personal Memoir", Public 
Administration, 2000, pp.  195-213. 
265 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 132. 
266 B. Landers, ibid. 
267 1. Garrett, "Developing State Audit in Britain", Public Administration, Vol. 64,1986,425. 
268 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. p. 40. 
2691. Bates, "The Scrutiny of  Administration", in M. Ryle and P. Richards (eds.), The Commons under 
Scrutiny,  (Routledge), 1988. 
84 serious shortcoming, especially that the PAC, accustomed to work within the framework 
of an annual timetable, completes its inquiries and presents its reports more speedily than 
a  number of other parliamentary committees and  is  regarded by many as  the hardest 
working Committee of the Commons.270 The criticism related to expertise and neutrality 
of PAC members, however, should not be too easily dismissed. It may well be the case 
that the PAC reports are made with the attempt to attract attention of the Parliament as 
well as wider public as their key audiences, and therefore tend to overemphasise certain 
shortcomings,  while  not  addressing  less  visible  and  more  delicate  administrative 
weaknesses. 
Finally, the key limitation of the PAC is that its 15 members, who hold two hearings per 
week when Parliament is in session,  cannot handle the abundance of auditors work in 
modem times.  The NAO  already produces  more reports  than  the  PAC  can  examine. 
Possible ways forward in this respect could be subdivision of the PAC to subcommittees 
or delegation of PAC's work to  departmentally related  select committees.271  Another 
solution  is  that  PAC  focuses  its  attention  on  broader issues  and  outputs  and  not  be 
concerned with minor matters and processes. In order to reduce its workload, PAC could 
still get involved with examination of issues of lesser importance, but would not need to 
hold oral hearings on them. This would also help dismiss the arguments that PAC focuses 
too much attention on smaller failures and thus discourages innovation. In relation to this, 
it  has  been  recommended  that  PAC  use  its  position of a  cross-cutting  committee  to 
consider issues which go beyond the limits of individual departments, taking an overall, 
strategic  view  of  the  stewardship  of  public  money  (such  as  for  example,  risk 
management, corporate governance, performance measurement, fraud).272  It is  expected 
that  production of such kind of comprehensive high-level  reports  will  bring about an 
270 V. Flegmann, op. cit., p.  169; A. Adonis, Parliament Today, (Manchester University Press), 1993, 
pp.184-185. 
27J Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 131-137. 
272 L. Sharman of Redlynch, op. cit. pp. 39-41. 
85 increase in overall financial management standards throughout the various British public 
sector organisations. 
There is no doubt that the PAC has a major advantage over any other select committee 
because it relies  on the work of the NAO. The good continuous cooperation with the 
Comptroller and Auditor General as auditor of  public expenditure has thus been regarded 
as essential for the success of  the PAC's work.
273 
The Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office 
Status and structure 
The Comptroller and Auditor General  (C&AG) and the National Audit Office have a 
long  history of development,  which  is  analysed  in  Annex  1.  Their current status  and 
functions  are  governed by three  fairly  different Acts:  the  1866  Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act,274  the 1921  Exchequer and Audit Departments Act275  (which repealed 
and amended most of the provisions of the  1866  Act)  and the National Audit Act of 
1983276  (which also repealed and amended a number of provisions of the previous two 
Acts). 
The role of the C&AG and the NAO is to provide independent assurance and advice to 
Parliament  on  the  proper  accounting  for,  and  regularity  and  propriety  of  central 
Government expenditure, revenue and assets. It is also to provide independent reports to 
Parliament  on  the  economy,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  with  which  Government 
departments and other bodies use their resources. These reports form the basis for PAC 
hearings. The C&AG is responsible for the audit of a total of some £800 billion revenue 
273 A. Harrison, The Control of  Public Expenditure 1979-1989, (Policy Journals), 1989. 
274 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, 29&30, Vict.3.39 of 28 June 1866. 
275 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921, 11  and 12 Geo.5, c52 of 19 August 1921. 
276 The National Audit Act 1983, c.44 of 13 May 1983. 
86 and  expenditure  each  year,  along  with  assets  of much  greater  value  and  audits  the 
accounts of some 600 bodies and prepares around 60 value for money reports a year. 277 
The 1983 Act is quite rigorous with regard to the independence of the C&AG against the 
Government. Thus, subsection 1  (2) first establishes the status of the C&AG as an officer 
of the House of Commons. Subsection 1(1) requires the agreement of the Chairman of 
the Committee of Public Accounts to the appointment of the C&AG, which additionally 
secures independence of the C&AG since the Chairman of the PAC is always a member 
of the opposition.  Functional independence of the C&AG was provided by subsection 
1(3) of the NAO 1983 Act, which gives the C&AG complete discretion in the discharge 
of his/her  functions  concerning value  for  money studies.  Financial  independence was 
furthermore secured by the establishment of a Public Account Commission, which has a 
responsibility for approving the estimates of the NAO and also appointing an accounting 
officer for preparing the accounts of the NAO together with an independent auditor to 
audit the accounts of  the NAO.278 
The NAO does not have the status of a government department and its staff are placed 
formally outside the civil service.  The C&AG is  given a wide discretion regarding the 
staffing of the  NAO.  Subsections  3(2)  and  (3)  of the  1983  Act give  the  C&AG  the 
authority to  appoint  such staff as  he  considers  necessary for  assisting  him/her in  the 
discharge  of his/her  functions,  on  such  remuneration  and  other  terms  as  he/she  may 
determine.  Although  the  placement  of  the  NAO  staff  outside  the  civil  service 
undoubtedly underlies the independence of the NAO staff towards the executive, it may 
be  argued  that  C&AG' s  authority  over  its  staff  is  too  wide  and  could  lead  to 
administrative instability.  It therefore  may be argued  that more  stability and  possibly 
higher quality of work would be attained by giving the NAO staff the privilege of civil 
service tenure. 
277 NAO Annual Report 2005, Helping the Nation Spend Wisely, www.nao.gov.uk 
278 Sections 2 and 4 of  the NAO 1983 Act. 
87 The Office's audit staff are recruited as  university graduates. At least an upper second 
class  honours  degree  is  required  for  entering  the  service.  Graduates  are  trained  as 
professional accountants.  The Office employs around 800 staff,  most of which, around 
600,  are  professionally qualified accountants,  technicians  or trainees.  Each year NAO 
recruits around 70 graduates and trains them as  professional accountants.
279  NAO  also 
employs  other  specialists,  such  as  economists,  statisticians,  corporate  financiers, 
operational  research  specialists  and  sectoral  specialists,  which  are  often  employed on 
short-term contracts, particularly for value for money studies.
28o 
NAO is  divided into six units. A central unit offers administrative support to the other 
five  audit units.  Remaining units  are  responsible  for  both the  financial  and  value  for 
money audit within particular areas:  Unit  B,  for  example,  covers  environment,  home 
affairs,  agriculture,  inland revenue,  customs and excise,  transport and finance.
281  Each 
unit is headed by an Assistant Auditor General appointed by the C&AG. 
Functions a/the C&AG 
The  C&AG  has  two  mam  functions:  that  of Comptroller  General  and  Auditor.  As 
Comptroller  General,  the  C&AG  authorises  the  issue  of public  monies  from  the 
Consolidated Fund and the National Loan funds to Treasury, which then distributes it to 
government  departments  and  other public  sector  bodies,  as  explained  earlier.
282  The 
Comptroller function is essentially an ex ante checking, or financial control function. It is 
quite interesting that the C&AG has retained this ex ante checking role, which is one of 
the main  features  of some  other supreme  audit  institutions  in Europe.
283  However,  it 
279 NAO Annual Report 2005, pp. 34-35. 
280 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 48. 
281  Ibid. 
282 Cf. Government Accounting. 
283 This is, for example, the case with the Italian Corte di  Compti, which performs ex-ante audit of all 
public funds issues. G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control of 
the Budget - Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of  Montenegro, Podgorica, 2000. 
88 should be noted that this C&AG's function,  in comparison to other European Supreme 
Audit  Institutions,  is  quite  restrictive  and  relates  largely  to  checking  of whether  the 
requested amounts conform to the ambit of  respective votes. 
In order to  understand the function of the Comptroller General better, more should be 
said about the process of issuance of public funds,  which could be depicted as  follows. 
Treasury requests  granting of the  monies  of the public  funds  from  the  C  &AG.  The 
amount sought is checked by the Comptroller section of the NAO to ensure that it comes 
within the total voted or,  in case of standing services, such as judicial pensions or EU 
funds, to ensure its conformity with the legislation,z84 Provided the above criteria are met, 
credits are rarely refused. The only occasions when the C &AG refuses granting a credit 
are  in cases  when the  Treasury requisitions  accidentally exceed the monies  voted by 
Parliament, or ifthere is an error in quoting the authorising legislation,z85 In the course of 
2004-2005, a new payment system has been introduced, requiring on-line authorisation 
for  payments  from  the  public  Funds  from  the  C&AG.  The Treasury and  the  C&AG 
managed to complete the transition to the new process successfully.286 
The  second  and  mam  function  of the  C&AG  is  of auditor  general  of the  central 
Government  accounts.  As  an  auditor  general,  C&AG  is  responsible  for  checking the 
legality, regularity, propriety and value for money of the  spending ex post. There are, 
thus, two basic strands of C&AG' s work:  financial audit and value for money audit. As 
we  could  see  earlier,  there  is  a  close  connection  between  these  two  types  of audit, 
especially from  the  administrative  law point of view.  Looking  from  a  more  practical 
perspective, an overlap between these two functions can also be found, since findings in 
financial audit can provide a basis for value for money audit and vice versa.
287  However, 
financial audit and value for money audit are generally perceived as  distinct disciplines, 
284 F.  White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 47-48. 
285 Ibid. pp. 58-59. 
286 NAO, General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-05, www.nao.goY.uk 
287 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 60-61. 
89 and  are performed by NAO  as  strictly  separate  exerCIses.  Therefore,  we  shall  devote 
closer attention to each of  them separately. 
Financial audit 
The basis for the financial audit of the C&AG are provided in the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act 1921, subsection 1(1): 
"Every appropriation account shall be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General on behalf  of  the 
House of  Commons and in examination of  such accounts the Comptroller and Auditor General shall satisfy 
himself  that the money expended has been applied to the purpose or purposes for which the grants made by 
Parliament were intended to provide and that the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it. " 
Financial audit, traditionally called certification audit,  thus involves two basic kinds of 
examination: 
whether the figures in the account are properly stated (requirement of accuracy of 
the accounts) and 
whether  the  payments  and  receipts  accord  with  Parliament's  intentions  and 
relevant legislation and other regulations (requirement of regularity/legality and 
probity of  the accounts). 
In addition to these examinations, the C&AG investigates whether accounts comply with 
the requirements of  propriety and probity, which we have discussed earlier. If the account 
contains material misstatements and does not satisfy the above requirements, the auditor 
shall qualify its opinion on it. 288 Qualified opinion is always followed by a report, which 
288 In 2004-2005 fiscal year, the NAO has qualified its opinion on only two sets of  departmental resource 
accounts compared to four qualifications in the prior year. It has further qualified its opinion on eleven sets 
90 provides the background and the reasons for the qualification?89 If, however it does not 
find any irregularities, NAO shall produce a clear opinion or a clear opinion and a report 
(in the case that it wants to bring some matter which has arisen in the course of  the audit 
to the attention of Parliament and into the public domain). After the process of audit is 
finalised,  the C&AG issues a certificate of audit, where he/she confirms that audit has 
been  undertaken  and  expresses  his/her  opinion  on  the  accuracy,  legality,  regularity, 
propriety and probity of the accounts. When the audit is completed and the account has 
been  examined,  certified and reported  upon,  the  C&AG  signs-off the  account,  which 
cannot be reopened afterwards.  290 
At least theoretically, the C&AG is statutorily responsible for forming an opinion on all 
the accounts. Practically, of course, the work necessary to form that opinion is delegated 
to a team of auditors, usually comprising of a director, an audit manager, and a principal 
auditor who  may be assisted by other junior staff.291  The  size  of the team,  naturally, 
depends on the accounts of  a particular audited body. 
Nowadays,  NAO  practices  two  basic  audit approaches:  system based audit and  'risk-
based'  approach.  System  based  audit  focuses  on  testing  samples  of  individual 
transactions, on the basis of which the conclusions on reliability of the internal controls 
or  systems  established  within  the  public  body are  made?92  The  risk-based  approach 
involves a more comprehensive understanding of an audited body's business, the risk it 
faces and the controls in place to manage those risks.293 It consists of  provision of advice 
to  the  audited  body on  accounting  issues  and  financial  controls,  commenting  where 
of  accounts of other public bodies. See: General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004-
2005. www.nao.gov.uk, pp. 10-13. 
289 F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 73-74. 
290 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
291  Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
292 Ibid., p. 28. 
293 General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General, 2004-2005. www.nao.gov.uk, pp. 25-27; NAO 
Annual Report, 2001, Focusing on Success. 
91 appropriate on possible improvements in accounting and financial control systems which 
have  been identified  during  the  audit.  Where  the  C&AG considers  that  a  significant 
breakdown in financial control has occurred, he/she will report this matter to Parliament 
by means of a  qualified audit opinion and a  report, while other weaknesses identified 
during the C&AG's examination are brought to the attention of  management of  the body. 
In many instances this is done through day-to-day contact with audited public bodies, but 
more important issues are usually addressed formally in letters to management.294  It is 
interesting to  note that reporting of its findings in the form of management letters puts 
NAO  in  the  interesting  position of more  a  Government  management  consultant  than 
external auditor, since a direct connection between the NAO and auditee is established, 
without elements of  democratic, parliamentary accountabiIity.295 
Lastly,  when  talking  about  financial  audit,  we  shall  address  the  issue  of C&AG 
institutional jurisdiction. C&AG's financial audit jurisdiction is determined by the 1866 
and 1921  Act. Besides, C&AG 's jurisdiction over public bodies can be established by a 
specific statute or an agreement. Thus, the core financial audit work of  C&AG is directed 
at three main groups of  accounts: 
1)  central  government departmental appropriation accounts audited under the terms of 
the 1866 Act; 
2)  agency resource accounts audited  under the  1921  Act or the Government Trading 
Funds Act 1973; and 
3)  the  accounts  of other  bodies  audited  under  the  terms  of a  specific  statute  or by 
agreement. 
294 See for example: NAO Annual report, Helping the Nation to Spend Wisely, 1999. Management letters 
can have quite an important effect on central government bodies. In 1999 NAO have sent 514 management 
letters, prompting the bodies it audits to make over 1.300 changes to their systems in response. NAO has 
estimated that in total, 94 per cent of  the recommendation it made in management letters were accepted and 
implemented by audited bodies. 
295 F. White, K.  Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp.  128-129. 
92 Such institutional jurisdiction was not satisfactory,  as  it was not brought up to date to 
reflect the changes  in the delivery of central  government services.  Namely,  when the 
1866  and  1921  Acts  was  passed,  the  central  Government  consisted  mainly  of 
Government departments, which gave the C&AG the right of access to all public money. 
As the organisation of central Government has drastically changed in the last century, the 
statutory provisions of the 1866 Act were obviously obsolete, as they did not include a 
number of  different public bodies created at the central Government level in the previous 
decades. For example, due to strong resistance from their lobbies, nationalised industries 
and statutory public  corporations have never been subject to  C&AG's jurisdiction.  A 
large  number  of diverse  executive  non-departmental  public  bodies  (NDPB's)  were 
excluded from the C&AG's jurisdiction.296  Moreover, C&AG was not allowed to audit 
companies  established by central  government bodies,  basically due to  legal  problems 
imposed by the Companies Act 1989, which envisages that only a registered auditor can 
audit a body established as a limited company.297 Lastly, the ability of  the NAO to follow 
public monies into private contractors' hands and local public spending bodies was also 
significantly constrained.  298 
These  concerns  were  expressed  in  one  of the  reports  of the  Committee  of Public 
Accounts,299  which stressed that a  number of publicly funded bodies were audited by 
auditors appointed by, and reporting to, Ministers, rather than Parliament's own officer -
C&AG. In  February 2000, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury announced a review of 
audit and accountability arrangements in central government in response to Committee's 
concerns. The Review was led by Lord Sharman of Redlynch and its findings endorsed 
296 Labour Government has provided that all executive NDPB's created since May 1997 have had the 
C&AG appointed as their statutory auditor. Previous to this, where an executive NDBP was newly 
established and the C&AG was not the appointed auditor under relevant legislation, this was a matter 
largely within the remit of  the parent department. 
297 L. Sharman of Redlynch, ibid. 
298  F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. pp. 86-87. 
299 PAC, Report on Government Resources and Accounts Bill,  9
th  Report 1999-2000 HC  159. 
93 by the Committee of Public Accounts quickly.300 The key recommendations of  the report 
were the following: 
as a matter of  principle, the C&AG should be the auditor, on behalf of  Parliament, 
of  all non-departmental public bodies, 
the C&AG's access rights should be formalised where they are currently based on 
negotiated agreement or conventions; 
the C&AG should be able to audit companies owned by a department, or which 
are subsidiaries of  a non-departmental public body. 
The Government has swiftly positively responded to the Review's recommendations on 
institutional jurisdiction of the  C&AG.301  Thus,  the  Treasury has  made  seven  orders 
under the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 (GRAA) extending the C&AG 
statutory rights of access to  all NDPBs. These orders came into force on 23  May 2003, 
extending the  C&AG jurisdiction to  most NDPBs and is  working  on  coverage of all 
NDPB's within the C&AG remit.302 As for the audit of companies, the progress on Lord 
Sharman's review has been slower, due to the need to change the existing legislation on 
companies. At the moment, the Government is preparing the Company Law Reform Bill, 
which should enable the C&AG to  audit government owned companies. The NAO has 
already started working on the preparation for the implementation of such measures, in 
continuous  consultation  with  the  Institute  of Chartered  Accountants  in  England  and 
Wales and the Department of  Trade and Industry and the Treasury.303 
300 6
th Report, Session 2000-01, He 260. 
301  Audit and Accountability in  Central Government,  The Government's response to Lord Sharman's report 
"Holding to Account", March 2002, http://www.hm-treasury/gov.uk 
302 NAG, Financial Auditing and Reporting, General Report of  the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-
2005, www.nao.gov.uk, p.22. 
303  Ibid. p.6. 
94 Value/or Money Audit 
It is  often  argued  that  the  C&AG  concern  for  issues  of economy,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness  has  for  quite  some  time  constituted  a  part  of public  sector  auditor's 
responsibilities.
304  However,  the  existing  practice  of value  for  money  studies  was 
formally recognised only recently, by  Part II of the 1983 Act. Thus, Section 6 provides 
that  the  C&AG  may  "carry  out  examinations  into  the  economy,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness with which any department, authority or other body to which this section 
applies,  has  used its resources in  discharging its functions".  Section 6(3)  specifies the 
C&AG jurisdiction in conducting value for money studies to: 
any department required to prepare an appropriation account under the 1866 Act; 
any body required  to  keep  accounts  under  section  98  of the  National  Health 
Service Act  1977  or section 86 of the National  Health Service (Scotland) Act 
1978; 
any authority or body whose accounts are required to be examined and certified 
by,  or are  open  to  the  inspection  of the  C&AG  by virtue  of any  enactment 
including an enactment passed after this Act; and 
any authority or body whose accounts are required to be examined and certified or 
are  open  to  the  inspection  of the  C&AG  by virtue  of any  agreement  made, 
whether before or after the passing of this Act, between the authority or body and 
a Minister of  the Crown. 
Furthermore, section 7 (1) prescribes that if the C&AG has reasonable cause to believe 
that any authority or body has in any of its financial years received more than half of its 
income from public funds, he may carry out an examination into the economy, efficiency 
and  effectiveness  with  which  it  has  in that  year used its  resources  in  discharging  its 
functions.  However,  section  (4)  specifies  that  this  refers  only  to  bodies  which  are 
appointed by the  Crown and explicitly excludes remaining nationalised industries  and 
304 D. Dewar, "Value for Money Audit: The first 800 years", Public Finance and Accountability, 1985. 
95 some  statutory  public  corporations  from  C&AG's  institutional  remit.  Section  8, 
furthermore,  provides  the  C&AG  a  right  of access  at  all  reasonable  times  to  all 
documents in the custody or under the control of the department, authority or other body 
being audited, as he may reasonably require to  conduct a value for money examination. 
Finally,  section 9 stipulates that the  C&AG may report to  the House of Commons the 
results of any value for money investigation. 
Since  1983,  the NAO  has  produced about 40-60 value  for  money reports  each  year, 
covering a wide range of  government activities. Value for money studies usually focus on 
a specific topic, such as  introduction of new government policies, implementation of a 
new programme or the management of  a service or a crisis. 
Although  each  study is  umque,  several  stages  in the  production  of value  for  money 
reports can be discerned. The first stage involves a research and study selection. Topics 
are identified by audit staff from close monitoring and analysis of the risks to value for 
money across various public services.
305  A study can also originate from other sources, 
including members of the Parliament, departments themselves, or the public.
306 The PAC 
has a particular statutory role in relation to study selection. Section 1  (3) of the 1983 Act 
provides that in determining whether or not to  carry out a value for money study, the 
C&AG  must  take  into  account  any  proposals  made  by  the  PAC.  After  the  initial 
identification  of the  study  and  approval  by  the  C&AG,  full  investigation  can  be 
undertaken. The report is usually conducted by the audit team, comprising one director, 
one audit manager and one or two principal or senior managers. The following stage is a 
production of a draft report by the audit team and its presentation to  the auditee, who is 
given about four weeks to respond. This process of sending the draft report to the auditee 
is  known  as  clearance.  Its  objective  is  to  reach  an  agreement between  the NAO  and 
auditee on the facts of the case, making sure that both sides agree that all materials and 
305 NAO Annual Report, 1999. 
306 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., pp. 74-76. 
96 relevant facts  have been included in the report and that their presentation was  fair.
307 
Where a common ground does not exist, both views can be reflected in the report.  The 
last phase is publication of  the vim report, which will generally include recommendations 
to the auditee.
308 
It should be noted that as NAO has moved further away from the account-based approach 
and  has  found  its  higher  profile  role  examining  value  for  money  of Government 
programmes, it has experienced some problems in relationships with the executive. After 
some initial misunderstanding of what was expected, efforts have been made to work out 
acceptable forms of  words going beyond the purely factual element in a report. However, 
as seen from the executive, the NAO has been pushing at the frontiers of its remit and 
encroaching on policy issues, which needs to be strongly discouraged. This has provoked 
substantial problems when conduct of  value for money studies is in question. 
It has been argued that among three Es, effectiveness, concerned with the extent to which 
outputs  of goods  or  services  achieve  policy  objectives,  although  undoubtedly  most 
controversial,  has  the  greatest potential  for  bringing  about  change  and  saving  public 
funds, while maintaining the quality of service provision.
309  However, most authors and 
NAO auditors agree that up  to  now relatively few genuine audits of effectiveness have 
been carried out. 
3 
\0 Audit offices are criticised for concentrating too much on ensuring 
307 This convention was formalized following a Committee of Public Accounts hearing in  1986 when NAO 
and auditee, Department of  Education and Science, disagreed on the facts ofthe vfm report. PAC refused to 
arbitrate between the NAO and departments and asked for process to be reviewed and agreement on facts to 
be made. Cf J. Keen, "On the Nature of  Audit Judgements: The Case of  Value for Money Studies", Public 
Administration 1999, 77, 509-525. 
308 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 77. 
309 H.  Gordon, "Effectiveness Audit in the Audit Offices", Public Money & Management, 1998, pp. 5-6; 1. 
Glynn, Valuefor Money Auditing in the Public Sector, (Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales),1985. 
310 Ibid; M. Pendelbury, O. Shreim, "UK Auditors' Attitudes to Effectiveness Auditing", Financial 
Accountability & Management, 6(3), 1990. 
97 that the existing rules, regulations and systems are appropriately applied, without giving 
sufficient consideration whether they are the best available option to achieve policy aims. 
There are several reasons why effectiveness audit is rarely carried out in NAO practice. 
One is that it is very difficult to determine the effectiveness of  public services. Objectives 
of government  policies  are  often  vague  and  ambiguous,  and  even  more  so  is  the 
measurement  of  their  achievement.
311  Furthermore,  effectiveness  is  a  particularly 
sensitive matter because it has the potential to question the merits of policy objectives.
312 
Since  policy  decisions-making  is  in  exclusive  competence  of the  executive,  any 
interference of the auditor in policy matters is deemed unacceptable and is forbidden by 
the  1983  Act.  Thus,  subsection (2)  prohibits the C&AG from  questioning the merits of 
the  policy  objectives  of any  department,  authority  or  body  in  respect  of which  an 
examination is carried out. 
Although it is not disputed that an auditor should not judge the policy objectives, he/she 
has to be allowed access to policy information, in order to establish the policy aim and 
hence assess whether it has been achieved. Only after establishing what policy objectives 
are, can an auditor examine the means by which the policy is put into effect and consider 
alternative strategies which could achieve the same results at lesser costs.
313  Therefore, if 
effectiveness audit is to be carried out, the first step is  to  enable auditors to get familiar 
with policy issues, having access to  information and papers so that the auditor can gain 
in-depth knowledge of  the main components of  the relevant policies.
314 
It seems however that fear of interfering with policy objectives prevents auditors from 
carrying out effectiveness examinations at all. It often happens in practice that financial 
aspects  of the  policy are  identified with  the  policy itself.  Thus,  Departments  usually 
311  Ibid. 
312 Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit, pp. 74-76. 
313 H. Gordon, op. cit. 
314 D. Dewar, 'The Auditor General and the Examination of  Policy", International Journal o/Government 
Auditing, 1986, pp. 10-12. 
98 defend their positions by claiming that auditors are interfering with issues of policy, in 
the cases when auditors attempt to examine only its financial implementation aspect.315 
This discussion raises  several  criticisms  when conduct of value  for  money studies by 
NAO  is  in  question.  Although NAO  has  a  guaranteed constitutional  independence,  it 
looks as if  it is too reluctant to undertake more radical measures when examining whether 
public bodies have achieved value for money for the use of allocated resources. One of 
the problems is  that the NAO reports  are  usually extensively cleared with the  audited 
bodies concerned. This procedure can take quite a long time, involve lots of compromise 
and result in a more biased than truly independent study.  As  a corollary, NAO reports 
often yield fairly general and polite recommendations, simply pointing out that particular 
management  aspects  of  the  body  in  question  require  "continuing  attention,,316  or 
"review",317 instead of providing more detailed measures which the audited body should 
take in order to improve unsatisfactory segments of its work.318  The problem is that the 
more  controversial  and  open  to  argument  the  NAO'  s  recommendations,  the  less 
authoritative they will be, especially if  the findings are to be unfair, and the more likely is 
that  they  will  not be accepted.319  Furthermore,  as  previously mentioned,  auditors  are 
rather  hesitant  to  undertake  serious  efficiency  studies,  not  wanting  to  interfere  with 
questions of  policy in any way. 
The  explanation  of  such  a  position  of NAO  when  conducting  value  for  money 
investigations may be sought for in the ultimate dependence of the NAO on the Public 
Accounts  Committee  and  Parliament.  Although  NAO's  independence  towards  both 
Parliament  and  PAC  is  constitutionally  supported,  NAO's position of "Parliamentary 
assistant" requires him to  pay attention to  the needs of its main audiences, members of 
315 H. Gordon, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
316 See for example NAO vfm report: "The BBC: Collecting the Television Licence FEE", 2001-02. 
317 See for example NAO vfm report, "Government on the Web II", 2001-02. 
318 S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, "Audit or Evaluation? A National Audit Office VFM Study", Public 
Administration, Vol. 72, pp. 527-549. 
319 A. Harrison, The Control of  Public Expenditure J  979-J  989, (Policy Journals), 1989. 
99 the PAC and Parliament. In this sense, NAO has to make sure that its reports will, firstly, 
raise  interest of the  members  of the  PAC,  otherwise their usefulness  could be put in 
question. NAO is thus criticised for conducting "headline hunting" studies, which would 
undoubtedly attract PAC's attention, instead of  producing more demanding reports, based 
on complex societal issues. Secondly, and more importantly, NAO's work is constrained 
by its need to balance opposing views on more sensitive political issues, taking care not 
to provoke partisanship among its "political" audience.
32o Therefore, it may be expected 
that if NAO would tackle some of the more sensitive Government policies,  this could 
divide PAC on political lines and question the authority and legitimacy of  both PAC and 
NAO. In this way,  the basis of the British system of financial accountability would be 
substantively disturbed. 
It may be argued that the above critics overemphasise some of  the inherent weaknesses of 
the  British  financial  accountability  system.  It  should be  stressed  that  the  1980s  have 
undoubtedly brought about a substantial improvement in the arrangements made for the 
external audit of the public sector,  strengthening the  independent position of the NAO 
towards the PAC and the Parliament. Since its institutional independence was established 
in 1983, the C&AG has not hesitated to  investigate areas which the Government of the 
day  might  consider sensitive,  as,  for  example,  was  the  case  with  introduction of the 
financial  management  initiative  into  central  government  Departments,  Ministry  of 
Defense's purchasing policies and number of other cases which reflected badly on the 
Government's  management of Departmental  resources.
32
!  NAO  also  became  the  first 
national audit institution to examine the variety and complexity of privatization sales.
322 
More recent NAO studies have focused on some of the key British societal issues, such 
as, for example, the national health service system, which has for quite a while been the 
320 S. Roberts, C. Pollitt, op. cit., pp. 546-547. 
321  A. Harrison, ibid. 
322 National Audit Office, He 645, Session 1995-6; The  Work of  the Directors of  Telecommunications.  Gas 
Supply.  Water Service and Electricity Supply. 
100 subject of a great number of NAO's critical reports.
323  NAO has also quickly responded 
to crises which occurred at various public service areas.
324 Lastly, in recent years NAO, 
together  with  PAC,  has  started  producing  high-level  overview  reports  on  thematic 
subjects.
325 The objective of these reports is to draw out lessons from a number of more 
detailed reports  on  similar  subjects  and  disseminate  good practice  throughout  central 
Government.  In this way,  NAO has  started developing a new function as  Government 
advisor. 
The final  question which remains to  be answered is how can the implementation of the 
recommendations of the NAO be secured and strengthened? The present situation is that 
the Government formally responds to  each PAC report, which means at least that each 
recommendation  is  looked  at.  One  step  forward  in  that  respect  is  to  require  explicit 
acknowledgement of the relevance of the auditor's main findings and a statement of the 
action taken in response to them. A further step would be to give NAO and PAC reports 
even wider publicity in the media and thus  increase the pressure of the public on the 
Government. Although this influence has up to now been considerable, it is essential that 
the public is informed of  NAO findings timeously and extensively. Therefore, one of the 
conclusions may be that in a long run, the effectiveness of  the NAO will depend not only 
on the expertise and quality of the NAO'  s work, but also and even more on the general 
323  See recent NAO reports on NHS: The NHS Cancer Plan -A Progress Report, HC 343, 2004-2005; 
Tackling Cancer: Improving the Patient Journey, He 288, 2004-2005; Darent Valley Hospital: The PFI 
Contract in Action, HC 209, 2004-2005; Patient Choice at the Point ofGP Referral, www.nao.org.uk 
324 Cf. NAO reports: Reducing Crime: The Home Office working with Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnership, HC 16,2004-2005; London Underground: Are the Public Private Partnerships likely to work 
successfully? He 644, 2003-2004; Regeneration of  the Millennium Dome and Associated Land, He 178, 
2004-2005; Shadow Strategic Rail Authority: Action to improve passenger rail services (1999-00). 
www.nao.goY.uk 
325 Cf NAO reports: Good Practice in Performance Reporting in Executive Agencies and Non-
Departmental Public Bodies; Examining the Value for Money of  Deals under the Private Finance 
Initiative; Supporting Innovation: Managing Risk in Government Departments. 
101 climate within which they work, i.e. the general level of public interest in the questions 
h  .  326  t  eyexamme. 
The Government Accounting System 
Public accounts in the United Kingdom have traditionally been prepared on a cash basis, 
but in recent years there has been a substantial shift towards accruals accounts. This has 
been  provided  by  the  Government  Resources  and  Accounts  Act  of 2000.  The  key 
objective of  the introduction of  resource accounting and budgeting, as we could see, is to 
improve  the  planning  and  control  of Government  spending  as  well  as  to  improve 
departments'  accountability  to  Parliament  through  more  comprehensive  financial 
information it will provide. We shall analyse in more detail sections of  the Act which are, 
in our opinion, most relevant for audit and accountability. 
Section  5  of the  Resources  and  Accounts  Act  2000  reinforces  the  1866  and  1921 
Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts' provisions that the Treasury prescribes the form 
in which the accounts are laid. However, it also requires the Treasury to, in determining 
the content of accounts, have regard to any relevant guidance issued by the Accounting 
Standards  Board
327  and  include  in  the  accounts  contents:  statement  of  financial 
performance, statement of financial position and a cash flow statement.
328  Section 5 (6) 
puts on a statutory basis the appointment of  accounting officers, who shall be responsible 
for the preparation of the department's resource accounts and their transmission to  the 
Comptroller and Auditor Genera1.
329 Sections 6 and 8 furthermore deal with authorities of 
the C &  AG in examination of accounts.  Subsection 6 (1) prescribes that in examining 
326 A. Harrison, ibid. 
327 The body responsible for setting accounting standards under the companies legislation. Its independence 
is strengthened by the Act by requiring the Treasury to consult the C&AG in the process of selection of  its 
members. 
328 s. 5(4)a and b. 
329 s. 5(7). 
102 any resource accounts, the C &  AG must satisfy him/herself that: a) the accounts present 
a true and fair view, b) that money provided by Parliament has been expended for the 
purposes intended by Parliament, c)  that resources authorised by Parliament to  be used 
have been used for the purposes in relation to  which the use was authorised, d)  that the 
department's financial transactions are in accordance with any relevant authority. While 
the  first  paragraph  (a)  reflects  the  change  from  cash  to  accrual  accounting  requiring 
provision of the opinion usually given by auditors on company accounts, the remaining 
items may be subsumed under the regularity requirements of cash accounts and legality 
requirements when looked from the legal point of  view. 
The Resources and Accounts Act 2000 has also provided for the preparation and audit of 
consolidated  accounts  for  the  whole  of the  public  sector  (Whole  of Government 
Accounts- WGA).  The Treasury has been introducing the WGA gradually, by making 
preliminary central government sub-consolidations for the financial years 2001-2002 and 
2002-2003 and more complete central government consolidation account for the financial 
year 2003-2004, which has been subject to the NAO audit. At the moment the Treasury is 
working on inclusion of  the local authorities, health trusts and public corporations within 
the WGA, which will add a great number of public bodies to  the consolidation process 
and will require harmonisation of accounting policies.
33o It is expected that the whole of 
government account will provide Parliament with an overall picture of the financial state 
of the public sector,  allowing in this way more effective scrutiny of the government's 
economic policies.
331 
The  introduction  of the  resource  accounting  and  budgeting  as  well  as  the  whole  of 
government  account  has  undoubtedly  brought  about  improvements  in  accountability 
arrangements of  the central Government, providing Parliament and other interested actors 
330 NAO, Financial Auditing and Reporting, General Report o/the Comptroller and Auditor General 2004-
2005, pp. 20-2l. 
331  F.  White, K.  Hollingsworth, "Public finance reform: The Government Resource and Accounts Act 
2000", op. cit., pp. 56-61. 
103 with  more  sophisticated  financial  information  on  the  basis  of which  accountability 
standards  are  measured.  Encouraging results  of reforms  are  to  be thanked  first  to  the 
Treasury,  which has designed a very good strategy of gradual introduction of resource 
accounting in the central Government.
332 However, full success and effectiveness of  these 
reforms will greatly depend on the ability of  its users to understand and efficiently use the 
information provided.
333  In this sense, it is essential that the Parliament's support to the 
resource  accounting  project  is  strengthened  and  that  the  members  of the  PAC  are 
provided further education and training on how the new financial informational base can 
be used for enhancing accountability of the executive for the public money stewardship 
to Parliament and the public. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Despite some inherent weaknesses, the British system of financial accountability can be 
depicted as well-tried and effective. It is based on external, parliamentary accountability, 
where  Parliament,  through the  work of its  Public  Accounts  Committee,  based on the 
expertise of NAO,  holds  the  executive to  account for  the  legal  and productive use  of 
public money. The other key chain of accountability is managerial, established between 
the Treasury and accounting officers of public bodies, where ex ante financial  control 
tasks have been delegated from the former to the latter. Accounting officers represent the 
key link between these  two  lines  of accountability,  since both the  Parliament and the 
Treasury can call them to account for stewardship of  public money. 
The developments in the accountability system have had an important impact on the basic 
systematic premises,  such as  one of the concept of public money stewardship.  In  that 
sense, it should be noted that traditionally clear lines between the issues of legality and 
regularity of public expenditure on the one hand and value for money on the other hand 
332 This is contrast to Australia and New Zealand which undertook a rapid approach to resource accounting 
implementation. Cf. D. Heald, "The Implementation of Resource Accounting in UK Central Government", 
op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
333 F.  White, K. Hollingsworth, ibid. 
104 have been unequivocally blurred.  Hence,  attainment of value  for  money in the  use  of 
public funds in Britain is no longer of secondary importance, but constitutes an equally 
important standard against which financial accountability is measured. 
The UK system of accountability has further been significantly enhanced by extending 
the jurisdiction of the C&AG to  other public bodies, especially NDPBs, and a gradual 
introduction of  resource accounting and budgeting and. It is expected that the new way of 
financial  reporting,  contained in the  application of resource accounting and budgeting 
introduced through The Resources  and Accounts Act 2000  will  substantially improve 
both  internal  and  external  financial  accountability.  New  accounting  practices  are 
perceived to  enhance departmental management as well as bring about better value for 
money in the use of resources. More importantly, new financial reporting should provide 
Parliament with high quality information on the basis of which it could, on behalf of the 
citizens, more efficiently exercise both its ex ante and ex post democratic accountability 
title. 
105 Chapter III 
Financial Accountability in France 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse the financial accountability system of France. 
Following the structure of the previous chapter, we shall examine the way that financial 
accountability, as a relationship established between the citizens, as accountors, and the 
state, as accountee, where citizens are holding the state to account for the stewardship of 
entrusted public money, is operationalised in the French state context. In  this sense, we 
shall  first  analyse the  'who  is  accountable'  dimension of accountability,  attempting to 
provide an overview of the  structure of the  French state.  This will be followed by an 
examination of  the 'for what' financial accountability dimension, which should reveal the 
complexity of the  concept of "stewardship" of public money in France.  However,  the 
focus  of our  inquiry,  again,  will  be  placed  on  the  fourth  financial  accountability 
dimension  - mechanisms  through  which  the  accountability  relationship  operates. 
Throughout our research we shall especially focus on the impact that the Law Regulating 
the Public Finance in France, so called - LOLF
334 has had on the financial accountability 
framework in France in the last couple of  years. 
Another Highly Complex Accountee - the French Central Government 
Constitutional background 
Unlike Britain, France has possessed a strong administrative state tradition since at least 
Napoleonic times.
335  After many hundreds of years of monarchy, a variety of political 
334 La Loi Organique Relative aux Lois de Finances (LOLF),  Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of I 
August 2001  on budget acts, 'French Official Journal' No. 177 of2 August 2001, p.  12480. 
335 The differences between the Anglo-Saxon and continental traditional perception of  the state are certainly 
corollary of different historic paths of  the British Isles and the continent from XVII onwards. The 
supremacy of Parliament in Britain has been already established after the revolution in 1688 and 
sovereignty had been vested in Parliament instead of  the monarch. At the same time, the continent 
106 systems  followed:  First  Republic  (1792-1804),  First  Empire  (1804-1815),  Restored 
Monarchy (1815- 1830), Liberal Monarchy (1830-1848), Second Republic (1848-1852), 
Second Empire (1852-1870), Third Republic (1870-1940), Fourth Republic (1946- 1958). 
The current Fifth Republic was proclaimed in 1958. 
France's  republican  status  is  enshrined  in  the  Constitution.  The  Fifth  Republic  has 
increased the power of the executive in order to promote strong and stable government. 
The constitutional and political reinforcement of the  executive led to  a  corresponding 
reduction in the powers of the parliament. Thus, many of the important laws passed in 
Parliament are so-called lois d'orientation, laws which present only the general outlines 
and guidelines of legislation.
336  The Constitution, in tum, vests in the executive strong 
powers to regulate by decree (decrets).337 
The  French  Parliament  is  comprised  of  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Senate. 
Deputies  of the National  Assembly are  elected by direct  elections,  and  represent  the 
people of territorial units of the Republic. The Senate members, in tum, are elected by 
indirect election and represent French nationals settled outside France.
338 
Revision of the Constitution in 1962 provided for a powerful President and the creation 
of a  so-called  'semi-Presidential'  political  system.  The  President  is  elected  by direct 
popular vote for a five-year term.
339 The President appoints the Prime Minister, appoints 
experienced at least another century of absolutist state development, which brought about alienation 
between the state and the citizens. Cf C. Knill, The Europeanisation of  National Administrations, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 74. 
336 V. Wright, The Government and Politics of  France, London, Routhedge, 1994, pp. 100-101. 
337 L. N. Brown, J. Bell, French Administrative Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), 1993, pp. 8-9. 
338 Article 24 of  the French Constitution. 
339 From 1962 to 2002, the President was chosen for the seven year term. However, referendum of  2000 has 
changed President's mandate to 5 years, since it was out of  step with the five-year lifetime of  parliament, 
and three times in the past 14 years that has produced paralysing "cohabitations" between presidents and 
prime ministers of different political persuasions that have effectively stymied major institutional change. 
107 senior  civil  servants  and  military  commanders  and  oversees  observance  of  the 
constitution.34o  He promulgates laws passed by Parliament and has the power, although 
seldom  used,  to  refer  laws  back  to  the  Parliament.341.  As  in  every  parliamentary 
democracy,  Government is  responsible to  the National Assembly (the lower house of 
Parliament) and must resign if it loses  a  vote of confidence.  The resignation has  not 
always been accepted by the President, who may maintain the Prime Minister in office 
and call for new general elections after dissolution of  the National Assembly.342 
In  order to  secure balance between the judicial and legislative power, draftsmen of the 
1958 Constitution have established a new institution, the Constitutional Council (Conseil 
Constitutionnel).343 The basic function of the Constitutional Council is adjudication upon 
the  validity of presidential, parliamentary elections and referenda344  and  checking  the 
constitutionality of  laws approved by the Parliament.345 
The  French  political  system  cannot  be  classified  fully  either  as  "majoritarian"  or 
consensual. Cabinets are usually one-party or a minimal coalition, but these majoritarian 
characteristics are counterbalanced by the existence of a multi-party system and a strong 
President.346  During the period since 1980 there has been a fairly frequent alternation of 
the parties in office.  In the majority of cases the President and the Government came 
from  the same political party,  but there were periods when this  was not the case (the 
periods  of cohabitation  - Jospin  government  under President  Chirac,  1997-2002,  for 
example). 
340 Article 7 of  the French Constitution. 
341  Article 10 of  the French Constitution. 
342 V. Wright, The Government and Politics of  France, (London, Routhedge) 1994. 
343 Articles 56 - 63 of  the French Constitution. 
344 Articles 58, 59 and 60 of  the French Constitution. 
345 Cf. L. N. Brown, 1. Bell, op. cit., pp. 14-15. 
346 C.  Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, Public Management Reform - A Comparative Analysis, (Oxford University 
Press 1999), p. 227. 
108 France can furthermore be depicted as  a "legal model" state (rechtsstaat).347  The state 
activity is  overtly regulated by legal rules and the state administration conceived as  an 
autonomous  domain  apart  from  civil  society.  France  has  a  well-developed  system of 
administrative  law  (droit  administratij),  largely  created  by precedents  of the  Conseil 
d'Etat, which had an immense influence on evolution of administrative law concepts.
348 
And while in the United Kingdom conflicts between public authorities and the ordinary 
citizens are solved by the 'ordinary' courts, France has a number of specially constituted 
administrative courts, which exclusively exercise control over Government bodies.
349  In 
this  way,  the  French  legal  founders  wanted  to  achieve  a  full  separation  between 
legislative, administrative and judicial power. 
It is interesting to note that the French administrative system also recognises a strict legal 
division of the civil service into a large number of corps, each with its own educational 
entry requirements and its own set of hierarchically arranged posts, defined by a general 
civil service law.
35o The state power is mainly situated at the grands corps of the state, 
comprised of:  the  Inspection  des finances  (financial  inspectorate),  the  Conseil  d'Etat 
(Supreme Administrative  Court)  and  the  Cour des  Comptes  (The  Court of Accounts, 
hereinafter the Cour). All these bodies recruit their members from the prestigious Ecole 
Nationale d 'Administration. 
Despite its 'rigid' traditional structure, the French state has undergone significant reforms 
during the last several decades. There have been a series of  reform initiatives by different 
governments,  focusing  on  decentralisation/deconcentration  and  privatisation.  Thus,  in 
1982,  under the socialist Mitterrand's Government, a significant transfer of power from 
347 L. N. Brown, J. Bell, op. cit., p. 7. 
348 G. Braibant, Administrativno pravo Francuske [French Administrative Law}, (Sluzbeni list SRJ, em 
Podgorica) 2002, pp. 403-426, translation of  G. Braibant, Le Droit Administratif  Francais (Presse de la 
fondation nationale des sciences politiques & Dalloz), 1992. 
349 Ibid. 
350 This feature of  the French administrative system has been interpreted as one of  the sources of 
considerable rigidity and resistance to public management reforms. C. Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, op. cit., p. 231. 
109 central to  regional and local government occurred.
351  Furthermore, during the period of 
the socialist government (1981-86) extensive nationalizations were undertaken (exactly 
the opposite of  the trend which was beginning to develop in the UK). Shortly afterwards, 
however,  the  neo-liberal  government  of  Chirac  (1986-88)  has  started  excessive 
privatisation, which resumed in a more moderate way in  1993, after the right regained 
power.  This  trend  continued  by  the  following  socialist  Government  resulting  in 
privatisation of a great majority of state corporations. Therefore, in the last 25  years the 
central Government in France witnessed significant reduction of  its scope. 
Variety a/public bodies 
The French central Government comprises a number of fairly different bodies,  which, 
similar  to  the  UK,  seem  to  be continuously  diversifying  over the  time.  One  of the 
possible  general  classifications  of great  variety  of public  bodies  would  encompass: 
central  government  departments;  public  bodies  called  etablissements  publics  (EPs); 
(semi) independent public bodies - Autorite Administrative Independante (AAI) and state 
owned corporations. Regional and local government bodies shall be excluded from our 
research interest, since they fall under a distinct financial accountability regime. 
Core  central  Government  compnses  ministries,  as  policy  making  bodies,  and 
etablissement public (EP), as policy implementation bodies.
352 There are no pre-existing 
criteria  to  determine  whether  a  given  activity  is  to  be  performed  by a  Government 
351  France (without overseas departments and territories) is divided into 22 administrative regions. 
352 The EPs were actually created by case administrative law precedents rather than enacted into statutes or 
issued as regulations. The concept of  the EP's was defined by the Conseil d'Etat already in mid 19
th 
century (1856) and is based on the following criteria: an agency has to be a separate legal and public law 
entity, need to have a specific object of  activity, have administrative and financial autonomy and be under 
the supervision of  the national/regional/local Government. The concept ofEPs developed by case law over 
the decades along with the very notion of  public service (understood as the services of  national economic 
and social interest). Cf. L. Digi, Preobrazaj javnog prava [Transformation of  Public Law], (Geca Kon, 
Belgrade), 1929. Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, "Country Report France", in Financial Management and 
Control of  Public Agencies, SIGMA Paper No.32, OECD, Paris, 2002.op. cit. pp. 43-44. 
110 Department or an EP, although there is a political consensus that those tasks which are a 
"royal" prerogative (defense, police, justice and foreign affairs) must be handled directly 
by the central government Ministry.353 
EP's are  by far  the  most frequent  form  of public  bodies  (autonomous  organizations) 
within the French state due to their fairly flexible structure and can be divided into three 
broad categories: administrative, industrial and commercial. Administrative EPs (around 
1000 of  them) are the most common form of  organization which are used for provision of 
government services (e.g. national employment agency, universities, museums etc). The 
number of industrial  and  commercial  EPs  is  smaller  (around  80)  and  has  often  been 
established as a corollary of  gradual transfer of functions from the core executive to more 
flexible forms  of organizations.
354  Whereas the administrative EPs are subject to public 
law  rules  and  budgeting  and  accounting  regulations  similar  to  those  of Government 
departments,  the  industrial  and  commercial  EPs,  which  enjoy  somewhat  greater 
autonomy and were designed to operate as commercial companies, are subject to private 
law rules, but are required to use public law accounting regulations.
355 
It should be noted that social security funds also fall under the category of  EPs. Although 
they  have  a  particular  management  structure  composed  of representatives  of both 
employers and employees, the Government and the Cour have in the last decades started 
exerting much tighter control of  the use of  their funds.
356 
353 Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., pp. 43-73. 
354 Industrial and commercial EPs are for example big public enterprises (electricity, railways companies), 
the Paris opera, the French Foreign Trade Centre etc. 
355 It is interesting to not that most of  the industrial and commercial EPs apply government accounting 
regulations, but are not the subject of  the a priori financial control of  the Government. Cf. S. Touchon, D. 
Tommasi, ibid. 
356 The Constitutional amendments of 1996 have thus enabled the Cour to audit social security funding 
institutions, Article 147(1) ofthe French Constitution. 
111 Questions are  also being raised about the need to  tighten the financial  control over all 
EPS.
357  Although the  Ministry of Finance itself has  created a  number of EPs,  it has 
developed a generally negative attitude towards the increase of number of the EPs, since 
their operation generate additional public spending, partly due to difficulties in imposing 
proper financial supervision. In order to avoid difficulties related to  supervision of EPs, 
over the last decade the Government started creating a new type of public body called 
"bodies with nation-wide jurisdiction" (Services a  caractere national - SeN), which are 
not  separate  legal  entities  and  could  provide  an  alternative  solution  to  the  continued 
creation of  EPs. 358 
Semi-independent public bodies - Autorite Administrative Independante (AAI) constitute 
another important category of public  bodies,  having a  nature of a  regulatory agency. 
AAIs thus regulate "sensitive" Government sectors of their area of competence, such as, 
for  example, broadcasting,  freedom of information, protection of consumers and other 
citizens' rights etc.
359 AAIs are usually created by statute voted by Parliament and are not 
subject  to  any  supervisory  authority.  Therefore,  it  is  argued  that  their  members  are 
independent from both the executive and the Parliament.  360 However, unlike EPs, AAIs 
do not have a status of legal person separate from the State, which again questions their 
complete  independence  from  the  executive.  Being  a  part  of the  state  administrative 
structure, AAIs are subject to control of administrative courts. Most AAI are not subject 
to the a priori financial control of the Ministry of Finance discussed below, but are still 
subject to government accounting regulations and audit by the Cour. 
All  this variety of public bodies coupled with the privates ones receiving considerable 
public  funds  constitute  a  rather  complex  and  comprehensive  financial  accountability 
357 Cf. S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., p. 49. 
358 The first SCN was created in 1997, Ibid. 
359 Examples of  AAIs created by statute are:  Broadcasting High Council, responsible for appointing the 
Presidents of  the television and radio state-owned companies; National Commission for Information and 
Freedoms (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertes). 
360 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit. 47-49. 
112 accountee, which is constantly evolving. In order to follow up this evolving nature of  the 
accountee, proper financial accountability mechanisms need to be defined and adjusted to 
the new circumstances, so that the central Government administration can be effectively 
held  to  account,  or as  the  French  people  would  rather  say - so  that  state  would  be 
adequately controlled in the use of  the public funds. 
Systemic reforms of the financial accountability framework through LOLF 
The  overvIew  of the  gradual  reduction  of scope  of the  French  central  Government 
presented at the outset of  this chapter demonstrates that the French public sector reforms, 
in  comparison  to  its  Anglo-Saxon  counterparts,  have  been  implemented  in  a  fairly 
piecemeal way in  the  last two  decades  of the  20
th  century.  Although the pace of the 
reforms  has  been  slower,  the  structure  of administration  did  experience  substantial 
overhaul,  which resulted in the transfer of a number of central  Government functions 
either to  the  local  level  or to  the private sector.  Interestingly enough,  these  structural 
changes  have  for  several  decades  not  been  accompanied by reforms  in  the  financial 
accountability framework, which has remained almost intact for more than 40 years. 
The  budget  and  financial  accountability  was  governed  for  more  than  40  years  by  a 
Constitutional  Bylaw  of 1959,  the  so-called  French  "Financial  Constitution".361  The 
budget framework under the 1959 Financial Constitution is characterised by a strong role 
of the  executive in determining the overall  scope and allocation of expenditure,  fairly 
centralised control by the Ministry of Finance and quite weak powers of the Parliament 
both in the process of  budget approval and in the later phase of accountability. In spite of 
numerous attempts at changing a fairly outdated budget framework (around 38 initiatives 
altogether),  the  executive  has  constantly  refused  to  reform  the  budget  process.  This 
resistance  to  change  is  usually  explained  by strongly  entrenched  values  of a  strong 
361  L 'ordonnance N 59-2 du 2 janvier 1959, which ceased to be in effect from 1 January 2005. 
113 administrative state and structure of strong Grands Corps that appear to have stayed in 
control of  most of  the reforms, with their central roles not been seriously undermined.362 
However, the very beginning of the 21 sl century has witnessed a substantial reform of  the 
budgeting,  accounting  and  financial  accountability  framework  enabled  through  the 
adoption of the new "Financial Constitution", so-called LOLF (fa  loi organique relative 
aux lois de finances) in 2001.363  The LOLF attempts to attain several objectives: increase 
accountability of managers,  create a  more active role  for  Parliament and improve the 
transparency  of expenditure  allocation  and  Government's  performance.  The  law  was 
adopted in the wake of  the discovery of a tax fraud affair in 2000, which brought to bear 
significant pressure from  the Parliament on the Government to  overhaul the budgetary 
process.364  Furthermore, it may be argued that the requirements of the EU economic and 
monetary union have also had an impact on the need to improve public management and 
reduce fiscal deficit and provided an additional impetus for reforming the budgeting and 
financial accountability framework.365  Finally, it is interesting to note that the LOLF was 
adopted  in  France  only  a  year  after  the  UK  Parliament  adopted  the  Government 
Resources and Accounts Act (2000), which, as we could see in the previous chapter, the 
UK Treasury  considers  as  the  "biggest  reform  and  modernisation  programme  in  the 
management  of the  country's  public  finances  since  the  Gladstone  era".366  However, 
although the importance of this Act for the enhancement of financial  accountability in 
362 C. Pollitt, G. Bouckaert, op. cit., p. 230. 
363 Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of 1 August 2001  on budget acts, 'French Official Journal' No. 177 
of2 August 2001, p.  12480. 
364 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, "France: The Challenge of  a Systemic Reform", paper presented at the EGPA 
meeting of  the Study Group on Productivity and Quality in the Public Sector, "Performance Measurement 
and Public Management Reform", in Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2004. 
365 R. Hertzog, "Une grande premiere: la reforme du droit budgetaire de l'Etat par Ie Parlement", Revue 
Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 73, January 2001, pp. 7-18; H. Enderlein, "Adjusting to EMU, The 
Impact of  Supranational Monetary Policy on Domestic Fiscal and Wage-Setting Institutions", European 
Union Politics, Volume 7 (1), (Sage Publications), 2006, pp. 113-140. 
366 H.M. Treasury News Release 195/99. Cf F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Public finance reform: The 
Government Resource and Accounts Act 2000", Public Law, 2000, pp. 56-61. 
114 UK  cannot  be  disputed,  the  reforms  undertaken  by  the  LOLF  have  much  more 
substantially changed the  French  financial  accountability  framework  than  it  occurred 
under the Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000 in UK, as  pointed out in the 
previous chapter. 
The LOLF provides the basis for the introduction of  programme budgeting in the French 
central  Government,  which  has  started  to  be  fully  implemented  in  the  current  2006 
budget. Unlike in the previous system, where each body was assigned the budget based 
on  different  types  of expenditure  (operational,  capital  etc.),  in  the  new  system  the 
expenditure  is  based on missions  which  correspond to  the  Government's key public 
policies  (security,  education,  research,  etc).  Each  Mission  consists  of a  number  of 
progammes,  which  are  further  divided  into  sub-programmes  (actions)  as  operational 
means to  implement the  Programme.
367  This introduces  much more transparency and 
flexibility in the  system.  Namely,  in the new system appropriations may be freely re-
allocated within the programmes and their breakdown according to sub-programmes is 
now purely indicative,  which  allows  for  much more  flexibility  for  the  organisation's 
management.
368  Such  developments  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  British  reforms  of 
enlarging  the  sub-heads  within  the  votes,  as  pointed out  in the  previous  chapter.  In 
exchange for the high degree of  autonomy they now have, programme managers in public 
bodies  have  to  be  fully  committed  to  their  goals  and  held  accountable  for  their 
.  I'  d'  d  I  369  management acts VIa resu ts In Icators an  target va ues. 
The reform introduced by the LOLF,  as  a  second French Financial  Constitution have 
unsurprisingly affected  all  elements of the  French financial  accountability framework, 
starting from the concept of the stewardship of public money and extending to internal 
and even more external accountability framework,  with an increasingly important role 
367 Article 7, paragraph 1 of  the LOLF. Cf Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de L'Industrie, Budget 
Reform and State Modernisation in France, available at www.minefi.gouv.fr or www.1olf.minefi.gouv.fr 
368 Personnel expenditure is the only exception to the globalisation principle: it cannot be topped up with 
other appropriations and payroIls have to be capped, cf. Article 7, paragraph III of  the LOLF. 
369 Article 48 item 4 of  the LOLF Chapter V, Information and Audit of  Public Finances. 
115 given to democratic accountability forms of the French Parliament, as will be explained 
in the course of  the ensuing analysis. 
Stewardship of Public Money - from compliance to performance? 
The concept of stewardship of public money is not explicitly defined in the French legal 
system.  Instead  of providing  a  detailed  definition  of what  may be  subsumed  by the 
concept of stewardship of public money, the French legislator has regulated this area in a 
fairly vague manner, providing the external accountability actor, the Cour des Comptes 
(hereinafter the Cour) substantial freedom of interpretation of this concept. Nevertheless, 
the  Cour's  basic  framework  of  control  is  explicitly  regulated  by  the  Code  des 
jurisdictions financiers,  which  authorises  the  Cour  to  conduct  three  major  areas  of 
financial accountability investigations: 
1)  accuracy of the accounts (controle de la regula  rite comptable),  370 where the Cour 
has to be assured that figures in the accounts are properly stated; 
2)  regularity  of financial  operations  (controle  de  la  regula  rite  de  la  gestion),371 
where  the  Cour  checks  whether  receipts  and  payments  accord  with  relevant 
budgetary legislation and,  in  the  case  of public bodies,  relevant administrative 
legislation;  in the case of public enterprises - relevant commercial law; or in the 
case of subsidised organisations - relevant civillaw.
372 
3)  quality of  management, assurance of "good use of  public funds" (bon emploi des 
fonds  )373 and "verification of the accounts and management of  public enterprises" 
370 Article L III - 1 of  the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
371  Article L III - 3 of  the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
372 Within the control of  financial operations, an auditor also checks whether rules of fiscal and criminal 
law are respected, although this does not represent hislher major preoccupation. Cf C. Deescheemaeker, La 
Cour des Comptes, (La Documentation Francaise, Paris), 1998, pp. 61-62. 
373 Article L III - 3 of  the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
116 (fa  verification des  comptes et de  fa  gestion des  enterprises pub/iquesi74 which 
would generally correspond to British value for money requirements - attainment 
of  economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of  public funds. 
There is  certainly a  similarity between the  definition  of a  concept of stewardship  of 
public money in the British and French central Government. Although the French system 
does not regulate different public money stewardship requirements in greater detail, as is 
the  case  with  British  regulations,  both  systems  explicitly  stress  the  importance  of 
regularity of financial operations, in addition to the requirement of account's accuracy. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that both systems use the term "regularity" instead of 
"legality" which, in our opinion, would be more appropriate and legally "correct" term in 
this case. Lastly, there is surely some similarity in which the third financial accountability 
requirement, the requirement of achieving "value-for-money" in the UK, and the French 
imperative of bon  empfoi des fonds  are  defined.  The reforms  undertaken through  the 
LOLF will bring about even greater proximity between these two national concepts. 
In  this respect, in it interesting to note that an absence of the clear meaning of the bon 
empfoi  des fonds  in  France  has  never been  perceived  as  a  problem  for  the  French 
financial accountability system. Lack of  a precise definition of  this notion has enabled the 
Cour to develop its own concept of what this principle means in practice. This does not, 
in any case, mean that the Cour has not taken this role seriously or that the freedom of 
interpretation has undermined the assessment of the good use of the public funds.  Thus, 
relatively recent research conducted on the performance audit conducted by the Cour has 
demonstrated that there is  a wide range of criteria which the Cour's auditors apply in 
their  performance  management  inspections.  These  are:  economy,  efficiency, 
effectiveness,  goal  attainment,  good  management  practice  and  good  governance, 
depending on the context and purpose of  the particular audit. 375 However, it is also not in 
374 Article L III - 4 of  the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
375 C. Pollitt at ai, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 84. 
117 dispute that a lack of a clearly set objectives and targets of financial performance in the 
French  administration  has  generated  significant  difficulties  in  the  Cour's attempts  to 
assess efficiency and effectiveness of  financial operations. Due to these limitations, many 
auditors  have  kept  their  activities  within  a  more  narrowly  defined  framework  of 
controlling the regularity and consistency of the audited body's decisions, stability of its 
operations and investigating any specific problems that came to the auditor's attention.
376 
It is  expected that  the  introduction of programmatic  budgeting,  with  clear  setting  of 
objectives and indicators, will even more enhance the importance of values of efficiency 
and effectiveness in the use of the public funds in France. As the programme budgeting 
has been introduced only this year (2006) it is still not possible to judge its results and 
impact  on  the  concept  of the  stewardship  of public  money.  However,  the  first  pilot 
ministries  which  have  undergone  this  process,  have  experienced  difficulties  when 
attempting to reorient budgets to the performance budgeting framework.
377  This is partly 
due to difficulties in defining clear targets and objectives of the programmes for the first 
time, and partly due to  strong rechstaat legal tradition of the French administration, in 
which most Government activities are already closely regulated by detailed framework of 
law and do  not leave much space for managerial  freedoms.  It will,  therefore, be very 
interesting to  see how and to  what extent the  French  legal  culture based on  Weber's 
classical bureaucratic values of regularity and compliance will be able to embrace strong 
New Public Management values of performance orientation and management flexibility. 
This  issue  will  surely be tested  through  the  ongoing  introduction of a  more  flexible 
internal control management framework. 
376 Ibid. 
377 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, op. cit. p.  11. 
118 Internal financial accountability mechanisms 
Financial control posts and General Inspectorate of  Finance 
There are three key posts in the French government internal control system. These are the 
ordonnateur (authorising officer), the controleur financier (financial controller) and the 
comptable (or public accountant). 
Ordonnateur holds the power over the budget of a public body, by being authorised to 
enter  into  commitments  (engage),  issue  contracts  and  orders,  verify  deliveries  and 
invoices  (liquide)  and authorize payments  (ordonne).378  The  authorising officer in  the 
Ministry is  the line Minister (or for EPs the head of the EP), who usually delegates this 
responsibility to other members of  staff, such as General Directors (heads of Sectors). 
Comptables make the payments authorised by the ordonnateur (and later approved by the 
controleur financier).  They are  accountants by profession,  but of a very special  kind, 
which  makes  them  a  sort  of a  'national  phenomenon'  that  has  no  real  counterpart 
elsewhere in the world.
379 Thus, comptables are personally responsible for the decisions 
taken and liable for the  sums involved should a payment be made without appropriate 
authorisation or without legal authority in the budget.  380  Such an emphasis on personal 
liability of comptables can be traced back to the beginning of  the XIX century, when they 
obtained a key position in the process of  judicial financial  accountability. As Napoleon 
wanted to create a strong state with an efficient executive, he simply exempted Ministers 
(ordonnateurs)  from  judicial  audit  of  the  Cour,  placing  the  burden  of  financial 
accountability  solely  on  comptables.381  This  'imbalance'  in  accountability  lines  was 
addressed in 1948, by creation of the Court of Budgetary and Financial Discipline (La 
378 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit. p. 59. 
379 Cf. Normarton, The Accountability and Audit of  Governments, (Manchester University Press, 1964), pp. 
18-19. 
380 Cf. 1. Magnet, Les comptables publics, (L.G.D.J, Paris), 1995, pp. 105-137. 
381  Cf. Normarton, ibid. 
119 Cour de  discipline  budgetaire et financiere),  which has  the authority to  decide on the 
cases of irregular action of commitments officers or other persons involved in financial 
matters other than comptables.
382 
Comptables are  responsible for verifying the regularity of payment orders, to  issue the 
payment through the Treasury Single Account (or the EP's account at the Treasury) and 
keep  the  accounting  books.  There  are  around  55,000  comptables  in  the  French 
administration, operating in central, regional and local government.  383 They are internally 
supervised by the General Directorate of Public Accounting (as part of the Ministry of 
Finance), and externally account for their actions to the Cour, which carries out detailed 
audits of  their accounts. 
Controleur  financier  is  an  official  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance  placed  in  each 
Ministry/other body,  who supervises financial  operations within that body and ensures 
that spending does not exceed prescribed limits.  Controleur financiers perform ex-ante 
control of financial  operations and are  obliged to attach a visa (indicating approval) at 
two different stages in the expenditure procedure: at the stage of commitment and at the 
stage  of payment.  They must  verify  that  there  is  an  appropriation  available  and  the 
commitment fits  the  purpose of the  appropriation,  performing in  this  wayan ex-ante 
control of  regularity of financial operations.
384 
For an outside observer, the function of  controleur financier appears to be redundant, as a 
great degree of ex-ante control of payments is  already performed by comptables.  The 
main logic behind the introduction of  controleur financier, however, seems to be the wish 
of the  Ministry of Finance  to  more  strongly and  directly  control  line  ministries  and 
agencies by placing their officials all  throughout the  administration.  It should also  be 
382 Cf. 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, 
4th edition (Berger-Levrault, Paris), 1996, pp. 313-329. 
383 National Audit Office, State Audit in the European Union, 2005, pp. 89-90, available at 
www.nao.gov.uk 
384 E. Devaux, Finances Publiques, (Breal Editions, 2002), pp. 266-268. 
120 noted that in addition to their role of controlling the regularity of operations, controleur 
financiers also carry out an advisory function. They thus report regularly to the Minister 
of Finance and give opinions upon all the financial projects of the ministry, including the 
preparation of  the budget.  385 
The function of the controleur financier was introduced as early as in 1890 and gradually 
developed to modem times.
386  The Minister of Finance has the authority to  appoint the 
controleur financier in each public body and to have direct supervisory power upon them. 
In  order to  strengthen  their independent  position,  the  Law  of the  21  of March  1947 
provided that  contra leur financier  could not be  recruited  from  the  Ministry  they  are 
situated  at,  but  need  to  be  brought  from  another  public  body  or  outside  of the 
administration.
387 Usually, controleurs financiers are experienced civil servants, without 
express political affinity, at the end of  their career.  388 Therefore controleur financiers are 
often  perceived  as  alien  elements  imposed  by  the  Ministry  of Finance  in  order  to 
strengthen the already existing framework of internal financial accountability established 
between ordonnateur and comptable. 
The French internal  financial  accountability system  firmly  establishes  the  principle of 
incompatibility/segregation of functions between the ordonnateur and comptable.
389 This 
principle  ensures  that  the  same  person  cannot  at  the  same  time  make  orders,  verify 
deliveries and make payment. The principle of incompatibility therefore provides that the 
comptable  does  not  report  to  the  ordonnateur.  He/she  is  empowered  to  reject  any 
irregular payment orders issued by the ordonnateur.  This principle is  applied for  both 
expenditure and revenue (since revenue assessment is separated from revenue collection). 
Subsequently, the comptable is  responsible for  communicating all  transactions through 
the  Treasury's  accounts.  In  exceptional  circumstances,  however,  the  ordonnateur can 
385 Cf. Normarton, op. cit. 92-93. 
386 E. Devaux, op. cit., pp. 266-268. 
387 Ibid. 
388 The final status of controlleur financers has been regulated by a Decree of  January 23, 1956. 
389 Cf. J. Magnet, Les comptables publics, op. cit, p.  10. 
121 impose a "requisition order" onto the "public accountant", to authorise a payment order 
that the accountant had previously rejected.  When this  occurs,  the requisition order is 
reported  to  the  Cour by the  Ministry  of Finance  and  accountability  shifts  from  the 
comptable to  the  ordonnateur.
39o  Although the principle of segregation of duties  is  a 
fundamental principle of French financial accountability, which has been further spread 
to  other systems (such as  the EU one, as will be discussed in  the next chapter),  it has 
recently  been  criticized  for  slowing  down  the  introduction  of costing  procedures, 
separation  of management  from  accounting  and  weakening  managers'  awareness  of 
overall budgetary performance.391 
When a relationship between the comptable and controleur financier is looked at more 
closely,  it  seems  that  the  role  of both  actors  correspond  to  the  role  which  the  UK 
Treasury performs in the UK.  As  pointed out in the previous chapter,  one of the  key 
principles of internal control in the UK is  that no  expenditure or commitments can be 
incurred without the  approval of the  Treasury.  However,  as  we could see,  in the  UK 
model the Treasury is not able and does not want to control every detail of expenditure. 
Instead,  it delegates the  financial  responsibilities to  departments,  while it concentrates 
only on potentially sensitive financial issues (increase of establishments, salary cost etc.). 
In  contrast,  the  traditional  French  internal  control  model  is  highly  centralised, 
emphasising  a  strong  controlling  role  of the  Ministry  of Finance,  exercised  through 
controleurs financiers and comptables. 
Another internal  accountability mechanism in  France is  provided by operation of the 
General Inspectorate of  Finance, based in the Ministry of Finance (L 'inspection Generale 
des Finances). The Inspectorate was set up in  1816 and, as pointed out earlier, together 
with the Cour and the Conseil d'Etat, represents one of the three senior bodies of French 
administration, so called 'Grands Corps de l'Etat,.392 It has a staff of some 350 inspectors 
390 S. Touchon, D. Tommasi, op. cit., 59-60. 
391  Ibid, p. 60. 
392 Its staff is normally recruited from the prestigious ENA. 
122 who are authorised to make on the spot checks and access documents in ministries and 
any institution or enterprise that spends or receives public funds.
393  The nature of their 
control is mainly preventive, as there are no real direct sanctions that the Inspectorate can 
impose. The report on performed control is, however, sent to  the Finance Minister for 
information,  and  he  alone  can  decide  on  eventual  sanctions,  as,  for  example,  on  the 
personal liability of the accountant or his/her suspension.
394 It should also be pointed out 
that  the  General  Inspectorate  has  gradually  developed  a  role  of a  consultative  body 
producing reports and audits of  public bodies and public policies. Its reports can be made 
public and its recommendations about procedures or the performance of individuals are 
usually well received and accepted. 
Gradual reform of  the internal control framework 
In spite of a satisfactory level of operation of the internal control structures in the French 
administration, the system of  internal accountability can be criticised on several grounds. 
The first obvious criticism may be directed towards numerous levels of financial control 
within  the  executive,  which  undoubtedly  have  an  adverse  effect  on  administrative 
flexibility in the use of  the public funds. The existence of  numerous levels of control and 
detailed regulation of available items of expenditure prescribed by budget expenditure 
items,  do  not leave  enough  flexibility for  managers to  use  public  money in the  most 
efficient and effective way,  but force  them to  move within a  fairly  restrictive legally 
defined  framework.  In  such a system,  values of compliance indeed dominate  over the 
values of  performance. 
The second strand of criticism may be directed towards ambiguous accountability lines 
established between different control post actors.  Although ordonnateurs are  generally 
responsible for  financial management of a public body, this responsibility is to quite an 
393 E. Devaux, op. cit. 271-273; NAO, State Audit in the European Union op. cit, p. 90. 
394 E.  Devaux, ibid. 
123 extent  devolved  to  the  financial  controlleurs  and comptables.  Both  actors,  especially 
financial controlleurs, who actively control the ordonnateurs in their every day work, in 
this  way assume considerable level  of responsibility for  financial  management,  which 
brings about a blurring of accountability lines within the organisation. 
Third, it may be argued that within the concept of separation between the ordonnateur 
and  the  comptable,  too  much  emphasis  is  placed on the role  of comptables,  who  are 
personally liable for the proper execution of authorised payments and held to account for 
their operation before the Cour. Although the role of comptables is certainly important, it 
is also true that their overall involvement in the financial process is fairly technical and 
implementory, as they represent basically cashiers of an organisation they operate within. 
This is  in contrast to the level of responsibility of the management of an organisation. 
And whereas comptables face continuous high level of  scrutiny by the Cour, management 
of an  organisation faces  lesser amount of pressure, imposed primarily by the  Court of 
Budgetary Discipline, which has not achieved great results in its work so far and does not 
enjoy  the  prestige  of the  Cour  in  the  French  administration.  It  is  also  true  that 
ordonnateurs may also face  criticisms presented in the annual or special reports of the 
Cour, but difficulties in following up the Cour's recommendations undermine the effects 
of such a scrutiny. 
The LOLF has tried to  address the weaknesses of the existing model primarily through 
providing more strength and flexibility to ordonnateurs in the use of the public money. 
The enlargement of budget appropriations through the introduction of programmes will 
allow  for  much  more  flexible  management,  as  managers  in  charge  of individual 
programmes will be able to freely reallocate appropriations between sub-programmes or 
types  of expenditure.  This will not only strengthen the role of ordonnateurs,  but also 
substantively lessen the importance of the role of controlleurs financiers, whose ex-ante 
controls of expenditure will become redundant, due to significant enlargement of votes. 
Although the  LOLF does  not  explicitly address  this  issue,  the  French Government  is 
making plans for  a gradual  change of a function  of controlleur financier from  ex ante 
124 control to ex-post internal audit,395  which is in line with the existing models of internal 
accountability  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  world.  In  this  way,  the  French  model  of internal 
control is, at least to some extent, moving towards the UK accounting officers model. 
It is, however, interesting to note that the role of comptables has remained almost intact 
in  the  new  legal  framework,  in  spite  of systemic  changes  in  the  public  expenditure 
management.  It does not seem very likely that this traditional  role of comptables will 
change  in  the  near  or  distant  future.  It  even  may  be  argued  that  the  LOLF  has 
strengthened the position of comptables, by pointing out that comptables responsible for 
keeping and drawing up their accounts need to ensure faithful accounting and compliance 
with procedures, especially in the view of the introduction of accrual accounting.396  This 
demonstrates  that,  in  spite  of the  strong  influence  of New  Public  Management  ideas 
based  on  performance  logic  and  the  doctrine  of enhanced  managerial  freedoms,  the 
French financial accountability system will not easily let go  its traditional values based 
on primary respect for legal rules and compliance with established procedures. 
Finally,  in  the  light  of strengthening  the  role  of ordonnateurs,  the  question  which 
naturally  arises  is  how  to  ensure  accountability  for  increased  level  of  their 
responsibilities?  As  regards  assurance of internal accountability,  managers  at  different 
levels of public bodies will have to  establish results (performance) indicators and target 
values, which will provide benchmarks for assessing their performance. Strengthening of 
external accountability mechanisms, on the other hand, can be achieved by two possible 
options. The first would be to enhance the effectiveness of the Court of Budgetary and 
Financial  Discipline397  or to  possibly allow  the  Cour des  Comptes  additional  powers 
when  dealing  with  senior  officials.  The  second  course  of action  would  go  towards 
substantial increase the role of the French Parliament in the scrutiny of the use of public 
395 NAO, op. cit., p. 90. 
396 Article 31  of  the LOLF. 
397 S. Thebault, "L'imperiuse refonne de la Cour de discipline budgetary et financiere", Revue Francaise de 
Finances Publiques, No. 75, Septembre 2001, pp. 171-185. 
125 money. The French MPs have given quite a clear answer to this question, opting strongly 
for the latter option. 
Enhancement of Parliamentary Accountability 
Historical background 
The right of  Parliament to scrutinise public finances in France was established only at the 
beginning of the XIX century, following the development of a parliamentary system in 
France. The foundations of the Parliamentary control over finances were set up almost a 
century and half later than in Britain, during the period of  Restoration (1814-30), often in 
an attempt to imitate well established practices that existed in the British Isles at that time 
(see Annex 1).398 Thus, the Restoration law of 15  May 1818, for the first time stipulated 
the right of  Parliament to pass two kinds of financial laws: loi de finances, which contains 
both envisaged revenues and expenditure of the Government for the next year, and loi de 
reglement, which comprises the consolidated government accounts (financial statements), 
prepared on the basis of the actual execution of the loi de finances, as an ex post control 
of government financial  operations. At this time, this was of great political importance, 
since it enabled the Parliament to control the actions of  the executive.
399 
During the III  and IV Republics the means of control of Parliament over the executive 
were oscillating from  rather strong position of the Parliament over the executive under 
the III republic and gradual lessening of its powers under the IV republic. Under the III 
Republic  (1875-1940),  Parliament was  endowed with  very real  powers  enabling  it to 
influence the contents of the budget and thus control the Government. The debate on the 
398 P.  Lalumiere, "Parliamentary Control of  the Budget in France", in D. Coombes et aI.,  The Power of  the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976, pp. 126-127. 
399 L. Saidj, "La loi de reglement et Ie deceloppement du controle parlementaire de la Restauration a nos 
jours", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, n 51,  1995, pp. 172-173. 
126 proposed loi de finances allowed the Parliament to obtain extensive infonnation about the 
policies  of the  government  and  to  influence  its  activities  in  a  desired  direction.4oo 
However,  during  the  IV  Republic  Parliament  was  gradually  losing  its  powers  over 
finance,  which resulted in further fonnal restrictions imposed after the establishment of 
the V Republic.401 
As pointed out earlier, the Constitution of  the V Republic deliberately reduced the power 
of the Parliament, as a reaction to its omnipotence of previous times, which resulted in 
great instability of successive French Government cabinets. This has had a direct effect 
on  the  reduction  of  the  Parliament's  financial  powers.  Although  the  decline  in 
Parliament's role arises from the provisions of  the 1958 constitution, Parliament's 'power 
of the purse' was even more undennined by the 'organic' Constitutional Bylaw of 1959, 
earlier mention as  the  French "Financial Constitution,,.402  The main problem with the 
1959 'Financial Constitution' lay in its requirements that Parliament must either accept or 
reject the loi de finances as a whole without ever getting into details of its provision. The 
budgetary debate was actually limited only to  the "new measures" to be introduced in 
individual ministries, which amounted to around 10% of the overall budget.403  This has 
deprived the Parliament of real powers of political control.  Similar situation was to  be 
found for the discussion on the consolidated government accounts, presented in the loi de 
reglement,  which  was  not  perceived  as  a  genuine  instrument  for  scrutinising  the 
executive or bringing any additional power to  the Parliament and therefore provoked an 
even lesser degree of  interest of  the French MPs. 
Enhancing Parliamentary Scrutiny through UK recipe - creation of  MEC 
In the 1990s, due to  growing international dialogue with other countries and within the 
EU,  French parliamentarians have started to become increasingly aware of the need to 
400 P. Lalumiere, ibid. 
401  Ibid. 
402 L'ordonnance N 59-2 du 2 janvier 1959, which ceased to be in effect from 1 January 2005. 
403 F. Waintrop, C. Chol, op. cit., p. 3. 
127 introduce substantive changes in their system of parliamentary financial  accountability. 
The first natural reaction of  the French parliamentarians was to look up at the UK model 
of accountability to  try to find solutions that would fit the existing restrictive legislative 
framework.  Thus,  in  1998,  a  parliamentary  report  on  reforming  scrutiny of financial 
legislation  was  produced,  devoted  considerable  attention  to  a  study of the  House  of 
Commons Public Account Committee (PAC).  404 This led a year later to the establishment 
of a "Mission d'Evalution et de Controle", MEC, as a sub-committee of the Parliament's 
Finance Committee, modelled on the UK PAC.
405 
The main objective of  the MEC is to examine the cost effectiveness of  public policies and 
to give the government the incentive needed to shift from efforts to accumulate resources 
to  a culture based on  spending results.
406  In  order to  perform its tasks effectively,  the 
French  have  introduced  basic  rules  of operation  of the  UK  PAC  with  some  slight 
modifications. 
The MEC is comprised of  the members of  both ruling party(ies) and opposition and relies 
in  its work on the expertise of the  Cour.  Unlike the UK PAC, the composition of the 
MEC  does  not  rest  on  the  proportional  representation  of the  political  parties  in  the 
parliament.  Instead,  in order to  minimise possibilities of partisanship, political parties 
have equal representation on the committee.
407  Furthermore, the MEC is co-presided by 
404 Assemblee Nationale, Groupe de travail sur I'efficacite de la depense publique et Ie controle 
parlementaire, Rapport, 1998. Cf H.B. Street, "MPs Attitudes towards Scrutiny in Britain and France", 
draft prepared for the ECPR workshop on the renewal of  Parliaments, March 2002, Turin (permission to 
quote obtained from the author), p. 3. 
405 Assemblee Nationale, Rapport de la Commission des Finances, de I'Economie Generale et du Plan en 
conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'evalution et de controle constituee Ie 3 fevrier 1999, Repport, No. 
1781, July 1999. 
406 D. Migaud, "Des progres incontestables en droit et dans la pratique du contro1e parlementarie sous la XI 
legislature. La Mission d'evalution et de controle: un exemple parmi d'autres", Revue Francaise de 
Finances Publiques, No 77, 2002, pp. 47-54. 
407 SIGMA papers 33: Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
OECD/SIGMA, Paris, 2002, pp. 36-37. 
128 the President of the Finance Committee or his/her representative, who  comes from the 
majority party and one representative of the opposition parties. According to  the initial 
agreement, the Cour pays close attention to work of the MEC and its representatives are 
continuously present at the MEC's meetings. Work of the Cour is thus perceived as  one 
of  the key elements for successful functioning of  the Committee.
408 
The  statute  establishing  the  MEC  stipulates  that  MEC  members  conduct  their 
investigations not only on the basis of written evidence, which has been the case with the 
Finance Committee, but also can hold hearings of  responsible administrators.
409 This kind 
of examination requires again the assistance of the Cour in preparation of its hearings. 
MEC also cooperates in its work and communicates its findings to  other parliamentary 
committees  (especially  the  Financial  Committee),  so  that  all  the  institutionalised 
parliamentary bodies can be involved in the process of  financial scrutiny. 
The MEC examination methods have demonstrated the ambition of MEC to examine use 
of public funds  on a regular basis, assessing not only the regularity of expenditure, but 
also  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of public  spending.  This  has  been  proved  by the 
majority  of  MEC's  reports,  in  which  questions  of  efficiency  and  effectiveness 
investigations occupy the most prominent place.
410 The MEC members have also ensured 
that their work is open towards media and the public and its reports regularly published 
and represented in the broadcasting media, which should facilitate effective follow up on 
its findings and recommendations. 
408 J.D. Charpantier, "L  'asistance de la Cour des Comptes au Parlement", (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de 
Grenoble Universite Pierre Mendes France), 2000, pp.  173-175. 
409 Ibid. 
410 For example cf. Assemblee Nationale, Rapport d'Information par la Commission des Finances, de 
L 'Economie Generale et du Plan en conclusions des travaux de la Mission d'evalution et de controle 
(MEC) sur la gouvernance des  Universites dans Ie contexte de la LOLF, Rapport No. 3160, Juin 2006, all 
MEC reports are available at the website of  the French National Assembly: http://assemblee-nationale.fr 
129 Although the  first  years  of MEC's operation have  shown  satisfactory results,  senous 
challenges still remain to be faced. This is primarily due to overall attitude of the French 
Parliament which perceives itself mainly as a legislator and much less as a scrutiniser of 
Government activity, which does not provide a good environment for the MEC's work. 
The MEC has, naturally, still not achieved the prestige of  the UK PAC and will need time 
to impose itself as an important guardian of public money. Furthermore, the cooperation 
between the MEC and the Cour has not been satisfactory, as will be pointed out in more 
detail later. Although there is no need that the Cour establish too close a relationship with 
the Parliament, modelled on the NAO/House of Commons, a high degree of cooperation 
will be necessary in order for MEC to function properly. Furthermore, it is very important 
for  MEC to  enhance collegial work within its membership in order to  reduce possible 
political  partisanship  and be  able  to  more effectively convey its  findings  both to  the 
Parliament and citizens.
411 
Substantive reforms of  parliamentary accountability through LOLF 
The passage of the LOLF in 2001  (which made the earlier 1959 bylaw largely defunct) 
has substantively increased the role of the Parliament holding the executive accountable 
for the use of  the public money. Under the new legal framework, MPs are given the right 
to  make amendments to  the budget framework,  as  they will  now be able to  reallocate 
appropriations between the various programmes which constitute a particular mission, in 
accordance with the Article 43 of  the LOLF. Parliament will thus be paying a much more 
substantial role in outlining public finance expenditure strategy and setting priorities of 
policy  objectives.  In  order  to  strengthen  the  link  between  budget  execution  and 
parliamentary  authorisation,  Parliament  will  also  have  the  right  to  supervise  the 
411  Assemblee Nationale. Rapport de la Commission des Finances, de I 'Economie Generale et du Plan en 
conclusion des travaux d'une mission d'evaluation et de controle constituee Ie 20 decembre 2000, Rapport 
No. 3664, 2002. 
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The enhancement of Parliament's role in financial matters should also be improved by 
providing  MPs  with  much  better  information  on  the  overall  economic,  social  and 
financial  situation in the country at the time the loi de finances  is  discussed. Thus, the 
LOLF requires that the Government, in addition to the list of missions, programmes and 
performance indicators for the following year's loi de finance,  provide Parliament with 
several  reports:  an  analysis  of economic,  social,  financial  situation  and  outlook;  a 
description of  its economic and fiscal policy guidelines with regard to France's European 
commitment and medium term evaluation of the State's resources and charges broken 
down by main functions.
413  All  this should enhance Parliament's understanding of the 
complex and comprehensive issues of  Government finances. 
It is  important to  note that the  scrutinising role of the  Parliament has  also  been very 
strongly  emphasised  in  the  LOLF.  In  accordance  with  Article  57,  the  Finance 
Committees of both Assemblies of the  Parliament will  have  greater investigative  and 
hearing  powers.  They  will  have  the  right  to  conduct  on-the-spot  investigations  on 
particular matters and refer them to the Cour and other bodies as part of their control and 
assessment  remit.  Article  57  also  explicitly  requires  public  officials  to  attend  the 
Committee's hearings, if requested by the Committee's chairman, in order to account for 
the  results  achieved with the  resources  allocated  to  them.
414  In  this  way,  the  current 
position of the  MEC  in  making  its  own  investigations  and hearings will  certainly be 
reinforced. 
412 Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de L'Industrie, Budget Reform and State Modernisation in 
France, available at www.minefi.gouv.fr 
413 Article 48 and Article 50 of  the LOLF. 
414 Minister of  the Economy, Finance and Industry et aI, The Performance-Based Approach: Strategy, 
Objectives, Indicators ~  A methodological guide for applying the Constitutional bylaw of  August 1
51 2001 
on budget acts, available at http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/lolf. 
131 The first effects of the LOLF have been experienced through the adoption of the loi de 
finances  for  2006,  the  first  French  budget  based  on  the  introduction  of programme 
budgeting and with substantively reformed powers of the Parliament. As expected, the 
Parliamentary debate on the basis of the LOLF was much more substantial than in the 
previous years and have prompted a significant reaction of the French MPs, who have 
submitted around 1100 amendments to the loi de finances proposal, 400 being related to 
the revenue issues and around 700 regarding issues of expenditure.415  The debate on the 
loi de finances was held over around 30 sessions of the Parliament (14 of them related 
only to issues of expenditure),416 which provided room for detailed analysis of  particular 
missions and definitely revived the Parliament's 'power of  the purse' in France. 
Whereas the first signs of the LOLF implementation have been encouraging (as regards 
the Parliamentary power to approve expenditure and revenue), it still remains to be seen 
whether the Parliament will have enough strength and capacity to  effectively keep the 
executive  to  account  for  the  effective  implementation of the  modernised  expenditure 
framework. Attainment of  true Parliamentary accountability will, of course, require much 
more than changing the legislation. It will definitely necessitate the change of culture in 
the French parliament from the legislative role towards strengthening its scrutinising role, 
which has been widely suppressed throughout decades in the fear of reestablishment of 
the fragile III French Republic. 
Against such a background, it will be essential to further strengthen the role of the MEC 
in the overall accountability framework.  It needs to be ensured that the MEC members 
are adequately trained to  perform their investigative duties and to impose their work to 
members of Parliament as well as the wider public. In this sense, it would be helpful if 
the MEC would obtain the status of the standing Committee of the French Parliament, 
415 Assemblee Nationale, Loi De Finances Pour 2006 (No 2540) Deuxieme parties, Amendments, Available 
at http://assemblee-nationale.frI12/pdf/amendments/adts  PLF2.pdf 
416 Assemblee Nationale , Calendrier de la discussion en seance publique de la second partie du project de 
loi de finances pour 2006. http://www.assemblee-nationale.frI12/dossiers/loi  finances  2006-calend2.asp 
132 instead of its  current status  of the  Financial  Committee sub-committee, which has  to 
some extent kept the operations of the MEC in the shadow of its Finance Committee big 
brother. Furthermore, it is essential to establish good working relations between the MEC 
and the Cour, which highly professional staff would be able to continuously provide the 
MEC  with  reliable  information  on  the  Government's  financial  performance.  This, 
however, will not be such an easy task, as it may look at the first sight, the reasons of 
which will be examined in the next section. 
La  Cour  des  Comptes  (The  Cour)  - a  traditional  guardian  of the 
'public' purse 
Historical background 
Similar to Britain, France has a long history of institutionalised scrutiny of  public money. 
The oldest audit body established for the purpose of overseeing the royal receipts and 
payments  dates  back  to  1190.417  At  the  beginning  of the  XIV  century  the  Royal 
Chambers of Accounts (Chambres des comptes) were established in most provinces. At 
that time the separation between financial  control posts (ordonnateurs and comptables) 
also occurred.418  The eighteenth-century crises of accountability resulting in the famous 
Revolution brought about abolition of the Royal Chambers. Following the principles of 
the 1789 Declaration of the rights man and the citizen,419 two clear opposing tendencies 
appeared: one, which favoured the examination of  the accounts by the National Assembly 
417 C. Deescheemaeker, La Cour des Comptes, (La Documentation Francaise, Paris), 1998, p.8-1 O. 
418 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes. op. 
cit, p. 29. 
419 As mentioned earlier, Article 14 of  the Declaration of  the Rights of Man and Citizen, 1791  proclaimed 
that "All citizens have the right to ascertain, either in person or through their representatives, the necessity 
for public taxation, to consent freely thereto, to observe its expenditure and to determine its apportionment, 
its assessment, its collection and its duration." 
Article 15 "Society has the right to require of  every public agent an account of  his administration". 
133 itself and another, which proposed the establishment of  a body independent both from the 
legislative and executive power.
420 The latter option undoubtedly prevailed. 
It was not until the beginning of  the 19
th  century that the auditing of  public accounts was 
formalised by Napoleon I,  who established the  Cour des  Comptes  (the Cour) in  1807. 
After the  Bourbon Restoration and  consequently Orleanist monarchy the  Cour started 
cooperating more closely with the Parliament, underpinning the legislative control of the 
budget. However, the Cour has never become a close ally of  the representative body as is 
the case in Britain. Its essential characteristic is strong judicial independence, dedicated 
to  a task of financial control, as the servant of neither the executive nor legislature, but 
only of  "the nation".421 
Article 47 of  the French Constitution of 1958 proclaims that "The Cour assists Parliament 
and the Government in the control of the execution of loi de finances."  Constitutional 
establishment  of the  Cour  demonstrates  its  high  status  and  prestige  in  the  French 
constitutional and institutional framework. Article 47 was amended in 1996 (Article 47-
1), giving a basis for the Cour's annual report on the yearly Social Security Finance Acts. 
The structure and staffing of  the Cour 
According to the Law of 16
th  September 1807, the Cour was composed from "a Premier 
President,  three  Presidents,  28  maitres  des  comptes,  rejerendaires,  which  number  is 
established  by the  Government,  one procureur general  and  one  greffier  en  cheJ'.422 
Although the  composition of the  Cour has naturally been changing over the  last two 
centuries, its main structure has remained the same to modem times. Thus, according to 
Article L.  112-1  of the  Financial  Courts  Code (Code  des juridictions financieres)  the 
420 C. Deescheemaeker, ibid. 
421  E.L. Normanton, The Accountability and Audit o/Governments, op. cit, p. 19. 
4221. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit. 73. 
134 Cour is composed of "a Premier President, Presidents of chambers, conseillers maitres, 
conseillers rf?ferendaires and auditors." The Cour is headed by a Premier President, who 
is  appointed  by  the  President  of  the  Republic,  and  has  significant  management 
responsibilities as will be analysed further in the text. However, it should be noted that in 
spite of  a relatively strong position of  the President, the Cour in its essence is a body of a 
collegiate nature, as pointed out in the above legal provisions. 
The Cour has quite a good system of  career development of its staff. Auditors of  the Cour 
are  chosen from  the best graduates of the prestigious Ecole National d 'Administration 
and  appointed  by  the  President  of the  Republic.  After  several  years  of working 
experience and positively assessed work abilities, an auditor can be promoted to the post 
of conseiller referendaire and consequently to  the post of conseiller maitre. Their roles 
shall be examined in more detail later in the text. At this point, it is interesting to note that 
around two thirds of  conseillers maitres have taken their positions after occupying one of 
the lower levels posts of  the Court's hierarchy while one third comes from outside of  the 
court  (other  civil  service  positions).  Similarly,  three  quarters  of  the  conseillers 
referendaires  were previously auditors  of the  Cour while the  remainder are  generally 
selected from the wider civil service, particularly the Ministry of  Finance. As the scope of 
performance  is  increasing,  the  Cour  has  shown  interest  in  recruiting  people  with 
experience in social, scientific and industrial walks oflife.
423 
It may be argued that the accumulating experience of the Cour's staff obtained outside of 
the Cour's work increases the Cour's appreciation of  the practical management problems 
in  the  bodies  they  audit  and  increases  their  credibility  with  those  subject  to  their 
examination.
424  In  addition,  many  magistrates  have  worked  in  the  internal  control 
environment of ministries, sometimes even as  comptables, which surely enhances their 
expertise. Once appointed to a chambre, staff tend to  stay within one area and build up 
considerable  competence.  Furthermore,  magistrates  are  also  encouraged  to  assume 
423  C. Pollitt at aI, op. cit., p. 61. 
424 Ibid. 
135 responsibilities  in  the  wider public  sector.  It is  thus,  not  an  unusual  practice  for  the 
magistrates of  the Cour to leave the Cour and start a political career, or go to and work in 
the  civil  service  and  come  back  to  the  Cour  at  some  later  stage  of their  career.
425 
Therefore, it is often argued that the staff of the Cour and the civil service (especially the 
Ministry of Finance) represent a joint elite, sharing the same objective of stewardship of 
bl·  426  pu  IC money. 
Like all  other French courts, the Cour is  assisted by the Parquet, headed by Procureur 
General  (Chief Prosecutor),  appointed  by the  Government.  The  key  functions  of the 
Procureur General are internal coordination of the activities of the individual Chambers 
and external coordination between the Cour and other state bodies.
427 One of his/her key 
roles in this sense is to ensure rendering of the accounts by the comptables and to  follow 
up  on the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the Cour, as will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
The Cour is divided into seven chambers each headed by a President de Chambre, who is 
chosen by Government from among a list of conseillers maitres prepared by the Premier 
President.  Each  chamber  employs  approximately  thirty  magistrates  and  examiners, 
together with specialised support of  senior civil servants and engineers on secondment.
428 
Chambers of the Cour are quite independent in their work.  After consultation with the 
Presidents of Chambers and a Procureur General, the Premier President makes a formal 
decision on the work of each chamber.  429 Presidents of  Chambers further allocate tasks to 
425 It is interesting to note that the President Chirac has started its career in the Cour. 
426 I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of  Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability in 
the European Community", European Public Law, Volume 1, issue 4, pp. 559-662. 
427 Cf website of  the Cour des Comptes: http//:www.ccomptes.fr 
428 Ibid. 
429 Since 12 September 1997, the work-load of  the Cour has been distributed between the seven Chambers 
as follows: First chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of  Finance and the Budget; Second 
chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of defence, industry, energy, foreign and domestic trade; 
136 Chamber teams headed by a conseiller maitre. It is important to note that each Chamber 
has  total  independence in establishing its  findings  on the accounts of the government 
departments  and  the  associated governmental bodies  within their sphere  of operation. 
Each chamber proposes to the First President, on an entirely independent basis, an annual 
work programme and a medium term programme. On the basis of these proposals from 
the chambers, the Premier President decides on the annual programme of the Cour as  a 
whole. 
The  Cour is  very proud of its  independence  in  deciding  on  its  own  programme  and 
regarding its operation in general. As pointed out earlier, the Cour is not closely linked 
either with the Parliament or with the Government, but represents a prestigious judicial 
institution in its own right, being accountable directly to citizens. 
This independent feature of the  Cour,  has,  however, been seriously challenged by the 
adoption of  the LOLF. Namely, in their desire to improve the role of  the Parliament in the 
scrutiny of public  money,  MPs have  introduced a provision in the  LOLF (Article 58, 
paragraph  1)  which requires the Cour to  submit its annual working programme to  the 
Parliament's Financial Committees (one of  the National Assembly and one of the Senate) 
for their opinion.
43o This provision has provoked serious protests from the Cour, which 
claimed that its independent status accorded by the Constitution was grotesquely violated. 
The  story has  got  its  epilogue  in  the  decision  of the  Counseil  Constitutionel,  which 
proclaimed the disputed provision unconstitutional, in violation of the Article 47  of the 
Third chamber: Ministries and public bodies responsible for education, culture and research; the public 
broadcasting; Fourth chamber: Ministries and public bodies in charge of  justice, interior, foreign affairs as 
well as appeals against rulings of  the Chambres Regionales des Comptes; Fifth chamber: Ministries and 
other public bodies in charge of  employment, Labour, professional training, housing and social affairs; 
charitable organisations; Sixth chamber: Ministries and other public bodies in charge of  health and social 
security; social security bodies; Seventh chamber: Ministries and other public bodies in charge of 
infrastructure, transport and urban planning, agriculture and fishery, the environment and tourism. 
430 B. Cieutat, "La Cour des comptes et la reforme", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 76, 
Novembre 2001, pp.  107-122. 
137 Constitution.
431  In  this  way,  the  Cour  has  won  an  important  battle  in  securing  its 
independence from the Parliament. However, it looks as if the war has not been yet won, 
as  the Parliament is continuing to put increasing pressure on the Cour to respond to its 
requests and needs, as will be analysed in more depth later. 
Institutional jurisdiction of  the Cour 
The Cour institutional jurisdiction is quite wide.  Most of the Cour's institutional remit 
was established in a law passed in 1967, which provides for the audit of  all ministries and 
public bodies. The audit of public enterprises and nationalised industries was added in 
1976  when  the  bodies  previously  responsible  for  their  audit  were  merged  with  the 
Cour.
432 
Institutional  jurisdiction  of the  Cour  can  be  mandatory  or  optional.  433  Mandatory 
examinations  are  those  where  the  Cour  is  the  only  body  authorized  by  primary 
legislation  434  to  audit  the  accounts  of the  bodies  concerned.  Code  des  Juridictions 
Financieres (Code on Financial Jurisdiction) establishes general mandatory jurisdiction 
of the  Cour  over  all  central  Government  bodies:  central  government  departments, 
ministries  and  agencies;  etablissements  publics  nationaux,  semi-independent  public 
431  Le Counsil constitutionnel decision no 2001-448 DC du 25 Juillet 2001. 
432 Thus, the Cour took on duties that had previously been allocated to the Commission de verification des 
comptes des entreprises publiques (The Nationalised Industries Accounts Commission). The Commission 
was set up in  1948 to examine the accounts of  public corporations and nationalised industries and audit 
their accounts, and was affiliated to the Court of  Accounts. Cf J. Bertucci, "Le droit de controle des 
juridictions financiers", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 75 2001, 95-101. 
433 Cf the website ofthe Cour des Comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
434 Primarily by the Code on Financial Jurisdiction (Code des juridictions financieres) in which the laws 
and regulations about the Cour des Comptes and the 'chambres regionales des comptes' (regional chambers 
of audit) have been merged in. Courts mandatory jurisdiction is provided in the Articles L. 111-1, 111-3, 
131-1,133-1,133-2. 
138 bodies (Autorite Administrative Independante -AAI); since 1950, social security bodies; 
and, since 1976, public corporations and nationalised industries.435 
The Cour has only optional jurisdiction over private bodies, as their accounts are audited 
regularly by other organisations and the examination of the Cour is only discretionary. 
However, involvement of  the Cour in audit of  these bodies is important, due to significant 
amounts  of public  money which  may be  invested  in  the  work of these  bodies.  The 
organisations under which the Cour exercises only optional jurisdiction are: 
-private sector companies where a majority of the voting rights or capital is held 
by one of the public sector bodies listed above, who are subject to the mandatory 
jurisdiction of the Cour des  Comptes,  or where such a public sector body has a 
decisive influence over decision-making and management within the company; 
-private sector organisations (including the voluntary sector, charities and other 
non-profit  organisations)  which  receive  support  from  the  public  sector; 
-charitable organisations funded by contributions from the general public (since 
1991); 
-organisations which receive funds from the European Union (Art. 45 of Act No. 
96-314 of 12 April 1996).436 
It is obvious that institutional jurisdiction of the Cour is rather wide. Such a broad remit 
of the Cour brings about comprehensiveness in the audit of public monies, defined in 
their broadest sense. 
Functional jurisdiction of  the Cour 
The Cour is, at least in form, a court of law, whose primary task is to make judgement on 
accuracy and regularity of public accounts. Nowadays, however, the role of  the Cour has 
435 Article L.  Ill-I. of  the Code des jurisdictions financiers. 
436 Cf the website of  the Cour des Comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
139 evolved towards an audit body which perfonns a  much wider scope of activities than 
judging the accounts. In fact, the Cour's judicial powers have gradually been weakened 
and delegated to  other institutions,437  and its  'accessory' role as an auditor of financial 
management of  public funds has been significantly strengthened. 
Evolution of the  Cour can  easily be followed  through  legislation  which  regulates  its 
material jurisdiction. Material jurisdiction of  the Cour has for a long time been defined by 
the  Law  of 16  September  1807,  which  laid  down  two  distinct  roles  for  the  Court: 
principal  and accessory.  The principal  role  of the  Cour was  stipulated by Article  11, 
which provided for the Cour the right and duty to judge the enumerated public accounts. 
The second,  accessory,  or extra-judicial role of the Cour was  stipulated by Article  16 
which provided for  the  Cour the  role of examining financial  irregularities  that it has 
discovered during the control of the accounts and consequently presenting them in an 
annual  report  containing  general  observations  from  the  examination  of the  accounts 
(Article 22).438 
It should be noted that although judicial and extra-judicial functions of the Court seem to 
be distinct, they are not necessarily separate. Thus, while exercising its judicial function, 
the Court naturally examines the regularity of the procedures which the administration 
employs  in its  everyday work and subsequently reports  on its  findings.  Unlike  in the 
British system where controls of financial audit and value for money audit are separated 
both  substantially and organisationally,  in  the  French  system  all  kinds  of control  are 
exercised simultaneously. Reporters are thus obliged to devote equal attention to all the 
aspects of  financial control and management.  439 
437 Thus, as a result of  decentralization refonns in  1983 some of  the Cour's competences were transferred to 
regional audit bodies (chambres regionales des comptes).437 On the other hand, the highest administrative 
court, the Conseil d'Etat has overtaken its role of  imposing fines on accountants and has become a Court of 
Cassation for the decisions of  the Cour. 
438 J.  Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., pp. 73-74. 
439 C. Descheemaeker, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
140 Depending on the nature of the audited bodies in question (whether they fall  under the 
Cour's mandatory or optional jurisdiction), the  Cour performs its  control in a  slightly 
different manner: 
1)  for bodies under the public accounting rules regime (falling under the mandatory 
audit), the Cour exercises both judicial and extra-judicial functions; 
2)  for bodies under the private accountancy regime (optional audit of the Cour) the 
Cour  does  not  have  authority  to  exercise  its  judicial  functions  and  therefore 
exercises only extra-judicial  powers,  communicating its  findings  to  the  audited 
bodies and provides different kind ofreports.
44o 
Although  the  Cour  does  not  distinguish  operationally  and  organisationally  between 
regularity and  financial  management audit,  we  shall  examine  Cour's distinct  roles  in 
more detail separately, hoping to provide more clarity in the Cour's complex audit remit. 
In addition to the role of the Cour as a judge of accounts and as an auditor of financial 
management, we shall also separately examine the new role the Cour obtained under the 
LOLF, which could be described as assistance to Parliament. 
The COUf as a judge 
The judicial function  of the Cour is  usually expressed in the following definition:  "La 
Cour juge les comptes et non les comptables [The Cour judges the accounts and not the 
accountants]."  This  definition  was  originally  designed  to  express  limitations  of the 
competence  of the  judge  of the  accounts,  but  has  been  abusively  extended  to  the 
440 Ibid. 
141 definition of its jurisdiction, as there have been many misunderstandings concerning this 
"  441  Issue. 
On the one hand, the phrase that the Cour is judging the accounts means that it judges the 
regularity of financial operations. However, as the Cour cannot annul irregular operations 
or correct the accounts that have been rendered, this statement does not accurately depict 
reality. On the other hand, the statement that the Cour cannot judge the comptable is not 
completely true,  it is  contrary to  the law of 1807 (Article  13),  which provides that the 
Cour definitely establishes  with  its judgment on whether comptables  have  done  their 
work accurately/regularly, or have surplus or are in arrears. In the first two cases the Cour 
will  discharge the comptables, and in the third one,  it will  sentence the comptables to 
settle  their  arrears.
442  Thus,  by necessity,  when  the  Cour  is  making  a  judgment  on 
accounts, it also makes a judgment on comptables as well, especially in the case when the 
Cour sanctions the comptables.  Such a judgment is  not simply a declaratory statement, 
but represents a legally enforceable act against a comptable.
443 This is in contrast with the 
UK system of financial audit where the NAO just provides a clear or a qualified opinion 
on the accounts. The NAO's opinion on the accounts is  a simple declaratory statement 
that does not imply any personal liability of  the person who prepared these accounts. 
In this sense, it is important to point out that the Cour does not base its judgment solely 
on the material elements of the case, but takes into account any personal circumstances 
that could justify ones behaviour, such as, for example existence of  vis maior, which may 
justify the action of the accountant and thus discharge him/her of his/her responsibility. 
The best interpretation of  this issue has been given by the Cour itself. It thus states: 
441  1. Magnet, "Que juge Ie juge des comptes?" Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, 1989, no. 28, pp. 
115-124. 
442 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., pp. 147-148. 
443 Ibid. 
142 "The task/mission of  the judge charged with checking the regularity of  the accounts is  to  understand the 
responsibility of  the comptable and his position, in the view of  the whole situation of  the accounts. ,,444 
Therefore,  if the judge finds  that  a  comptable is  in  arrears  and that there  is  no  good 
justification  for  his/her  behaviour  (such  as  e.g.  vis  maior),  the  judge  will  establish 
personal financial liability of the accountant (law of 23  February 1963, Article 60-VI) in 
its judgment, which will be enforced against the comptable.
445 All judgments emanating 
from  auditing  the  accounts  are  also  communicated to  the  Minister,  in  order to  avoid 
repetition  of errors.  In  2004,  the  Cour made  333  judgments  on  the  accounts  of the 
comptables.
446 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  Cour  does  not  only  judge  accounts  kept  by  'official' 
comptables, but also examines the accounts of any person who has improperly become 
involved in handling public monies,  In this case, the Cour can declare the existence of 
gestion  de fait (de  facto  management).  If the person is  found  to  be a de facto  public 
accountant,  it consequently becomes subject to  the  same obligations  and formal  legal 
'b'l' ,  bl  447  responsl  1 Itles as a compta  e, 
The Cour as an auditor of  financial management 
Since its very establishment, the Cour has been authorized to  exercise its powers only 
towards  comptables,  who  were  held personally and  financially  responsible  for  use  of 
public  money,  while  the  ministers  and  higher  officials  qualified  to  order  payments 
(ordonnateurs)  were exempted from  any form of accountability, Napoleon's  1807  law 
was quite explicit in this respect. Thus, Article 18 of the 1807 Act prescribed that:  "The 
444 Cour des Comptes, 10 August 1880, commune de Frasne (Doubs), p. 8. 
445 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op, 
cit, 191-194. 
446 NAO report, op, cit. p. 94. 
447 Cf 1. Magnet, "La regularisation de la gestion de fait", Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, No. 66, 
1999; R. Hertzog, "La necessaire refonne de la procedure de gestion de fait", Revue Francaise de Finances 
Publiques, No. 66, 1999. C. Descheemaeker, La Cour des comptes, op, cit.  119-133. 
143 Cour may not, in any case whatever, claim any jurisdiction over ordonnateurs".448 This 
prohibition can be interpreted as  a clear wish of the executive to  protect its  absolutist 
executive power. It may be argued that it is  due to this legal situation that the indirect 
control, through the public accountants, was evolved and encouraged by the Cour.
449 
It is interesting to note that the Cour is still not authorized to judge elected officials or 
civil  servants  entitled to  order payments and receipt of public moneys.  As mentioned 
earlier,  enforcement of personal responsibility for ordonnateurs was instead given to  a 
new body, the Court of  Budgetary Discipline, founded in 1948.
450 However, since it is far 
more difficult to impose personal responsibilities upon administrators than upon cashiers, 
additional ways of imposing accountability towards ordonnateurs were sought. One of 
the ways of putting pressure on ordonnateurs was to give the Cour the right to examine 
their performance, i.e. efficiency and efficacy of the use of public funds.  Thus, the Law 
of 22  June  1967  introduced a new role  for  the  Cour,  which is  defined in  the  current 
Article L 111-3 of the Code on Financial Jurisdiction which provides that the Cour is to 
"ascertain the good use of public funds" ('bon emploi des fonds'), and that it shall verify 
the accounts and management of public enterprises (Article III-4). These provisions have 
provided a basis for examination of  value-for-money aspects of financial management, as 
pointed out earlier in the course of discussion on the concept of stewardship of public 
money. In this way, the Cour has indirectly started reviewing the work of elected officials 
and  civil  servants  entitled to  authorize  payments.  The  Cour performs  this  role  either 
during its examination of  the accounts of government departments and other State bodies 
produced by the public accountant, or by directly reviewing the work of  ordonnateur. 
It is difficult to estimate the share of  performance audit in overall work of the Cour, since 
the  Cour's investigations  generally combine judiciary work and financial  management 
448 C. Descheemaeker, op. cit. 119-133. 
449 Ibid. 
4501. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit., 313-329. 
144 audit. However, according to some estimates, two-thirds of  the resources of the Cour are 
nowadays devoted to the audit of financial management or performance.
451 
Within the Cour, performance audit is carried out by each chamber. Thus, each chamber 
selects topics for performance audit, on the basis of the annual plan and in accordance 
with level  of public interest,  possible risks  involved and experience of the  concerned 
area.
452 After the subjects of  the audit have been determined by the chamber, the process 
of planning  of the  work  commences,  in  accordance  with  the  detailed  rules  of the 
decision-making process of  the Cour. 
The rules of  the decision-making process 
The  decision-making  process  of the  Cour  in  both judicial  proceedings  and  financial 
management audit (as they are performed together) can briefly be described as  follows. 
The audit is performed by an auditor, who carries out his audit alone and remains free to 
express  his/her  own  opinion  on  the  accounts,  even  if he  is  part  of a  team.
453  After 
finalisation of  the initial version of  report, an auditor submits his/her work to a conseiller 
maitre (contrerapporteur). The role of  the conseiller maitre is to study the report together 
with  all  supporting  documents  and to  submit his/her  assessment of the  report  to  the 
committee of other conseillers maitres of the  chamber.  The reporter's report  and  the 
conseiller maitres remarks are given to the members of the chamber, which can require 
that more details on the report are provided. This review considers all the aspects of the 
report: its scope, methodology, findings and conc1usions.
454 After thorough examination, 
the  members of the  chamber collegiaUy  decide  if they will  accept the  report.  All  the 
members of  the chamber vote for the report, except for the reporters, who are usually not 
allowed to vote. In order to avoid influence of  the older magistrates, younger magistrates 
451  NAO report, op. cit, p. 94. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Article 22 of  the Decree 11  February 1985. 
454 Cf. website ofthe COuT, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
145 vote first, while the president of the chamber votes last. In the case of a balance of votes, 
·d'  .  d  ..  455  a pres  I  ent s vote IS  eClslve. 
The following phase of  the procedure is based on the right of  reply. In the case of  judicial 
proceedings the results of the collegial hearing are forwarded as an interim ruling to  the 
comptable,  who  is  then required to  submit a  formal  response.  In  the  case of audit of 
financial management, an audit report is sent to the audittee, who is required to comment 
on the report.  Only after submission of an comptable/audittee's formal  response is  the 
Cour  allowed  to  reach  the  verdict/adopt  the  final  report.
456  In  the  case  of financial 
management reports, the Cour generally attempts to obtain an agreement with the auditee 
on the substance of the report. However, if no agreement between them is reached, the 
Cour will annex the auditee's comments to the Report and publish it all together.
457 
The decision-making process of the Cour undoubtedly has many advantages, which are 
primarily based on the right of reply and collegiality of decision-making. The right of 
reply protects the democratic value of providing an  audittee the opportunity to  express 
his/her  view  on  the  alleged  irregularities.  Collegiality of the  decision-making,  on  the 
other hand,  undoubtedly contributes to  the high quality of decision-making.  Two  key 
control mechanisms - cross-examination by the conseiller maitre, in the first instance and 
collective  examination  of the  chamber in  the  second,  certainly add  to  the  high  level 
standards of  the Cour's reports. In this way the experience of other experts in the field is 
widely used and quality of  the final decisions secured. 
After the completion of  judicial decision-making process, a comptable does not have the 
right  to  appeal  against  the  decisions  of  the  Cour.  Nevertheless,  there  are  two 
455 J.  Magnet, op. cit. p.  110. 
456 In the case of  a production of  a report, a Chamber also needs to approve that revisions to the report are 
made following the organisation's comments. Cf. website of  the Cour des comptes, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
457 For example, in the case of  the Cour's report on museums and collections (1997), the commentaries 
were almost half as long as the text produced by the Cour itself (Cour des Comptes ,1997). 
146 extraordinary  remedies  which  can  be  used  to  challenge  the  judgments  of the  Cour: 
revision and cassation.
458 
Revision is based on allegations of errors of  fact, in which case the Cour is the competent 
body to decide on it. The basis for revision are thus the facts which could not have been 
known  to  the  judge  when  he  made  the  judgment  (e.g.  new  circumstances,  facts  -
additional  facts).  The  revision  proceedings  can  be  initiated  on  the  request  of the 
accountant, or the Procureur General, the Minister of Finance, other relevant Ministry or 
legal representative of  other public bodies.
459 
The case for cassation, on the other hand, can be based only on breach of the rules of  the 
first instance procedure. Reasons for cassation could thus be lack of competence and/or 
misuse of power. A request for cassation is submitted to the Conseil d'Etat, which is the 
Court  of cassation  for  the  decisions  of the  Cour.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that 
cassations are very rare and those who  succeed are even rarer.  From 1807 to  1995,  67 
requests were introduced, and only 19 were accepted.
46o 
Follow up on the audit process 
After the completion of  an overall audit process, the Cour has to communicate its general 
financial audit or performance audit findings to the public bodies that have undergone the 
audit process. There are several different types of communication between the Cour and 
audited bodies, depending on the seriousness of financial management issue and the rank 
of addressee.  Less  significant  problem  issues  are  communicated  through  letters  of 
presidents of  the chambers to directors of  the audited bodies (Article 35 of the Decree 20 
September  1968).  Furthermore,  usual  correspondence  between  the  Cour  and  audited 
bodies goes through the Procureur General (Article 4 of the Decree 11  February 1985). 
458 1. Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit. pp. 273-280. 
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid. 
147 The Procureur General issues notes, in which he lists irregularities and suggests ways to 
improve them. The addressees are obliged to provide an answer to the note, but are not 
generally obliged to  apply the proposed recommendations.
461  More  serious,  especially 
recurrent financial management irregularities, are in charge of the Premier President of 
the Cour (Article L  135_1).462 Following the general procedure, the  Premier President 
sends the refere containing the overview of the findings together with recommendations 
for improvement to a minister. The Minister is obliged to give his/her reply in the period 
of six month. If the Cour does not receive a satisfactory answer within that time, it sends 
the referes to Parliament.  463 
It is interesting to note that most of  the Cour's audit work is not published nor distributed 
to  the broader audience.
464 Although this may raise concerns for the transparency of the 
operation of  the Cour and the executive, it seems to be in line with the modem trends that 
external audit institutions should move away from  the  pecuniary,  sanctioning function 
they exercised during past centuries and instead work on development of their advisory 
and partnership  function  with the  Government.  This also  corresponds to  the  emerging 
advisory  function  of the  NAO,  which,  as  we  could  see  in  the  previous  chapter, 
communicates its numerous findings  through management letters directed solely to  the 
executive, without any interference on the side of  the PAC. However, it is very important 
to find a balance in this advisory exercise, as the democratic nature of modem external 
audit institutions requires that findings of the audit, especially those addressing serious 
systematic flaws, be disseminated to the Parliament and the general public. 
461  J.  Magnet, La Cour des Comptes les institutions associees et les chambers regionales des comptes, op. 
cit.p.137. 
462 On average seven hundred reports are produced every year, all of  which involve correspondence with 
the audited body's parent organisation and its senior managers. Around two hundred letters from the 
Procureur General are sent to departmental heads and directors, while around three hundred letters are 
signed by the Presidents of  the seven Chambers. Cf. website of  the Cour, http://www.ccomptesJr 
463 Thus, Article 135-5 of  the Code provides the possibility for the Cour to communicate its findings to 
Finance Commission of  the Parliament. 
464 C. Pollitt et ai, op. cit. 181. 
148 Public  Annual  Reports  of  the  Cour  represent  an  important  means  of  direct 
communication between the Cour and the public. The significance of the Public Annual 
Reports  is  established by Article L.  136  of the  Code, which provides that:  "The Cour 
informs the President of the Republic and Parliament of its audit findings in an annual 
report".  It is  the responsibility of the Premier President to  ensure that its  drafting and 
presentation are  satisfactory.  Although  Public  Reports  generally contain  extracts  from 
other unpublished audit reports, they often address complex financial management issues, 
which,  in  Cour's  opinion,  require  substantive  reforms,  underpinned  by  changes  of 
legislation and regulations.
465  Implementation of such reforms undoubtedly necessitates 
strong public support and Parliamentary support in order to be properly followed up. 
Recommendations  of financial  management  audits  can  also  be  presented  in  special 
studies,  concerned  with  specific,  mainly  performance  issues  (rapports  publics 
particuliers).466  These  reports  basically  correspond  to  the  NAO's  value  for  money 
studies.  Since  1991  the  Cour  has  published  two  or three  reports  a  year  on  specific 
performance matters.
467 The reports are addressed to the Ministers concerned, to the head 
of the audited body, or to the appropriate legal authorities. Copies of the report are also 
sent to  the President of the Republic and Parliament. The rapports publics particuliers 
are also sent to newspapers and receive considerable attention in the media. 
However, it seems difficult to assess the Cour's influence on the audited bodies. This is 
primarily the corollary of the Cour's huge confidential correspondence with auditees and 
the fact that it publishes only a small section of  its overall work. Unlike the majority of  its 
counterparts  in  other  countries,  the  Cour  does  not  systematically  survey  the 
implementation  of recommendations  arising  from  its  work  which  makes  any  impact 
465 Ibid. 
466 The Cour has been authorized by the Council of Ministers decision of 1991  to conduct specific public 
reports. Cf. C. Pollitt at ai, op. cit., p.  154. 
467 The Cour's reports could be found on the Cour's website, http://www.ccomptes.fr 
149 evaluation difficult. In recent years, however, the Cour has included in its Annual Public 
Report details of the follow-up of previous evaluations, which are occasionally publicly 
cited.
468  However, this is  far  from the practice of regular accounting and publication of 
overall impact indicators, exercised on the regular basis by most of other Supreme Audit 
Institutions in Europe.
469 
The need for  more  effective  follow-up  of the  Cour's recommendations has,  in recent 
years,  attempted  to  be  addressed  through  the  establishment  of  a  closer  working 
relationship  between  the  Cour  and  the  Parliament.  As  pointed  out  in  the  prevIous 
sections, the LOLF has provided the Parliament with much stronger means of  holding the 
executive  to  account,  through  various  instruments  it  accorded  to  the  Parliamentary 
Finance Committees (MEC), modelled on the UK example of NAO/P  AC. It is expected 
that such cooperation will be able to address the existing weaknesses in the follow up of 
the Cour's recommendation and provide a synergy of action directed towards holding the 
managers  of  public  bodies  strongly  to  account  for  their  organisation's  financial 
performance.  In this  sense,  it could be argued that the  Cour is  moving away from  its 
strictly independent position from the Government and Parliament and is becoming more 
and  more  an  assistant  of the  Parliament.  This  contention  certainly  deserves  to  be 
addressed in the final section of  this chapter. 
The emerging role of  the Cour - an assistant to the Parliament? 
Although it may look as if the LOLF has not been able to introduce any changes in the 
traditional operation of the Cour, this has not been the case. Not surprisingly, the MPs 
have  addressed the  need for  a changing the role of the  Cour,  pointing out two  major 
aspects of reform. The first is a requirement that the Cour more actively respond to the 
468 For example, in  1997, Premier President introduced the annual report to the members of  Parliament 
pointing out different cases ofCour's impact on the audited bodies. Cf. C. Pollitte, op. cit. p.  181. 
469 C. Pollitt, H. Summa, "Reflective Watchdogs? How Supreme Audit Institutions Account for 
themselves", Public Administration, Vol. 75, summer 1997, pp. 313-336. 
150 requests of the Parliament in carrying out its audits. The second is an obligation of the 
Cour to  provide MPs  with additional  sources of information on execution of the new 
budgetary framework, especially on the state of  the Government accounts. 
The LOLF has  defined  the  need  for  a  more  proactive  assistance  of the  Cour to  the 
Parliament in scrutinising the implementation of  the loi de finances through the following 
requirements: 
1)  the obligation of  the Cour to respond to assistance requests from the chairman and 
the general  rapporteur of each assembly's finance  committee for  the audit and 
evaluation mission (MEC);470 
2)  the obligation of  the Cour to carry out any investigation requested by the National 
Assembly and Senate financial  committees on the managements of agencies or 
bodies  it  supervises.  The  conclusions  of  these  investigations  must  be 
communicated  within  eight  months  of the  formulation  of the  request  to  the 
committee issuing the request, which rules on their publication.
471 
In spite of a clearly defined legal framework, the cooperation between the Parliament and 
the  Cour  is  not  functioning  well.  This  should  perhaps  not  been  surprising  as  these 
provisions of the LOLF do  infringe the Cour's independence in defining its own work, 
which has been the traditional feature of this prestigious institution. In order to  'defend' 
its independence, the Cour has consistently refused to respond to Parliamentary request 
for carrying out specific investigations. This has provoked strong reaction from the MP's 
and  especially  the  President  of a  Finance  Committee  (who  is  at  the  same  time  the 
President  of MEC)  who  have  characterised  the  Cour's  refusals  for  cooperation  as 
'shocking'  .472  It  is  further  argued  that  although  the  Cour  should  certainly  have 
470 Article 58, paragraph 1 of  the LOLF. 
471  Article 58, paragraph 2 of  the LOLF. 
472 Cf. Assemble Nationale, "Rapport d'!nformation par la Commission des Finances, de l'Economie 
General et du plan sur Ie suivi de preconisations de la Cour des comptes et de la Mission e'evaluation et de 
controle," Report No. 2298, of May 2005., available at http://assemblee-nationale.fr, p. 61. 
151 independence in carrying out its duties, this independence must have its limits, especially 
in relation to an institution of democratic audit, such as the Parliament. In the President's 
own words: 'The democracy requests the controllers also to be sometimes controlled".473 
The adversarial relation between the Parliament and the Cour is certainly not a good sign 
for  the  future  development  of the  French  financial  accountability  system.  Clearly, 
contrary to  the presupposed intention of the LOLF to  develop strong working relations 
between the Cour and the Parliament, the opposite is happening at the moment, which 
may have an adverse effect on both functioning of the Parliament as a scrutiniser of the 
executive's  behaviour  and  the  Cour's  ability  to  follow  up  on  its  recommendations. 
Therefore, we again reiterate the need for establishment of a more cordial relationship 
between the Cour and the Parliament in their day-to-day work. 
As regards the second sets of obligations of the Cour towards the Parliament, the LOLF 
further  requires  the  Cour  to  provide  the  Parliament  with  three  annual  reports:  the 
preliminary report on developments in the national economy and public finance trends,474 
(which is to assist the Government to prepare for the Parliamentary discussion on the loi 
de  finances  for  the  next  year)475;  the  report  regarding  the  consolidated  financial 
statements  of  the  Government,  which  in  particular,  analyses  the  utilisation  of 
appropriations by mission and by programme; and report on certification that the State's 
accounts are lawful, faithful and present a true and fair view.476  This certification will be 
annexed to the loi de reglement (law on consolidated Government accounts) and will be 
accompanied by the report on the audits conducted.477 
Whereas the request for presenting the first two kinds of annual reports is  obviously in 
line with the desire to  enhance  the  role of the  Parliament in holding the  executive to 
473  Ibid. 
474 Article 58 paragraph 4 of  the LOLF. 
475 Article 48 of  the LOLF. 
476 Article 58, paragraph 6 of  the LOLF. 
477 Article 58, paragraph 5 of  the LOLF. 
152 account  for  better  financial  performance,  one  may wonder  what  is  the  logic  behind 
requesting the Cour to provide the certification/assurance that the Government accounts 
present a fair view. This requirement may seem a bit surprising, as the Cour has lately not 
experienced any significant problems with respect to accuracy of  the public accounts. It is 
interesting to note that the concept of provision of certification/assurance of  the accuracy 
and  fairness  of accounts  has  for  some time been present in the  framework of the EU 
financial  management,  as  will  be  analysed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter.  The 
European Court of  Auditors has for the last 11  years been request to provide statement of 
assurance  (declaration  d'assurance-DAS)  on  reliability  of the  EU  accounts  and  its 
underlying transactions.  This is  one of example of how EU concepts  and instruments 
affect  areas  of traditional national  competence.  However,  whereas the reasons  for  the 
introduction of  the DAS in the EU system stem from complexities and weaknesses of  the 
EU financial accountability framework, the logic behind the introduction of certification 
in the French system is certainly different. 
Reasons  for  requiring  the  Cour to  produce certification of the  accounts  become quite 
apparent  when  one  takes  into  account  the  LOLF's  intention  to  introduce  resource 
accounting in the French Government.  Introduction of resource accounting, as  a part of 
overall  changes  introduced  by the  LOLF,  represents  a  big  challenge  to  the  French 
Government,  as  faithful  representation  of transactions  and  events  under  the  resource 
accounting  requirements  will  be  much  more  complex  and  demanding.  Although  the 
budget  of  2006  has  elements  of  resource  accounting,  the  transition  towards  the 
introduction of a  true  accrual  accounting is  a long-term project and will  take  at  least 
another 5 years to be fully successfully implemented.
478  This will require lots of efforts 
on the side of  comptables, but also on their management. 
Furthermore,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  imposed  request  to  the  Cour  to  carry  out 
certification of the accounts may have a much deeper meaning than it may look at first 
478 International Federation of Accountants, "The Modernisation of Government Accounting in France: the 
current situation, the issues, the outlook, January 2003", available at http://www.ifac.org 
153 sight. Although the concept of  the certification itself is not fully clear, it does imply a sort 
of  technical examination of  the accounts, rather than deciding on a personal responsibility 
of accounts.
479  And although elements of personal responsibility of accountants are still 
very much present in the French system and not denied in the LOLF, requesting the Cour 
certify the accounts will certainly enhance the Cour's already existing advisory role.  In 
this way, the Cour should be further moving away from its sanctioning role and become 
an important Government (and hopefully Parliament's) advisor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides a very clear example on how a national financial  accountability 
system can be reformed in a relatively short period of time under increasing inside and 
outside pressure. The introduction of LOLF in 2001  has made quite a revolution in the 
financial  operations  of the  French  Government,  putting  in  place  a  completely  new 
legislative framework for the operation of  financial accountability in France. 
The strengthening of the role of the Parliament, through enhancement of its powers to 
decide on the allocation of expenditure as well as to scrutinise its implementation through 
specialised Parliamentary Committees (MEC), demonstrates the recognition of all French 
authorities  of  the  importance  of  democratic  financial  accountability  mechanisms. 
However, the relations between the key guardian institutions of financial accountability, 
the Parliament and the Cour are still not functioning well, which may have an  adverse 
affect  on  the effectiveness of the  overall  financial  accountability system.  Therefore,  it 
will  be  important  to  work  on  establishing better working  relations  between different 
financial accountability actors. 
This  analysis of reform of financial  accountability system in France also  demonstrates 
that, in spite of strong influence of  New Public Management ideas based on performance 
479 P. J-R. Alventosa, "La nouveau role de la Cour des comptes," ENA mensuel, June 2002, No. 322, pp. 9-
II. 
154 logic  and  the  doctrine  of  enhanced  managerial  freedoms,  the  French  financial 
accountability system will not let go easily its traditional values based on primary respect 
for legal rules and compliance with established procedures. But it could, perhaps, provide 
an affirmative example on how traditional values of compliance could be well coupled 
with modem ideas of  performance. 
155 Chapter IV 
Financial Accountability in the EU 
This chapter shall examine financial accountability at the supranational level of the EU. 
Following  the  structure  of the  previous  chapters,  we  shall  first  analyse  the  key 
supranational accountor of the EU level - EU institutions. We shall then examine  the 
concept of stewardship of public money in the EU.  Significant attention shall again be 
placed on both internal and external financial accountability mechanisms that operate at 
the EU level. 
Furthermore,  in this  chapter  we  shall  attempt  to  comprehend  the  nature  of financial 
accountability at the supra-national level of the European Union. There is no doubt that 
the establishment of a democratic financial accountability, in the most general sense of a 
relationship between the EU citizens and EU institutions, is even more complex than at 
the national level. This is primarily because the EU expenditure is managed largely by 
the Member States and only in small part by the Commission and other EU institutions. 
In  order to  be able to  comprehend the financial  accountability relationship  in the EU 
context  we  will  have  to  comprehend the  nature  of the  EU  itself.  Therefore we  shall 
discuss the main theories attempting to  explain the nature of the EU integration and its 
basic features. This will provide us with a basis for drawing general conclusions on the 
nature of  the financial accountability relationship. 
Finally,  the  focus  of our attention  shall  be laid on the  requirements  for  the  acceding 
countries  in the  area of financial  accountability.  We  shall  especially focus  on  the EU 
basic standards in the area of internal financial  control and standards related to external 
audit and the protection of  the EU financial interests. 
156 Unique Supranational Financial Accountability Accountor - EU institutions 
The EU has an exceptional governmental structure, which at first sight resembles that of 
a national system. The EU has a Council, a Commission, a Parliament, and a Court of 
Justice,  institutions  which,  on  the  surface,  correspond  to  a  national  government's 
executive,  legislature and judiciary. Although there are  certain  elements of similarity, 
they may be quite misleading. Thus, the Council consists of Member States' government 
ministers  and  instead of executive function,  mainly performs the legislative one.  This 
legislative function  is  shared with the directly elected Parliament, whose  functions  are 
therefore much more limited then in the national contexts. It may be argued that only the 
European  Court  of Justice,  consisting  of judges  appointed  by  the  Member  States, 
.  "  1  480  approXImates to Its natlOna  counterpart. 
The Council of the European Union - formerly known as the Council of Ministers -is the 
main  legislative  and  decision-making  body  in  the  EU.  It  brings  together  the 
representatives of the Member State governments, which are elected at national level. It 
is  the  forum  in  which  the  representatives  of national  governments  can  assert  their 
interests and reach compromises.  They meet regularly at  the  level of working  groups, 
ambassadors  and  ministers.  The  European  Council  which  decides  major  policy 
guidelines is composed of  Heads of  State or Government.
481 
The European Parliament is  intended to  represent the peoples of the Community. The 
members  of the  European  Parliament  were  for  a  long  time  selected  by the  national 
legislatures and it was only in 1976 that agreement was reached on direct elections. The 
European  Parliament  (EP)  is  now  directly  elected  every  five  years  and  attempts  to 
provide the democratic voice of  the peoples of  Europe. 
The  Council  and  the  European  Parliament  set  the  rules  for  all  the  activities  of the 
European Community (EC), which forms the first "pillar" of the EU. It covers the single 
480 D. Dinan, Ever Closer Union, An Introduction to European Integration, Macmillan, 1999, pp. 205-229. 
481  www.europa.eu.int 
157 market and most of the EU's common policies, and guarantees freedom of movement for 
goods, persons, services and capital. They also share competence in EU budget issues. In 
addition, the Council is the main institution responsible for the second and third "pillars", 
i.e. intergovernmental cooperation on common foreign and security policy and on justice 
and home affairs.
482 
The key executive organ of the Community is the European Commission, which has no 
analogue  in  national  governmental  systems.  Although  the  Commission  members  are 
appointed by national  governments, they must be approved by the Parliament and are 
pledged to  act  in  the  EU's interests.  The  Commission has  exclusive  right  to  initiate 
legislation in the first pillar, makes sure that EU decisions are properly implemented and 
supervises the way EU funds are spent. It also makes sure that everyone abides by the 
European  treaties  and European  law.
483  Assisted by around 24000  multinational  civil 
servants, the Commission lies at the hart of  the EU supranational system.
484 
The Commission consists of a number of Directorates General (DGs), which resemble 
the structure and functions of national ministries.  Although no  formal  hierarchy exists 
within the  Commission's services,  it may be argued that  the  DGs which are  directly 
involved  in  policy development  enjoy more  prestige  than  those  which  are  primarily 
concerned  with  policy implementation  or with  horizontal  activities  such  as  financial 
coordination.
485  Each  Directorate  General  is  headed  by a  Director  General,  who  is 
responsible  to  the  relevant  Commissioner.  There  are  also  a  number  of specialized 
services, such as the Legal service, which gives legal advice to all Directorates General 
and represents the Commission in legal proceedings.
486 
482 www.europa.eu.int 
483 T.e. Hartley, The Foundations of  European Community Law,  Clarendon Press Oxford, 1999, pp. 12-17. 
484 D. Dinan, ibid. 
485 N. Nugent, "At the Heart of  the Union", in N. Nugent, At the Heart of  the Union, (London: Macmillan) 
1997, pp. 1-26. 
486 Ibid. 
158 In  addition  to  the  above  institutions,  the  EU  has  a  number of other institutions  and 
supporting bodies, such as:  the European Court of Justice, the European Economic and 
Social  Committee,  Committee  of  the  Regions,  European  Central  Bank,  European 
Investment  Bank  and  European  Ombudsman. The  EU  also  has  a  Court  of Auditors 
(hereinafter  ECA),  which  has  a  special  importance  for  our  financial  accountability 
research and will be examined in greater detail later. 
It should be pointed out that the EU institutions operate in a fairly diverse and dynamic 
multicultural  and  multinational  environment.  Such  an  environment  is  much  more 
unstable than the national one, given the frequency of Treaty changes in the Union since 
the  mid  1980s.  The  Union  structure  is  further  characterized  by peculiar institutional 
rivalry, as most EU institutions consistently follow the objective of enlarging the scope of 
their competence. Institution building in the EU is therefore usually quite pragmatic and 
incremental, as each institution seeks to enhance its formal legal competence and obtain a 
more important place in the Union's institutional structure.
487  This has brought about a 
significant  alteration  in  the  balance  between  institutions  over  time,  which  generally 
resulted in a gradual enhancement of  the Parliament's power at the expense of the power 
the  EU  Commission.
488  This  movement  was  also  reflected  in  the  area  of financial 
accountability, which experienced different stands of  reforms in the last couple of  years. 
Background of reform of EU financial accountability framework 
Just like national governments, the  EU supranational  government is,  through  different 
mechanisms, financed by the EU citizens and therefore requires the existence of effective 
financial  accountability mechanisms by which the EU citizens would hold it to  account 
487 Cf B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': the Evolution of  the European Court of  Auditors", 
Journal of  Common Market Studies (1999), Vol. 37, No.2, pp. 251-268. 
488 Cf J.P. Jacque, "The Principle of Institutional Balance", Common Market Law Review 41,2004, Kluwer 
Law International, pp. 383-391; A. Dashwood, A. Johnston, "The Institutions of  the Enlarged EU under the 
Regime of  the Constitutional Treaty," Common Market Law Review 41, 2004. pp. 1481-1518, Kluwer Law 
International. 
159 for the stewardship of their money. Many efforts have been made in order to strengthen 
the  financial  accountability  at  the  EU  level,  primarily  by  establishing  an  effective 
accountability relationship between the European Parliament and the Commission and by 
enhancing the role of  key external accountability mechanism of  the ECA. 
In spite of these efforts, handling of public money in the EU kept attracting significant 
attention of EU citizens and Member States, especially during the last decade. There has 
been a quite high incidence of financial irregularities, waste and fraud in the management 
of EU financial resources, which has provided Euro sceptics with additional arguments 
against the EU and further integration processes. 
The occurrence of a series of  cases of  mismanagement in handling of EU resources led to 
the  resignation  of the  Santer Commission  in  1999,  as  the  first  case  when  the  entire 
Commission resigned in the history of the EU.
489  The resignation was preceded by the 
Report of the  Committee of Independent Experts,  which  examined the  allegations  of 
fraud, mismanagement and nepotism in the Commission. The Committee of Independent 
Experts  further  published  its  second  report  analyzing  the  then  current  financial 
management practices and laying proposals for  tackling mismanagement,  irregularities 
and fraud in the EU .490 
The reports of the Committee of Independent Experts and the subsequent Commission 
White paper on reforming the Commission (2000t
91  have led to substantive changes in 
the regulation of the EU public expenditure management. The Community budget and 
financial procedures are traditionally governed by secondary legislation, embodied in the 
489 A. Tomkins, "Responsibility and Resignation in the European Commission", (1999), 62 MLR 744. 
490 Committee of Independent Experts, Second Report on Reform on the Commission, Analysis of current 
practice and proposals for tackling mismanagement, irregularities and fraud, Volume II, September 1999. 
491  Commission's White Paper: "Reforming the Commission", COM (2000)200, Brussels, 5.4.2000. 
160 Council  Financial  Regulation,  adopted  in  1977.492  In  June  2002,  the  Council  has 
substantially amended the  1977 version of the Financial Regulation,  adopting the new 
Regulation on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European 
Communities493  (hereinafter  Financial  Regulation),  followed  by  the  Commission 
Regulation  of  23  December  2002,  which  laid  down  more  detailed  rules  for  the 
implementation of  the Financial Regulation. Both Regulations came into force in January 
2003.  These  Regulations  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  the  various  financial 
accountability mechanisms in the EU context and will be explored in more details in the 
course of  the ensuing analysis. 
Concept of Stewardship of Public Money 
The concept of stewardship of public money in the EU resembles the concepts found in 
the Member States and consists of two main components - requirements of reliability of 
accounts, legality and regularity of financial transaction on the one hand and 'value for 
money'  principles on the other hand.  The only reference to  the  stewardship of public 
money provided in the Treaty relates to  the mandate of the Court of Auditors,  which 
stipulates that the Court should examine "whether all revenue has been received and all 
expenditure  incurred  in  a  lawful  and  regular  manner  and  whether  the  financial 
management has been sound.,,494  The concepts of reliability, legality and regularity of 
492 Council Financial Regulation of21 December 1997 applicable to the general budget of  the European 
Communities, OJ No L 356, 21.12.1997, p.l; Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EC, ECSC, 
Euratom) No 76212001  (OJ L 111,2004.2001, p.I). 
493 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 248/1, 16.9.2002; Commission 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 234212002 of23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 357/1, 31.12.2002. 
494 Article 248 (ex Article 188c) Ee. 
161 accounts have been developed by the Court of Auditors itself and could be defined as 
follows: 
Reliability of accounts assumes that all revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities 
have been properly recorded and that the annual  accounts faithfully reflect the 
Community's financial position at the end of  the year;495 
Legality and regularity require that all  transactions must conform to  applicable 
laws  and  regulations,  and  that  they  are  covered  by  sufficient  budgetary 
..  496  appropnatlOns. 
Whereas the concept of reliability of accounts is  quite straightforward,  the conceptual 
distinction between the requirements of legality and regularity of expenditure is not very 
clear.  There  seems  to  be  no  clear  reference  to  meaning  and  using  of one  of these 
principles  separately.  Instead,  they are  always  used together,  e.g.  that  "expenditure is 
incurred in a lawful and regular manner" and "transactions are legal and regular" etc.497 
This, however, should not be surprising, as the distinction between principles of legality 
and regularity of expenditure, as pointed out in the previous chapters, is not clear in the 
national contexts either.  It  seems that the concept of regularity of financial transactions 
holds  sway over the principle of legality in international practice, although it has the 
same meaning as the principle oflegality (conformity with laws and regulations). In order 
to avoid confusion and point out the importance of  the principle, we have, in the previous 
chapters, suggested that principle of legality is used instead of regularity. However, until 
this  issue is  resolved at the international  level,  usage of both concepts of legality and 
regularity of  financial transactions at the Union level seems to be acceptable. 
Similarly to  Member States  contexts,  the  notion of legality and  regularity in  the  EU 
encompasses two elements - an element of quantitative allocation of money expressed 
through  the  EU budget and an  element of qualitative  allocation  of money expressed 
495 Brochure of  the ECA, Improving the financial management of  the European Union, 2004, 
www.eca.eu.int . 
496 Ibid. 
497  ECA's annual Report concerning the financial year 2004. 
162 through  vanous  procedural  or substantive  regulations  which  govern  spending  of the 
public money in the EU. In this sense, Advocate General Mancini in Case 204/86 stated 
that the European Court of  Auditors (ECA) has the power and duty to verify not only that 
transactions comply with the provisions relating to the budget which are contained in the 
Treaties  or  in  Financial  Regulation,  but  also  with  any  provision  belonging  to  the 
Community legal order in so far as  it has an effect on expenditure.498  Thus, in practice, 
any legal  provision affecting revenue or expenditure provides a point of reference for 
examination of  legality and regularity.499 
The second component of the concept of stewardship of public money,  a principle of 
sound  financial  management  (or  value  for  money requirement),  has  provoked  many 
controversies both in EU and the Member States. 
New  Financial  Regulation  of 2002  clearly  defines  the  principle  of sound  financial 
management, which encompasses the well-known principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Special attention is given to the principle of economy, which is defined by 
the  Regulation  as  the  requirement  that  "the resources  used by the institution  for  the 
pursuit of its activities shall be made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and 
quality and at the best price".500 The principle of efficiency is defined in a usual way, as 
"the best relationship between resources employed and results achieved." Effectiveness is 
498 Different view on the authorities of  the ECA was presented in the case Les Verts v Parliament, 294/83 
of  the Court of  Justice, where the Court had to pronounce on an action for annulment filed against the EP 
by one of its political groups, and it remarked that the ECA only has power to examine the legality of 
expenditure with reference to the budget and the secondary provision on which the expenditure is based 
(commonly called 'the basic measure'). However, it is important to note that the issue in question here was 
not the concept of legality of expenditure itself, but potential overlap and conflict of  competences between 
the Court of  Justice and the ECA in this case. In this sense, the Court of  Justice has argued that the ECA's 
powers of  review under Article 206a do not preclude any review by the Court of Justice.  1. Inghelram, 
"The European court of Auditors: Current Legal Issues", Common Market Law Review 37: 129-146,2000, 
Kluwer Law International, pp. 133-134. 
499 Ibid. 
500 Article 27, paragraph 2 of  the Financial Regulation No 160512002 . 
163 naturally concerned with "attaining the specific objectives set and achieving the intended 
results." 
In order to enhance the principles of sound financial management and enable their easier 
implementation  and  control,  the  Regulation  introduces  elements  of  performance 
management and programme evaluation. It requires all sectors of the activity covered by 
the  budget  to  set  specific,  measurable,  achievable,  relevant  and  timed  objectives. 
Achievement of those objectives should be monitored by performance indicators for each 
activity  and  spending  authorities  should  provide  such  information  to  the  budgetary 
authority.  50 I Furthermore, the Regulation requires all the institutions to undertake both ex 
ante and ex post evaluations of their progammes and activities which entail significant 
spending.  Evaluation  procedures  are  regulated  in  more  detail  in  Article  21  of the 
Commission  Regulation,  which  further  elaborates  the  requirements  of the  evaluation 
process.
502 
Despite obvious improvements (discussed below) of the regulation of principle of sound 
financial management, the question remains as to what extent the changes in regulation 
are having an effect on the actual enhancement of financial management in the EU.  A 
glance  over  the  reports  of the  Court  of Auditors  shows  that  the  EU  expenditure 
management  is  still  primarily  concerned  with  compliance  with  the  principles  of 
reliability,  legality  and  regularity  and  to  a  lesser  extent  with  sound  financial 
management.
503  The question which therefore may be posed is why 'value for money' 
501  Article 27, paragraph  3. 
502 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 234212002 of  December 2002 laying down detailed rules for 
the implementation of  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities. 
503 Cf ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003 and Annual Report concerning the financial 
year 2004; Special Report No 812004 on the Commission's management and supervision of  the measures to 
control foot and mouth disease and of  the related expenditure; Special Report 312003  on the invalidity 
pension scheme of  the European institutions, together with institutions' replies. www.eca.eu.int . 
164 principles and examinations have not been sufficiently grasped by the EU institutions, 
even after the reform of  its regulatory framework? 
It may be argued  that  one  of problems  with  the  application of a  principle  of sound 
financial management in the EU stems from the remaining vagueness of  the objectives of 
some  of the  EU  policies.  As  we  could see  earlier,  achieving  the  principle  of sound 
financial  management  presupposes  the  existence  of  clearly  defined  and  coherent 
objectives  and  operational  targets.
504  If the  objectives  of a  policy  are  vague,  self-
contradictory or unidentifiable, it is very difficult to obtain the value-for-money principle. 
This has especially been the case with the rolling, complex nature of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy, which contains a set of policies, which are often at odds with each 
other. At the same time, the CAP is taking a substantive part of the EU budget and has 
proved very difficult to be reformed.  505 In such circumstances, it is very difficult to obtain 
and  measure  soundness  of financial  management,  especially  since  policy makers  are 
likely to accuse the auditors of  interfering with political issues and can easily dismiss any 
criticism on their expenditure management.  506 
Furthermore,  it may be argued  that  the  lack of sufficient  budget restraint  in  the  EU 
undermines the achievement of sound financial  management.  507  Without a firm  budget 
constraint,  there  is  little  incentive  for  those  responsible  for  spending  to  engage  in  a 
serious attempt to achieve value for money. Some others argue that instead of attempting 
to  contain public  spending,  the  EU  institutions  seem  to  regard  expansion of the  EU 
budget as per se a good thing, because it represents a growth of European competences. 
504 Cf 1. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of  Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability 
in the European Community," European Public Law, Volume 1, Issue 4 (Kluwer Law International), 1995. 
505 R.  Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, (Edward Elgar), 2000, pp. 69-96. 
506 The Commission has thus tended to resist the ECA's increasing focus on value for money issues, 
claiming that these raise policy questions which are for the Commission and Council (The Court's Stuttgart 
Report, Report in Response to the conclusions of  the European Council of 18 June 1983 OJ C2871l  1983). 
Cf. I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, ibid. 
507 Ibid. 
165 This has resulted in the overly ambitious budgeting, which, coupled with the inability of 
Member and beneficiary States to absorb EU funds have brought about budget surpluses 
in subsequent years.
508 Furthermore, the difficulties experienced in recent discussions on 
the 2007-2013 EU budget show that the Coombes assertion that "the national Ministers 
of finance who meet to  decide budgetary questions in the Council are concerned more 
with keeping their own country's contributions  down,  or at least with maximizing its 
return on the principle ofjuste retour, than with getting the best value for Community's 
expenditure  as  a  whole"  is  still  valid.
509  This  implies  an  overall  tendency  towards 
'spending  culture'  rather  than  setting  of priorities  and  achieving  sound  financial 
management.  51 0 
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that around 80% of the EU budget is implemented not 
in  the  EU  institutions,  but  in  the  EU  Member  States,  which  have  quite  different 
understanding of  the concept of stewardship of  public money. The decentralized nature of 
implementation of the  EU  budget is  therefore  very much  dependent  on the  financial 
control and accountability systems of the Member States and their comprehension of the 
public money stewardship concept, which has, in most EU countries been largely based 
on principles of legality and regularity and has only relatively recently started embracing 
the value for money considerations.
511  Moreover, the quite high incidence of  breaches of 
concepts  of legality  and  regularity  in  EU's  financial  management,  especially  in  the 
implementation of resources managed by Member States, have necessitated that much 
508 For 2003 budget surplus totalled 5500 million euro. While still large in absolute terms, this represents a 
fall compared with 2002 and 2001  (7400 million euro and 15000 million euro respectively). European 
Court of Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2003 and Annual Report Concerning the 
Financial Year 2002, www.eca.eu.int. 
509 D.  Coombes, The Power of  the Purse in the European Communities, (London, Chatham House: PEP), 
1972, p. 69. 
510 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp.615-616. 
511  Cf C. Pollitt at aI, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 2002. 
166 more attention is paid to respect for these basic principles, instead of giving more weight 
to achieving value for money in the use of  the public money. 
Reform of  internal financial accountability mechanisms 
Until the adoption of the Financial Regulation amendments in 2002, the EU system of 
internal  financial  accountability  mechanisms  in  many  respects  resembled  the  French 
system of internal control.  Since the use of English terms for the main internal control 
actors (financial controller and accounting officer) may be misleading, as their functions 
do  not  correspond to  their English  counterparts,512  we  shall  use  the  French  terms  to 
denote their functions. 513  The  system was based on the distinction of three  key posts: 
ordonnateur  (authorizing  officer),  controleur  financier  (financial  controller)  and 
comptable (accounting officer).  As in  French system,  the  ordonnateur is  in charge of 
authorizing expenditure,  i.e.  entering into  financial  commitments and issuing payment 
orders.  The  controleur financier  monitors  the  commitment  and  authorization  of all 
expenditure and gives visa for the operation requested by the ordonnateur. And finally, 
the  comptable  is  responsible  for  the  proper  execution  of payments  and  is  liable  for 
disciplinary action and payment of compensation in the cases of financial misconduct. As 
in France, the system was based on the separation between the three functions, meaning 
the ordonnateur, controleur financier and comptable had to be different individuals.514 
512 This is especially the case for accounting officer, who (as was pointed out in II chapter) is normally a 
permanent secretary of  the Department, while in the French law 'comptable' (as pointed out in chapter III) 
has strictly determined financial and accounting responsibilities. The word 'controller' could also be 
misleading, since, as pointed out in chapter I 'controle' in the French language denotes a check rather than 
a power to manage, as would be assumed by the English term "control". 
513  We should, however, point out that the EU 'comptable' does not naturally have exactly the same status 
as the French 'comptable'. For more details on French comptables see Chapter III. 
514 Article 29 of  the "Financial Regulation on 21  December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the 
European Communities (OJ No L356 of21.12.1977, p.l). 
167 The  controleur financier  was  envisaged  to  be  the  key  person  in  charge  of securing 
financial  accountability  within  the  EU  institutions.  Each  institution  had  to  appoint  a 
controleur financier,  a  completely  independent person,  to  be responsible  for  ex  ante 
checking  of all  commitments  and  expenditure  incurred  by  granting  visas  for  each 
operation.
515  Although an institution who appointed its controleur financier also had the 
right  to  dismiss  him/her,  the  controleur financier's  independence  was  nevertheless 
secured through a complex system of  relations with other EU bodies (such as the Court of 
Auditors, the Court of Justice, the Commission, Council and Parliament).516 It should be 
noted that the controleur financier function for the Commission was centralised in DG 
Xx.  This  meant  that  DG  XX  performed  ex-ante  checking of all  transactions  of the 
Commission bodies (around 60,000 commitments and 300,000 payment approvals each 
year). 517 
Despite  its  seemingly well  designed  system,  the  internal  EU  financial  accountability 
mechanism based on the traditional French model proved to be ineffective in practice.5lS 
In  its  analysis  of  the  Commission's  internal  control  system,  the  Committee  of 
Independent  Experts  was  of the  opinion  that  the  multiplicity  of modem  financial 
transactions do  not allow that all  the financial  proposals are  genuinely and thoroughly 
checked. Due to the impossibility of universal testing, there is a move towards a sampling 
system,  where  only  few  sample  transactions  are  thoroughly  checked,  while  the  rest 
usually receive automatic approval, i.e. visa. 
Furthermore, the Committee found that the existence of  centralized ex ante controls takes 
away  the  responsibility  for  financial  management  from  the  person  who  manages 
expenditure  to  the  person  who  approves  expenditure.  Such  a  displacement  of 
responsibility  easily  brings  about  a  situation  where  no  one  seems  to  be  ultimately 
515 Article 39 of  the Financial Regulation. 
516 Articles 42-43 of  the Financial Regulation. 
517  Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 606-607. 
518 Committee of Independent Experts, ibid. 
168 responsible  for  financial  management.  519  Therefore,  many  European  countries  are 
moving away from rigid ex ante control systems, and adopting firmer ex post control, as 
is the case with France itself. It may further be argued that shifting the emphasis from the 
ex-ante control, concerned mainly with legality and regularity of  transactions, to stronger 
ex post control,  leads to the establishment of a more complex system of accountability, 
with higher degree of  interest for attaining value for money principles.520 
The new  Financial  Regulation  gives  legal  force  to  these  ideas,  with  an  emphasis  on 
decentralization and taking responsibility of  department management for overall financial 
control  framework.  In  this  sense,  the  Regulation  first  proclaims  the  principle  of 
segregation of duties between ordonnateur and comptable. Then it merges the function of 
ordonnateur and controleur financier, providing the ordonnateur with full responsibility 
for financial management, i.e. for entering into commitments and authorising payments. 
In  this  way,  the  ordonnateur  has  obtained  a  central  role  in  the  internal  financial 
accountability.52!  This has been confirmed by quite strict and lengthy provisions on the 
ordonnateur's liability for misconduct in the discharge of his/her duties.522  The role of 
the comptable, on the other hand, has not been substantially changed, as  the comptable 
has remained responsible for actual making of payments and keeping the accounts and 
liable  to  disciplinary  sanction  and  payment  of  compensation  in  the  case  of 
mismanagement of  public funds. 523 
Each  institution  performs  the  duties  of ordonnateur
524  through  the  delegation  of the 
ordonnateur's  duties  to  staff of an  appropriate  level.  The  delegation  is  regulated  by 
internal rules of an institution, which specify the scope of the powers delegated and the 
519 Ibid. 
520 OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, 2005., 
www.oecd.org/publications/pol_brief. 
521  Cf P. Craig, "A New Framework for EU Administration: the Financial Regulation 2002", 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. pp. 107-133, http://www.1aw.duke.eduijouma1s/Jcp/articles/Jcp68dwinter2004p107.htm. 
522 Chapter 4, Articles 64-66 of  the Financial Regulation, 2002. 
523 Article 67 of  the Financial Regulation, 2002. 
524 Article 59, paragraph 1, Financial Regulation, 2002. 
169 possibility for  sub-delegation.525  The person who is  given the authority of ordonnateur 
(or so-called authorising officer by delegation)  makes budget and legal  commitments, 
validates expenditure, and authorizes payments.526  When adopting a budget commitment 
and authorizing payment, he/she must make sure that the appropriations are available, 
that the expenditure conforms to the relevant legal provisions and is also responsible for 
implementing  expenditure  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  sound  financial 
management.  527  Odonnateur's  function  is  performed  by  Directors  General  (and 
exceptionally Directors)/Heads of Services, which have to report annually on the overall 
activity of the  Directorate-General/Service and in particular on the management of its 
resources.528 
Although the ordonnateur has full responsibility for managing expenditure, certain level 
of additional control is secured by providing the members of staff other than the person 
who initiated the operation the right to verify the operational and financial aspects of the 
transaction, before and after authorization of expenditure (so called ex ante and ex post 
verification).529 Furthermore, any member of staff involved in the financial management 
and control of transactions who considers that a decision he/she is required by hislher 
superiors  to  apply or to  agree  to  is  irregular  or contrary  to  the  principles  of sound 
financial management of the professional rules, is required to inform the ordonnateur by 
delegation  in  writing,  and,  if the  latter  fails  to  take  action,  to  other  authorized 
institutions.53o  More detailed regulation of rights and obligations of all  financial  actors 
has  been  provided in  the  Commission Regulation  laying  down  detailed rules  for  the 
implementation of  the Financial Regulation.531 
525 Article 59, paragraph 2. 
526 Article 60, paragraph 3. 
527 Article 60, paragraph I. 
528 http://ec.europa.eu/reforml2002/selection/chapterlen.htm#1  3 
529 Article 60, paragraph, 4. 
530 Article 60, paragraph 6. 
531  Cf. Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom), No. 234212002 of23 December 2002 laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial 
170 The strengthening of internal audit capacity is also central to  the refonn package. The 
idea was strongly advocated by the Committee of Independent Experts and endorsed by 
the  Commission's  White  Paper.  In  accordance  with  these  ideas,  the  new  Financial 
Regulation  provided  for  a  creation  of internal  auditor  services  in  all  Directorates-
Generals,  now called  Internal  Audit  Capabilities (IACs).  They provide  assurance  and 
consultancy services  to  director generals of the DGs on reliability of financial  control 
framework.
532  Furthennore, the central Internal Audit Service (IAS) was created in 2001 
to  strengthen  the  coordination  of work  of individual  IACs.  lAS  auditors  advise  the 
institutions about proper budgetary procedures and the quality of their management and 
control systems.
533  They are intended to help ordonnateurs by providing a check on the 
overall systems adopted.  534 
It is quite interesting to note that the refonners of the internal accountability mechanisms 
in  the  Commission  have  abandoned  a  variant  of the  traditional  French  model  of 
centralized  internal  control,  based  on  ex-ante  control  of financial  operations  by the 
officials of the Ministry of Finance (DG XX in the then EU system). Instead, they have 
moved  towards  establishing  principles  of  the  new  French  internal  accountability 
framework,  which  is  a  variant of the  UK model  of decentralized managerial  internal 
control, based on responsibility of a UK accounting officer.  The authorities of the  EU 
ordonnateur  (to  authorize  payments,  make  commitments  etc.)  and  his/her  full 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 35711,31.12.2002, In May 
2005, the Commission decided to amend this Regulation and has prepared the draft amendments, mainly of 
technical nature. Cf Draft Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) amending Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
234212002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
160512002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, 
Brussels 12.10.2005. SEC(2005) 1240 final. 
532 Cf. "A New Stage of Reform: The European Commission's recently appointed internal audit Chief says 
his organisation must continue to work toward modernisation and progress", Internal Auditor, 2004. 
http://www.theiia.org/?act=iia.internaIAuditor. 
533 Cf. http://europa.eu.intlcommldgs/internal_auditlgeninfo_en.htm. 
534 Financial Regulation, supra note 5, Art. 85-86 
171 responsibility for  financial management are  almost identical to  the new responsibilities 
the French ordonnateurs have obtained under the LOLF and very much correspond to 
responsibilities of  a UK accounting officer. The similarity is even more striking when one 
takes  a  look  at  the  actual  delegation  of responsibility  of the  ordonnateur  in  the 
Commission.  In most cases it is  performed by the Commission's Director-Generals or 
Heads  of Services,  which  constitute  a  rough  equivalent  to  the  British  Permanent 
Secretary post and General Directors (managers) posts in the French administration. The 
difference  between these models,  however,  lies  in a  thoroughly regulated  role  of the 
comptable in the French system and to a lesser extent in the EU system as well, which is 
in contrast and the UK system, which does not recognise the role of a comptable as such. 
Furthermore,  whereas  the  EU  system  has  fully  abolished  the  post of the  controlleur 
financier, the French system has kept it, gradually changing its role towards the ex-post 
audit.  Therefore,  it  may  be  concluded  that  the  EU  model  of  internal  financial 
accountability still remains an interesting mixture of  both UK and the French model. 
The  change  of the  model  of the  system  of internal  accountability  in  the  EU  has 
undoubtedly brought about positive results, enhancing the legality and regularity of the 
transactions which are subject to direct management by the Commission.535  However, as 
noted by the European Court of Auditors in its 2004 report, progress is still required in 
terms  of actual  implementation,  since  the  extent  of implementation  and  effective 
operating  are  not yet  satisfactory.536  Additional  efforts  are  still  needed to  be  made  in 
strengthening of internal control systems in order to provide reasonable assurance as  to 
the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions and to further support the shift 
from  a  compliance  to  an  effectiveness  approach.  Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  to 
strengthen the coordination of work programmes and harmonise audit methodologies and 
reporting structures within the Commission.  In this sense, the Commission has obliged 
535European Court of  Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2003,2004. www.eca.eu.int; 
National Audit Office, "Financial Management of  the European Union", HC 289 Session 2004-2005, and 
HC Session 2005-2006, www.nao.org.uk. 
536 European Court of  Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, 2004. www.eca.eu.int. 
172 the IACs to systematically send their final reports to the IAS and in this way reinforce the 
relations between the lAS and IACs.537 
Towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework 
Although the Commission management of expenditure has been enhanced as a result of 
the recent reforms, the European Court of Auditors has not been satisfied with the level 
of effectiveness of the overall Community financial  management especially in areas in 
which the Community and Member States share the management of programmes.  538 Due 
to continuing excessive criticisms of the Community financial management, the Barroso 
Commission has therefore made a strategic objective to strive for a positive assessment of 
legality  and  regularity  of the  Community  financial  operations.  539  The  key  issue  in 
question here is how to  ensure a sound implementation of the EU budget at the central 
level when 80% of  the budget is presently implemented by Member States? Decentralised 
nature of the budget implementation implies a relatively long control chain with a high 
number of actors involved and the corresponding difficulty to maintain common levels of 
application of rules. Therefore, it is essential that Member States take an active part in 
obtaining the Commission's objective. 
In order to address this complex issue, and following the initiative of the European Court 
of Auditors,540 the Commission adopted a communication on a roadmap to an integrated 
internal control  framework on  15  June 2005.541  The purpose of this  document was to 
537 European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004. www.eca.eu.int. 
538 Ibid. 
539  Cf. Commission Communication Strategic Objectives 2005-2009, Europe 2010: A Partnership for 
European Renewal, Prosperity, Solidarity and Security - COM(2005) 12,26.1.2005. 
540 European Court of Auditors Opinion No 212004, OJ C107Il of 30.4.2004 ("Single Audit" opinion). 
541  Commission Staff Working Paper, A gap assessment between the internal control framework in the 
Commission Services and the control principles set out in the Court of  Auditors 'proposal for a Community 
internal contralframework' opinion No 212004,07/07/05. 
173 initiate  a  process  which  should  lead  to  an  agreement  between  the  Commission,  the 
Member States  and acceding countries  on how this  framework  could be improved in 
order to get reasonable assurance on the regularity and legality of  financial transactions. 
After discussing the communication document with all relevant actors, the Commission 
has  adopted an  Action Plan towards  an Integrated Internal  Control  Framework on  17 
January 2006.
542  The Action Plan defines 16  specific actions to be implemented during 
2006 and 2007, such as:  simplification of  management of EC funds, adoption of common 
internal control principles, issuing management declarations and synthesis reports at the 
national  level,  sharing results and prioritising cost benefit etc.
543  The Plan requires  all 
relevant actors, i.e. the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, the Member States 
and the Commission to contribute to the implementation of  these actions. 
A need for  institutionalisation of an  integrated control  framework has been addressed 
through  the  preparations  of amendments  of the  existing  Community  legislation,  i.e. 
Financial Regulation.  According to its Article 184, the Financial Regulation is subject to 
review every three years, or whenever it proves necessary to do  so.  In compliance with 
this obligation, on 3 May 2005  the Commission adopted a proposal for its revision. In 
line with the Commission's Action Plan,  a new budgetary principle is  to  be added in 
Chapter 9 of the Title II  - the principle of effective and efficient internal control. This 
new principle underlines  the importance of improvement of the implementation of the 
budget,  the  effectiveness  and  efficiency  of the  operations,  the  reliability  of financial 
reporting,  the  protection  of  the  financial  interests  of  the  Communities  and  the 
management  of the  risks  relating  to  the  legality  and  regularity  of the  underlying 
transacti  ons. 
542 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Court 
of  Auditors, Commission Action Plan towards an Integrated Internal Control Framework, {SEC(2005) 
49}, Brussels, 17.1.2006 COM(2006) 9 final. 
543 Ibid. 
174 It is expected that the joint action of all relevant actors of financial accountability in the 
EU context, with a special emphasis on the Member States internal and external financial 
accountability  mechanisms,  will  provide  a  much  needed  synergy  in  addressing  the 
inherent weaknesses of complex multi-layered financial accountability system of  the EU. 
Although it is not very likely that this initiative will yield positive and concrete results in 
the short term,  or even in the mid term,  it is  very important that the Commission has 
started tackling the problems of shared/decentralised budget implementation. In order for 
this initiative to work in the long run,  it is necessary that the EU institutions provide a 
continuing leadership throughout this process. In this sense, an important role in further 
enhancement of the overall financial accountability framework will certainly be accorded 
to the Commission, but equally so to the Commission's external observers, the European 
Parliament and the European Court of  Auditors. 
External financial accountability mechanisms in the EU 
The establishment of first external financial accountability mechanisms of the EU dates 
back only to the early 1970s. It may be argued that the development of external financial 
accountability mechanisms was the consequence of  the transition from the budget system 
of national  contributions to  the  establishment of an  autonomous  EC budget based on 
'own resources544  in the 1970 Budget Treaty.545 Integration in the sphere of own revenue 
resources  naturally  created  a  pressure  for  further  integration  in  the  control  and 
accountability  for  their  use.  Hence,  a  more  supranational  EU  budget  necessitated  an 
independent EU audit body, such as the European Court of Auditors.  546 Moreover, there 
544  Community revenue is based on several sources: 'traditional own resources', such as: customs, 
agricultural duties and sugar levies and resources based on value-added tax (V  AT) and gross national 
income (GNI). 
545  B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of  the European Court of  Auditors", op. cit., 
p.254. 
546 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: The Court of  Auditors and OLAF", in 1. Peterson and M.  Shackleton 
(eds.), The Institutions o/the European Union, (Oxford University Press), 2002, p. 235. 
175 was  a growing pressure for  further  advancement of democratic control of Community 
expenditure and calls for granting the European Parliament a right of a 'discharge' to the 
Commission on its execution of its previous year's budget.
547  However, it was obvious 
that the Parliament would not be able to  exercise this right without the  assistance of an 
expert institution. These interrelated factors led the signing of  the 1975 Treaty which both 
gave the Parliament power to  discharge the budget and created the European Court of 
Auditors, and thus provided a basis for the establishment of key EU external financial 
accountability mechanisms. 
Parliamentary accountability - granting the discharge to the Commission 
Parliamentary  financial  accountability  of the  EU  finances  is  peculiar in many  ways. 
Unlike in nation states, budgetary authority in the Community does not rest solely with 
the Parliament, but is generally shared between the Council and Parliament. Whereas the 
Council has the key role in determining the scope of EU revenue, the Parliament has an 
important role in the control of the EU expenditure, which resembles the role Parliaments 
play in Member States. In order to understand the overall context of  the external financial 
accountability and especially Parliamentary accountability in the EU, it is necessary to 
gain some insight into the EU budgetary process. 
The budgetary process in the EU could briefly be described as  follows.  The scope of 
Community revenue is  decided by a  unanimous decision of the  Council.  All  Member 
States  must  agree  with  the  revenue  decision  in  conformity  with  their  respective 
constitutional  requirements.
548  The  Budget Directorate  General  of the  Commission  is 
responsible  for  preparing  the  Commission's  budget  proposal  (the  preliminary  draft 
budget). Similar to the process of  budget discussion between the Ministers of  Finance and 
547 The wise chair of  the Budget Committee published an influential report in 1973, entitled "The Case for a 
European Audit Office", in which he called for the establishment of a new institution,  the Court of 
Auditors. 
548 Article 269 (ex Article 201) EC. 
176 spending  ministries  in  the  nation  state,  such  a  draft  is  then  discussed  with  other 
directorate  generals  and other EU institutions.  The Commission's preliminary draft  is 
subsequently  sent to  the  Council  which  by a  qualified  majority determines  the  draft 
budget.  The draft budget is  then  forwarded  to  the  Parliament,  which has the right to 
amend it.  After Parliamentary discussion and approval, the draft budget is sent back to 
the  Council.  It  should  be  noted  that  approximately  half  the  budget  is  spent  on 
'compulsory  expenditure"  (mostly  agriculture).  Whereas  in  the  case  of dispute  over 
'compulsory expenditure' between the Council and Parliament, the view of the Council 
prevails,  the  Parliament  will  have  the  final  say  on the  non-compulsory  expenditure. 
Finally, the Parliament adopts the budget acting by a majority of its members and three 
fifths of the votes cast. After the budget has been approved, the EU Commission bears 
overall responsibility for its implementation.
549 
In  contrast to its rather accessory role in determining the EU budget, the EU Parliament 
has a more prominent role in holding the Commission to  account for  spending of EU 
citizens'  money.  Since  1977,  the  Parliament,  acting  on  a  recommendation  from  the 
Council, grants a discharge to the Commission for implementation of the budget.  550 The 
Parliament's discharge to the Commission is a formal act, which marks the final closure 
of the accounts. It could further be argued that the discharge also represents a political 
verdict on the overall performance of  the Commission.551 
Although  the  discharge  procedure  seems  to  be  clear,  it  has  provoked  certain 
controversies. The key question is what would happen if the Parliament would refuse the 
discharge to the Commission? Up to now, the Parliament has refused to give a budgetary 
discharge on three occasions and threatened to do so on others, and has withheld approval 
549 For more details on the budgetary procedure see: 
http://europa.eu.inticomm/budgetlbudgetJindex  _en .htm. 
550 Article 276 (ex Article 206) EC. 
551  C. Kok, "The Court of Auditors ofthe European Communities - the other European Court in 
Luxemburg", Common Market Law Review 26: 345-367 (1989). 
177 of the budget for  1984 before discharging the budget implementation for the 1982.
552 At 
that time, the Commission was very close to the end of its term and Parliament did not 
take  any  steps  to  dismiss  it.  The  discharge  was  later  given  to  the  newly  appointed 
Commission. This case points to the fact that the key Parliamentary sanction in the case 
of refusal of discharge may just be a postponement of such an action, rather than calling 
the Commission to  resign.
553  This could also be confirmed by the later and  even more 
senous  case  of the  1996  budget,  when  the  European  Parliament  delayed  giving  the 
Commission  a  discharge  following  one  of the  critical  reports  of  the  ECA.  The 
Commission  survived  a  motion  of censure  only  because  a  special  Committee  of 
Independent Experts was appointed to investigate the charges of mismanagement and the 
ultimate  result  was  the  resignation  of the  entire  Santer  Commission.  Nevertheless,  it 
could  also  be argued  that refusal  of granting of discharge  to  the  Commission  could 
prompt a call  for  Commission's resignation in accordance with the Article 201  of EC 
Treaty. The problem, however, may arise if this right would be used too frequently, as it 
could  bring  about  adverse  political  consequences  on  stability  and  efficiency  of EU 
governance processes. 
In  order to  find  a  good  compromise  solution that  would balance the  need  for  strong 
Parliamentary powers in the process of discharge and the potential problems that may be 
faced in the case of a refusal of  the discharge, some authors are of the opinion that instead 
of focusing  on the  discharge of the  Commission as  a collective body,  the Parliament 
should bring pressure to  bear on one or more  specifically responsible members of the 
Commission, which would ultimately result in their resignation.
554 This further triggers a 
wider debate on whether the collegiality principle on which the Commission grounds its 
operation should be maintained. The strict application of the collegiality principle might 
have seemed necessary at the early stage of development of the EU in order to prevent 
confrontations that could arise due to a Commissioner's loyalties to their Member States. 
552 R. Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, op, cit., pp. 16-17. 
553 Cf I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op.cit. pp. 620-622. 
554  C. Kok, op. cit., p. 352. 
178 However, with the development of a genuine supranational structure and an increasingly 
prominent role of individual commissioners, the principle of collegiality may strongly be 
disputed.  The  key  issue  here  is  that  the  collegial  structure  of accountability  for 
individually  assigned  portfolios  may  lead  to  a  conceptual  "diffusion  of 
responsibilities",555  which  undoubtedly  has  an  adverse  effect  on  the  principle  of 
accountability, as exemplified by the recent need for reform of  the Commission's internal 
accountability mechanisms. 
The question which should be raised, however, is whether the Commission should fully 
be held to  account  through  the  discharge  procedure,  since  the  process  of EU  budget 
implementation  is  performed  largely  by  the  Member  States  themselves.  The 
Commission's  accountability  for  the  implementation  of the  budget  in  the  system  of 
divided budget implementation management makes sense only if  all Member States have 
the  administrative  capacity  for  sound  financial  control  and  management  and  if the 
Commission would have sufficient levers to  make them  use  it.556  For this reason,  the 
Commission has  a  very  strong interest that  all  Member  States  and potential  Member 
States which are receiving the EU accession funds  have good and reliable systems of 
financial  accountability and has taken a number of measures in this respect, as  pointed 
out earlier in the text.  Only if the Member States and potential Member States would 
achieve adequate implementing capacity the Commission would be able to fully take on 
the burden of  key accountee of  financial accountability. 
As in nation state context, the EU Parliament would have serious problems in holding the 
Commission to  account if it would not be supported by other bodies, primarily by its 
committees and by work of the  EU  supreme  audit institution,  the  Court of Auditors. 
Therefore,  we  shall  devote  our  further  attention  to  the  functions  of the  Parliament's 
555 V. Mehde, "Responsibility and Accountability in the European Commission", Common Market Law 
Review 40, 2003 Kluwer Law International, pp. 423-442. 
556  C. Kok, op. cit., p. 352  .. 
179 committees and the Court of Auditors, which shall be analysed in the overall context of 
EU financial accountability. 
The Budgetary Control Committee - the EU PACIMEC? 
In  1973,  the  European Parliament approved the  creation of a  new Parliamentary sub-
Committee  on  the  budget  of  the  Communities,  responsible  for  the  budget 
implementation. The idea was to establish a body that would provide a link between the 
external  auditor that was planned to  be established and the Parliament.  However,  the 
work of this  sub-committee was  quite  ineffective in the mid  1970s.  Therefore,  it was 
decided in  1979  that the  sub-committee should be  upgraded to  a  status  of a  separate 
Budgetary Control Committee
557 (generally called "COCOBU" -according to its name in 
French: Commission du Contr6le Budgetaire). 
COCOBU has a key role in the discharge process, as it invites the Parliament to  grant, 
postpone or refuse the  discharge of the budget implementation.  Similar to  the  British 
PAC and the more recently established French MEC, the COCOBU often bases its own 
work on reports made by the external auditor, the European Court of Auditors. However, 
the  COCOBU  also  responds  to  proposals  and  reports  from  the  Commission
558  and 
produces its 'own' initiative reports, which provides it a rather broad basis for the final 
decision. It should be noted that the COCOBU adopted its last report in which it invites 
557 Cf 1. Harden, F. White, K.  Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 622-625. 
558 Following the Commission's White Paper on reform, the number of  reports and materials available from 
the Commission has substantively increased. One of  the most important Commission reports is the 
Synthesis report and the individual Commission DG's activity reports, which aim at giving a global picture 
of  the internal management issues raised in the DGs' reports and to draw conclusions on how to address the 
identified problems. 
180 the Parliament to discharge the implementation of the EU budget for 2004 on 21  March 
2006.
559 This report is expected to be adopted by the Parliament shortly. 
Like the British PAC, the COCOBU provides an added value in exercising parliamentary 
control by trying to ensure that problems identified in audits by the Court of  Auditors and 
in investigations by the Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) are  given political prominence and 
addressed in a timely manner.
560 However, it should be noted that the COCOBU has not 
enjoyed the status and the prestige of the British PAC. Attendance of its members has 
been quite low and most of them have not been substantially interested in following up 
the European Court of Auditor's reports.
561  Furthennore, the attendance of the plenary 
sessions  of the  Parliament  when  the  European  Court  of Auditor's  report  and  the 
COCOBU's draft discharge resolution are discussed has also been low, which has further 
undennined the effectiveness of the EU financial accountability system, based on the UK 
model. 
It should, however, be noted that the COCOBU's profile has begun to rise as a result of 
the prominence accorded to the  'fight against fraud'  over the last couple of years.  The 
COCOBU has  spent  significant  amount  of time  on  issues  of legality  and  regularity, 
especially  on  fraud,  payments  under  CAP  and  Commission  virements  between 
accounts.
562  Given the complexity of EU budgetary matters, individual members of the 
committee during the  previous parliamentary tenn specialised in  particular EU  policy 
areas, preparing a Parliament's response to  special reports by the Court of Auditors in 
their field, often in the fonn of  working documents, which has had a positive effect on the 
559 Committee on Budgetary Control, Report on the Discharge for implementation of  the European Union 
general budgetfor thejinancial year 2004,27.3.2006, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparJ/cont/adopt/dischargeI2004/default_en.htm. 
560 Committee on Budgetary Control, Handbook 2004 for New Members, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/cont/guide/default_en.htm. 
56l Cf I. Harden, F.  White, K.  Donnelly ibid. 
562 Cf R.  Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy, op. cit. 25-25. 
181 efficiency of its  work. 563  Nevertheless,  the Committee is  still  experiencing difficulties 
especially as it has to protect its own field of  competence against other committees which 
want to set up inquiries in areas that the COCOBU would normally cover, making use of 
the  power  which  the  TEU  has  provided  to  the  Parliament  to  conduct  ad  hoc 
.  ..  564  mvestIgatIOns. 
This  discussion  points  out  the  difficulties  which  may be  faced  when  attempting  to 
transplant financial accountability mechanisms from one system to  another and may be 
quite  useful  when  we  start  examining  the  possible  introduction  of different  financial 
accountability mechanisms in Serbia. 
The European Court of  Auditors CECA) 
Historical background 
The ECA is the key external accountability mechanism operating within the EU financial 
accountability  system.  The  1975  Budget  Treaty  provided  the  legal  basis  for  the 
establishment of  the ECA and it began to work in 1977, replacing the then existing Audit 
Board and the Auditor of  the European Coal and Steel Community. 
The main incentives  for  the establishment of the  ECA could be  sought in two  major 
developments.  The first  is  the earlier mentioned change of the EU financing based on 
"own resources"  in the  1970  Budget Treaty,  which has  greatly  enhanced  the  limited 
budgetary powers of the  European Parliament.  565  The second is  the admission of new 
563 Committee on Budgetary Control, Handbook 2004 for New Members. 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl!contiguide/defauIt_en.htm . 
564  Cf R.  Levy, Implementing European Union Public Policy. ibid. 
565 The vice-chair of  the Budget Committee published a report in 1973, entitled The Case for a European 
Audit Office, which had exerted significant pressure for the establishment of  the ECA.  B. Laffan, 
"Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of  the European Court of Auditors", op. cit. p. 251. 
182 Community Member States- Denmark, Ireland and UK in 1973.
566 As all these countries 
have  a  strong  tradition  of independent  public  sector  auditing,  they  from  the  outset 
imposed considerable pressure for the creation of  the stronger Community accountability 
framework, which was able to satisfy their needs.
567 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) enhanced the ECA's formal  status, moving it from the 
category of 'other bodies' to the status of a full  institution. This was clear recognition of 
the need to enhance the authority of the Court and to  elevate it to  a status equivalent to 
those institutions over which it had auditing power.  568  Enhancement of the ECA's status 
has extended ECA's audit powers to the second (Common Foreign and Security Policy) 
and third (Cooperation in the fields of  Justice and Home Affairs) pillars of the Union. 
The Treaty of  Amsterdam (1997) and Treaty of  Nice (2001) have further strengthened the 
status of the ECA. The Treaty of Amsterdam has emphasized the Court's role in respect 
of irregularities  and measures to  combat fraud.  Furthermore,  it confirmed the  Court's 
right to bring actions before the Court of Justice to protect its prerogatives with regard to 
the other EU institutions. In the view of  the EU enlargement, the Treaty of  Nice provided 
that the Court of Auditors should be composed of one member from each Member State 
(instead of 15  members). It also emphasized the importance of the cooperation between 
the Court and the supreme audit institutions of  the Member States.
569 
Organisation and Structure of  the ECA 
The structure and procedures of the Court have changed over time, aiming at enhancing 
the coherence and effectiveness of the Court's activities. As confirmed by the Treaty of 
Nice, and in accordance with the principle of  national representation, the ECA consists of 
566 N. Price, "The Court of  Auditors of  the European Communities", in  Yearbook of  European Law, vol. 2, 
pp. 240, Oxford, 1982. 
567 Ibid. 
568 1. Inghelram, op. cit., pp. 129-146. 
569 Cf http://www  .  eca. eu.intl  eca/treaty/  docs/  disp  _ cdc_en.  pdf. 
183 one  Member from  each  Member  State.  The  Members  are  appointed  by the  Council, 
acting  unanimously  after  consultation  with  the  European  Parliament,  on the  basis  of 
nominations made by individual Member States. The Members' term in office is six years 
and  is  renewable.
57o  The  members  are  required  to  perform  their  duties  in  complete 
independence and in the general interest of  the EU.  571 
Although  it  is  naturally  headed  by the  President,  the  ECA  operates  primarily  as  a 
collegiate body, with its members adopting audit reports and opinions by majority vote. 
The President is  elected by the members with a three years renewable mandate.
572  The 
President's role is that of  primus inter partes. He/she chairs the ECA's meetings, ensures 
that its decisions are implemented and that overall activities are well managed. 
The ECA regulates its structure and procedure by its own Rules of Procedure, which are 
submitted for approval to the Council. Nowadays, the structure of the ECA consists of 
audit groups comprising a number of specialized divisions which cover the different areas 
of  the budget. Each member of  the ECA is assigned to a group. The groups are chaired by 
a "Dean", elected by the members of the group for a renewable two-year term. The Dean 
is responsible for overall operation of the group and its divisions. There are around 800 
staff in the ECA, who have a broad range of professional backgrounds and experience 
from  both the public and private sector. The ECA employs nationals from  all  Member 
States in order to ensure a sufficient spread of linguistic and professional skills within its 
workforce.  573 
The organization of the  ECA,  however,  has been the  subject of heavy criticism.  This 
especially relates to the large composition of the ECA's membership, appointed in line 
570 Article 247, paragraph 3, items 1,2 of  the EC Treaty. 
571  Article 247, paragraph 4 of  the EC Treaty. 
572  Article 247, paragraph 3, item 3 of  the EC Treaty. Hubert Weber, from Austria, was elected President in 
January 2005. 
573  The European Court of  Auditors, "Improving the Financial Management of  the European Union", op.cit. 
p.  10. www.europa.eu.int 
184 with the principle of national representation.  Whereas there is  nothing wrong with the 
principle  of national  representation  itself,  the  fact  is  that  with  each  enlargement  the 
number of ECA's member significantly increases, which questions the effectiveness of 
collegiality.574 It furthermore appears that each enlargement reduces the workload of its 
members, questioning the necessity of their high position in the ECA's hierarchy.575  The 
second,  and the  key related  question  is  how  to  ensure  the  comprehensiveness  of the 
ECA's work  given the  variety of external  audit  traditions  of its  numerous  members, 
which has negatively affected the uniformity of the ECA's work. Therefore, there have 
been  calls  for  the  reduction  of the  number  of the  ECA's  members  and  possible 
abandoning of the  collegiate  structure  and introduction of a  single  head  organisation, 
modelled on the UK C&AG.576  Whereas the latter solution may be too  extreme for  an 
institution  of a  supranational  governance,  the  former  solution  would  most  probably 
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the ECA'  s work and would prevent potential 
problems of  inflation of  its membership in the case of  future enlargements. 
Mandate of  the ECA 
Article 248 of the EC Treaty sets out the mandate of the ECA. According to Article 248, 
the ECA has the following competences: 
audits  the  accounts  of all  the  revenue  and  expenditure  of the  EU  and,  unless 
otherwise specified, of  all bodies established by the Union; 
examines whether all EU revenue and expenditure has been received or incurred 
in a lawful and regular manner and whether the financial management has been 
sound; 
574 This is particularly obvious in the case of  the last enlargement, when the number of  the ECA's members 
have increased for 10 new members. 
575 N.  S. Groenendijk, "Assessing Member States' Management ofEU Finances: an empirical analysis of 
the annual reports of  the European Court of  Auditors, 1996-2001", Public Administration Vol. 82 No.3, 
2004, pp. 701-725. 
576 Ibid; I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 627-628. 
185 produces an Annual Report containing its observations on the execution of  the EU 
budget for each financial year, including a Statement of Assurance (DAS) on the 
reliability of the EU accounts for that year and the legality and regularity of the 
underlying transactions; 
may submit observations on specific topic of  its choice at any time, particularly in 
the form of Special Reports; 
in cases of irregularity or suspected fraud detected in the course of its audit work 
provides formal opinions on proposals for EU legislation of  a financial nature; 
is consulted on any proposal for measures in the fight against fraud; 
assists  the  discharge  authority - the  European  Parliament - in  exercising  its 
powers of control over the implementation of the budget of the European Union 
through the publication of  audit reports and opinions. 
The listed competences show that ECA has no legal powers of its own.  Therefore the 
name of the Court is somewhat misleading, since the ECA's does not judge the accounts 
(as the French Cour des  Comptes) but performs general audit functions (like the British 
NAO) without judicial competences. If auditors discover fraud or irregularities in their 
investigations they inform the European Anti-Fraud Office - OLAF. 
Similar to national supreme audit institutions, the ECA issues an annual report, published 
in the autumn of each year for the preceding year and a number of special reports on 
particular  institutions,  policy programmes  or financial  processes  and  Opinions  when 
requested by the Councilor observations on the initiative of  the ECA.
577 
Very early on, the ECA decided not to limit its investigations to  compliance of legality 
and regularity, but started examining whether financial management has been sound. The 
European Parliament has characterized the value for money controls as being "the most 
577 www.europa.eu.int 
186 important work of  the Court",578 as it has on numerous occasions pointed out to the waste 
of using of resources in various EU institutions. The majority of ECA's special reports 
consist  of value  for  money audits  of the  Union's  internal  policies  with  a  particular 
emphasis on the CAP and structural expenditure.579  However, in the last couple of years 
the  ECA's  special  reports  also  have  focused  very  much  on  the  sound  financial 
management in the pre-accession aid and measures to prepare the candidate countries to 
C  .  ~  d  580  manage  ommumty lun  s. 
When the ECA obtained the status of  a full institution (by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992), 
it got a major new responsibility, known as a statement of assurance or DAS (from the 
French term declaration d'assurance). This task, the origin of  which is a British proposal, 
means that in addition to the Annual Report and special reports, the Court must provide 
the Council and the Parliament with a statement of assurance as to "the reliability of the 
accounts and the legality and regularity of underlying transactions".581  This is  quite a 
demanding exercise, as it requires the ECA to  move from its traditional  'system based 
approach,582 to sample based detailed financial audit checks of  all underlying transactions 
578 D. O'Keefe, "The Court of  Auditors", in Institutional dynamics of  European integration: essays in 
honour of  Henry G.  Schermers, vol. II (1994), p.  177-194 in the Liber Amicorum for Professor Henry G. 
Schermers, 1994, KluwerlMartinus Nijhoff, p.187. 
579 Cf. Special Report No 312004 of  the Court of  Auditors concerning the recovery of  irregular payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy, 10 June 2004 OJ C 269, 4.11.2004; Special Report No 712004 of 
the Court of  Auditors concerning the common organisation of  the market in raw tobacco 21  July 2004; 
Special Report No 1412003 of  the Court of Auditors on the measurement offarm incomes by the 
Commission 4 December 2003 OJ C 45, 20.2.2004; Special Report No 8/2004 of  the Court of  Auditors on 
the Commission's management and supervision of  the measures to control foot-and-mouth disease and of 
the related expenditure, 21  July 2004, being published. 
580 Cf. Special Report No 512004 concerning Phare support to prepare candidate countries for managing the 
Structural Funds, OJ C 15, 20.1.2005; Special Report No 212004 of  the Court of Auditors concerning pre-
accession aid - Has SAPARD been well managed? OJ C 295, 30.11.2004. 
581  Article 248EC 
582 The system-based approach assumes examination of different areas of  revenue and expenditure over a 
four-year cycle. Cf. Kok, op. cit. note 4. 
187 down  to  the  level  of the  final  beneficiary.  In  the  last  couple  of years  statement  of 
assurance is given on the specific parts of  the Community revenue and expenditure (CAP, 
structural measures, internal policies, external actions, pre-accession aid,  administrative 
expenditure  and  financial  instruments  and banking  activities).  583  The  Court  gives  an 
assurance that the accounts representing financial transactions were reliable and if  it feels 
that they were not reliable, it states why this was not the case.
584 It should be noted that 
the ECA has not issued a positive DAS on the EU expenditure in each of  the last eleventh 
years, although it has noted some general improvements in specific areas.
585 
However, the ECA's has been criticised for the limited impact of  its DAS findings and its 
work overall. The information resulting from the DAS is often too general and not overly 
useful  for  its  audiences.
586  Furthermore, the ECA's reports, naturally,  do  not have any 
legally binding effect. Therefore, a negative statement of assurance, does not oblige the 
European Parliament to refuse the discharge to the Commission, which further questions 
the usefulness of this  instrument.
587  Nevertheless,  it should be noted that the repeated 
negative  DAS  assessments  have  prompted the  reaction  of the  Commission  and  other 
actors in creating a common framework for enhancing the framework of internal control 
(as  discussed  earlier  in  the  chapter)  which  demonstrates  the  ECA's  potential  for 
providing constructive feedback arising from the DAS examinations. 
583 ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2002, Annual Report concerning the financial year 
2003, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, www.eca.eu.int . 
584 Ibid. 
585 The ECA has found that the transactions underlying the accounts for 2004 were legal and regular with 
respect to revenue, commitments, administrative expenditure, expenditure on the pre-accession strategy (!) 
and areas of  expenditure under the CAP covered by the Integrated Administration and Control Systems. 
However, it was not able to provide the positive assessment for the remaining four (out of  six) main areas 
of  expenditure. 
586 N. S. Groenendijk, op. cit. p. 702. 
5871. Inghelram, op. cit. pp. 132-133. 
188 The EC Treaty gives the ECA a right of  access to any information it requires to undertake 
its  tasks.  According to  Article 248(3)  EC,  the  audit shall  be based on  records  and,  if 
necessary, performed on the spot in the other institution. Article 248(3) further provides 
that the other institutions shall also forward to the ECA, at its request, any document or 
information necessary to carry out its tasks. However, the ECA has experienced problems 
with enforcement of  its right to access information. Although the ECA had the possibility 
of filing an action for failure to act against another institution under the Article 232 EC 
since it became an institution under the Maastricht Treaty, this right was restricted as  it 
was possible to file an action only if  the defending institution has not defined its positions 
within  two  months  of  being  called  upon.
588  In  response  to  ECA's  request  for 
strengthening  the  right  of freedom  of access  to  information,  the  Amsterdam  Treaty 
provided the ECA an additional instrument to enforce its right to access information. In 
accordance  with  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  the  ECA  has  the  right  to  file  an  action  for 
annulment  of the  decision  by  which  an  institution  refuses  to  grant  an  access  to 
information  before  the  Court  of Justice  under Article  230(3)  EC  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting its prerogatives.lf this Court of  Justice finds that the refusal of  the access is not 
justified,  it  will  annul  such  a  decision  and  provide  the  ECA  access  to  necessary 
documents. 
Relationship between the ECA and other EU institutions and Member States 
In  the  beginning  of its  operation,  the  ECA  had  quite  conflictual  relations  with  the 
Commission, was largely ignored by the Council of Ministers and the European Council, 
but  instantly  established  good  relations  with  the  European  Parliament,  which  has 
accepted  it  as  an  important  ally  in  its  power  struggle  with  the  Council  and  the 
Commission.
589  Relations between the ECA and the Commission especially deteriorated 
during  Jacques  De1ors'  tenure  in  Brussels.  In  contrast to  the  situation  during  De1ors' 
tenure  in  the  Commission,  Jacques  Santer  invested  considerable  efforts  in  improving 
588 Ibid, p.  137. 
589 D. Q'Keeffe, ibid. 
189 relations with the ECA and acknowledged the many managerial weaknesses highlighted 
by the  Court in its  reports.
590  The  tone  of Commission-ECA relations  changed  from 
hostility to a shared approach towards sound financial management and a sense that the 
key issue in the longer term is to address the weaknesses not in the financial management 
of the Commission, but in the Member States. Internally in the Commission, it was felt 
that the ECA was strong enough to  criticize the Commission but was still  unwilling to 
take a tougher stance on the Member States.
591 
It seems that the ECA is  now more sympathetic to  the management difficulties of the 
Commission  and  is  more  willing  to  identify problems  with  the  Member  States.  The 
Parliament and the ECA continue to share a joint concern about the management of EU 
monies, although the ECA is less subservient to the EP. As it grew in confidence, it has 
started pointing out to  growing financial management difficulties in the Member States 
and not just in the Commission.
592 
In the last couple of years, the ECA has especially pointed out various risks in the area of 
pre-accession strategy on implementation of all programmes carried out in the candidate 
countries, although the overall area of management of the EU pre-accession funds  has 
been assessed as  satisfactory. Thus, for example, in its 2003 and 2004 Annual Reports, 
the  ECA  has  pointed  out to  numerous  shortcomings  in  the  supervisory  systems  and 
controls  in  the  case  of pre-accession  aid,  which  had  already  been  identified  in  the 
previous years and resulted in errors and greater risks affecting the legality and regularity 
of the transactions. The errors detected during the ECA's audits of transactions in 2003 
have  revealed  system  weaknesses  and  the  need  to  further  improve  the  supervisory 
systems and controls in order to limit the risk of  irregular payments.
593 
590 Cf. B. Laffan, "Becoming a 'Living Institution': The Evolution of  the European Court of  Auditors", op. 
cit., pp. 256-263. 
591  Ibid. 
592 Ibid. 
593 ECA, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003. 
190 The ECA has been trying to establish co-operative relations with national audit offices so 
that  it  can  also  rely  on  their  findings  in its  work.  Following  a  British proposal,  the 
Amsterdam Treaty specified that the  ECA shall  perform  the  audit on the  spot in  the 
Member States,  including on the premises of any natural or legal  person in receipt of 
payments from  the budget.  Such audit is  carried out in liaison with the  national  audit 
bodies or competent departments. In the Treaty of Amsterdam (Article 248_3)594  it was 
agreed that "the Court of Auditors and the national audit bodies of the Member States 
shall cooperate in a spirit of  trust while maintaining their independence." Proposed by the 
German  delegation,  this  provision  reiterates  the  general  obligations  of cooperation 
between the Community institutions and the Member States under Article 10 Ee.  595 
However,  it is  interesting to  note that the ED Treaty has  kept the last sentence of the 
Article  248(3)  that  national  audit  bodies  or  departments  "shall  inform  the  Court  of 
Auditors whether they intend to  take part in the audit."  This indicates that they are free 
not to participate and has placed the onus on national audit authorities to make a decision 
concerning their involvement in the statement of assurance process. This sentence also 
confirms the autonomous nature of  the ECA's audit rights in the Member States.596 
In order to balance the autonomous nature of  the external audit institutions in the Member 
and  candidate  States  and cooperation  with  the  ECA,  the  Nice Treaty has  included  a 
Declaration on the Court of  Auditors by which the ECA and the national audit institutions 
have  been  called  to  improve  the  framework  and  conditions  for  cooperation,  while 
maintaining the autonomy of each. To that end, it has been advised that the President of 
the Court of  Auditors should set up a contact committee with the chairmen of  the national 
audit institutions.597 
594 Amended Art. 188c of  the TEU, Treaty of  Amsterdam. 
595 Cf. 1.  Inghelram, op. cit. p.  140. 
596 Ibid, p.  139. 
597 http://www.eca.eu.intieca/treatY/docs/disp  cdc  en.pdf. 
191 For several years now, the Contact Committee, comprising the heads of  the external audit 
institution (which includes the President of the ECA), the Committee of Liaison Officers 
and working groups on specific audit topics has been operating rather successfully. The 
heads of the national external audit institutions and the ECA meet once a year and their 
meetings are prepared by the liaison officers who themselves meet usually twice a year. It 
should also be noted that the ECA, together with the Contact Committee has  set up  a 
parallel liaison structure with the external audit institutions of the candidate countries to 
help facilitate their integration into the EU after accession. Although the Member States 
are still under no obligation to carry out controls on behalf of the Court, the cooperation 
between  the  ECA  and  national  external  audit  institutions  has  undoubtedly  improved 
under this framework. 
Similarly to the Member States contexts, the key issue in ensuring an effective external 
audit  in  the  EU  is  a  provision  for  adequate  follow-up  procedures  in  the  case  of 
recommendations by the ECA. The critical importance of follow-up procedures has now 
been widely recognized by requiring the Commission to comment on the ECA's annual 
report and any relevant special reports and to state how the ECA'  s recommendations are 
being met.
598  However, the question is  how the ECA's audit powers could be enforced 
not only in the  Commission,  but also  in the  Member States.  Some authors  are of the 
opinion that the ECA's powers towards the Member State could be enforced through an 
action for infringement of the Treaty via the Commission.
599 However, this could be an 
unsatisfactory solution since the Commission (under Article 274 EC) and the Member 
States are jointly responsible for the implementation of the budget and it is not plausible 
that  one  would go  directly against  another  in this  process.  The  better solution  could 
perhaps  be  giving  the  ECA  the  right  to  bring  an  action  directly  to  ECl against  the 
Member States, in order to protect the institutional balance between both the Community 
institutions and Community institutions and the Member States.
600 
598 Annual Report concerning the financial year 2004, www.eca.eu.int . 
599 1. Inghelrarn, op. cit., p. 140. 
600 Ibid, pp. 140-141. 
192 Fight against fraud and OLAF 
The  establishment  of OLAF  in  1999  can  be  traced  back  to  1988  when  the  Delors 
Commission  felt  compelled  to  establish  UCLAF  in  response,  notably,  to  repeated 
requests from  the European Parliament to  the Commission to  enhance its  fight against 
fraud.  In  1998, in anticipation of the coming into force of Article 280 of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on protecting the EU's financial interests, the Commission proposed that an 
independent  anti-fraud  office  should  replace  UCLAF.  However,  the  real  impetus  for 
creating  OLAF  came  from  continuing  criticisms  of  the  Commission's  financial 
management and a very critical report by the ECA and UCLAF itself. 
While  emphasizing the importance of OLAF's investigative function,  the  Commission 
entrusted  the  Office  with  a  wide  range  of activities  related  to  the  protection  of the 
European Union's financial interests. These activities cover the following: 
-the assistance that the Commission gives to the Member States in the fight against fraud; 
-the development of a strategy for fighting  fraud within the framework of its policy on 
the protection of  financial interests (Article 280 of  the Treaty); 
-the preparation of  the Commission's legislative and regulatory anti-fraud initiatives; 
-technical assistance, especially in the field of training, to  the other Community bodies 
and  institutions  and  to  the  national  authorities  concerned  with  the  protection  of the 
Community's financial interests.
601 
OLAF issued its first annual report in June 2000. When presenting its first report OLAF's 
director pointed out the continuing problems arising from the differences in national legal 
systems which prevent the emergence of EU wide anti-fraud rules and common penalties 
for offenders.  602 
601  Decision 1999/3521EC, ECSC, Euratom, Article 2(3) to (7). 
602 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: The Court of  Auditors and OLAF", pp. 247-248. 
193 OLAF is  still  a  young  institution,  which  is  in  the  process  of establishing  its  internal 
structures, procedures, processes. Like the ECA, it is part of the Union's accountability 
structure with a specific remit to combat fraud and crime. Its remit is based on the clear 
recognition that there is an important transnational dimension to budgetary fraud in the 
EU.  Similar to  the ECA, there is  a clear recognition that OLAF has to  work with and 
through national investigative channels. 
In  2005, the ECA produced a special report on the operation of OLAF, pointing out the 
difficulties it has faced in its first years of operation and giving recommendations for its 
future  work.
603  The report reveals that the preparation and follow-up  of investigations 
have frequently been rudimentary. The investigators objectives are still vague as regards 
the evidence to be obtained and the resources to be used. Apart from the customs sector, 
cooperation  with  Member  States  still  calls  for  serious  effort  in  both  areas  that  are 
managed directly and where management is shared with the Member States.
604 
OLAF is  independent in its investigations, but subject to  the Commission as  far  as  its 
other duties are  concerned.  This hybrid status has  not affected its  independence in its 
investigative functions.  The fact that it is attached to the Commission has enabled it to 
benefit not only from extended administrative and logistical support, but also  from  the 
same regulatory anti-fraud provisions as Commission departments. Therefore there are no 
proposals to  change the Office's status.  60S  The key issue to be addressed instead is the 
need  for  OLAF  to  focus  its  investigative  function,  so  that  better use  is  made  of its 
resources, notably with a view to  opening investigations that target areas in which the 
risk of  fraud is considered greatest, as suggested by the ECA's special report. 
603 The Court of Auditors, Special Report No 112005 concerning the management of  the European Anti-
Fraud Office (OLAF) together with the Commission's replies. OJ C 20211  of 18/8/2005" 
604 Ibid. 
605 Ibid. 
194 Nature of the EU and financial accountability at the EU level 
After analysing the key elements of financial accountability at the EU level, the question 
which  arises  is  what  is  the  nature  of financial  accountability  at  the  EU level?  Is  the 
accountability relationship established between the EU institutions and EU citizens the 
same  as  in  the  nation  state  context?  Is  there  a  difference  between  two  levels  of 
accountability and if so, what are then the consequences of  such a difference? 
In  order to be able to  comprehend the  financial  accountability relationship  in  the  EU 
context  we  will  have  to  comprehend the  nature  of the  EU itself.  Therefore  we  shall 
discuss the main theories attempting to  explain the nature of the EU integration and its 
basic features. This will provide us a basis for drawing general conclusions on the nature 
of financial accountability relationship. 
Theoretical basis  Jor EU integration 
There  are  several  theories  which  attempt  to  explain  the  nature  of the  EU.  The  most 
prominent  ones  are:  neo-functionalism,  inter-governmentalism  and  multi-level 
governance. Although all these theories seem to provide quite different determinants and 
postulates of supranational integration, they in fact emphasise different aspects of  the EU 
integration process and  operation.  We shall  briefly analyse  the  main features  of these 
theories, which should provide a basis for understanding of financial accountability at the 
EU level. 
N eo functionalists  have  for  many years  provided the  framework  for  understanding EU 
integration. The key tenet of neo-functionalism is that different social groups (including 
bureaucratic actors at state level, societal interest groups and multi-national cooperations) 
within  Member  States  have  particular  interests  in  the  integration  processes.  These 
interests  are  mainly of economic  nature  and cross  the  borders of nation  states due  to 
strong interconnectedness of national  economies. The promotion of economic interests 
195 leads to certain degree of integration, which is then by 'spill-over' effect spread to other 
areas of integration. The main idea is thus that integration in one sphere creates pressure 
for integration in other areas.  Economic integration naturally leads to  certain degree of 
political integration, which is further spread by spillover effect to different sectoral areas. 
In  order to  attain their integration objectives interest groups concentrate their attention 
both on the national institutions and EU institutions, applying the pressure on those who 
have the regulatory power.  606 
Neofunctionalism has been facing numerous criticisms. The main problem of this theory 
seem  to  lie  in  its  relative  simplicity,  which  could  well  serve  to  explain  gradual 
strengthening of integration processes but could not account for difficult periods in the 
EU context, featured by serious crises in the EU development in the  1970s  as  well  as 
those experienced relatively recently, with rejection of the EU Constitution by some of 
the Member States and budget disputes. As Community integration had not proceeded in 
the  manner  predicted  by  neofunctionalists,  the  initial  neofunctionalists  theoretical 
framework  was  modified  and  become  much  more  complex.  Notwithstanding  these 
modifications, the neofunctionalists were not able to  explain the causal links of various 
shifts and changes in the EU integration process. Furthermore, the lack of  more advanced 
ideas on Community democratic features and accountability represent the weak points of 
this theory, which seems to be well-suited to explain the early EU integration process, but 
fails to provide insight into its more advanced stage of development.  607 In spite of these 
critics, neofuctionalist theory certainly has its values and could be well used to provide at 
least partial explanation of  the development of financial accountability mechanisms in the 
EU context. Neofunctionalism could thus be well used to  explain the emergence of the 
European Court of  Auditors, as has been pointed out earlier. 
606 Cf P. Craig, O. de Burca, The Evolution of  EU  Law, (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-7; J. 
Peterson, M. Shackleton, The Institutions of  the European Union, (Oxford University Press), 2001, pp.5-6 
607 P. Craig, O. de Burca, op.cit., pA. 
196 The next theory which attempts to  explain the EU integration is intergovernmentalism. 
Intergovernmentalism  represents  a  state-centric  theoretical  framework  which  tries  to 
explain the nature of the EU on the basis of a rational choice theory,  overtaken from 
economic  liberalism.  The  key  argument  of intergovemmentalism  is  that  increasing 
transborder  flows  of goods,  services,  factors  or pollutants create  "international policy 
externalities",  which  create  costs  and  benefits  for  the  groups  outside  national 
jurisdictions. In order to  overcome possible disputes and individual interstate bargains 
and in this way reduce the costs of externalities, the states have created a supranational 
structure, which should provide a stable institutional setting for the resolution of  possible 
disputes  and  bargains.  In  this  sense,  the  states  have  either pooled  their  sovereignty, 
through qualified majority voting or delegated power to  semi-autonomous institutions, 
which should be able to deal efficiently with all  the issues arising from the integration 
process.608 
The core of the intergovernmentalist argument is that, despite certain level of delegation 
of  power to supranational institutions, the Member States remain key determinants in the 
integration  process,  unlike  the  Community  institutions  which  have  little,  if  any, 
independent impact on the  integration process.  Intergovernmentalists contend that the 
existence of democratic institutions and mechanisms in the EU is fully contingent upon 
the consent of the States, which are the driving forces behind integration. Supranational 
actors act mainly at their behest and exert almost no influence on the pace of  integration. 
The  significant  powers  of  the  Commission  and  the  European  Court  of  Justice 
intergovernmentalists explained by use of  delegation and agency theory.609 
Intergovernmentalists have been heavily criticized for over-simplification of the driving 
forces  for integration and their reduction to pure economic calculus. Furthermore, their 
contention  that  Community  institutions  have  no  genuine  impact  on  the  integration 
process is highly disputable. Nevertheless, insights of intergovernmentalism are certainly 
608 Ibid, pp. 9-15. 
609 Ibid. 
197 useful for explaining some of the key features of the ED integration and will be used to 
some extent in our financial accountability research, as will be pointed out later. 
As  a reaction to  the intergovernmentalists'  overstressing of the importance of Member 
States in the integration process,  a new theory of multilevel  governance has  emerged, 
emphasising the  importance of the ED  institutions  in  the  policy-making process.  The 
theory  of multi-level  governance  draws  on  the  new  institutionalist  thinking,  which 
stresses the importance of  the design of  political institutions on the society. Advocates of 
multi-level governance argue that although national governments are major players in the 
policy  process,  they  do  not  have  a  monopoly  of control.  Supranational  institutions, 
including the Commission, the European Parliament and European Court of  Justice, have 
genuine, independent influence on policy making process that does not stem from  and 
cannot be explained by individual national interests.
610 
Multi-level  governance  theory  sees  the  rationale  for  integration  in  the  wish  of the 
Government  leaders  to  transfer  decision-making  power  either  because  the  political 
benefits  may  outweigh  the  costs  of the  loss  of political  control,  or because  of the 
advantages  obtained  by  shifting  the  responsibility  for  unpopular  decisions  from  the 
national  to  supranational  level.  Their main  argument  is  that  once  competence  over a 
certain subject matter has been transferred to the Community level individual states have 
only a limited degree of control of supranational decision making process. Ability of the 
Member States to control the ED institutions is limited by a range of factors,  including 
the  'multiplicity of principals,  the  mistrust  that  exists  among  them,  impediments  to 
coherent principal action and by unintended consequences of  institutional change.  ,611 
Stone,  Sweet  and  Sandholtz  have  made  an  interesting  attempt  at  combining  the 
intergovernmentalism with new institutionalism (i.e. multilevel governance). They argue 
610 Ibid, pp. 16-23. 
611  G. Marks, L. Hooghe, K. Blank, "European Integration form the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multiple-Level 
Governance', (1996) 34 JCMS pp. 341-342. 
198 that these two theories could be placed at two opposite ends of  the continuum. At the one 
end of the continuum, there is  pure intergovernmental politics where the states are the 
central  players who  bargain  in  order to  attain  commonly acceptable policies.  In  such 
matters,  the  role  of a  Community is  one  of a  passive  observer,  who  can  only  try  to 
enhance the efficiency of  such interstate bargain. At the other end of the spectrum there is 
supranational politics which covers the areas of competence which,  due to  pressure of 
different societal actors, have been transferred to the Community decision making level. 
In  these  matters,  the  Community  institutions  take  precedence,  greatly  limiting  the 
influence  of the  Member  States.  Stone,  Sweet  and  Sandholtz  therefore  believe  that 
different areas of Community policy could definitely be located at different points along 
the  spectrum.  The location of a policy area at  a particular point on the  continuum is 
dependent  on  the  levels  of cross-border  transactions  and  the  consequential  need  of 
different societal actors for supranational coordination within that area.
612 
In a similar vain Weiler argues that there are three modes of governance operating at the 
Community level: the international, the supranational and the infranational. International 
governance is concerned with macro-level matters, such as the fundamental rules of the 
system and issues of  high political sensitivity. The key actors of  the international mode of 
governance are the states and especially state executives.  Supranational governance, on 
the  other  hand,  deals  with  the  passage  of the  primary  legislative  agenda  of the 
Community,  including  the  principal  harmonization  measures.  In  the  supranational 
context, states are also important players, but so too are the Community institutions, such 
as the Commission and the EP. Weiler furthermore adds an important third dimension of 
the  Community governance  - infranational  governance,  which  includes  executive  and 
implementing  measures.  At  the  infranational  level  of governance,  the  key  actors  are 
neither  the  states  executives  nor  the  Community  institutions,  but  administrations, 
612 A.  Stone Sweek and W.  Sandholtz, "European Integration and Supranational Governance", 19974, 
JEPP, p. 297. 
199 departments, private and public associations and certain interest groups of both Union 
and member state levels.
613 
Theoretical model of  EU  financial system and  financial accountability 
We find the models of Stone, Sweet and Sandholtz and especially the Weiler model most 
useful to explain the dynamic and fairly complex policy-making process operating within 
the  Community,  and  in  particular  its  financing.  These  models  provide  quite  a  good 
framework for  understanding of the complexity of the EU budget issues and financial 
accountability. 
If we apply the Stone Sweet and Sandholtz model to the EU financial  system, we may 
argue that at the one end of  the intergovernmental continuum (international governance in 
Weiler's model)  there  are politically sensitive  issues  of the  EU budget,  in  which the 
Member States are the key players of  the game. Relatively recent fierce disputes over the 
British rebate  which triggered the  question  of the  reform of the  common agricultural 
policy have demonstrated the delicacy of budget issues for the individual Member States 
and underlined the existence of the right of the Member States to veto budget proposals 
which do not satisfy their national interests. 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the process of budget preparation and allocation falls 
somewhere in the middle of the two ends, between intergovernmental and supranational 
levels of governance. The Commission is  responsible for  budget preparation while the 
Council  and  Parliament  are  in  charge  of its  approval.  As  we  could  see  earlier, 
approximately half of the Union's budget is spent on 'compulsory expenditure' (mostly 
agriculture).  In  the event of disagreement between the Council and Parliament over the 
compulsory expenditure the Council's view prevails.
614 This keeps the budget allocation 
pendulum towards the intergovernmentalist end.  On the other hand, other half of 'non-
613  P. Craig, G. de Burca, The Evolution of  EU  Law, op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
614 I. Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 602-603. 
200 compulsory' expenditure the final word rests with the Parliament.
615 Therefore, the issue 
of expenditure  allocation  is  slightly  reversed  towards  the  supranational  end  of the 
spectrum. It may in any case be argued that both cases generally fall within the Weiler's 
supranational governance model. 
The above discussion implies that our key concept of  democratic financial accountability, 
defined in the Chapter 1,  understood as  a relationship between the Government and its 
citizens,  where  the  citizens  have  entrusted  their  money  to  the  Government  and 
consequently are holding it to account for its stewardship, cannot be easily transferred to 
the  supra-national  context  of the  EU.  The  key  problem  is  that  the  main  democratic 
relationship  between  the  EU  citizens  and  the  EU,  established  through  the  European 
Parliament, is still fragile. The European Council, as the main forum of Member States 
interest, still wields a preponderance of power in the decision-making process on public 
expenditure issues. This points to the intergovernmentalist nature of  the game. 
Furthermore,  for  the  purposes  of the  more  in  depth  understanding  of the  general 
conception of financial accountability at the EU level, it is also important to  look at the 
revenue side of  the EU budget. Although the financing is of the budget is ensured by the 
EU rules which are binding for all Member States there is no direct link to citizens or tax-
payers. Instead, the financing of  the budget relies on transfers from national treasuries.
616 
Therefore the citizens of the EU do not feel that they have directly delegated their money 
to  the EU. Instead it is the Member States who are in charge of providing the money to 
the EU budget and  subsequently they are  the key actors  in the  process of the  budget 
allocation,  approval and,  as  will be pointed out later, implementation. With the current 
overwhelming weight of the gross national  income (GNI) resources in the EU budget, 
Member States themselves tend to judge EU policies and initiatives exclusively in terms 
615 Ibid. 
616 Commission of  the European Communities, "Financing the European Union, Commission report on the 
operation of  the own resources system", Brussels, 14.7.2004. COM(2004) 505 final. 
201 of their national allocation and with little regard to  the substance of policies.
617  This all 
again implies a strong case for intergovernmentalist thinking, which clearly undermines 
financial accountability established directly between the EU citizens and EU institutions. 
In  order  to  strengthen  this  relationship  and  provide  more  transparency  in  the  EU 
budgeting  process,  the  European  Commission  has  recently  started  giving  thought  to 
changing the system of the EU financing,  which should address the key weaknesses of 
the present system.
618 
If we, however, look at a more specific concept of financial accountability, understood as 
a phase in the  public  expenditure management process in which a government has  to 
account  for  the  money spent,  we  may see  that  the  area  of financial  accountability is 
characterised by multiple levels of  operation, which could perhaps best be placed towards 
the neofunctionalist end of the spectrum and Weiler's infranational governance model. 
On the side of  the EU, there are a number of  the EU institutional financial accountability 
mechanisms established for the purpose of  securing the financial accountability at the EU 
level.  However,  the  fact  that  the  EU  budget  is  not  implemented  solely  by the  EU 
institutions,  but  largely  by  the  Member  States,  places  the  burden  of  financial 
accountability  not  only  on  the  EU  institutions  but  even  more  so  on  the  financial 
accountability mechanisms of  the Member States, which are the key safeguards of  the EU 
money.  The  area of financial  accountability would  furthermore  correspond quite  well 
within  Weiler's  third  infranational  dimension  of EU  governance,  concerned  with 
execution and implementation measures taken at both international and national levels of 
governance. 
It may be therefore concluded that financial accountability in its more specific sense in 
the EU context is  a relationship established not only between the EU citizens and EU 
617 Ibid. 
618 The Commission has been considering introduction of  a new tax-based resource replacing the current 
statistical VAT-based resource and has proposed three main candidates as possible future fiscal own 
resources: a resource based on energy consumption, national V  A  T bases and corporate income. 
202 institutions,  but also  between the EU  citizens  and their own nation states,  where  the 
citizens are holding both layers of governance to  account for the stewardship of public 
money.  Financial  accountability  is  ensured  through  a  number  of different  financial 
accountability mechanisms which exist both at the EU and the national level. 
Due to its complex, multi-level governance nature, the area of financial accountability is 
characterised  by  constant  interaction  between  the  EU  and  national  financial 
accountability institutions and mechanisms. As we could see,  the  Member States have 
established the financial accountability mechanisms at the Union level (Court of  Auditors 
etc.) to  oversee their agent,  the Commission,  in its management of EU monies.  In the 
process of establishment of the EU financial accountability mechanisms, the EU policy 
makers  found  their  inspiration  in their national  contexts,  which  made  an  undisputed 
impact on the design of the EU institutions. However, over time the EU institutions, due 
to complexity and shared competence in the budget execution had to start scrutinizing the 
functioning of the financial accountability mechanisms of the Member States as well as 
the countries acceding to  the EU.  Therefore,  the national  financial  management came 
under increasing scrutiny of the EU institutions. This has contributed to an enhancement 
of the norm of sound financial  management in the EU and to  creating a web of rules 
around  the  control  of the  EU  expenditure,  which  started  having  a  reverse  affect  on 
financial  management  of national  institutions.
619  All  this  points  to  the  supranational 
nature  of  the  financial  accountability  in  the  EU  context  and  proves  the  new-
institutionalist argument that the form and shape of institutions have a powerful impact 
on the policy-making process in most of the EU spheres of competence,  including the 
area of financial accountability. 
The remainder of this  chapter shall  examine the influence the EU system of financial 
accountability on countries which have expressed the wish to become members of the 
EU. 
619 B. Laffan, "Financial Control: the Court of Auditors and OLAF", op. cit, pp. 249-251. 
203 Financial Accountability as a condition for the EU accession 
The EU key challenge - process of  enlargement 
The expansion of  the European Union of 1
51 of  May 2004 which took in eight Central and 
East European countries (CEECs) and two Mediterranean countries to the EU has marked 
a  new  momentum  in  the  European  integration  process.  On  the  side  of the  EU,  the 
enlargement  is  conceived  as  a  "historic  opportunity,,620  for  bringing  the  European 
continent together. It should provide greater security and stability of the continent and 
economic  prosperity  for  all  the  European  nations.621  Although  enlargement  denotes 
investment of sufficient financial resources into the CEECs economies,622  it also creates 
bigger and  more  dynamic  market  for  the  benefit of all  of its  members.  For the  new 
members, on the other hand, the accession into the EU means becoming part of the long 
desired  "West",  with  blooming  economy,  prosperity  and  world  without  frontiers.  It 
signifies  an  era of greater  freedom  and respect for  human rights,  based on European 
democratic values. 
The  EU's readiness  to  accept the  CEECs  as  potential  candidate  states  was  explicitly 
expressed for the first time at the Copenhagen European Council (1993), which declared 
that: 
"the  associated countries  in  central and eastern  Europe  that  so  desire  shall become 
members of the  European  Union.  Accession will take place as  soon as  an  associated 
620 Cf European Commission, "Agenda 2000. For a stronger and wider Union", Bulletin a/the European 
Union,  Supplement 5/97,  13, 1997. 
621  Cf Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of  the candidate 
countries, November, 2000. 
622 The Commission has estimated that the enlargement will cost the Union up to 75 billion ECU. Cf D. 
Dinan, Ever Closer Union, (Lynne Reinner Publishers) 1999, p.  198. 
204 country is able to assume the obligations of  membership by satisfYing the economic and 
political conditions required". 623 
In June 2000, the Santa Maria de Feira European Council agreed that all the countries in 
the region are "potential candidates" for the accession to the EU. This perspective should 
help  each country to  accelerate the pace of reform and to  begin to  align its laws and 
structures with those in the EU.624  While Bulgaria and Romania hope to join the EU in 
2007, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey have the status of candidate countries and Serbia 
and  Montenegro,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  Albania  have  the  status  of potential 
candidate country. The increased EU co-operation with the countries of Western Balkans 
and the anticipation of their accession to  the Union are  expected to  bring about greater 
stability of  the whole region. 
Conclusions of Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003, reiterate the determination 
of the  EU to  support the  European perspective of the  Western Balkan countries.  The 
Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become members of  the 
EU "once they meet the  established criteria".625  Although the prospects of further EU 
enlargement  have  been  seriously  questioned  after  the  2005  stalemate  with  the  EU 
Constitution, the EU Commission has still  not changed its rhetoric  and intentions and 
seems to be determined to enable the comprehensive economic and political unification 
of  the European continent in the years to come. 
Setting up the EU  membership criteria 
In order to help the candidate states achieve the objectives of accession to the EU, the 
Commission outlined the strategy for preparing the Central and East European states for 
623 European Commission, "PH  ARE 1994 Annual Report", COM(95) 366 final,  14. 
624 Cf Enlargement Strategy Paper, Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession 
by each of  the candidate countries, November 8, 2000. 
625 Presidency Conclusions of  the Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003. 
205 membership,  providing  significant  political  and  financial  support.  The  pre-acceSSIOn 
strategy generally consists of several  distinct parts:  priority setting,  discerned through 
Accession  Partnerships,  financial  assistance,  Association  agreements,  participation  in 
Community  Programmes  and  preparation  of  the  negotiations  through  analytical 
examination of the candidate country's achievements. The Commission has also set up a 
number of conditions  which need to  be  met in  order to  join the  EU.  Therefore,  the 
accession to  the EU should be perceived as  a long-term process, rather then a  simple 
agreement  of  contractual  parties,  which  was  a  feature  of  most  of  the  previous 
enlargement waves. 
The question which should be raised is why did the Commission adopt such an approach 
and  imposed quite wide  accession conditions  upon the  candidate countries,  especially 
since similar conditions were not imposed during the previous EU enlargements? 
To answer this question, several important factors should be taken into account. The main 
one is that the accession of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the European 
Union is in many respects different from all the previous European Union enlargements. 
First, the number of countries applying for membership was much greater than was the 
case with the previous waves of enlargement. Second, CEECs democratic systems were 
rather  fragile  at  the  beginning  of the  accession  process  and  the  level  of economic 
development is  still  substantially below the  European average.
626  Third,  the European 
Union  is  in  a  much  more  advanced  stage  of integration  than  it was  in the  previous 
enlargement waves, which necessitates meeting of  certain standards before entering in the 
European space. Early accession to the EU, without meeting certain standards, would be 
626 Average GDP per head in the ten new member countries is only 46% of  the EUl5 average. Although 
one new member country, Slovenia, is richer than the poorest 'old' member, Greece, the poorest new 
country, Latvia, has a GDP per head of  only 39% of the EU average. According some estimates, it will take 
Poland approximately 59 years to achieve the EU average of GDP per head. Cf. The Economist, May lSI 
2004, Volume 371, Number 8373. 
206 likely to undermine the process of further European integration and smooth functioning 
of the Union.  Therefore,  there seem to be many arguments to  support the necessity of 
meeting certain number of  conditions in order to join the EU. 
The conditions for the EU membership set up by the European Council and developed by 
the European Commission's Opinions are mainly of  a political and economic nature. The 
EU  requires the  prospective candidate States to  attain  certain level  of democratic  and 
economic  development,  so  that  they  would  be  able  to  sustain  the  obligations  of 
membership  without major difficulties.  In  that  sense,  the  EU also  requires  CEECs  to 
adopt voluminous acquis communautaire.  Changes in law are therefore conceived as  a 
basic tool for the process of  political and economic integration. 
However, the EU is quite aware that changes of law alone cannot bring about significant 
reforms in political and economic systems of the candidate states, especially when most 
of the acceding countries suffer from the discrepancy between the legal system and legal 
order.  Quite often very good laws  are  enacted, but the degree of their implementation 
remains pretty low.  Therefore the Commission insisted that candidate states work very 
hard  on  the  strengthening of their  administrative  and judicial  capacities.  One of the 
important  aspects  of  the  administrative  capacity  of  candidate  states  is  financial 
accountability. 
Financial accountability - a valid EU membership criterion? 
The first  time financial  accountability was used as  a criterion for  accession in its  own 
right  were  the  Commission  Opinions  issued  in  July  1997.  From  1997  and  on,  the 
European  Commission  started  regularly  checking the  candidate  states'  administrative 
abilities  and  providing  advice  and  solutions,  in  its  opinions  of the  progress  of the 
207 candidate states towards accession.
627 In these opinions references were not only made to 
administrative  capacities  to  deal  with  the  absorption  of specific  elements  of acquis 
communautaire, but also to the need to develop adequate financial accountability system, 
based on effective internal and external financial control. 
The issue which may arise in this respect is whether the Commission, i.e. the ED, has the 
legal right to demand the candidate States to comply with certain financial accountability 
standards? This question appears to be problematic, especially having in mind that there 
are  only few  provisions  in  European  Treaties  and  secondary  European  legal  sources 
which contain provisions of  general application to financially accountability of  ED funds. 
Although the  ED has  started taking  a  more proactive stance in  this  regard  in the last 
couple of years  (as  pointed out earlier),  the  area  of financial  accountability still  falls 
within the principle of subsidiarity and the ED has no  competence interfering with the 
organization  and  operation  of the  financial  accountability  institutions  of its  Member 
States.  But what then gives  it the legal  right to  impose public  financial  accountability 
standards on the countries which are still not its members? 
Although there  is  no  direct  legal  basis  which  gIves  the  ED power to  reqUIre  certain 
institutional  standards  from  the  candidate countries,  it could,  however,  be argued that 
there  are  some  indirect  sources  which  provide  the  ED  with  such  a  right.  The  most 
important is Article  10EC, which requires the Member States to  take all  the necessary 
measures  to  fulfill  the  obligations  arising  of the  ED  membership.  This  implies  that 
Member  States  must  have  adequate  capacity  to  be  able  to  ensure  the  timely 
implementation  of the  ED policies  and  managing  the  ED  funds.  This  is  especially 
important in the view that the ED does not have its own administration outside Brussels 
and  thus  heavily  depends  on  national,  regional  and  local  governments  for  the 
627 Cf Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by each of the candidate 
countries, 1997, 1998, 1999,2000,2001,2002; The EU Commission reports on Bulgaria, Romania and 
Turkey's progress towards accession, 2004; The EU Commission Comprehensive Monitoring reports on 
Bulgaria and Romania, October 2005, http://europa.eu.intJcommlenlargementJindex_en.htm. 
208 implementation of its policies. As it has been pointed out a several times by now, 80% of 
the EU budget is  implemented by the Member and potential Member States and only 
around 20% by the EU institutions themselves. Therefore, Member States have to ensure 
efficient and effective management of the EU funds  provided under the numerous EU 
programmes,  such  as  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  the  Regional  Development  fund, 
European Social Fund etc. 
The issue of  the candidate States financial accountability has not been only the concern of 
the  EU  institutions,  but  also  of the  current  Member  States,  especially  those  who 
significantly contribute to  the  EU's budget.  If a  new Member State lacks  capacity to 
comply  with  the  Community  rules  and  does  not  have  proper  financial  control 
mechanisms,  other  Member  States  may  be  put  at  risk.  Although  the  financial 
accountability systems of the current Member States are  not ideal  and  do  suffer from 
various shortcomings and weaknesses (as pointed out in the ECA reports), acceptance of 
generally fragile systems of financial  accountability of the candidate/acceding countries 
may generate  additional  burdens  on the  control  institutions,  the  Commission and  the 
ECA. 
On the other hand, the establishment of effective financial control mechanisms will be of 
great  importance  for  the  candidate  countries  own  administrative  developments.  The 
establishment of effective systems of financial  control  should provide better value for 
money of public  funds,  as  well  as  decrease  the  possibilities  of fraud,  corruption  and 
financial  irregularities,  as  one of the candidate countries greatest public administration 
problems. 
The above discussion leads us to conclude that the EU has the general right to require the 
candidate countries to have reliable and effective financial  accountability systems.  The 
way they organize their financial  accountability systems is still  left to  themselves, but 
209 they must assure that such a system will be able to properly manage and control the use 
ofEU funds.
628 
Defining the European standards of  financial accountability 
The next question which should be raised is whether there are unique European standards 
of financial  accountability to  which the  candidate countries  should aim?  And if these 
standards exist, what is the best way of  achieving them? 
As we could see, the Treaty establishes only general obligations of the Member States in 
specific financial  accountability areas,  such as  fight  against fraud.  It also provides the 
basis of its  own financial  accountability system,  setting out the responsibilities  of the 
Commission and for  the  ECA.  Many other detailed requirements  are  set out in other 
regulations and directives, etc. on how the processes of management and control of EU 
funds  and  resources  should  be  designed  and  function.  However,  what  seems  to  be 
missing are  the  general  standards of operation of financial  accountability systems and 
guidance on how to achieve the standards and develop required financial accountability 
requirements for accession. 
In response to this need, the European Commission has developed a special negotiation 
Chapter 32  (before 2005  Chapter 28)  which comprise acquis  in  the  area of financial 
control  and accountability.  The acquis requirements  for  public  financial  control  under 
Chapter 32, cover a limited number of Regulations related to  the financial management 
and control of EU funds.
629 Instead of relying on detail legal regulation in specific areas 
628 J. Fournier, "Governance and European Integration - Reliable Public Administration", Preparing Public 
Administration for the European Administrative Space, SIGMA papers No 23, CCNM/SIGMA/PUMA 
(98)39. 
629 First, there are already discussed regulations on the general management of  the EC budget: The Council 
Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 248/1,  16.9.2002; Commission Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) No 234212002 of  23 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of 
210 of management of EU funds, the acquis in the area of financial accountability are based 
on  general  European  and  internationally  agreed  principles  of  sound  financial 
management. 
In order to develop the requirements of  this and other negotiation chapters in more depth, 
the European Commission SIGMA programme,630  provided a useful  instrument in the 
assessment  process  by  producing  the  "baseline"  criteria.  Baselines  are  designed  in 
accordance with the  EU legislation,  but they also  incorporate  good  or best European 
practices  in six  core functions  that public management systems  are  expected to  fulfill 
effectively.631  They  were  prepared  in  close  co-operation  with  various  Directorate 
Generals  of the  Commission  and  the  European  Court  of Auditors.  In  many  cases, 
candidate  countries  have  also  given  contributions  for  the  design  of these  baselines. 
SIGMA regularly revises the baselines in order to keep them up to date with the new EU 
legislation and developments.  Since  1999, the  European Commission has produced its 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general 
budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 357/1, 31.12.2002. Furthermore, key regulations on financial 
management, control and audit of  EU pre-accession funds are: Council Regulation (EC) No.  126611 999 of 
21  June 1999 on coordinating aid to the applicant countries in the framework of  the pre-accession strategy 
and amending regulation (EEC) No. 3906/89, OJ L 161168; Council Regulation (EC) No. 126711999 of21 
June 1999 Establishing an Instrument for Structural policies for Pre-accession (ISPA), OJ L 161/73, 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1268/1999 of  21  June 1999 on Community Support for pre-accession 
measures for agriculture and rural development in the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 
the pre-accession period (SAPARD), OJ L 161  (with 2003 and 2004 amendments) . Key regulations on 
financial management, control and audit of EU structural and cohesion funds are: Council Regulation (EC) 
No 126011 999 of  21  June 1999, laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds, OJ L 161/1; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of2 March 2001  laying down detailed rules for the 
implementation of  Council Regulation (EC) No 126011999 as regards the management and control systems 
for assistance granted under the Structural Funds, OJ L 63/21. 
630 SIGMA programme is mainly funded by the EU PHARE programme and represents one of  the main 
instruments of  the European Commission in promoting capacity development in public administration in 
Central and Eastern Europe, as well as a technical assistance service to the candidate states  .. 
631  On policy management, civil service, internal financial control, public expenditure management, 
external financial control and procurement 
211 regular  Progress  Reports  on  the  basis  of the  SIGMA  baselines.  In  this  way,  the 
Commission has created a well-defined tool for administrative capacity assessment. 
However, it should be noted that although the key objective of  the SIGMA's baselines is 
to  assess  administrative  readiness  for  EU membership,  they have  been  used  widely 
beyond the direct EU accession context as a basic benchmarking system for establishing 
whether  public  administration  and  financial  accountability  systems  meet  minimum 
institutional  and  legal  standards  and  have  contributed to  a  broad discussion  on  what 
constitute 'European Values' of  public administration and financial accountability.632 
There are four main elements of  EU financial accountability requirements that have been 
envisaged  by the  EU negotiations  instructions  and  further  developed by the  SIGMA 
baseline  criteria:  public  internal  financial  control,  external  audit,  EU  pre-accession 
funding and future structural actions and the protection of the EU's financial interests.633 
The vast majority of these requirements are based on the  existing EU regulations and 
practices. 
Public Internal Financial Control 
Public  Internal  Financial  Control  (PIFC) requirements refer to  the  entire public  sector 
financial  internal  control  systems  in  an  accession country,  disregarding  their possible 
involvement  in  dealing  with  the  EU  funds.  PIFC  requirements  consist  of two  key 
components:  financial  management  and  control  (FMC)  and  internal  audit.  Under  the 
632 Dimitrova, A. (2002), Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Criteria. 
West European Politics, Vol. 25. No 4.171-190. 
633 Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement of  the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, Chapter by Chapter, December 2004, 
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/enlargementlnegotiations/chapters/index.htm 
212 PIFC model, all public income and spending centres should be subject to PIFC and all 
control and audit systems should be integrated in the system.
634 
The Commission assesses the progress of PIFC development through monitoring a series 
of steps to  be taken by the central authority responsible for  the development of PIFe. 
The first step is the drafting and adoption of a PIFC Policy or Strategy Paper in which a 
gap  analysis  is  provided  of the  present  control  systems  that  leads  to  a  number  of 
recommendations for upgrading the systems taking into account internationally accepted 
control and audit standards.  The second step is the drafting and adoption of  framework 
and implementation laws relating to internal control and internal audit.  The third step is 
the establishment of  operational and well staffed organizations like decentralized internal 
audit  units,  adequate  financial  services  in  income  and  spending  centres,  and  central 
harmonization units for both functions (FMC and internal audit).  The fourth step is the 
establishment  of sustainable  training facilities  for  financial  controllers  and  internal 
auditors.
635 
These requirements  have  further  been  developed by the  SIGMA Baselines on  Public 
Internal  Financial  Control,  in  line  with  the  existing  EU system of internal  control  as 
defined  by  the  Financial  Regulation  2002  (discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter).  The 
Baselines thus require the acceding countries to  have an adequate management control 
systems  and  financial  control  procedures  in  place.  This  means  that  management  of 
organization must have the responsibility for adequate financial management and control 
systems,  including  ex  ante  controls  of commitments  and  payments  and  recovery  of 
unduly paid amounts.
636 
The next set of  baselines requires the establishment of  a functionally independent internal 
audit/inspectorate mechanism with relevant remit and scope. The Commission does not 
require  any  specific  organization  structure  of such  a  body,  but  insists  it  should  be 
634 Ibid. 
635 The World Bank draft Report, Serbia - Fiduciary Assessment Update, July 2005, p.31. 
636 Public Internal Financial Control Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
213 functionally independent, have an adequate audit mandate (in terms of  scope and types of 
audit) and use internationally recognised auditing standards.
637 
The  Commission  also  insists  that  there  should  be  appropriate  co-ordination  and 
supervision  of the  applied  audit  standards  and  methodologies.  This  means  that  there 
should  be  an  organization  responsible  for  the  coordination  and  harmonization  of the 
implementation  of PIFC  throughout  the  entire  public  sector.  Usually,  there  are  two 
central harmonization units:  one for managerial accountability and another for internal 
audit.
638 
External Audit 
The  nature  and  functioning  of external  audit  is  not  as  such  part  of the  acquis 
communautaire. However, following the criteria laid down by the Copenhagen Summit, 
the  new  Member States  will  need to  adhere  to  the  additional  political  and  economic 
conditions which require,  amongst others,  that  the  candidate has achieved  stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of  law. This includes the existence of an 
effective supreme audit institution (SAl). In a more practical manner, the EC Treaty is in 
fact implying the existence of such institutions and their capacity to co-operate with the 
European  Court  of Auditors  (Articles  246-248).  Moreover,  general  financial  control 
standards for the management of EU-funds and own resources in the candidate countries 
as  well as  in the Member States require an effective external audit of all  public sector 
resources and assets, and that this should be carried out in a continuous and harmonised 
manner.  The  external  audit  could  also  have  a  crucial  role  in  the  evaluation  of and 
reporting on how the financial control systems are implemented and function. 
The  SIGMA baseline  requirements  on  external  audit require  the  SAl to  have a  clear 
authority to  satisfactorily audit all public and statutory funds  and resources, bodies and 
637 Ibid. 
638 The World Bank draft Report, Serbia - Fiduciary Assessment Update, ibid. 
214 entities,  including EU resources.  If the  SAl is  not the  sole provider of public  sector 
external  audit,  then any assessment should also  refer,  as  applicable,  to  the alternative 
arrangements  made and in  particular to  any gaps  in  audit  coverage.
639  The  SA  Is  are 
further required to carry out full range of regularity and performance audit in compliance 
with INTO  SAl auditing standards.  640 
A  special  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  necessity  of having  operational  and  functional 
independence. This should be ensured by providing the SAl the right to decide what work 
it will carry out and to make the results of  its work directly available to the public and the 
Parliament.  The  Parliament,  e.g.  its  designated  committee  should  be  also  obliged  to 
consider SAl's reports and the Government should be obliged to  formally and publicly 
respond to the published reports. It is further important to  ensure an effective follow-up 
on whether its and parliament's recommendations are implemented. The SAl should also 
adopt internationally and generally recognised  aUditing  standards  compatible with EU 
requirements and must be appropriately aware of the requirements of the EU accession 
process.
641 
The Commission is, however, aware that in addition to the criteria described above, the 
capacity  of a  country  to  bring  public  sector  external  audit  into  line  with  European 
standards and international best practice, and to maintain those standards, will depend on 
a number of  factors including the capability and capacity to develop and make change, 
existence of  a strategy for development and its effective implementation and commitment 
to  the change and development process.  The Commission therefore recommends that, 
SUbjective  and  objective  indicators  should  be assessed  to  try sum up  the  impact  and 
effectiveness of  the SAL 
639 Public Sector External Audit Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
640 Cf. INTOSAI: Lima Declaration on Guidance on Auditing Precepts, 
http://www.intosai.org/Levelll1_defaue_new.html 
641  Public Sector External Audit Baselines, SIGMA baselines, October 1999. 
215 EU Pre-accession funding and future Structural Action and Protection of  the EU financial 
interests 
In  addition  to  requirements of well  functioning  PIFC  and  external  audit  systems,  the 
Commission naturally pays special attention to the correct use,  control, monitoring and 
evaluation  of EU  funding,  which  constitute  an  important  element  in  assessing  the 
Candidate Countries ability to apply the acquis under the Chapter 32. The Commission 
requests the acceding countries to apply the PIFC procedures (ex-ante financial control as 
well as internal audit) in the same way to all the public funds irrespective of  their source, 
as there should be no distinction made in terms of control for the national budget and for 
EU resources.  With reference to  the internal control procedures related to the EU pre-
accession  funds,  the  Commission  requests  the  acceding  countries  establish  the 
appropriate ex  ante control and functionally independent internal audit mechanisms,  to 
make  available  experienced  and  qualified  staff resources  and  to  produce  procedure 
manuals as well as  audit trails for each pre-accession instrument. One of the important 
indicators is the existence of  the procedure for the recovery of  lost EU funds. 642 
Furthermore, protection of  the EU financial interests assumes the ability to implement the 
relevant EC Regulations by the accession, namely Regulation on the protection of  the EC 
financial  interests  and  Regulation  on  the  on-the-spot  checks  carried  out  by  the 
Commission  in  order  to  protect  the  EU  financial  interests  against  fraud  and  other 
irregularities.
643  The acceding countries are also requested to  designate a single contact 
point for co-operation with OLAF and to  ensure the development of the administrative 
capacity  necessary  to  implement  the  acquis,  including  the  capacity  of  the  law 
642 Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement o/the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, Chapter by Chapter, December 2004, 
643 Regulation (EC) No.  1073/1999 of  the European Parliament and the Council of 
25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), Council 
regulation (EURATOM) No.1 074/1999 of  25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by the 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). 
216 enforcement bodies and judiciary to  address cases where EU financial  interests are  at 
stake.  644 
Finally, in accordance with article 164 of the Financial Regulation, the Commission may 
decide  to  entrust  project  implementation  management  of its  pre-accession  funds  to 
authorities  of beneficiary  countries,  under  the  so-called  decentralised  management 
framework. This takes place after having established that the beneficiary third country or 
countries are in a position to apply in whole or part a number of predefined criteria for 
financial management and control, and in particular: (a)  Effective segregation of the  duties of 
authorizing officer and accounting officer; (b) existence of an  effective system for the internal control of 
management  operations;  (c)  for  project  support,  procedures  for  the  presentation  of separate  accounts 
showing the use made of Community funds;  and for other forms of support, an  officially certified annual 
statement for the area of expenditure concerned to be made available to the Community; (d) existence of a 
national  institution  for  independent  external  auditing;  (e)  transparent,  non-discriminatory  procurement 
procedures ruling out all conflicts of  interest. 
The  European  Commission  closely  monitors  EU  acceding  countries'  progress  in 
preparing and implementing a new regulatory framework for public financial control. As 
the requirements under Chapter 32 are largely based on EU and internationally accepted 
standards, the practical interpretation and implementation of these standards can in some 
cases pose a  significant challenge to  acceding countries,  especially since the financial 
accountability standards are not static values, but are themselves of  evolving nature. That 
is  why DO  Budget and DO OLAF in co-operation with DO Enlargement attach high 
importance to the monitoring and cooperation process. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This  chapter  has  pointed  out  the  great  complexities  of  financial  accountability 
relationship established at the supra level of  governance such as the EU. Numerous levels 
at which financial accountability operates in the EU context has resulted in weakening of 
644Cf. European Commission Directorate-General Enlargement: Enlargement of  the European Union, 
Guide to the Negotiations, ibid. 
217 the direct financial  accountability relationship between the EU citizens and  institutions 
which use the tax-payers money, creating a general  feeling of distrust towards the EU 
governance system. 
Over  the  last  couple  of  years,  in  response  to  senous  criticisms  on  its  financial 
management, the EU has made an important progress in improving the overall financial 
accountability framework.  The  reform  of internal  accountability mechanisms,  coupled 
with strengthening of the powers of the ECA and creation of OLAF have undoubtedly 
had a positive effect on firming  up  the  financial  accountability relationship.  However, 
further efforts are still needed in order to fully implement the well-designed reforms and 
keep the reform momentum. 
In the light of the ongoing reforms of the EU institutions, the EU accession process has 
initiated discussion on another important dimension of reform - definition of European 
standards  and  values  in  financial  accountability to  which  acceding  countries  need  to 
adhere  in  order  to  join  the  EU.  This  discussion  has  influenced  not  only  acceding 
countries,  but also  the  Member  States,  as  the  completion of the  Internal  Market  and 
Monetary Union requires  further harmonization of legislation and practices in  various 
fields,  including  financial  accountability  matters.  This  is  exemplified  in  the  recent 
initiative for  the creation of a common framework for  internal financial  control  of the 
EU,  focusing on the need for active participation and reform of internal control systems 
of  the Member States themselves. 
The evolving nature of the EU standards in financial accountability and other acquis has 
made it  more  difficult for  the acceding  countries to  get  to  know the  EU standards  in 
financial  control  and  audit.  In  response to  this  need, the  Commission's benchmarking 
systems  elaborated  in  the  chapter  32  of negotiations  and  SIGMA's  baselines  have 
established a much more clear sense of what kind of financial  accountability system is 
needed and is  likely to  provide a continuing impetus for  states to  measure progress in 
establishing high standards of  financial accountability. 
218 The value of this chapter is  therefore not only in the analysis of the EU accountability 
system as such and identification of its links with other Member States, but even more so 
in providing benchmarks against which we shall compare the development of  the Serbian 
system of financial accountability and identify the steps which need to be made in order 
to reach the European standards of  financial accountability. 
219 Chapter V 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN SERBIA 
The objective of this chapter is  to  analyse the  Serbian financial  accountability system. 
Analysis of  the current Serbian financial accountability system should provide a basis for 
comparison  with  other  systems  of  financial  accountability,  which  should  yield 
recommendations for the improvement of the institutional setting and functioning of the 
current Serbian system and its alignment with the EU standards, as will be discussed in 
the concluding chapter. 
In accordance with our earlier established theoretical framework, we shall firstly analyse 
the who is accountable dimension of  accountability. We shall provide a short overview of 
the transformation of the  Serbian  'state'  during the last two  centuries and analyse the 
current structure of the Serbian central Government. We shall also point out the European 
integration  component  in  the  Serbian  development  and  outline  key  medium  term 
standards on financial  accountability which have been set up  by the EU as benchmarks 
for further integration. 
The remainder of the chapter will  focus  on  the examination of the for what financial 
accountability dimension of public money stewardship and mechanisms through  which 
the  accountability  relationship  operates.  The  development  of a  normative  concept  of 
"stewardship" of  public money will be analysed through examination of a newly adopted 
legal  framework.  The  focus  of our  inquiry,  however,  will  be  placed  on  the  fourth 
financial  accountability  dimension  - mechanisms  through  which  the  accountability 
relationship  operates.  As with  Britain,  France and  the  EU,  we  shall  identify the  key 
internal  and external  financial  accountability mechanisms,  pointing out their strengths 
and weaknesses. This will provide us  a good starting point for an in depth comparative 
analysis  of different  systems  of financial  accountability  and  examination  of ways  of 
achieving  European  standards  of  financial  accountability,  to  be  discussed  in  the 
concluding chapter. 
220 The Serbian state - a short historical overview 
Although the first foundations of Serbian statehood could be traced back to the XII -XIV 
century, the modem Serbian state was created only in the XIX century. After nearly five 
centuries under the Ottoman Empire, Serbia first gained its limited independence in 1804 
and started developing its  state  structure  under strong European influence.
645  The  first 
steps  towards  full  independence were  laid  in  the  mid  1830s,  when  Serbia obtained  a 
limited form of autonomy from the declining Turkish Empire.
646 In the late 1850s Serbia 
gained full  autonomy under the Turks, and not much later full  sovereignty at the Berlin 
congress in 1878. 
Being  strongly  influenced  by  the  neighbouring  political  and  legal  systems,  Serbia 
established  a  system  of parliamentary  monarchy,  with  Governments  formed  by  the 
majority party or coalition.
647 The Serbian legal system also developed under the strong 
influence of  continental Austrian, German and French legal tradition, where the extensive 
legal regulation satisfied the need for a strict rule of law and an orderly bureaucracy, as a 
means of  overcoming the legacy of  the decaying Ottoman Empire. 
After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in WW I in  1918,  the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenians was established by unifying the small Balkan kingdoms of 
645 Although being ruled by the Turks for centuries, Serbia managed to save its identity mainly due to the 
strong influence of  the Serbian Orthodox Church and relatively weak rule of  the Turks, who were mainly 
interested in collecting taxes and providing public order. Cf Z. Sevic, "Politico-Administrative relations in 
Yugoslavia", in T. Verheijen (ed.) Who Rules?Politico-Administrative Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe, (NISP  Acee, Bratislava), 2000. 
646 The first and rather advanced Serbian Constitution, so-called Sretenjski Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav) 
was proclaimed in 1835. However, only 3 years later in 1838, it was replaced by the new, so-called Turkish 
Constitution, which gave more power to the monarch and better reflected the needs of  the then Ottoman 
Empire. 
647 Nevertheless, the role of  the monarch was at times substantial, going beyond his formally established 
authorities. 
221 Serbia,  Montenegro with the  south-Slav provinces of the  ex Austro-Hungarian Empire 
(Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina) that were at last freed from foreign occupation. The 
country changed its name to Yugoslavia (so-called first Yugoslavia) in  1921, when the 
Vidovdanski Constitution of  the new common state was proclaimed. The first Yugoslavia 
was also a parliamentary monarchy, ruled by the Serbian heirs. 
After WW II, the "Second Yugoslavia" was established as a Socialist Republic under the 
domination of the  USSR.  However,  in  1948,  Yugoslav President Marshall Tito broke 
away from the USSR and began a cautious journey towards a market society. 
The introduction of 'workers self-management" in  1950  with the  "social property" of 
enterprises  and  limited  private  ownership  was  another  turning  point  in  Yugoslavia's 
development.  The  system  of a  full  command  economy  was  abandoned,  which  has 
provided a positive incentive and enhanced Yugoslav economic growth. However, while 
the Communist Party retained mild control over society, it preserved pretty strong control 
over  state  and  party  bureaucracies.  This  curtailed  the  introduction  of  stable  and 
sustainable political development and hindered the introduction of full market economy. 
Nevertheless, the existence of moderate socialism enabled Yugoslavia to achieve much 
higher level of economic and political development in comparison to  its Eastern Block 
neighbours.  The  openness  of the  country  towards  the  West  and  its  willingness  for 
cooperation has been expressly acknowledged by the European Community, which,  in 
the mid-1960s,  started the negotiation process  for  the accession of Yugoslavia to  the 
EC.
648 
However, during the late 60s and 70s, the country suffered from stagnation and stubborn 
defense  of the  communist party monopoly  in  the  name  of the  country's  unity.  As  a 
consequence  of this  resistance  to  change,  social  conflicts  grew  into  complete  ethnic 
648 Cf. D. Kavran, A. Rabrenovic, D. Milovanovic, "Public Administration Education in Yugoslavia", in T. 
Verheijen, 1. Nemec (eds.), Building Higher Education Programmes in Public Administration in CEE 
Countries, (NISPAcee & EPAN), 2000, pp. 303 - 321. 
222 intolerance. This has resulted in the breaking up  of the country in unfortunate military 
conflict. 
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or so-called third Yugoslavia, was formed in  1992 
out of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, as the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (SFR  Y) was breaking up in civil conflict. Although the 1992 Yugoslavian 
Constitution prescribed a  number of competences  for  the  federal  authorities,  many of 
them had never been exercised.  From  1990,  the Republics were gradually transferring 
powers from  the federation, thus obtaining many features of independent states. At the 
time when the new federation was established, a number of competences were already 
obtained by the  Republics,  as  centres  of core  political  and  economic power.  Federal 
authorities, in tum, mainly played a role of rather passive observer, obediently following 
instructions from the RepUblics. 
In March 2002, an agreement on the new state status of Yugoslavia between Serbia and 
Montenegro was reached. In accordance with the agreement, Serbia and Montenegro, as 
two  semi-independent  states,  entered  a  union  called "Serbia  and  Montenegro"  on  4th 
February 2003. The new state with sui generis con-federal features, however, only had a 
transitory nature. Upon the expiration of a period of three years, the member states were 
entitled to institute proceedings for a change of  the state status. 
The Montenegrin referendum of 21  May 2006, at which most of people of Montenegro 
voted for independence, has finally resulted in the creation of two independent states of 
Serbia and Montenegro, as  consequently proclaimed by their National Assemblies. The 
establishment of two  independent states is  expected to  provide a more  stable political 
background  for  their  further  economic  development  and  facilitate  their  smoother 
integration in the ED. 
223 The  Serbian  Government  - Overcoming  the  Flaws  of a  Democratic  Transition 
Failure 
More than ten years of poor economic management, regional conflicts and international 
isolation  have  resulted  in  a  serious  decline  of the  Serbian  economy  and  overall 
deterioration of the state institutions and society.  At the end of the  1990s, the Serbian 
administrative system suffered from  wide-spread corruption practices and a high degree 
of state capture.
649  The economic legacy of the previous regime left Serbia a number of 
state and socially-owned enterprises, loss-making and deeply mistrusted banks, and over-
committed,  poorly functioning  social  safety nets  that make  economic  recovery  fairly 
difficult. The process was even more difficult due to large and mounting fiscal pressures, 
huge external debt, weakened governance, and post-conflict challenges such as rebuilding 
d  d ·  c:  650  amage  111lrastructure. 
Since 2001, Serbia has made commendable economic and social progress in a number of 
areas.  Substantial  reforms  have  been  underway  in  different  sectors:  restoring  macro-
economIC  stability,  restoring  the  viability  of the  banking  sector,  privatisation  of the 
extensive  sector  of socially-owned  enterprises,  rehabilitation  of the  energy  sector, 
restructuring public utilities, reforming inefficient systems of  pension and social security 
etc.
651  Despite significant advancement, major efforts still have to be made to fully open 
the country to foreign trade and investment and establish a market economy. 
The reform progress slowed considerably in 2003, following the assassination of Prime 
Minister Djindjic. However, reform momentum was regained after the instalment of the 
new Government of Serbia in March 2004. A significant number of  laws in economic and 
financial  field  have  been  adopted  since  then.  Further progress  in  many  areas  of the 
649 Cf Kostic V. "Korupcija u Srbiji - fenomen zarobljene drzave" [Corruption in Serbia - Phenomenon of 
State Capture], Monitor, www.monitor.cg.yu. 2003. 
650 Cf The W orId Bank report, Serbia and Montenegro - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review, 
Volume Two: Serbia, February 2003, pp.2-6. 
651  Cf The World Bank Report prepared for the Donor Coordination Meeting of November 18,2003. 
224 reforms,  however,  will  depend  largely  on  the  reform  of the  public  sector,  whose 
institutions are critical for the implementation of  the overall reform agenda. 
Key central Government institutions are still fragile and cannot adequately respond to the 
imposed transitional  challenges.  There  is  still  a  visible  discrepancy between the  legal 
system  and legal order,  which means that the level of law implementation is  low and 
often  discriminatory.  652  Furthermore,  international  surveys  indicate  that  Serbia  still 
suffers from  a high level of corruption.
653  This raises the feeling of legal insecurity and 
uncertainty  and  has  an  adverse  effect  on  very  much  needed  foreign  investments. 
Although  the  process  of reform  of both  public  administration  and  judiciary  has 
commenced,  it  has  still  a long way to  go  until  satisfactory situation in these fields  is 
reached. 
The Serbian legal system is  based on a continental legal tradition. Both the French and 
German legal systems had an important impact on the development of the Serbian legal 
culture.
654  Similarly to  their administrative systems,  the  Serbian Government structure 
and  functions  are  regulated  by  a  special  body  of administrative  law.  The  state 
administration is thus perceived as an autonomous domain apart from civil society. The 
structure of the state administration is  based on a hierarchical bureaucratic model with 
strong emphasis on legality and proper fulfilment of regulatory functions.  This  'over-
legalisation' poses problems for the functioning of the system which lacks flexibility in 
its  operation,  as  the  'rules of the  game'  can  often be changed only by Parliamentary 
amendments. 
652 Cf z. Sevic, "The Political Economy, Economics and Art of  Negotiation and Reconciliation: The 
Production of  Law and Legal Order in a Polycentric Federation of  Yugoslav Type", paper presented at the 
9
th  Maastricht Workshop in Law and Economics, Maastricht: Univerisity of  Limburg, 1996. 
653 In the Transparency International Report for 2005, Serbia scored 2.7 out of 10 (97
th out of 146 countries) 
on the basis of  corruption perception index, Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2005, p. 
202-205. www.globalcorruptionreport.org 
654 This is mainly due to the fact that many leading Serbian intellectuals of  that time had obtained their 
education in France and Germany. 
225 One  of the  key  reform  issues  is  adoption  of the  new  Constitution.  General  political 
instability and high degree of polarization between key political actors have adversely 
affected  the  possibilities  for  disentanglement  of key  Serbian  constitutional  issues. 
Milosevic's  malfunctioning  1990  Republican  Constitution  is  still  in  force,  partially 
preventing enactment of new legislation, based on modem legal concepts and principles 
(especially in the field of  structural reforms). 
According  to  the  current  Constitution,  Serbia  is  a  parliamentary  democracy  with  a 
relatively strong role of the President of the Republic, who is elected by direct votes of 
the citizens for the period of five  years.  Serbia has a unicameral Parliament, called the 
National Assembly, which holds the Government to account for its operations. Over the 
last  decade,  all  Serbian  Governments  have  been  coalition  Governments,  which  has 
undermined  the  cohesion  of designed  policies,  effective  implementation  of initiated 
reforms and possibilities of  reaching a firm general consensus on the country's future.
655 
Serbia's winding path to the ED 
Interestingly, one of the rare issues of general national consensus is the Serbian peoples' 
wish to become members of the European Union. According to the latest public opinion 
poll conducted in September 2005, 64% of the population strongly supports the idea of 
accession to  the EU,  12%  are against it,  while  16%  are undecided.
656  All  key Serbian 
political parties also proclaim EU accession as one of  their and country's main objectives. 
The European Union,  on the other hand,  has given important signals to  Serbia that it 
655 Cf. A. Rabrenovic, "Politico-Administrative Relations under the Coalition Government in Serbia", in G. 
Peters, T. Verheijen, L. Vass (eds.), Coalitions of  the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in 
Coalition Governments, (NISPAcee, Bratislava) 2005, pp.  146-177. 
656 Opinion poll conducted by Strategic Marketing in September 2005, www.smmri.co.yu; 
www.seio.sr.gov.yu/code/navigate.asp?Id=89 
226 wishes to accept it in its European family of  nations when the time is right and the all EU 
accession conditions met. 
Shortly after the democratic changes  in Serbia, the Copenhagen Council of December 
2002  and  Thessaloniki  European  Council  of June  2003  confirmed  the  European 
perspective  of state  union  of Serbia  and  Montenegro  and  underlined  the  European 
Union's determination to support its efforts to move closer to the European Union.657  In 
April  2005  the  European  Commission  approved  a  Feasibility  Report  that  assessed 
positively  the  readiness  of Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  negotiate  a  Stabilisation  and 
Association Agreement.658  Negotiations  for  a  Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
started in October 2005, symbolically marking 5 years from democratic change in Serbia. 
However, due to the failure of  the Serbian Government to extradite General Ratko Mladic 
to  the Hague Tribunal, the EU negotiations were suspended in May 2006 and will  be 
continued only if  full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal is established. 
The Thessaloniki European Council has introduced the European Partnership as one of 
the means to  intensify the stabilisation and association process.  The Council has been 
authorised to decide, by qualified majority and on the proposal of  the Commission, on the 
principles, priorities and conditions to be contained in the European Partnership.659  On 
June  14  2004,  The  Council  adopted  a  first  European  Partnership  with  Serbia  and 
657The Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of  the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf. Presidency Conclusions of  the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, www.europa.eu.int 
658  Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the preparedness of  Serbia and Montenegro to negotiate a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, Brussels, 12.04.2005, SEC(2005) 478 
final. 
659  Regulation CEC) No 53312004, OJ L 86, 24.3.2004. 
227 Montenegro including Kosovo as  defined by the UN  Security Resolution  1244.660  The 
implementation  of the  European  Partnership  priories  was  examined  through  annual 
progress  reports  presented by the  Commission  which  assesses  progress  made  against 
established principles and conditions and notes areas where the country needs to increase 
its efforts.
661 
In  early  2006,  the  European  Partnership  was  updated  in  order  to  identify  renewed 
priorities  for  further  work on the basis of the  findings  of 2005  Commission progress 
reports.
662  It is important to note that Community assistance under the stabilisation and 
association process to Serbia is conditional on further progress in satisfying Copenhagen 
criteria  as  well  as  progress  in  meeting  the  specific  priorities  of  this  European 
P  h·  663  artners  Ip. 
It should be noted that  the  funds  from  the  EU  are  currently managed directly by the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), as an independent agency of the European 
Union,  and not by the  Serbian Government.  The EAR was  established in 2000 and is 
accountable to the Council and European Parliament and overseen by a Governing Board 
composed  of  representatives  from  the  EU  Member  States  and  the  European 
660 Council Decision of 14 June 2004 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the European 
Partnership including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, 
(2004/520/EC), OJ L 227121, 26.6.2004. 
661  Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Report 2003, 
Brussels, 26.3.2003, SEC(2003) 343; Commission Staff Working Paper, Serbia and Montenegro 
Stabilisation and Association Report 2004, Brussels, SEC(2004) 376. www.europa.eu.int. 
662 Council Decision of  30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
663 Paragraph 5 of Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo: 2005 European Partnership, Annex to the 
Council Decision of30 January 2006, ibid. 
228 Commission.
664  The  European  Commission  has  not  yet  indicated  that  it  would  be 
prepared to consider any degree of decentralization of management of aid until it gets an 
assurance  that  Serbia  possesses  a  reliable  system  of  financial  accountability  in 
accordance with the benchmarks set out in the Chapter 32  of the Acquis (before 2005, 
Chapter 28). 
European Partnership priorities in the area of financial accountability 
The priorities listed in the 2006 European Partnership have been selected on the basis that 
it is realistic to  expect that Serbia can complete them or take them substantially forward 
over the next few years. A distinction is made between short-term priorities, which are 
expected to be accomplished within one or two years and medium-term priorities which 
are expected to be accomplished within three to  four years. The priorities concern both 
adoption of  legislation and its effective implementation. 
Several medium term priorities identified in the European Partnership concern the area of 
financial accountability. These medium-term priorities are: 
"Develop  and  implement  the  principles  of decentralized  managerial  accountability  and functionally 
independent internal audit in accordance with the internationally accepted standards and EU best practice. 
Strengthen the operational capacity and  functional as well as financial independence of  the Supreme Audit 
Institution. 
664 The objectives of  the EAR are: to support good governance, institution building and rule oflaw; to 
continue supporting the development of  market economy and to support social development and 
strengthening of civil society. The Agency recently shifted away from reconstruction projects to projects of 
a more "institutional" and reform based nature. Cf. EAR Annual Report to the European Parliament and 
the Council, January to December 2003, Thessaloniki, June 2004. 
229 Develop  procedures  and administrative  capacities  to  ensure  effective protection  of the  EU financial 
interest. ,,665 
Since the key aim of our research is  to  provide recommendations on  how the  existing 
financial  accountability  system of Serbia  can  be  improved  so  that it  satisfies  the  ED 
requirements,  there  is  a  need  for  an  in-depth  analysis  of the  features  of the  current 
financial accountability system. Following the pattern of the previous chapters, we shall 
start our analysis by focusing on the scope of  the Serbian central Government and place a 
special emphasis on key financial accountability concepts and mechanisms. 
Ongoing reforms of the Serbian central Government 
Over the last couple of years, the Serbian Government has started the process of overall 
public  administration reform.  The  first  step  was  adoption  of a  comprehensive  Public 
Administration Reform strategy in October 2004.666 The strategy is anchored in European 
principles of professionalisation,  depoliticisation,  rationalization  and  modernisation.  In 
2005,  a  new  legal  framework  on  Government's  organization  has  started  to  emerge 
through the adoption of several key public administration laws: Law on Government,667 
Law on State Administration,668 the Civil Service Law669 and Law on Public Agencies.67o 
665 Council Decision of  30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520/EC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
666 The Government of  the Republic of Serbia, Public Administration Reform Strategy, November 2004. 
667 Law on Government, "Official Gazette of  the RS", No. 61/05. The Law on Government clarifies 
structures and relations at the Centre of  Government (COG). The policy development and strategy role of 
the COG is strongly emphasized, as opposed to its mainly technical role exercised in the communist and, to 
some extent, current system. The law further clarifies some key elements of  the central organization of  the 
government (cabinets of  the prime minister and deputy prime minister, general secretariat and government 
services) and the relationship between the government and Parliament. 
668 Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of  the Republic of Serbia" No. 79/05. 
669 Civil Service Law, "Official Gazette of  the RS", No, 79/05. 
230 The rapid process of  legislative drafting was justified by the urgent need to adapt much of 
the  systemic  legislation in  Serbia,  as  much of it  is  outdated and,  because of frequent 
amendments, incoherent. 
The new Laws on State Administration and Civil Service provide a framework for the 
depoliticisation of the civil service, in particular the senior civil service levels. The key 
senior civil service positions in the Serbian administration are a Secretary of  the Ministry 
and Assistant Minister. Whereas a Secretary of the Ministry is in charge of running the 
day-to-day  operations  of  the  Ministry  and  coordinating  the  work  of  Ministerial 
departments (which could correspond to the post of the Permanent Secretary in the UK 
system and Director Generals in the French and EU systems), Assistant Ministers are the 
heads of sectors in charge of special  Ministerial portfolios. Up to  now all  senior civil 
service  positions  were  subject  to  Government  appointment  based mainly on  political 
grounds  and  have  therefore  been  removed  from  their  positions  with  each  change  of 
Government, or Government reshuffle, which had an adverse affect on the continuity of 
the work in the Ministry. The new Civil service Law, however, sets out the overall firm 
conditions  for  competitive  recruitment  of senior  civil  servants  and  provides  limited 
grounds for their dismissal. This is  an encouraging development, which should provide 
conditions for depoliticization and professionalization of the core civil service and could 
also have implications for internal financial accountability mechanisms. 
In  accordance  with  the  Constitution  and  the  Law  on  State  Administration,  state 
administration  activities  are  performed by state  administration  organs,  which  can  be 
established  as  ministries  and  special  organisations.  Whereas  ministries  perform  state 
administration  activities,  special  organisations  carry out specific  expert activities,  and 
exceptionally,  state administration activities, when stipulated by law.
671  Ministries may 
also  have  internal  organs  which  perform  administrative,  inspection  and  related 
670 Law on Public Agencies, "Official Gazette of  the RS" No. 18/05. 
671  Article 1, paragraph 2 of  the Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of  the RS", No. 79/05. 
231 professional activities, if  the nature or number of activities require broader independence 
h  h  . h·  h  M··  672  t  an t  e sector WIt  In t  e  InIstry. 
In  addition  to  ministries  and  special  organisations,  the  Serbian  central  Government 
structure comprises a number of regulatory agencies,  whose status is  regulated by the 
Law  on  Public  Agencies.
673  The  Law  provides  a  common  legal  framework  for  the 
establishment,  management,  and  dissolution  of regulatory  agencies  and  represents  an 
important step in clarifying the status of numerous government agencies created by the 
previous  Government. It also highlights  the  independence of agencies  and provides  a 
clear scope for the creation of independent regulatory bodies, at arms  length from  the 
executive branch. 
When organisation of the Serbian central Government is  looked through the budgetary 
prism, the distinction between different state bodies is  made between direct budgetary 
users  (DBBs)  and  indirect  budgetary  users  (IBBs).  All  state  administration  organs 
(ministries and special organisations) and regulatory agencies are direct budgetary users, 
as they receive funds directly from the budget. Indirect budgetary users, in tum, are the 
second tier users receiving budgetary funds indirectly, through the direct budgetary users. 
Thus  for  example, whereas the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of  Labour, Employment and Social Policy are direct budget user, indirect budget 
users  are  educational  institutions  (schools,  institutes  etc.),  health  institutions  (primary, 
secondary and  tertiary  health  care  institutions)  and  social  security institutions,  which 
receive their funds  through respective ministries of education, health, employment and 
social policy and social insurance funds.
674 The judiciary is also an indirect budget user 
as it receives funds through the Ministry of  Justice. 
672 Article 28, of  the Law on State Administration, "Official Gazette of  the RS", No. 79/05. 
673 Public Agencies Law, "Official Gazette of  the RS" No.  18/05. 
674 Judiciary is also an indirect budget user as it receives its money through the Ministry of Justice. 
232 In  addition  to  DBBs  and  IBBs,  Serbian central  Government  encompasses  mandatory 
social  security  institutions,  such  as:  Health  Insurance  Fund,  Labour  Market  fund, 
Employees' Pension fund,  Self-Employed Pension and Farmers' Pension Fund.
675  Their 
financing  comes mostly from  mandatory payroll taxes,  with republic budget financing 
being limited to the financing of  the poor and for the clearance of arrears. Social Security 
funds  are  currently  also  undergoing  significant  reforms,  which  should  bring  about 
sustainability in their operation and efficient and effective performance of  their duties. 
It should be pointed out that the scope of the Serbian central Government is fairly large, 
especially  due  to  overt  centralization  processes  during  the  1990s.  Excessive  public 
spending  is  undermining  the  country's  economic  growth  potential,  decreasing  the 
opportunities  for  private  investment.  676  Therefore,  there  has  been  a  pressing  need  to 
reduce the scope of the public  sector and central Government in particular in order to 
generate  savings  for  structural  reforms  and  create  better  social  safety  net  for  those 
affected  by  reforms.
677  To  this  aim,  the  Government  has  started  implementing  a 
diversified public employment reduction strategy which includes: privatisation, voluntary 
redundancy programmes, contained external  recruitment,  staff redeployment initiatives 
etc.
678  The Government has also  started working on the  design of decentralization of 
delivery of services  from  the  central  to  local  level  which  should result  in  significant 
reduction of  the scope of  the central Government in Serbia in the years to come. 
675 Cf. Cf. World Bank report, Serbia and Montenegro - Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. 
Volume Two: Serbia, 2003, p. 2. 
676 The World Bank, The Serbia Economic Memorandum (2004): An Agenda/or Economic Growth and 
Employment, p. 14., http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSERBIA/Resources/300803-
I 12118888816I!serbia-sem-complete.pdf 
677 IMF Country Report No OS1232, Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, July 
200S, http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scrI200S/crOS232.pdf. 
678 Cf. Ministry of Health of  the Republic of  Serbia, Human Resource Strategy, Interim Report on phase 1, 
2006-2007, May 2006. 
233 In conclusion, the Serbian Government has made important strides in putting in place an 
overall  framework  for  public  administration  reform  and  creating  a  smaller and  more 
efficient  public  sector.  However,  effective  implementation  of well-designed  reform 
framework will require firm and continuous efforts of all the involved factors.  Serbia is 
undoubtedly a country in transition, which in itself is  a very difficult and slow process 
that  cannot  yield  obvious  results  in  a  short  amount  of time.  Experience  from  other 
transitional countries show that the overall reform process can be sustained only if there 
is  continuous  consensus  among  all  the  main  stakeholders  and  a  firm  political 
commitment.
679 While both elements have been present in some aspects of reform, they 
have  been clearly lacking  in  other,  more  sensitive,  institutional  matters.  The  field  of 
financial  accountability has fallen  somewhere between these two ends of a continuum, 
with the  stubborn intention of staying closer to  the latter end.  Nevertheless, important 
reforms  have  been  commenced in  all  financial  accountability  elements,  including the 
concept of stewardship of  public money. 
Firming up the Concept of Stewardship of Public Money 
The  concept  of stewardship  of public  money is  not  unknown  in  the  ex-Yugoslavian 
region. This concept existed to  some extent in Serbia and Yugoslavia, primarily due to 
the functioning of an external audit institution, so  called "Supreme Control" up to the II 
World  War and "Social Accounting Service" during the communist/socialist rule.  The 
Social  Accounting  Service  was  in  many ways  an  exceptional,  sui-generis  institution, 
which carried out control of financial flows in both public and private sector, as  will be 
discussed in more detail later in the text. At this point it should only be noted that its role 
of an external auditor comprised two main functions: control of  the accuracy of accounts 
and control of  legality of  financial operations.
68o A similar function was performed by the 
679 Cf D. Coombes,  "Re-building the Capacity to Govern: Setting Priorities for Public Administration 
Reform in Serbia", draft discussion paper for the round table 'Priorities for Institutional Development in the 
Reform Process in Serbia' Belgrade, March 2003. 
680 Cf Social Accounting Service Act, "Official Gazette of  the SFRY", No.  15177. 
234 internal unit of the Ministry of Finance, called - budgetary inspection, which conducted 
an administrative control of spending of public  funds.681  Therefore, it may be inferred 
that the post second-world-war Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia as its constitutive 
part, did legally recognise a narrowly defined concept of stewardship of public money, 
based  exclusively  on  certification  (financial)  audit,  without  elements  of performance 
audit. 
During the  1990s,  however, the  concept of stewardship of public  money was  grossly 
undermined and devalued. The external audit function was abolished, and a concept of a 
certification audit sustained only in a segment of administrative control of public money, 
i.e.  budgetary  inspection,  which  influence  was  fairly  limited.682  Public  money  was 
blatantly misused by high officials and key political figures who dissipated public funds, 
using them for their private needs and purposes. Financial embezzlements and excessive 
use of  public money became a commonplace of  the system which did not entail a concept 
of  public money stewardship and financial accountability.683 
The  first  democratic  Serbian  Government  has  early  recognised  the  importance  of 
developing a concept of stewardship of public money. The significance of this concept 
was  for  the  first  time  explicitly recognised by the new Budget System Law,684  which 
introduces the concepts of  both financial and performance audit. 
According to the Budget System Law, the budget inspection of the Ministry of Finance 
shall hold the users of  public money (i.e. DBBs and IBBs) to account for: 
681  Cj G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control of  the Budget-
Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 1999. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Cj D. Antonic et aI., Korupcija u Srbiji [Corruption in Serbia], (Centar za liberalno-demokratske 
studije), Belgrade, 200l. 
684 Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of  the Republic of Serbia", No. 912002, 87/02,66/05. 
235 1)  The legality of the use of public funds, which encompasses control of confonnity 
with financial  management legislation as well as assurance that the money was 
spent in confonnity with the intentions of  the Parliament, i.e. Budget law;685 
2)  The economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of  public funds;686 
3)  The  legality,  adequacy  and  effectiveness  of internal  control  and  monitoring 
systems.687 
Whereas  the  concept of legality as  confonnity of financial  transactions  with  existing 
legislation seems to be quite straightforward, the concepts of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness are not well developed in the law and therefore there is a  scope for  their 
different interpretation in practice. 
This deficiency has, however, been addressed in the recently adopted Law on State Audit 
Institution,688 which defines three basic principles of  public money stewardship: 
principle  of accuracy  of  financial  statements,  as  a  requirement  that  all 
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities have been properly recorded and 
truly and objectively present the financial position of  an auditee;689 
principle  of regularity  of transactions,  which  requires  that  all  financial 
transactions  be  carried  out  in  confonnity  with  law,  other  delegated 
legislation and regulations and are used for the planned purposes;690 
principle  of purposefulness  denotes  a  request  that  funds  be  used  III 
accordance with principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness as well 
as in compliance with the planned goals.691 
685 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 3 of  the Budget System Law. 
686 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 4 of  the Budget System Law. 
687 Article 68, paragraph 1, item 1 and 2 of  the Budget System Law. 
688 The Law on State Audit Institution (LSAI), Official Gazette of  the Republic of  Serbia No 101/05. 
689 Section 2, paragraph 1 of  Article 2 of  the LSAI. 
690 Section 3, paragraph 1 of  the Article 2 of  the LSAI. 
691  Section 4, paragraph 1 of  the Article 2 of  the LSAI. 
236 While  the  requirement  of accuracy  of accounts  is  quite  straightforward,  it  is  agam 
interesting to  note that,  similar to other European models, the new Law on State Audit 
Institution  lays  down the principle of regularity  instead of legality,  as  defined in  the 
Budget System Law. Similar to the UK and French systems, it appears that the concept of 
regularity is prioritized over the concept of  legality, although the content of  the regularity 
principle is exactly the same as of the principle of legality. Therefore it may perhaps be 
logical that the term 'regularity' is replaced with the term 'legality' in order to point out 
the seriousness of legal consequences that breach of this principle may entail. However, 
as the concept of  regularity of financial transactions has become an international standard 
used in financial accountability and audit, especially when used in the context of external 
audit, changes in this respect will largely depend on the wider international agreement on 
this issue, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
The  principle  of purposefulness  of financial  operations  entails  a  request  that  public 
money is  spent in accordance with principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. 
These three Es concepts are further elaborated as follows: 
principle of economy means that minimum consumption of funds will be used for 
a  specific  activity,  taking into  account that it does not undermine the  expected 
quality;692 
principle of efficiency denotes  the relationship  between achieved results  in the 
production of goods or in rendering services and resources used for production or 
for rendering services;693 
principle of effectiveness denotes the extent to which the set goals are achieved, 
as well as the relationship between the planned and realized effects of a specific 
..  694  actIVIty. 
692 Article 2, para 1, item 5 of  the LSAI. 
693 Article 2, para 1, item 6 of  the LSAI. 
694 Article 2, para 1, item 7 of  the LSAI. 
237 This rather exhaustive definition of principles of legality, regularity and purposefulness 
of spending of public  funds  represents  a  big  step  forward  in the  development of the 
concept of  public money stewardship in Serbia. However, the key question to be posed is 
whether it is realistic to  expect that these principles will be attained in the short or even 
mid  term  perspective  in  the  Serbian  transitional  environment.  The  Serbian  central 
Government institutions are  still  struggling to  satisfy the requirements of basic public 
money  stewardship  of  accuracy  of  accounts,  legality  and  regularity  of  financial 
operations and do  not seem to have sufficient capacity to  implement high performance 
standards set out by the new legislation, especially since achievement of these standards 
presupposes  existence of clearly defined policy objectives  and  targets,  which are  still 
lacking.  Despite  these  difficulties,  it  is  essential  that  the  concept  of public  money 
stewardship, defined through requests of both conformity with laws and regulations and 
attainment of economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of public funds, has been 
put on a statutory footing.  It is of utmost importance that all  public sector institutions 
become aware of this widely defined principle and start working on the attainment of the 
public money stewardship standards and objectives. 
Building Effective Internal Accountability Mechanisms 
Over  the  last  couple  of years,  Serbia  has  made  important  progress  with  its  initial 
development  of internal  financial  accountability  mechanisms.  The  newly  established 
legal framework provides a good basis for establishing management accountability and 
delegation, proper segregation of duties and central government monitoring of financial 
regularity.  Nevertheless,  lots of efforts still need to  be invested in order to  meet basic 
European  standards  and  criteria  in  the  main  internal  financial  accountability areas  of 
internal control and internal audit. 
238 Emerging System of  Internal Financial control 
Similar to the French and the EU system, the Serbian legal framework provides for the 
segregation of duties for  payment order,  financial control and accounting functions  (in 
the French system - ordonnauteur, con tro lleur financier and comptable).695 The payment 
order  function  (ordonnateur  function)  is  given  to  a  head  of DBB,  who  has  the 
responsibility  for  the  legal,  regular,  economical  and  effective  use  of  a  budget 
appropriation.
696 A head of a DBB can delegate this responsibility to other personnel in 
the Ministry/special organization. This right of delegation, however,  is  not often used, 
due to  the general unease of senior civil servants for taking responsibility for handling 
public money. The responsibility for the stewardship of  public money is thus perceived to 
be a primarily political rather than administrative function. Accounting (comptable) role 
is  performed by employees of both DBB  and IBBs in question.  The financial  internal 
control  function  (controlleur financier  function),  however,  is  carried  out both by the 
DBBs and IBBs and centrally, by the Treasury in the Ministry of  Finance. 
In order to effectively perform their financial management duties, DBBs and IBBs have 
the responsibility for establishing their own financial services.697  Financial services are 
in charge of financial planning and execution and in particular: preparation of financial 
(budget)  plans,  asset distribution to  indirect budget beneficiaries  within the  approved 
appropriations, preparation of documentation for executing financial plans, management 
of  state property and accounting and book keeping.
698 
In addition to  financial services, most of DBBs which are organizationally complex and 
all  major  mandatory  social  security  organizations  are  required  to  establish  separate 
695 Article 51  of  the Budget System Law. 
696 Article 50 of  the Budget System Law. 
697 Articles 9 and 66 of  the Budget System Law. 
698 Decree on Financial Department of  Direct Budget Beneficiaries, Official Gazette of  the Republic of 
Serbia, 2512005. 
239 internal  control  units.  This  requirement  IS  set  out  III  the  Rulebook
699  on  Internal 
Controllers  700  issued by the  Ministry of Finance in 2004.  This  Rulebook requires  the 
establishment of internal  control  units in  18  DBBs and in the major mandatory social 
insurance organizations. The audit responsibilities listed in the Decree are focused on ex-
ante and ex-post inspection of  commitments and payments.701 
If in the process of ex-ante control an internal controller determines any inaccuracy of a 
financial statement or illegality of a financial operation, he/she will warn the person who 
carried out that financial operation of such an irregularity?02 The reports on both ex-ante 
and ex-post controls are  submitted to  the head of a DBBs/head of a mandatory social 
insurance  institutions  twice  a  year.  However,  if findings  of the  report  require  urgent 
measures to be undertaken, internal controller makes a special report on ongoing control 
and immediately submits it to the head of  an institution.703 
In most cases legality of  operations of  DBBs is ensured via the double signature of  a head 
of DBB,  who  authorizes  the  commitment  or payment,  and  internal  controller of the 
internal  control  unit,  who  approves  them.  DBB  and IBB  which  do  not have  separate 
internal  control  services  ensure the legality of financial  operations through the double 
signature  of the  head  of DBB  and  the  head  of the  financial  service  who  approves 
commitments and payments. 
Although it may appear that emerging internal control systems are operating well, the key 
problem which arises is that DBB's/IBB's management do not take much interest and are 
699 The Rulebooks are general acts passed by state administration organs and have the legal status of 
tertiary legislation. 
700 The full name of  the Rulebook is "Rulebook on Direct Budget Beneficiaries (DBBs) that Organize 
Special Internal Control Body and on Common Criteria for Internal Control Organization and Procedure of 
DBBs and Mandatory Social Insurance Organizations," Official Gazette ofthe Republic of Serbia No. 
22/2004. 
701  Article 7 of  the Rulebook, ibid. 
702 Article 6, paragraph 2 of  the Rulebook, ibid. 
703 Article II of  the Rulebook, Ibid. 
240 not responsible  for  the  effective operation of their internal  control  units.  The  general 
perception is  that the  operation  of internal  control  systems  is  a  responsibility of the 
Ministry of Finance  rather  than  of the  DBB  or IBB's management.  The  established 
internal controls are not designed, implemented or monitored by departmental managers, 
which  have  very  limited  responsibility  for  internal  control  matters.  The  Ministry  of 
Finance, on the other hand, does not have the capacity to  supervise and coordinate all 
internal  control  units  throughout  the  administration  (as  is  the  case  with  the  French 
Ministry of Finance in relation to  controlleur financiers),  which leaves internal control 
units in a sort of an institutional vacuum. Furthermore, control systems that do exist are 
driven by legal instruments with no flexibility for individual departmental variations. 
Due to  still ineffective decentralised internal control systems in the DBB's and IBB's, 
there  exists  a  second  level  of fairly  centralised  and  detailed  ex-ante  internal  control 
provided by the Treasury of the Ministry of Finance. The Treasury control is carried out 
by the  two  units of the Treasury:  Treasury Control Coordinators  and Internal  Control 
Department. Treasury Control Coordinators perform ex-ante control of all commitments 
and payments requested by DBBs that are less than  10  thousand dinars (approximately 
EUR  115).  The  Treasury  Internal  Control  Department  controls  all  commitments  and 
payments that are  over  10  thousand dinars.  It performs ex-ante control  of documents 
provided by DBBs to check budget approval and availability. 
At first  sight,  having the payment transactions processing and second instance ex  ante 
controls  under  the  full  responsibility  of Treasury  departments  might  seem  to  be  an 
effective and efficient solution from the viewpoint of expenditure control. However, as 
we  could  see  in  the  EU  chapter,  centralized  controls  can  have  adverse  effects  and 
increase  corruption,  as  the  accountability  lines  for  public  money  stewardship  are  not 
clearly established but divided between different actors. Furthermore, centralised ex ante 
controls  may  also  cause  delays  in  budget  implementation  and  hinder  efficient 
management.
704  Whereas  a  centralization  of cash  balances  is  desirable,  this  does  not 
704 R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds.), Managing Public Expenditure: A Reference Bookfor Transition 
Countries, SIGMA, OEeD, Paris, 2001, pp. 216-217. 
241 mean that  the  treasury  should be involved  in  the  day-to-day  control  of invoices  and 
payment  documentation,  as  it  slows  down  the  payment  execution  and  places  an 
unnecessary burden on the Treasury staff with constrained capacity. 
In  conclusion,  although  some  elements  of decentralised managerial  accountability are 
emerging, the Serbian system of internal financial control is still overly centralised and 
does  not  meet  the  requirements  of European  Partnership  which  requires  Serbia  to 
"Develop and implement the principles of decentralized managerial accountability." In 
order to  address  these  weaknesses,  the  Ministry of Finance has  started working  on  a 
strategy  for  developing  public  internal  financial  control  which  should  provide  the 
platform  for  strengthening  the  existing  elements  of  decentralized  managerial 
accountability. The proposals on how to  improve the current system will be analyzed in 
more depth in the concluding chapter. 
Combination of  Budget Inspection and Internal Audit 
The internal audit concept is not well  known and developed in the Serbian system of 
financial  accountability.  There  is,  instead,  a  traditional  concept  of budget  inspection, 
which has a narrower meaning and would correspond to early development of financial 
inspection in  France,  carried out by the General Inspectorate of Finance (L 'inspection 
Generale  des  Finances).  Whereas  the  budget inspectorate  inspects  finances  of other 
bodies using quasi-judicial authorities, internal auditing reviews and appraises activities 
that  are  organised within an  organisation.  As  pointed out in earlier chapters,  through 
internal audits the Government is assured that procedures for minimising potentials for 
fraud,  waste and abuse of public resources are put in place and operating. However, as 
there is  no  tradition of internal audit,  the current budget inspectorate is  the basis upon 
which the internal audit function is currently being built. 
The Budget System Law provides for the establishment of  joint Budgetary Inspection and 
Audit Service (BIAS), initially solely within the Ministry of Finance and later in other 
administrative organs as  well.  The problem,  however,  is  that the  Budget System Law 
242 does not clearly distinguish between the budget inspection function  and internal  audit 
function. This deficiency was addressed in the "Decree on the Method of Operation and 
Authorities of Budget Inspection and Audit" which was adopted in 2004.
705  The Decree 
reflects  modern internal  audit terminology in  accordance with the  Institute of Internal 
Auditor's  (IIA's)  International  Standards  for  the  Professional  Practice  of  Internal 
Auditing (ISPPIA). 
The BIAS has rather wide institutional jurisdiction. Thus, the BIAS has the right to carry 
out  inspections  and  audits  over DBBs  and IBBs,  organizations  of compulsory  social 
insurance,  public  enterprises  founded  by  the  government,  enterprises  in  which  the 
republic has direct or indirect control over capital or management and legal  entities in 
which public funds comprise more than 50 % of  total revenue.
706 
The BIAS was first established as a sector of the Ministry of Finance, as a key Ministry 
in charge of budgetary inspection and internal audit and a future centre of coordination 
for other BIAS services in other administrative organs.  Due to different nature of tasks, 
the BIAS work is performed by two different departments of the BIAS  sector:  Budget 
Inspection  Department  and  Internal  Audit  Department.
707  As  an  inspection  service, 
Budget Inspection  Department has  quasi-judicial  authorities,  which  consist of issuing 
decisions that order an action to be taken in relation to any fraudulent practices or serious 
irregularities discovered by the auditors.
708  The Internal Audit Department, on the other 
hand, has quite a wide remit of assessment of internal control systems and performance 
audits  and  also  has  the  role  of providing advice to  management on  the  reliability of 
705 "Decree on the Method of Operation and Authorities of Budget Inspection and Audit", Official Gazette 
of  the Republic of Serbia, No 1012004. 
706 Article 67 of  the Budget System Law. 
707 The World Bank, Staffing Needs Assessment o/the Government o/the Republic o/Serbia, June 2005, 
pp. 75-76, unpublished report. 
708 An inspection decision has a nature of an administrative act in administrative procedure and can be 
challenged in the second instance administrative procedure. The second instance act can further be 
challenged before the Court in administrative dispute procedure. 
243 internal  controls  and  audit  implications  relating  to  the  introduction  of new  systems, 
d  b ·  709  proce  ures or  usmess processes. 
However, the BIAS sector has been facing a number of problems in its operation. First, 
the position of the head of the BIAS sector has been vacant for two years which creates 
significant management problems. Furthermore, the BIAS sector is understaffed and its 
staff insufficiently trained and lacking  appropriate  guidelines.  Whereas  serious  efforts 
have gone into developing methodological guidelines and training of staff mainly through 
the support of the European Agency for Reconstruction, available staff resources are not 
at all adequate.
710 Thus, while the Inspectorate has 15  staff (in comparison to 350 staff of 
the  French  Financial  Inspectorate),  the  Internal  Audit  Department  has  only  11  staff 
(including the head of internal audit department). Such a staffing structure does not allow 
for carrying out wide inspection and audit responsibilities.
711 
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that although significant efforts have been 
invested  so  far  in  the  development  of an  internal  audit  system,  a  medium  term 
requirement of  European Partnership to "establish functionally independent internal audit 
in accordance with the internationally accepted standards and EU best practice" has still 
not been met. 
As will be discussed in more depth in the concluding chapter, the key recommendation 
which could be given at this point is that until Internal Audit Units in the major DBBs are 
fully  operational,  the  capacities  of the  Budget  Inspectorate  and  the  Internal  Audit 
Department  of the  Ministry of Finance  should  be  significantly  enhanced  to  provide 
assurance  on  financial  regularity  at  the  level  of the  Ministry  of Finance  and  the 
Government. Strengthening of the Internal Audit Department is especially important in a 
709 Article 68 of  the Budget System Law. 
710 The World Bank, Serbia: Fiduciary Assessment Update, 2005, Internal Document of  the WB, p.  18. 
711  Support for the training of  internal auditors is provided from a EUR 7 million project on "Public 
Finance" funded and implemented by the EAR. 
244 view of its future role of a central coordination and harmonization unit for internal audit 
work and methodology. 
Strengthening Parliamentary Accountability 
Serbia  has  a  relatively  long  tradition  of parliamentary control  of spending  of public 
money.  However,  during  the  1990s,  there  was  a  significant  erosion of the budgetary 
process and of the budgetary powers of the Serbian National Assembly.  Preparation of 
the  Republic's budget  followed  a  highly  compressed timetable that did  not allow  for 
detailed analysis of  budget issues and policies.
712 Parliamentary discussions on the budget 
were almost absent and the budgetary proposals, as well as final budgetary reports were 
adopted by the Parliament almost without any remarks. 
Budget reporting to the Parliament was also greatly limited. The 1991law
713 required that 
annual  consolidated  Government  accounts  (financial  statements)  be  submitted  to  the 
Parliament by 28
th February of the following year. Discussion on the budget proposal for 
the  next  year  and  consolidated  Government  accounts  for  the  previous  year  would, 
however, last only for a couple of days, without any significant debate on the substance 
of budget execution, presented in the consolidated accounts.
714 In this regard, there was 
an obvious lack of a professional body of external audit institution, which would be able 
to  give its professional opinion on the  state of Government consolidated accounts and 
point out strengths and weaknesses in the use of  the public funds.
715 
An important feature of the new Budget System Law is that it leaves considerably longer 
time for the consideration and approval of the budget by the Cabinet and the Parliament 
712 Cf G. Paovic-leknic, Budzetska kontrola - jugoslovensko i italijansko pravo [Control ofthe Budget-
Yugoslavian and Italian Law], University of Montenegro, Podgorica, 2000. 
713  The Law on Public Revenues and Public Expenditures, Official Gazette of  the Republic of Serbia, No. 
76/91,18/93,22/93,67/93,45/94,42/98. 
714 Cf G. Paovic-leknic, ibid. pp. 178-182. 
715 Ibid. 
245 (2  months).716  Implementation of this new time-table should help emphasise the role of 
the  budget  as  a  key  instrument  for  the  realisation  of  Government  policies  and 
programmes.  The  Budget  System  Law  further  specifies  more  regular  and  frequent 
reporting on the expenditures, commitments, cash payments from the budget and other 
reports that would provide a comprehensive picture of  the development of  public finances 
throughout the year.717 
It should be noted that the  adoption of the previous years'  budgets seemed to  be the 
subject  of significant  debate  in  the  Serbian  Parliament.  The  obligatory  nature  of the 
adoption of  the budget was, however, used mainly as a political means of threatening the 
Government  to  be overthrown and  in the  same  time  the  test if the  Government  has 
enough support in the Parliament. The lack of a more substantial debate on the budget 
proposal perhaps should not at all be surprising, bearing in mind that the members of the 
Parliament do  not have  sufficient knowledge to  examine  the  details  of the  budgetary 
legislation and even lesser powers to  keep the Government to  account for the effective 
use of public monies within the approved legal budgetary framework. The absence of an 
independent external audit institution further undermines their accountability potentials. 
Significant  delays  in  establishing  an  external  audit  institution  have  had  serious 
consequences  for  the  Serbian  financial  accountability  system  as  Government  annual 
consolidated financial statements for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 have not been audited 
and submitted to the Parliament. The BSL provides a deadline of June 1 in the following 
fiscal  year to  submit consolidated annual reports to  the National Assembly,  which has 
obviously not been met. The only solution to address this problem in the short term was 
to commission a private external audit of accounts for the previous years. This solution 
was  accepted for  2001  accounts,  which were audited by a  private firm.  However,  no 
qualified external private auditor was appointed to fill the external audit gap from 2002-
2005  and therefore  Parliament did not have  a chance to  see  and  discuss  Government 
716 Article 14 of Budget System Law. 
717 Articles 10-13 of  the Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of  the Republic of Serbia", No. 9/2002. 
246 actual spending decisions for the last four years. This also means that currently there is no 
official record of government expenditures for these years. A tender for the external audit 
of the 2002, 2003, and 2004 government accounts has now been undertaken, which is a 
good step, but there is an urgent need to find sustainable solutions to these problems. 
The role of Parliamentary Committees 
The parliamentary committee system in Serbia is still underdeveloped in comparison to 
its  western  counterparts.  There  is  a  number of Parliamentary Committees  which  are 
responsible  for  the  review  of the  legislative  proposals.  Their  general  authorities  are 
prescribed  by  the  Rules  of Procedure  of the  National  Assembly.718  However,  civil 
servants are rarely called to account before the standing Parliamentary Committees. It is 
only  the  Committees  for  special  inquiries,  which  are  formed  on  an  ad hoc  basis  to 
examine specific cases, that have the right to summon the civil servants involved in the 
case. This has also been given some attention in the media, which is still insufficient for 
provoking a strong public debate on the discussed issues. Committee support services are 
still  weak  and  their  organisation  is  not  flexible  nor  adaptable  to  work-load  changes. 
Therefore,  there  is  unanimous  consent  across  all  political  actors  that  Parliamentary 
Committees need expert, specialised research assistance to improve their review of draft 
legislation and fulfil their mandates as prescribed.
719 
The public finance oversight function of the National Assembly is primarily carried out 
by the  Finance Committee. The Finance Committee has  15  members and is  set  up  to 
review draft laws, other regulations and by-laws and other issues in the field of public 
finance  and  not to  scrutinise  the  activities  of the  Government.  The  chairman  of the 
718 Poslovnik Narodne Skupstine Republike Srbije [Rules of  Procedure of  the National Assembly of  the 
Republic of Serbia], the final text of 28 June 2005. 
http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/contentlcir/akta/poslovnik/poslovnik  _I.asp. 
719 Southeast Europe Parliamentary Program (SEPP), Parliamentary Centre, Join Baseline Report on the 
Internal and Human Resources Management in the National Assembly of  the Republic of  Serbia, 
November 2003. 
247 Committee has been appointed and is a member of an opposition party, in line with the 
best European practice. However, as the current president of the Committee at the same 
time discharges functions of the mayor of Belgrade, he rarely attends the sessions of the 
committee and leaves most of the work to  his deputy, who is a member of a governing 
coalition party. The committee itself has neither a proper structure and resources nor a 
clear mandate and is  obviously not a  specialized committee for the  scrutiny of public 
accounts, but carries out primarily legislative function. 
Nevertheless,  it should be noted that a  Sub-committee for  "Supreme Audit Institution 
Establishment Law  Drafting" was  established in  2004  and prepared the  draft Law on 
Supreme Audit Institution.  This is  an  encouraging sign,  as  it should enhance the MPs 
awareness  of the  need  to  develop  scrutinising  role  of parliamentary  committees,  in 
cooperation with the  supreme audit institutions.  However,  as  the independent external 
audit institution has still not been established, the Parliament still does not have a key ally 
to assist him perform its paramount function of  being a guardian of  the public purse. 
Developing external financial accountability mechanisms 
Today, Serbia seems to be the only European country which does not have an institution 
to perform independent external audit of public revenues and expenditures. Although the 
National Assembly adopted the Law on State Audit Institution in November 2005, the 
State  Audit  Institution  (hereinafter  the  SAl)  has  not  been  established  yet.  The  main 
reason for the delay in creating the SAl is a difficulty to reach a political consensus in the 
National Assembly of who  should be elected as  a member of the  SAl's management. 
This raises serious concerns for establishment and operation of this new institution in the 
current  unstable  political  environment  in  Serbia.  The  absence  of a  key  financial 
accountability mechanism greatly undermines exercise of a democratic accountability to 
the  Parliament,  which  simple  does  not  have  appropriate  means  of  holding  the 
Government to account for the public spending. 
248 It should,  however, be stressed that external financial  accountability mechanisms were 
very  much  present  throughout  the  Serbian  history  in  different  shapes  and  forms, 
depending on the broader political and social developments. In order to be able to provide 
recommendations on how the new Serbian financial accountability system could be built 
and  strengthened,  it  would  be  important  to  outline  a  brief history  of external  audit 
developments  in  Serbia  and  ex-Yugoslavia,  which  could  be  used  as  a  source  of 
inspiration for the future times. Lessons from the past should not be forgotten and should 
duly  be  taken  into  account  when  setting  up  a  new  transitional  system  of financial 
accountability. 
External audit in Serbia - an overview of a forgotten tradition 
Serbia has  a  significant tradition in the  field  of external audit.  Similar to  Britain and 
France,  the development of external audit in Serbia,  and later in first Yugoslavia, was 
fairly  dependent on  the continuous  struggle  between the monarch and  the  legislature. 
During the XIX and the first  decades of XX century, external audit gradually evolved 
from  the  instrument of autocratic  control of state revenues  and expenditures to  a  key 
supporting mechanism  to  the  democratic  parliamentary control  of spending  of public 
money. no 
It is interesting to note that the first Serbian Constitution (Sretenjski Ustav), proclaimed 
in the period of struggle for independence from the Turkish Empire in 1835, envisaged 
the creation of fairly  advanced external  audit institution.  Article  107  of the  Sretenjski 
Constitution proclaimed: "Prince and State Council (Drzavni Sojvet)  721  will establish the 
720 Cf N. Stepanovic, Opsta teorija 0  glavnoj kontroli Kraljevine Jugoslavije [General Theory on the 
Supreme Control of  the Kingdom of  Yugoslavia], doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of 
Belgrade, 1937. 
721  Drzavni Sovjet was the earliest form of  Serbian Parliament, which performed legislative functions until 
the establishment of  the National Assembly by 1869 Constitution. Drzavni Sovjet consisted of  the 
Monarch's advisors and key political persons of  that time and besides legislative, carried out other key state 
functions, such as the supreme court oflaw, with a power of  declaring the law. 
249 supreme accounting institution, which will audit all the financial accounts of  the state and 
make sure that public  money is  not spent  for  other purposes  than those approved by 
National Assembly". However, these provisions were never implemented in practice, due 
to continuous infighting between the Prince (Milos Obrenovic) and the legislature and the 
Prince's unwillingness to accept legal constraints to his power. 
The second Serbian Constitution, the so-called Turkish Constitution (1838), provided for 
the creation of an audit institution (racundzinica praviteljstvena ili glavna kontrola) as an 
organisational division of the Ministry of Finance. This division performed audit of all 
the state accounts and its findings were presented to the State Council by the Minister of 
Finance. In this way, external audit became a constitutive part of  the executive and hence 
did not contain elements of a democratic audit. This, perhaps, should not be surprising, as 
the  Prince's powers  in this period were still  prevailing upon the  scarce,  but growing 
powers of  the legislature.  722 
Only a few years later, in 1843, the legislature won its first victory in the field of control 
of public money. Under legislative pressure, the audit division of  the Ministry of Finance 
was  transferred  to  the  State  Council.  In  1844,  the  first  Decree  regulating  the 
organisational  structure and functions of the external audit institution was passed.  The 
Decree formally created a Supreme Control institution (Glavna kontrola), which obtained 
a  status  of a  division  of the  State  Council.  During  the  following  two  decades,  the 
authorities of Supreme Control were gradually expanding, so that in 1862 it obtained a 
quasi-judicial authority to decide on damages emanating from  irregularities, errors and 
mismanagement of  public money. However, the Constitution of 1869, reinstated Supreme 
Control in the structure of the executive, transformed the State Council into an advisory 
body of  the Government,723 thus taking away the democratic elements of  its operation. 
722 Cf. N. Sijepanovic, ibid. 
723 Articles 56 and 63 of  the 1969 Constitution. 
250 The  Supreme  Control  was  able  to  regam  and  strengthen  its  democratic  features  two 
decades  later,  in  1888,  when the  new  Constitution was  proclaimed.  The  Constitution 
enabled the Parliament to reinforce its right to approve the budget as well as its right to 
control  the  execution  of the  budget.  In  order  to  help  the  Parliament  perform  these 
authorities,  the  Constitution  considerably  strengthened  the  position  of the  Supreme 
Control it devoted a special section (section XI) to the functions of  the Supreme Control, 
which were further elaborated in the Law on its implementation (1892). According to the 
Constitution and the  Law (1892),  The Supreme Control obtained authority to  exercise 
several important functions: 
1)  the function of ex ante control of the execution of the budget, which consisted of 
checking the legality of sought amounts and their conformity with the budget. If 
the Control finds the payment request legal, it would grant a visa (authorisation) 
of the issue of public money to government departments.724  If,  however, it finds 
that the request is in breach of the material legislation and the budget, it would, 
after  communication  with  the  Government  department,  issue  a  visa  with 
reservation and inform the Parliament about the issue. 
2)  the function of  ex - post control of  the budget execution, which entailed: 
a)  financial audit of all the state accounts; 
b)  quasi-judicial  authorities  in  deciding  on  damages  emanating  from  the 
accounts; 
c)  certifying  and  providing  the  opmIOn  on  the  Government  consolidated 
financial statements (government accounts),725 which would only after the 
724 This function is similar to the UK Comptroller function of controlling the issue of  public money from 
the Consolidating and National Loans fund to Government departments and other public bodies. 
725 The Consolidated Financial Statements were drawn up by the Ministry of  Finance and included details 
of: the revenue and expenditure of  the national Government, including both a budgetary income and 
expenditure statement based on a modified cash basis and a cash statement showing all sources of funds 
cashed and all disbursements made during the year. The final report included a general declaration of 
conformity and details of  significant breaches of  budgetary rules. 
251 certification and provision of  the Supreme Control's report be submitted to 
the Parliament for the final discharge. 
The Parliament, on the other hand, obtained the right to approve the members of  Supreme 
Control, whose positions, according to the Constitution, were permanent and immovable. 
In  this  way the  Supreme  Control  secured  independence  from  the  interference  of the 
executive. Nevertheless, the Control  still  did retain  some links with the Executive,  as, 
interestingly,  the  Prime  Minister  was  in  the  last  instance  held  accountable  for  the 
performance of  its tasks and duties.726 
The formal position of the Supreme Control did not substantially change in the following 
decades,  although  its  functional  independence  was  frequently  jeopardised  by  the 
Monarch, who attempted to  exercise greater influence on the Supreme Control's work. 
After the creation of first Yugoslavia,  1921  Constitution (so-called Vidovdanski Ustav) 
reinforced the organisation and functions of the Supreme Control as  was prescribed by 
the  1892  Law.  However,  after the  introduction  of the  so-called  dictatorship  of 6
th  of 
January 1929,  when King Aleksandar temporarily abolished the  Parliament in  order to 
overcome serious obstructions in the Parliament, the position of  the Supreme Control was 
substantially changed, as all the Parliamentary competences regarding external audit were 
transferred  to  the  Monarch.  Only  two  years  later,  the  1931  Constitution  (so-called 
Oktroisani Ustav) returned the  competences of financial  control  to  the  Parliament and 
again  established  direct  reporting  relations  between  the  Parliament  and  the  Supreme 
Control, whose status and competences remained largely unaltered until the beginning of 
World War II. 
The function of external audit was not alien to  the second Yugoslavia, where a special 
kind of external  audit institution - "Social Accounting Service" (SAS)  was  created in 
1959. The SAS, however, was not a specialised audit organ, but combined the audit tasks 
with functions  which,  elsewhere,  are  entrusted to  national banks and/or treasuries.  The 
726 Cf N. Sijepanovic, op. cit. pp. 129-130. 
252 SAS had to watch over the legality of the disbursement of state and public (social) funds 
through pre-audits and post-audits. The SAS also exercised quasi-judicial authorities with 
regard to errors, irregularities and mismanagement of public funds by officials and civil 
servants.  If,  during  the  examination of the  public  accounts,  the  SAS  would  discover 
accounting irregularities and/or breaches of legal regulations, it had the right to require 
the organ in question to correct errors and irregularities and return the funds acquired by 
the irregular/illegal practice. 
It is interesting to note that all users of  public funds as well as private firms were required 
to open accounts with the SAS. The SAS investigated whether enterprises fulfilled their 
financial obligations towards the state and, if  necessary, made these payments itself from 
their  accounts.  This  function  was  clearly  outside  the  scope  of western  European's 
supreme audit organisations and enabled the Government to  interfere and fully control 
the  economy.  The  SAS  also  had  responsibilities  in  the  sphere  of national  financial 
recording and statistics. Perhaps the final proof of the totally different nature of the SAS 
was the fact that it actually charged for its services, and hence was not financed out of 
any fund of the state budgets.
727 
Contours of  a New External Audit Legal Framework 
Although  Serbia  still  does  not have  an  institution of independent external  audit,  it  is 
encouraging  that  the  new  Law  on  State Audit  Institution  (hereinafter the  LSAI)  was 
passed  in  November  2005.  The  Law  has  been  appraised  as  a  very  good  piece  of 
legislation  by  a  number  of  international  organisations  and  experts  and  definitely 
represents  an  important  step  forward  in  creating  a  functional  system  of financial 
accountability. 
727 Cf R. Szawlowski, "State Audit in Communist Countries", in B. Geist (ed.), State Audit - Developments 
in Public Accountability, (The MacMillan Press Ltd), 1981, p.  189. 
253 The  LSAI  is  quite  detailed  and  comprises  a  number  of sections  which  regulate  the 
organisation,  management,  functions  and  procedures  of the  State  Audit  Institution 
(hereinafter SAl). As we have already discussed some of the concepts of the new law 
(such  as  the  stewardship  of public  money)  we  shall  pay attention  to  other important 
elements of the LSAI related to its structure, management, guarantees for independence, 
functional and institutional jurisdiction and audit process. 
Organisation and management of the SAl 
According to the new LSAI, a Council of  the Institution is the supreme collegial authority 
of  the SAL The Council members bear a collective responsibility for the decision making 
process,728 which should enhance the quality of the SAl's decisions, especially since it is 
a brand new institution yet to be established. The Council has five members: a President, 
a Vice-President and  three  members.  Organisation of the  SAl consists  of audit  units, 
headed by the Supreme State Auditors, and assisting services. In  addition, the Secretary 
of the SAl carries out an important managerial function, by coordinating the activities of 
different audit units and services.729 
Although the SAl has a collegiate management, significant managerial powers have been 
provided to  the President of the Institution. The President has the right to:  manage the 
work of the institution by determining and implementing the work programme; prescribe 
rules  for  individual  stages  of  audit  activity;  make  decisions  on  supervision  of 
implementation of  the audit objectives; appoint the Supreme State Auditors and Secretary 
of the Institution, etc.
730  Exercise of these authorities should enable the President of the 
SAl  to  prevent  and  remove  any  potential  inefficiency  in  the  collegiate  work  of the 
Council. 
728 Article 13 of  the LSAI. 
729 Article 32 of  the LSAI. 
730 Article 25 of  the LSAI. 
254 Personal independence of the Council members is expected to be secured through rather 
strict conditions and procedures for their appointment and dismissal.  Council members 
ought to have an appropriate university education and relevant working experience  731  and 
must not be employees of any Government body for two years prior to their appointment 
to  the  Council.  This  should  ensure  at  least  some  degree  of political  and  personal 
impartiality  of the  Council  members  in  conducting  ex  post  audits  of Government 
operations.  The  cornerstone  of  Council  Members'  independence,  nevertheless,  is 
provided by a requirement that Council Members are  to  be appointed by the National 
Assembly for a period of 6 years, at the proposal of the competent working body of the 
Assembly and cannot be reappointed to their respective posts more than twice. 
Although the legal  framework providing for  independence of the  Council Members  is 
quite  well  established,  the  problems  in  the  implementation  of these  provisions  have 
already appeared in practice, as  the  Council Members have still not be elected by the 
National  Assembly.  Namely,  the  transitional  provisions  of the  LSAI  foresee  that  the 
Council of  the SAl will be established six months after the adoption of  the LSAI. Council 
Members have still not been appointed. This is due to political sensitivity of the Council 
operation, which will not only have important administrative but also political influence 
on  the  governance  processes.  Since  the  Serbian  Government  is  a  minority  coalition 
Government, it has not been easy to reach a political compromise on the appointment of 
the  SAl's Council  Members.  This  is  just the  first  sign  of the  difficulties  which  this 
institution may encounter in practice, in spite of  a fairly well designed legal framework. 
731  The Law requires the Council members to have a university degree and at least 10 years of working 
experience, out of  which minimum 7 years on jobs related to the powers of  the Institution. It is further 
stipulated that a minimum of2 members of  the Council must be graduated economists with the 
corresponding auditing or accounting profession and working experience in the domain of  public finances, 
while a minimum of one member of  the Council must be a graduated jurist with passed juridical exam and 
working experience in legal activities in the domain of  public finances. 
255 Being aware of the challenges which the SAl will face in its work, the draftsmen of the 
law  have  underlined  a  need for  securing  organizational,  functional  and financial 
independence of this  institution.  First,  the  law  provides  that the  SAl has  the  right to 
independently  determine  its  internal  organizational  structure  and  staffing  plans  Gob 
systematisation), as well as to  issue independently by-laws and other acts necessary for 
implementation of  the present Law.
732 Second,functional independence is secured though 
the right to  independently define the  scope, time and nature of audit;  to  conduct audit 
examinations on the spot; to have access to  all necessary documents and to submit audit 
and other reports without any restrictions.
733  This is  fully in line with the Commision's 
and  LIMA  declaration's  standards  and  provides  a  positive  answer  to  Commission's 
baseline question mentioned in the chapter N  on whether the SAl is free to decide what 
work it will carry out. Lastly, financial independence should be assured by determining 
the funds for work of the Institution as  a separate budget item in the scope of an annual 
Law on Budget of Serbia.
734 The financial plan of the SAl is determined by the Council 
and approved by the working body of  National Assembly and only then submitted to the 
Ministry of Finance for  inclusion in  the  general  budget.  This  is  also  in line with the 
Commission's requests  for  an  independence of the  financial  resources  needed  for  the 
fulfilment of  the SAl's mandate, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
Functional and institutional jurisdiction 
As mentioned in the review of  the concept of stewardship of public money in Serbia, the 
SAl is authorised to conduct three basic types of audit:  audit of accuracy of accounts, 
audit of regularity of financial operations and performance/value for money auditing. 735 
Besides the 'usual' auditing powers, the SAl is  also authorised to  carry out other tasks 
that  are  closely linked  with the  audit  function,  such  as:  assessment of functioning  of 
732 Article 12 ofthe LSAI. 
733 Articles 3,5,6,35,36,39 of  the LSAI. 
734 Article 51  ofLSAI. 
735 Section 2, 3 and 4, paragraph 1 of  Article 2 of  the LSAI. 
256 systems of internal control, general  advisory function to  auditees, giving proposals for 
changing of existing legislation, adoption of  auditing standards and tackling the fraud and 
.  736  corruptIOn. 
The SAl's institutional jurisdiction is also quite wide. It is authorised to carry out audits 
of a wide spread network of institutions which are using public funds, such as:  all DBBs 
and  IBBs  of  the  Republic,  units  of territorial  autonomy  and  local  governments; 
organisations of  mandatory social insurance; budget funds established by a special law or 
secondary legislation; public  utilities,  companies and other legal  entities founded by a 
DBB or IBB which participate in its capital or management; National Bank of Serbia (in 
the part referring to operations with the State budget and public funds); political parties; 
legal or physical entities which receive state donations and other irretrievable funds  or 
guarantees;  users of EU funds,  donations and assistance by international organizations, 
foreign governments and non-governmental organizations.
737 
Since the SAl is authorised to audit all public funds, resources and operations (including 
EU funds and resources), regardless of whether they are reflected in the national budget 
and  regardless  of who  receives  or manages  public  funds,  it may be inferred that  its 
functional and institutional jurisdiction is quite satisfactory. However, it should be noted 
that such a jurisdiction will require intensive efforts on the part of  the new institution and 
therefore it will be very difficult for  SAl to  manage to cover it,  especially in the first 
years of  its operation. 
In order to concentrate the SAl efforts, the law prescribes so called 'compulsory audits', 
which need to be conducted each year. These are: 
•  annual budget of  the Republic of  Serbia; 
•  organizations of  mandatory social insurance; 
•  National Bank of  Serbia, in the part related to spending of  public funds; 
736 Article 5 of  the LSAI. 
737 Article 10 of  the LSAI. 
257 •  a number of  public utilities, companies and other legal entities founded by a DBB 
or IBB which participate in its capital or management; 
•  budget of a suitable number oflocal self-government units.
738 
Conducting even this limited number of mandatory audits would be a very demanding 
task for the  SAl in the  first  years of operation.  The Institution will need time to  find 
appropriate  staff and build its  capacity,  which will be a  long and demanding process. 
Therefore, the initial expectations of the operation of this important institution should be 
kept fairly realistic. 
Audit Reports and Procedures 
Similar to its counterparts, a key SAl's weapon is issuance of audit reports and annual 
report on its work. The main instrument of  reporting is the annual report on consolidated 
Government accounts and final  accounts of organisations of mandatory social insurance 
which is to be submitted to the National Assembly every year.
739 The SAl is also required 
to  submit an annual  Report on its work to  the Assembly by the 31 st  of March of the 
current  year  for  the  preceding  year.
740  In  the  course of the  year,  the  Institution  may 
submit  special  reports  on  particularly  important  and  urgent  issues,  whose  content  is 
defined in more detail by the Rules of  Procedure of  the Institution. 
The procedure of audit is regulated in quite a detailed manner in the LSAI. This poses a 
question of whether some of the procedural details could have been left for  secondary 
legislation, as putting them on a statutory footing takes away the flexibility necessary for 
fine-tuning and adjusting to the real needs. 
738 Article 35 of  the LSAI. 
739 Article 47 of  the LSAI. 
740 Article 45 of  the SAl Act. 
258 The  Audit  procedure  conducted  by the  SAl may be  divided  into  three  mam 
phases: 
1.  Pre-Audit phase, relates to determining the annual audit plan and programme 
of the SAl and collection of information and documentation prior to the commencement 
of the process of audit. The Law grants the SAl the right of access to any information it 
requires to undertake its tasks.741  If an auditee fails to provide requested information, it 
will  be fined by an  appropriate penalty,742  determined by the penal provisions of the 
law.743 
2. Process of  Audit comprises a number of  procedures and principles, such as the 
right to a fair hearing (audi et alteram partem rule) and the right to object to the findings 
of the  report  in a  two-instance procedure.  Each  audit  starts  with the  adoption of the 
conclusion on undertaking of audit, which may be a subject of  objection by an auditee?44 
The Council decides on such an objection and its decision is final (no right of appeal is 
allowed).745 When a draft audit report is completed, it is sent to an auditee for comments 
and objections. If an auditee submits an objection or comments, the SAl will organise a 
hearing to discuss these objections and acquire any additional information to be presented 
by  an  auditee  at  the  hearing.746  After  the  hearing,  the  draft  report,  together  with 
objections  and  comments  is  given  to  a  Member of the  Councilor a  Supreme  State 
Auditor, who will review the report.747 After reviewing the report, a Council Member or a 
Supreme  State Auditor will  issue an  audit report proposal,  which will  be sent  to  the 
auditee. An auditee has the right to another objection to the report, which is then sent to 
the Council for the final decision. The Council can decide to either take out the objected 
finding from the report or to leave in it in the report (as it already is or to  reformulate 
741  Article 36 of  the LSAI. 
742 5.000-50000 dinars which corresponds to around 50-5000 pounds. 
743 Article 57 of  the LSAI. 
744 Para 1, Article 38 of  the LSAI. 
745 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of  the Article 38, of  the LSAI. 
746 Paragraphs 1-9 of  Article 39 of  the LSAI. 
747 Paragraph 10 of  Article 39 of  the LSAI. 
259 it).748  The final  report is  sent to  the auditee,  the National Assembly and other organs, 
which,  in  Council's  view,  should  be informed  of the  audit  findings.  The  Council's 
decision is final and there is no legal remedy which could challenge it. 749 
As we can see, the process of audit is rather complex and assumes active participation of 
an auditee in all stages of  the process. Such a demanding procedure should make sure that 
a final audit report to be submitted to the National Assembly and the public includes only 
disclosures  substantiated  by credible  evidence  that  corresponds  to  the  actual  state  of 
affairs.  It is  further  important  to  provide  information  to  future  audited  subject  and 
stakeholders awareness in general on their rights and responsibilities in their relations to 
the SAL 
3.  Post-Audit Procedure. Provision for adequate follow-up procedures of SAl's 
recommendations  in  the  post-audit process  is  of particular importance.  An  auditee  is 
obliged  to  take  actions  in  accordance  with  SAl's recommendations  and  to  notify  the 
Institution thereof not later than 90 days from the date of  delivery of  the audit report.750 If 
an  institution fails  to  comply with the SAl's recommendations in case of a significant 
irregularity or non-purposefulness of operations, the SAl shall determine that there is a 
serious violation ofa 'good practice' in the auditee's operation.,751 
One of  the key issues to be posed is whether the SAl should have any sanctioning powers 
in the case of non-respect of its recommendations. As we could see in chapter II, the UK 
NAO does not have any power of sanction of its own.  Instead, its basic weapon is the 
PAC, which holds the executive to  account for the stewardship of public money.  In the 
French  system  of financial  accountability,  the  Cour des  Comptes,  in  tum,  does  have 
sanctioning powers through the process of  judging of accountants. In the EU system, the 
ECA does not have any sanctioning powers on its own, but relies on support from  the 
748 Paragraphs 11-15 of  Article 39 of  the LSAI. 
749 Paragraphs 16-17 of  Article 39 of  the LSAI. 
750 Paragraphs 1-2 of  Article 40 of  the LSAI. 
751  Paragraphs 3-4 of  Article 40 of  the LSAI. 
260 COCOBU, Commission and Courts of Auditors of Member States. The question is what 
kind of  sanctioning powers, if  any, should be given to the Serbian SAL This question will 
be in more depth analysed in the concluding chapter. At this point, we shall outline the 
solutions presented in the new Law on SAL 
According to the Law, the SAl does have limited sanctioning powers over the auditees. 
Unlike the classical Westminster model or the French model of  judicial authorities, the 
SAl has been given the power to  directly issue orders to auditees for acting in the case 
when there is a serious violation of a 'good practice' in an auditee's operation. In the case 
when  an  auditee  fails  to  take  actions  in  the  defined  time  limit  to  remedy  identified 
irregularity, the SAl has the right to: 
•  issue a call for dismissal of the responsible officer of the auditee to the authority 
which the Institution considers to be able to carry out or initiate the procedure for 
dismissal; 
• 
• 
inform the National Assembly; 
inform the public.
752 
If the SAl has a reasonable doubt that the auditee has committed a misdemeanour or a 
criminal offence, it will propose to the relevant authority to submit a request for initiation 
of a  misdemeanour  proceeding  or bring  charges  in  the  criminal  procedure.
753  These 
sanctioning rights of the SAl are reasonably well defined, although they themselves do 
not provide sufficient assurance that the audit findings will be respected and followed-up 
by an auditee. Therefore, in order to effectively perform its role, the work of  the SAl will 
need  to  be substantively  supported  by other  financial  accountability  actors,  such  as 
Parliament  and  the  Ministry  of Finance,  as  will  be  discussed  in  more  depth  in  the 
concluding chapter. 
752 Paragraphs 9-13 of  the LSAI. 
753 Article 41  of  the LSAI. 
261 Overall, the adoption of  the new Law on SAl is a very important step forward in creating 
a supreme audit institution in Serbia. However, the question remains on whether there are 
sufficient underlying conditions that will enable its effective operation in practice. As we 
could see earlier, the EU Partnership medium term priority for  Serbia is to  "Strengthen 
the operational capacity and  functional as well as financial independence of  the Supreme 
Audit Institution". This condition has obviously not been met at all, since a SAl has not 
been created yet. Therefore, it is important to examine what are the ways to establish the 
SAl  as  soon  as  possible  and  to  secure  its  smooth  operation  in  the  first  years  of its 
functioning. 
Accounting and Reporting 
Public financial accounting system in Serbia operates on a cash basis, in accordance with 
the Decree on Budget Accounting adopted in 2003.754 The Decree requires that financial 
statements of all  budget beneficiaries be prepared in  compliance with the  Cash Basis 
International  Public  Sector  Accounting  Standards  (Cash  IPSAS).755  The  Decree, 
moreover,  requires  ledgers  of all  budget  organizations  and mandatory  social  security 
organizations be kept on the basis of double bookkeeping,  chronologically,  accurately 
and regularly updated.756  Although it may be argued that operation of the accounts on a 
cash basis is not in line with the modem principles of accrual accounting, it must be born 
in mind that the Serbian accounting system is still at a fairly early stage of development, 
in which even basic cash accounting principles are not properly implemented. Whereas 
the  central  accounting function of the  Treasury appears  to  be  fairly  modem and  well 
equipped the accounting  systems of most budget beneficiaries  are  generally outdated. 
Once the cash accounting system starts operating properly, options for a more advanced 
system  of resource  accounting  should be  thought  through.  Nevertheless,  it  should be 
754 The Decree on Budget Accounting, "Official Gazette of  the Republic of Serbia," No.  12512003. 
755 Article 3 of  the Decree on Budget Accounting. 
756 Article 4 of  the Decree on Budget Accounting. 
262 noted that although periodical budget execution reports and financial statements are cash 
based,  some accrual  information, including on commitments, is  already available from 
the Treasury's accounting system, which is a positive step and will be important for the 
future development of  the accounting system.757 
Conclusion 
Although  Serbia has  made  progress  in  building  a  democratic  financial  accountability 
system,  the  overall  development  is  unsatisfactory,  primarily  due  to  the  inability  to 
establish  a  supreme  audit  institution.  The  Serbian  legal  framework  for  public  sector 
financial  control is still not aligned with EU Partnership priorities and requirements for 
internal audit and external audit. Considerable effort, including capacity building, will be 
needed to  meet these requirements as  well as  the specific provisions of the Acquis for 
controlling and managing EU pre-accession funds. 
Development of  procedures and administrative capacities to ensure effective protection of 
the  EU financial  interests will  still  require  extensive  efforts  in  order to  be developed 
properly.  Funds  from  the  EU  are  managed  directly  by  the  European  Agency  for 
Reconstruction (EAR) and the European Commission has not yet indicated that it would 
be prepared to consider any degree of decentralization of  management of aid, for instance 
from the CARDS  758  programme.  As we could see in the previous chapter, in accordance 
with article 164 of the EC financial regulation,759 the Commission may decide to entrust 
757 The World Bank, Serbia: Fiduciary Assessment Update, op. cit., p. 23. 
758 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability, provided under Council 
Regulation (EC) No 266612000: http://europa.eu.intieur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l  306/1  3062000  1207enOOO 1  0006.pdf 
759  Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 248/1, 16.9.2002. 
263 management of certain actions to  authorities of beneficiary countries only after having 
established  that  the  beneficiary  third  country  or  countries  are  in  a  position,  in  the 
management of Community funds,  to  apply in whole or part a  number of predefined 
criteria for financial management and control. At this stage it is however unlikely that the 
EAR or the European Commission will consider using a decentralized model for  funds 
management in the short or medium term. 
Therefore, still a lot of work remains to be done on establishing a satisfactory financial 
accountability  system  in  Serbia.  The  concluding  chapter  shall  examine  the  ways  this 
could be done and provide recommendations for  its future  development relying on the 
conducted analysis of financial accountability systems of  the EU Member States (UK and 
France) as well as the EU system. 
264 Concluding chapter VI 
In  this  concluding  chapter  we  shall  attempt  to  map  the  way for  Serbia  to  establish 
effective financial  accountability system, in the view of the European Union accession 
requirements.  We shall first reiterate the importance of the European Union integration 
process as  an incentive for building of a reliable system of financial  accountability, as 
one of the conditions for the EU membership. In order make suggestions as  to how the 
current system of financial accountability in Serbia can be reformed to be able to  meet 
the EU requirements, we shall use comparative-historical and legal-sociological analysis 
of  the financial accountability systems of  the UK, France and the EU. We shall attempt to 
explain why different financial  accountability systems have been applied on the British 
isles and the continent and how they influenced the creation of  the specific EU system of 
financial accountability and, subsequently, spelling out of  the EU financial accountability 
requirements towards the acceding countries. This shall provide us with a background for 
an in-depth analysis of the options for  development of the  Serbian system of financial 
accountability. The aim of  this exercise is not to prescribe a particular model of reform to 
be applied, but rather to identify certain strategic choices, risks and constraints which will 
be faced in building a sound financial  accountability system in Serbia and facilitate its 
integration into the complex EU financial accountability space. 
European  perspective  as  one  of  the  incentives  for  creating  effective  financial 
accountability framework 
The process and the prospects of Serbia's accession to  the European Union serve as  an 
important anchor for reform of financial accountability mechanisms, as a part of overall 
institutional reforms in Serbia. As pointed out in  the previous chapter, the Copenhagen 
Council of December 2002 and Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003 confirmed 
the European perspective of state union of Serbia and Montenegro and underlined the 
European Union's determination to  support its  efforts to  move closer to the European 
265 Union.76o  The  successful  completion  of negotiations  with  some  of Serbia's  closest 
neighbours who joined the Union in May 2004 greatly contributed to  making Serbia's 
own perspective for joining the EU real and visible and reinforce the message that hard 
work and at times painful reforms will payoff. 
The accession  of Serbia  to  the  EU will  ultimately  depend  on  two  factors  - Serbia's 
progress  in  meeting  the  conditions  for  membership  and  the  continuity  of the  EU 
determination to accept Serbia as  an EU member.  In  this sense, at the current stage of 
development,  the  key issue  for  Serbia in  its  path  to  the  EU is  establishment of full 
cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the lack of which has brought about suspension of 
negotiations for the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in April 2006. All the other 
issues, including the financial accountability, seem to be only of secondary importance. 
On the  other hand,  the  actual  accession of Serbia and  other countries of the  Western 
Balkans in the EU, will, naturally, depend on the current Member States wish to embrace 
the countries of Western Balkans in the union of European nations. It is still to  be seen 
how the recently enlarged EU system will continue to develop (especially in relation to 
adoption of the EU Constitution)761  and what will be economic and social consequences 
of the  latest  enlargement.  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  that  up  to  now  the  EU 
institutions themselves have very much supported the accession of the Western Balkans 
countries, one of the reasons certainly being the wish to prevent possibility of breaking 
out  of another  military  conflict  in  the  Balkans  in  the  aftermath  of the  war  in  ex-
Yugoslavia.  Therefore,  the  sometimes  forgotten  role  of  the  concept  of European 
integration, as a tool for prevention of  national conflicts through economic integration, is 
expected to fulfil its role in the turbulent Balkan countries region. 
76°The Thessaloniki European Council explicitly states that the Western Balkan countries are to become 
members of  the EU "once they meet the established criteria". Cf. Presidency Conclusions of  the 
Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, www.europa.eu.int 
761  Some commentators argue that the rejection ofthe EU Constitution at referenda in France and the 
Netherlands is the corollary of their citizens disapproval of  the accession of  the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the EU. 
266 Once political conditions are met it is expected that the issue of financial accountability 
will  come  to  the  forefront  of the  accession  agenda.  This  is  primarily  due  to  a 
decentralised  nature  of the  ED budget  implementation,  which  makes  the  overall  ED 
financial  accountability framework very much dependent on the soundness of financial 
accountability mechanisms of the  Member States  and  Acceding Countries.  In  the ED 
chapter we have pointed out the problems which the ED Commission is  facing with the 
shared management of ED funds,  as the ECA has not been able to provide statement of 
assurance for legal and regular use of  the overall ED funds in 11  consecutive years. 
It is, however, interesting to note that a strong emphasis on financial accountability in the 
process  of ED accession  has  started  to  yield  positive  results,  as  the  specific  area  of 
management of  the ED pre-accession funds has been assessed by the ECA as satisfactory 
in  its  last  two  reports  for  2003  and  2004.
762  Namely,  the  ECA has  given  a  positive 
assessment on legality and regularity of the management of the ED funds  only for very 
few areas of the ED budget implementation, one of them being the expenditure incurred 
on  pre-accession  strategy  area,  whereas  in  the  areas  of shared  management  with  the 
Member States (large part of CAP,  structural measures and internal policies) the ECA 
could not get sufficient assurance as  regards the legality and regularity of payments.
763 
This  means  the  acceding  countries  have  in  general  attained  reliable  systems  of 
accountability, in some cases better than the Member States themselves. This conclusion, 
however,  should be taken with some reservation,  as  not all  acceding countries manage 
ED funds through their own financial accountability systems, i.e. on a decentralised basis. 
For most of the Western Balkans countries, it is the ED Commission itself through its 
agencies,  such  as  the  European  Agency  for  Reconstruction,  which  handles  the 
management of the ED funds.  However, it is  expected that this system will  in the mid 
term  be  replaced with  a  fairly  decentralised management of the  ED  accession  funds, 
which will require lots of efforts on the part of the countries to improve their systems. 
762 European Court of Auditors, Annual report concerning the financial year 2004; European Court of 
Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial year 2003, www.eca.eu.int 
763  Ibid. 
267 Serbia, however, is still far away from meeting the conditions set out in the Chapter 32 
(before 2005, chapter 28) of  the acquis and the management ofEU resources is still under 
the Commission's European Agency for Reconstruction. A sound financial accountability 
framework  has  been  underlined  as  one  of the  priorities  for  Serbia  in  the  European 
Partnership,  as  a  main  instrument  of a  Stabilisation  and  Association  process,  as  a 
framework for the EU accession. As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Commission 
has identified the development of a Public Internal Financial Control Strategy as a short-
term priority that should be attained in the course of 2006. The medium term priorities, 
on  the  other  hand,  relate  to:  development  and  implementation  of the  principles  of 
decentralised  managerial  accountability and  functionally  independent  internal  audit  in 
accordance  with  the  internationally  accepted  standards  and  EU  best  practice; 
strengthening the operational capacity and functional as well as financial independence of 
the  Supreme  Audit  Institution  and  development  of procedures  and  administrative 
capacities to  ensure effective protection of the EU financial  interest.  764  The progress in 
implementing  the  priorities is  regularly  monitored by the  Commission,  notably in  its 
Annual  Reports  and  through  other  structures  set  up  under  the  Stabilisation  and 
Association Process. 
In  order to  provide possible solutions for  creating an  efficient and effective system of 
financial  accountability  in  line  with  both EU requirements  and  the  local  institutional 
environment and culture in Serbia, we shall draw on analysis from the previous chapters 
and make a comparison of financial  accountability systems of the UK,  France and the 
EU.  As  has  been  pointed  out  several  times  throughout  this  thesis,  every  financial 
accountability system operates in a specific  socio-political  environment with a distinct 
legal  tradition  and  therefore  it  is  of utmost  importance  to  take  into  account  the 
764 Council Decision of  30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 2004/520IEC, (2006/56/EC), OJ L 35/32, 
7.2.2006. 
268 implications which specific social contexts have for financial accountability. Drawing the 
conclusions  on  different  financial  accountability  models  and  making  suggestions  for 
Serbia will therefore necessitate careful analysis of respective historical, social, political 
and  legal  environments  that  have  affected  the  creation  of fairly  different  financial 
accountability models throughout the European continent. 
UK and French systems of financial accountability as possible models for  financial 
accountability reform in Serbia 
Broadly  speaking,  Britain  and  France  are  representatives  of two  mam approaches  to 
financial  accountability,  which  are  at  times  addressed  as  north/south  divide.765  It is 
argued that in "Southern" States, financial accountability systems are based on detailed 
legal  requirements  and  personal  liability  of  officials.  Key  financial  accountability 
mechanisms in these states are ex ante payments control and judicial control of accounts, 
i.e. judging the legality/regularity of financial operations.766 The 'northern' States, on the 
other hand, devolve ex ante internal control to agency management and do not exercise 
judicial  functions  over accounts.  The  focus  here  is  ensuring that the  use  of resources 
achieves the set priorities and objectives and value for money.767 Although the concept of 
north/south divide represents an oversimplification of a variety of financial accountability 
models  across  Europe,  a  comparison  between  the  UK and  French  systems,  as  basic 
representatives of two  different models of financial  accountability,  definitely deserves 
closer attention. 
As we could see in chapter II, the accountability of  the executive to parliament lies at the 
heart of the  British  system  of financial  accountability.  For more  than  a  century,  the 
765 Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, "The Court of  Auditors and Financial Control and Accountability in the 
European Community," European Public Law, Volume 1, Issue 4, 1995, pp. 628-630. 
766  Ibid. 
767 OECD Policy Brief, Public Sector Modernisation: Modernising Accountability and Control, OECD, 
2005, www.oecd.org/publications/pol  brief, p. 2. 
269 British Parliament, assisted with its prestigious Public Accounts Committee supported by 
Comptroller and Auditor General,  has  been holding the  executive to  account  for  the 
stewardship  of public  money.  The  PAC  is  one  of the  oldest  and  most  prestigious 
committees of the  Parliament and its  role in  securing accountability is  essential.  The 
Executive,  on  the  other  hand,  exercises  control  of handling  the  public  money  itself 
through internal, managerial accountability mechanisms. Internal accountability is based 
on a decentralised system in which the Treasury delegates to departments the authority to 
spend within defined limits. The basic link between external and internal accountability 
mechanisms is provided in the role of an accounting officer, who is a key manager of  the 
department,  simultaneously  accountable  to  hislher  Minister,  Treasury  and  the 
Parliament.  768  The  role  of the  accounting  officer  is  governed  by tertiary  legislation 
produced by the  Treasury  and  easily  changed whenever there  is  a  need.  The whole 
system of financial  accountability is  based on trust and consensus of all  the  involved 
institutions  and  actors,  which equally share  the  interest of securing public  funds  and 
where additional, external means of control, such as courts, are not needed.
769 Efficiency 
and effectiveness in the use of the public funds are the key issues to be addressed through 
the operation of  both internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
By contrast, the traditional French (Roman) system of financial accountability does not 
rest  so  much  on  the  accountability  relationship  established  between  executive  and 
Parliament, but much more on the strong internal accountability relationships between the 
Ministry of Finance and other line ministries and agencies and an external accountability 
mechanism established directly between the executive and the special Court of Accounts 
- Cour des  Comptes (the Cour). In this system, payments are approved in advance by a 
controller outside the ministry, in the French case, the Ministry of Finance. As we could 
see in chapter III, the Cour makes a legal judgment on accounts, i.e. accountants, who are 
768 It should be pointed out that accounting officers were once personally liable for misuse of  public funds. 
The last recorded instance of  accounting officials personal liability appeared to have happened in 1920, 
when an accounting officer was called to repay the amount of  misused public money. 
7691. Harden, F. White, K. Hollingsworth, "Value for Money and Administrative Law", Public Law, 1986, 
pp. 670-671. 
270 personally liable for the use of the public money.  The Cour stands as an institution of 
high reputation and influence in its own right, firmly established by the Constitution as 
one of the three Grands Corps of the state. Unlike the British NAO, the Cour is not very 
close to the Parliament and only in recent years there have been attempts to  establish a 
more  active,  direct  relationship  between  the  Cour  and  the  legislature.  The  Cour 
constitutes an accepted part of  the French administrative elite and shares a common set of 
attitudes  and beliefs with the  executive,  especially since many senior Cour staff have 
previously worked in the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries. The French system is 
further  characterised  by  detailed  legal  regulation  of behaviour  of all  the  actors  of 
financial accountability. 
It may be argued that distinctions between the two  presented traditional  models  stem 
from differences in their political and legal systems and different understanding of the 
concept of the state, as mentioned in the Chapter I. Their financial accountability systems 
are placed within fairly different constitutional settings, which stem from their distinct 
historical  developments.  These  differences  will  be  shortly  analysed  to  provide  a 
background  for  examining the  options  for  improving the  Serbian system of financial 
accountability within its own constitutional and institutional setting. 
Historical  explanation  of  differences  between  presented  financial 
accountability models 
The central  role of the  UK Parliament in the operation of financial  accountability,  is 
related to historical roots of limitation of absolutist power on the British isles in the end 
of XVII century (see Annex 1). This prevented a creation of  a centralised and hierarchical 
state  administration  with  special  authorities  and  separation of activities  pursued  in  a 
public  interest separated from  the  'private interest'  .770  Whereas mainland Europe was 
undergoing a process of state apparatus straightening, British isles were operating mainly 
770 P. Dimitrijevic, R.  Markovic, Upravno pravo [Administrative Law}, Official Gazette SFRJ, 1986., pp. 
145-146. 
271 within local communities which carried out activities of local interest.  771  In its long fight 
against absolutism, the English parliament has in comparison to its mainland counterparts 
relatively early obtained position of the  organ of the supreme power with the right to 
enact laws and control taxation and expenditure.
772  The Monarch's administration was 
subject to  the  common law principles  and  ordinary courts,  instead a  special  body of 
administrative  law  and  special  administrative  courts.
773  Therefore  comes  the  famous 
Dicey's statement that Britain does not have administrative law, and doesn't wish to have 
it.  774 
UK historical development has influenced the British understanding of perception of the 
governance processes and financial  accountability. Thus, UK is  usually perceived as  a 
main  representative  of a  'public  interest'  approach,  which characterises  'Westminster 
system' countries, such as Australia and New Zealand.
775 In these systems, the concept of 
the 'state' is not developed as in the mainland of Europe, as Pollitt and Bouckaert nicely 
explain: 
'Government'  rather  than  ('the  state,)  is  regarded as  something of a  necessary  evil 
whose powers are to be no more than are absolutely necessary and whose ministers and 
officials must constantly be held to public account by elected Parliaments and through 
other means. ,776 
771  Ibid. 
772 Cf. P. Einzig, The Control of  the Purse - Progress and Decline of  Parliament·s Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959). p.  17. 
173 T. Fleiner, "The Common Law and Continental Law: Two Legal Systems", Institute of Federalism, 
Fribourg, 2005. 
http://www.federalism.ehlfiles/doeuments/tipsheet.pdf#seareh=%22differenee%20between%20English%20 
administrative%20and%20eontinental%20Iaw%22 . 
774 C. Harlow, R. Rawlings, Law and Administration, (Butterworths), 1997, p. v. 
775 Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouekaert, Public Management Reform - A Comparative Analysis, Oxford 
University Press 1999, p. 53. 
776 Ibid. 
272 Parliamentary scrutiny by calling the  Government to  account  for  its  actions  is  a  key 
means of controlling the executive, instead of designing the detailed rules and regulations 
to  which the  executive would need to  adhere.  Administration generally has  extensive 
discretion in decision-making process with little supervision through the courts. Instead, 
Parliament and its committees are seen as a more democratic force to oversee the work of 
the administration and confirm their consent to the Government policy. Although there is 
a growing number of soft-law regulations within the UK Government,  there is  still no 
special body of law which administrators apply in their routine work or when dealing 
with citizens. 
The absence of a strong framework of administrative law makes the Westminster models 
much  more  flexible  and  adaptable  to  changes.  Thus,  with  the  (re)  emergence  of 
governance  values  of efficiency  and  effectiveness  through  New  Public  Management 
doctrine over the last two-three decades,777 the main objective of financial accountability 
has easily been shifted from ensuring compliance to ensuring the maximum productivity 
through maximum efficiency of expenditure.778  This, however, does not imply that there 
is no more interest in respecting established procedure and correctness. It is more to  say 
that measuring performance has easily taken priority over checking compliance. 
The historical development of the French state has resulted in the  creation of a fairly 
different  constitutional  setting  and  environment  of a  financial  accountability  system. 
Unlike  UK,  France  continued  to  develop  strong  state  apparatus  throughout  the  XIX 
century, introducing a strict separation of powers between the parliament, executive and 
judiciary. In order to realise its vision of the state, as  a key instrument for changing the 
society, Napoleon built a viable governmental machine, governed by a special body of 
public  law,  relatively  independent  from  the  parliament  and  ordinary  judiciary. 
777 C. Hood, "A public management for all seasons?" Public Administration, 69:1, Spring 1991, pp. 3-19. 
778 C.  Pollitt at aI, Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five 
Countries, (Oxford University Press), 1999, p. 54. 
273 Establishment  of special  courts,  such  as  the  Conseil  d'Etat  and  revival  of the  Cour 
contributed to the development of a rather detailed public law framework, which needed 
to be observed by a Weber style bureaucracy model, so called rechstaat model. The role 
of specialised courts in ensuring legality and accountability of the executive is here of 
utmost importance and civil servants experience greater pressure in fulfilling their tasks 
more strictly according to legal norms since they are more closely checked by judges and 
judicial institutions.
779 
Against such a background,  ensuring the legality of expenditure seems to  be the key 
objective of financial accountability in France.
78o  This, however, does not mean that the 
issues of efficiency and effectiveness of the use of public money is  not an important 
concern in France, but just that the system itself is operating in a way which primarily 
addresses issues of compliance rather than financial  management of the use of public 
funds.  The  role  of Parliament  is  not  of essential  importance  in  ensuring  financial 
accountability, as the key Parliament's function is a legislative, instead of a scrutinising 
one.
781  Furthermore,  the  financial  irresponsibility of deputies  under the  parliamentary 
system of the Fourth Republic was the justification for putting the Executive firmly in 
charge of  budget processes under the constitution of  the Fifth Republic without giving the 
Parliament sufficient powers in the financial accountability framework. 
The logic of the French legal system have strongly influenced legal thinking within the 
liberal Europe, as well as in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Serbia included. 
As  was  pointed  out  in  the  previous  chapter,  Serbia  has  embraced  strong  rechstaat 
tradition, with clear body of administrative law and special administrative Court - State 
Council (modeled on the French Conseil d'Etat). The ex ante control of payments was 
779 C. van den Berg, T. Toonen, "National Bureaucracies and Intemationalisation: the Weberian model in a 
New mould?," paper presented at the Blackburg conference of  the Civil Service Systems Research Project, 
October 2005. 
780 C. Pollitt at aI, ibid. 
781  H.B. Street, "MPs attitudes towards scrutiny in Britain and France", draft prepared for the ECPR 
workshop on the renewal of Parliaments, March 2002, Turin. 
274 exercised by the external auditor - Supreme Control, which granted ex ante approval for 
all payments and exercised quasi judicial authorities in deciding on damages emanating 
from accounts mismanagement. Nevertheless, the work of the Supreme Control was very 
early linked to the Parliament, which strengthened the Parliament's position against the 
Monarch. However, after the II  World War, no democratic audit was performed, due to 
the introduction of the system of unity of powers. The work of Accounting and Payment 
Service focused exclusively on control of legality of financial operations of both public 
and  private  sector  and  therefore  strong  legalistic  approach  to  issues  of financial 
management has been kept to modem times. 
Gradual harmonisation of systems - emerging European model of financial 
accountability? 
Despite the outlined historical differences,  there  is  increasing evidence of the  gradual 
approximation  of  financial  accountability  systems  of  European  countries.  Public 
management reforms,  based on  the  ideas of new public  management,  that  started off 
more easily in the Westminster model countries, have recently spread, albeit to a more 
limited  degree,  to  the  mainland  of Europe.782  The  main  priority  within  control  and 
monitoring systems is therefore being gradually shifted from the values of economy and 
regularity towards the values of efficiency and effectiveness and from  detailed ex  ante 
controls to increased ex-post accountability for performance. 
In this respect, the French example is quite indicative. As we could see in Chapter III, 
with the adoption of  the Constitutional bylaw on budget acts in 2001 (so-called LOLF)/83 
centralised ex-ante internal controls performed by controlleurs financiers  are gradually 
changing towards the a posteriori control framework,  placing instead a high degree of 
782 F.F. Ridley, "New Public Management in Europe: Comparative perspectives", Public Policy and 
Administration Volume 11, No"  1 Spring 1996., pp. 16-29. 
783 Loi organique relative aux lois definances, LOLF - Constitutional bylaw No. 2001-692 of 1 August 
2001  on budget acts (1), French Official Journal No. 177 of2 August 2001, p. 12480. 
275 autonomy on organisation's management (ordonnateurs).784 Furthermore, the UK model 
of close parliamentary scrutiny for the use of public monies exercised through the work 
of Parliamentary Committee was  also  introduced in France,  through a  creation of the 
MEC (Mission d'evaluation et de controle) in 1999. Thus, it may be argued that a strong 
influence  of new  public  management  ideas  which  spread  first  in  the  Westminster 
countries  have  prompted  France  to  introduce  more  radical  approach  to  performance 
management in the use of  the public funds. 
The EU model of financial accountability represents an interesting mixture of the British 
and  French  systems  and another  good  example  of gradual  approximation  of the  two 
systems.  The internal  control mechanisms were initially modelled on the French strict 
differentiation between ordonnateur, controlleur financier and comptables. However, as 
we have  shown in  Chapter IV,  this  system proved ineffective  in  the EU  context and 
eventually brought about a series of mismanagement of  public money in the EU resulting 
in the resignation of the Santer Commission. Right after the French reforms undertaken 
through LOLF in 2001,  the  Commission also  reformed its  internal  control  framework 
through new Financial Regulation adopted in 2002,785  shifting the loci of accountability 
from controlleurs to ordonnateurs and thus moving towards the UK decentralised model 
of internal control. The UK model of external financial accountability was an inspiration 
for  creating  the  Court  of Auditors  (ECA),  which  has  been  linked  to  the  European 
Parliament  through  the  Parliamentary  Committee  of  COCOBD.  This  relationship, 
however, has not been as effective as of  the British NAO-PAC, which has to some degree 
undermined the effectiveness of the work of ECA. The absence of the strong Ministry of 
Finance in the EU institutional setting is another reason for general underachievement of 
the  overall  financial  accountability  framework.
786  However,  the  most  fundamental 
problem of divided accountability for implementation of  the Community budget and lack 
784 NAO study, State Audit in the European Union, 2005, 
www.nao.goY.ukipublications/stateaudit/state.htm. p. 89. 
785 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 160512002 of25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation 
applicable to the general budget of  the European Communities, OJ L 24811,  16.9.2002. 
786 Harden, F. White, K. Donnelly, op. cit. pp. 631-632. 
276 of incentives  for  Member  States  to  pursue  sound  financial  management  in  their 
administration of Community spending poses is definitely the most important  problem in 
the EU financial accountability framework, which the Commission has started to address 
through the creation of  a common internal control framework. 
The gradual harmonisation of all these systems triggers the question if we can talk about 
a general European model of financial  accountability, to  which the acceding countries 
need to  adhere? We would argue that although there is  still no  specifically elaborated 
European model of financial  accountability, the contours of such a  system are  clearly 
emerging. 
If we go back to our definition of financial accountability in Chapter I,  as a relationship 
where citizens hold the Government to account for the stewardship of public money, we 
could attempt to define the main elements of the emerging European system of financial 
accountability. Whereas the who and to whom dimensions of accountability are clear, the 
remainingfor what and how to secure it, can be defined as follows: 
1)  for  what  dimension of financial  accountability  assumes  regular/legal  but also 
economic, efficient and effective use of  public money 
2)  How  to  secure  it  dimension  finds  its  answers  in  interdependent  operation  of 
several financial accountability mechanisms, such as: 
a) internal financial accountability mechanisms based on: 
decentralised  internal  financial  control,  placing 
responsibility for the use of  public money to organisation's 
management; 
decentralised internal audit. 
b)  external financial accountability mechanisms based on: 
external  audit  performed  by  independent  supreme  audit 
institution 
277 Strong  parliamentary  oversight  through  operation  of  a 
Parliamentary Committee for public accounts, as a key link 
between the external auditor, Parliament and the executive. 
c)  establishing  other  accountability  lines  between  internal  and  external 
mechanisms,  such  as  for  example  direct  cooperation  between  external 
auditor and auditee's management, internal and external auditors, etc. 
The way forward for Serbia 
What are the lessons for Serbia to learn from the presented comparative experience which 
expenences  gradual  hannonisation towards  a  single  European  financial  accountability 
model? 
While giving any advice to  Serbia, the issue which has to be kept in mind is that legal 
rules, principles and institutions cannot simply be transplanted from one legal system to 
another.
787 This is especially the case if we are talking about fairly different systems on 
the different stages of development.  One might therefore question whether any of the 
Western earlier explored systems in this dissertation would be able to  function properly 
in  the  still  fragile  democratic  environment  of Serbia  at  the  moment,  including  the 
emerging European one. There are certainly a number of risks which will be faced in an 
attempt to  introduce such a model. If we,  instead, take a historical approach, we could 
think of going back to principles of old Serbian audit tradition, modelled on the French 
system. However, the question is again whether it would be feasible or desirable to re-
establish such a system after more than 60 years of  its absence? 
787 Cf J. Bell,  "Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of  Administrative Law in Europe", in lBeatson, T. 
Tridimas New Directions in European Public Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford), 1998, p.  147; S. Cassese, 
"Toward a European Model of  Public Administration", in D. Clark ed., Comparative and Private 
International Law, (Duncker & Humblot), Berlin, 1990, pp. 361-362. 
278 Although  it  is  quite  difficult  to  gIVe  answers  to  all  complex  questions  of financial 
accountability,  there  are  general  conclusions  which  may be  inferred  from  the  above 
comparison. As Serbian legal system is based on a strong rechsstaat tradition, there is no 
doubt that detailed legal regulation of financial accountability system would be of utmost 
importance  for  its  proper  functioning.  In  this  respect,  the  French  extensive  legal 
regulation of the system could be a good example on how to establish a proper legal base 
for the system of financial accountability. However, one has to be careful not to go into 
overt regulation as this would have an adverse effect on the flexibility of the system. It is 
therefore very important to properly assess what level of detail is needed to be included 
in  the  primary  legislation  and  what  should  be  left  for  the  secondary  and  tertiary 
legislation. 
However, establishment of the pure French system of financial accountability is not very 
likely in  Serbia,  despite  a  historical  institutional  similarity of the  French and  Serbian 
constitutional  and legal backgrounds.  The absence of a democratic  external auditor in 
Serbia for almost a century cannot be substituted so  easily and it will take many years 
until (once established) Serbian Supreme Audit Institution will acquire the prestige of  the 
French Cour des  Comptes, as a key external guardian of the use of the public funds.  As 
we have already discussed earlier, civil servants of the Ministry of Finance and of the 
Cour  des  Comptes  represent the  part of the  same  elite  and  therefore  can  work well 
together  even  without an  important  role  of the  French  Parliament.  This  is  not to  be 
expected in the Serbian context. Nevertheless, some elements of the French model could 
undoubtedly be well applied in the Serbian context. In line with the French model and 
Serbian tradition of  personal liability of  accountants in the first Yugoslavia, establishment 
of some degree of personal liability of persons dealing with the public funds  would be 
important  for  the  proper  functioning  of financial  accountability  system.  However,  it 
would be important not to limit the accountability concept to tackling individual cases of 
mismanagement  and  irregularities,  but  to  ensure  both  administrative  and  political 
accountability for stewardship of public money through effective Parliamentary scrutiny 
of use of the public funds. 
279 In  this  respect,  the  British system of financial  accountability,  based on parliamentary 
accountability, could serve as a good model to look to.  However, it is  obvious that the 
pure British system would not function very well in Serbian context due to  fairly weak 
powers of the Serbian parliament, the under-developed operation of the Parliament and 
its committees and lack of capacity of the  Serbian civil  service to  adequately monitor 
itself. As we have seen earlier, the whole system of financial accountability in Britain is 
based on trust and consensus of all  the involved institutions and actors,  which equally 
share  the  interest  of securing public  funds  and  where  additional,  external,  means  of 
control are superfluous. This is in sharp contrast with the Serbian fairly underdeveloped 
sense of trust between different financial accountability actors, which reinforces the need 
for strong external means of control. Nevertheless, the important concepts of the British 
system could without reservation be applied in the Serbian environment and add to  the 
creation of effective financial accountability system. 
On the basis of these general concluding remarks and the European Union standards in 
the  area  of financial  accountability,  the  remainder of this  chapter shall  provide more 
detailed  recommendations  for  each  of the  mechanisms  of financial  accountability  in 
Serbia in line with acquis communautaire requirements.  As the for what dimension of 
financial  accountability  has  been  reasonably  well  defined  in  the  Serbian  legislation, 
comprising both regularity/legality and value for money in the use of resources, the key 
issue  is  to  ensure  the  implementation  of these  principles  through  strengthening  the 
interplay of  internal and external financial accountability mechanisms. 
Proposals for Strengthening Internal Financial Accountability Mechanisms 
As we  could see  in the previous  chapter,  the  Serbian Government administration has 
made important progress in developing internal financial accountability mechanisms. The 
280 Budget System  Law
788  provides  a  legal  framework  for  segregation of internal  control 
actors  duties  and  establishment of internal  control  and  audit,  which has  been  further 
regulated in more detail by secondary legislation, as pointed out in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore,  internal  control  units  have  been created in a  majority of ministries  and 
social  security  funds,  and  a  number of internal  auditors  have been trained  under  the 
support of  the European Agency for Reconstruction. 
However,  significant  challenges  for  the  establishment  of  an  effective  internal 
accountability  framework  in line  with the  EU requirements  remain.  Although  lots  of 
efforts have been invested in creating a functional internal control system, principles of 
decentralised  managerial  accountability  framework,  required by the  EU  Commission, 
have still not been implemented, as the management of  the organisation is not responsible 
for  the establishment of a sound internal  control systems.  The internal audit system is 
also  in a fairly  early stage of development and will  require  substantive  strengthening. 
Capacity constraints in the Serbian administration represent an important impediment for 
the future development of  effective internal financial accountability mechanisms. 
Internal financial control- towards the UK accounting officer model? 
As we could see earlier, the decentralised managerial internal accountability framework 
has recently become a standard to  which the EU Commission aspires and requires the 
acceding countries to adhere to  as well. Learning from its own negative experience with 
overly  centralised  internal  financial  control,  the  Commission  is  now  insisting  on  the 
decentralisation of internal control framework.  In  this way, it is moving away from the 
French system of ex-ante internal control performed by the Ministry of Finance towards a 
British and consequently EU model of devolved responsibility for the use of the public 
funds given to management of  individual institutions. 
788 Budget System Law, "Official Gazette of  the RS," No. 9/02, 87/02,66/05. 
281 The  first  question  which,  however,  anses  is  whether  the  decentralisation  of internal 
control  framework  is  appropriate  for  unstable  transitional  governance  processes.  The 
devolved internal control systems leave considerable leeway to  individual organisations 
to  manage their own funds  and are therefore more prone to  financial  irregularities and 
mismanagement.  It may be argued that in the  first  phase of building up  of a reliable 
financial accountability system more emphasis should be placed on establishing a sound 
control and compliance ex-ante mechanism instead of moving further to more advanced 
models  of managerial  accountability.  Therefore,  it  seems  that  the  French  traditional 
model  of internal  control  with  the  strong  role  of the  Ministry  of Finance  IS  more 
appropriate for the current stage of  development of  the Serbian system. 
However, the negative sides of ex ante centralised internal control approach should again 
be  duly  taken  into  account.  In  particular,  possible  implementation  of the  traditional 
French system in which a financial officer appointed by the Ministry of Finance is posted 
in line ministries can create problems in implementation and potential conflicts between 
the  officials  in  line  ministries  and  seconded  officials  of the  Ministry  of Finance. 
Furthermore, the division of  responsibility for internal control between the line ministries 
and the Ministry of Finance would prevent establishment of clear internal accountability 
lines which may bring about problems encountered in the EU system of financial control. 
The best answer to  these complex issues could perhaps be found  in trying to  combine 
various  principles  of decentralised  managerial  accountability  exercised  by individual 
institutions, strong coordinating role of  the Ministry of Finance by creation of an internal 
control and audit unit in the Ministry of Finance and keeping an appropriate degree of ex 
ante  control  exercised  by  the  Treasury.  Achievement  of decentralised  managerial 
accountability will require separation between political and managerial roles in carrying 
out financial operations and securing a degree of  personal liability of staff engaged in this 
process. We shall devote closer attention to each of  these elements. 
282 Attainment  of managerial  accountability  for  establishing  a  sound  internal  control 
framework  will  undoubtedly require  revision of the  current  Serbian  legal  framework, 
either the adoption of a new Public Internal Financial Control specific law or substantial 
amendments to the existing legal framework, the Law on Budget System and the Decree 
on Internal Control. This legislation should emphasise that management of a state organ 
will have a duty to  establish an appropriate system of internal control and will become 
responsible for the secure and efficient operation of  an internal control system. 
The question which needs to raised in this respect is to who should be a key accountee of 
the internal financial accountability mechanism - a Minister or a senior civil servant? The 
ultimate accountee for performance of all duties in the Ministry is, of course, a Minister 
who is politically responsible to Parliament for hislher performance of  duties as well as of 
his/her Ministry.  However, if the loci of financial  accountability is  placed only at the 
political  ministerial  level,  the  issue  of financial  accountability  may  become  overly 
political and therefore unstable. The issues of financial management and accountability 
are not of changeable political nature, but are in essence established on administrative-
economical  principles  of stewardship  of public  money,  such  as  legality,  economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness of the use of the public funds.  When there is no  distinction 
between  the  political  and managerial  roles,  politicians  actually  take  over the  role  of 
managers, often having responsibility for  signing routine documents such as  orders for 
goods  and  making  ordinary  payments.  If this  role  is  given  only  and  primarily  to 
politicians, then the management of an organisation will not take substantive interest in 
financial issues and will not sufficiently understand the risks and introduce appropriate 
safeguards. 
Therefore,  it  is  necessary  for  any  organisation  to  separate  between  political  and 
management functions and have an apolitical professional official who will be aware of 
these issues and be able to provide a good and reliable advice to his/her Minister. That 
person would play the role of an Accounting Officer - Permanent Secretary in the UK 
system or Director General in France or in the EU system. As pointed out in the previous 
283 chapter, in the Serbian civil service system the equivalent role is accorded to a Secretary 
of the Ministry. In the case of Special Organisations, the head of  the special organisation 
could be held accountable for financial management of the Organisation as he also has a 
status of a civil servant (in accordance with the new Civil Service Law). In this light, it 
would be very important to set out a clear role for the Secretary of the Ministrylhead of 
Special  Organisation  to  be responsible  and  accountable  for  the  financial  transactions 
within the state organ, the role close to the UK role of an accounting officer. Adding the 
responsibility of an accounting officer would only add to  the importance of the place of 
Secretary General of the Ministry which would give him/her stronger role when dealing 
with his/her Minister. 
The  establishment  of clear  internal  accountability  lines  of is  not  only  important  for 
effective functioning within the Ministry, but also for an efficient operation of external 
financial  accountability mechanisms. The UK experience shows that giving an  explicit 
statutory responsibility to the most senior civil servant for the financial  affairs of their 
departments  may  allow  Parliament  and  its  Committees  the  ability  to  assign  clear 
accountability  lines  for  problems  of  financial  management.  The  establishment  of 
statutory responsibility of the  Secretary of the  Ministry to  Parliament  for  matters  of 
administration would add potential clarity and focus of investigations of once established 
Parliamentary Committee for public accounts. This would enable the senior civil servants 
to  be held to  account to  a Parliamentary committee without confusing this with hislher 
responsibility to Ministers. 
One  important  reservation,  however,  has  to  be  made  when  talking  about  the 
establishment of a variant of a UK accounting officer model in Serbia. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the post of a Secretary General is  still regarded as  primarily political 
instead of a key senior civil service post. Although a number of Secretary Generals in the 
Serbian Government are not politicians, they do  have a strong political affiliation and 
have been appointed by the Government for the period of 4 years, to follow the cycle of 
elections. The process of depoliticisation in Serbia has just began by the adoption of the 
284 Civil Service Law in 2005 which requires all senior civil service posts to be subject to 
internal/open  competition  that  should  enhance  professionalisation  and  reduce 
politicisation.  However,  the process of depoliticisation  will  take  time  and  therefore  it 
should not be expected that the Secretary General of the Ministry would obtain the status 
of the British Permanent Secretary over night. Therefore, although we strongly support 
the introduction of accounting officer model, we would still advise that it be introduced 
in  the  mid  term  period  of 3-5  years  to  follow  and  support  the  ongoing  process  of 
depoliticisation  of the  senior  echelons  of Serbian  administration.  For the  moment,  it 
would be sufficient to leave the responsibility for the use of the public funds to the head 
of an organisation and at the same time build capacities of civil servants to obtain more 
important role in the financial management issues. 
Another point  of concern  for  establishment  of the  UK accounting  officers  model  in 
Serbia, as will be discussed in more depth in the next section, is the still underdeveloped 
role  of the  Serbian  Parliament  and  its  Committees  in  scrutinising  the  work  of the 
executive.  In  line with strong rechstaat tradition,  and similar to  the  French case,  civil 
servants  work  in  Serbia  is  mainly  supervised  by specialised  courts.  In  cases  when 
personal liability for civil servants in carrying out of  their duties is at stake, the usual way 
to  secure legality of operation is  to  set out pecuniary sanctions for breach of particular 
provisions of the law.  Such cases are to be decided in the misdemeanour procedure.
789 
More  serious  breaches  of legal  financial  provisions  are  naturally  subject  to  criminal 
procedure. It is important that these elements of  personal liability, similar to ones existing 
in the French system, remain until much more stable and effective system of financial 
accountability is established. Once a more reliable system of trust between all  financial 
accountability actors is in place, provisions of  personal liability of civil servants could be 
gradually relaxed, as it is the case in the UK system. 
789 Thus, at the moment, the Budget System Law prescribes a number of  pecuniary sanctions for civil 
servants in breach of  obligations to secure legality in the use of  the public funds. They amount from 5000-
50.000 dinars (around 500-5000 pounds). Article 74-75 of  the Budget System Law, Official Gazette of RS, 
No. 9/02, 87/02, 66/05. 
285 In  order  to  strengthen  internal  accountability  lines  and  reduce  risks  of  financial 
irregularities  of staff dealing with public  funds,  all  Ministries  and  other state  organs 
should  have  an  obligation  to  develop  written  internal  procedures  in  the  form  of 
rulebooks/regulations, similarly to the EU case. The further step could be a publication of 
a set of internal control regulations, issued to all relevant staff, which should establish the 
detailed processes to  be followed by finance  and operational  staff (similar to  the  UK 
system  of Government  Accounting).790  These  regulations  must  conform  to  general 
principles  issued  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  be  approved  by  the  Central 
Harmonisation Unit of  the Ministry of  Finance. 
Another important point for establishing a sound internal control framework is a need for 
stronger inter-ministerial coordination and harmonisation mechanisms for internal control 
(and internal audit, as will be pointed out in the next section). In the Serbian context of 
strong individual ministries and weak inter-ministerial coordinating mechanisms, it is of 
utmost  importance  to  establish  a  Central  Harmonisation  unit  to  provide  advice  to 
departments  and  define  common  minimum  standards  for  internal  controls  as  well  as 
advising on their application. A central harmonisation unit for PIFC should be established 
in the Ministry of Finance. This unit should be responsible for developing methodologies 
and  standards  for  public  internal  financial  control  and  internal  audit.  In  order  to 
strengthen the role of the central harmonisation unit, the Head should report directly to 
the Minister of  Finance. 
The  involvement  of the  Treasury  in  the  ex-ante  financial  control  process  is  another 
important issue to be discussed. As pointed out in the previous chapter, at the moment 
there are centralised accounting controls within the treasury and all requests for payment 
and documents justifying them are sent to the Treasury, which controls them and plans 
their payment, even for very small amounts. Since early 2006, all the payments for direct 
790 The World Bank, Serbia. Fiduciary Assessment Update.  2005, Internal document of  the World Bank, p. 
77. 
286 budget users have been executed through the treasury single account, which is a positive 
development.  However,  although  stronger  Treasury  controls  are  necessary  to  ensure 
accountability especially in the early phases of transition, overt Treasury controls could 
potentially  lead  to  inefficiencies  and  increase  of corruption  and  therefore  should  be 
gradually relaxed. The current overly centralised system should therefore in the mid to 
long term be replaced by so-called "passive Treasury Single Account", where payments 
would be made directly by spending agencies, but through the Treasury Single Account. 
In such a system, the Treasury would set cash limits for the total amount of transactions, 
through the budget implementation plan, but would be involved in control of individual 
transactions,  which  would  enhance  efficiency  and  reduce  possibilities  of corruption 
.  791  practIces. 
Finally, it should be noted that the Serbian Government is currently preparing a Strategy 
or  Policy  Paper  for  PIFC  development  and  for  the  creation  of sustainable  training 
facilities for financial controllers, managers and internal auditors. When compared to the 
European Commission's four requirements for PIFC development (listed in the previous 
chapter), the adoption of  the Government strategy for the development and modernization 
of its internal financial control system is of significant importance, as it represents a short 
term EU Partnership priority. It would be important that all earlier discussed issues of: 
decentralised  financial  management,  establishment  of  a  clear  apolitical  lines  of 
accountability  in  the  mid term,  strong  internal  control  coordination mechanisms  and 
gradual relaxing of Treasury controls are entrenched in such a strategy, that will provide 
a comprehensive basis for establishing of  sound internal financial control. 
Gradual Introduction of Internal Audit 
As  we could see  in the previous  chapter,  Serbia has  no  tradition of modem internal 
auditing, but a tradition of  a "government control office" or "control activity", such as the 
791  R. Allen, D. Tommasi (eds), Managing Public Expenditure, A Reference Bookfor Transition Countries, 
SIGMA, OEeD, 2001. 244-245. 
287 Serbian budgetary inspection. The budgetary inspection investigates complaints received 
about staff from either civil servants or the public and may also investigate allegations of 
irregularity or fraud and refer cases to fiscal or criminal police. The inspection possesses 
quasi-judicial authorities, which consist of issuing decisions that order an  action to be 
taken in  relation to  any fraudulent practices or serious irregularities discovered by the 
inspectors. 
Although this concept of "policing nature" of budgetary inspection seems to be outdated 
when compared to  modem internal audit practices, it does represent a powerful tool for 
the Serbian Ministry of Finance to oversee and ensure implementation of financial rules 
and regulations. This concept perfectly fits within the context of  Serbian rechstaat , being 
modelled  on  the  prestigious  French  General  Inspectorate  of Finance  (L 'inspection 
generale des finances). Therefore, notwithstanding the need to move from the 'policing' 
and  'controlling'  internal  mechanisms,  to  'prevention  and  detection'  internal  audit 
mechanisms,  it  is  necessary  to  keep  and  strengthen  the  capacity  of the  budgetary 
inspection of the  Ministry of Finance at least until the  internal financial  accountability 
system is effectively established. 
At the same time, it is important to  start changing the overall logic of the system from 
merely taken action upon individual cases of mismanagement, irregularities, corruption 
or fraud to be pro-active and make sure all parts of the prevention, detection and follow 
up  chain  functions  well  together  and  strengthened.
792  This  will  require  substantive 
training and time in order to  change the mindset of not only of internal auditors but also 
of  organisations in which they operate. 
Whereas the rules and practices of  the budget inspection are relatively well understood in 
the Serbian system, due to long practice of existence of such an institution in Serbia, the 
792 Cf PIFe Expert Group, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries.  Volume II, February 2004, p. 
76. http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/35/37/34891262.pdf 
288 development of an internal audit function will require much more effort and time. As we 
could  see  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  Serbian  Government  currently  has  only  one 
centralised internal  audit unit in the  Ministry of Finance.  That unit certainly does  not 
have  the  potential  to  provide  the  decentralised  independent  government-wide  internal 
audit service, especially with a fairly limited number of staff it contains. It is therefore 
important to create a critical mass of auditors in key direct budget users. The first step in 
this respect is setting up clear legal requirements for establishing individual internal audit 
units in the direct budget users.  This should be done by amending the Budget System 
Law and subsequent Government decree on Budget Inspection and Internal Audit. Once 
established,  audit  units  of direct budget  users  should  also  carry  out the  audit of any 
indirect budget beneficiaries for which the organisation is  responsible (e.g.  Ministry of 
Education for network of  schools, etc.). In cases when the direct budget users have only a 
fairly small number of employees (such as  for example the Ministry of Religion, with 
only 8 employees),  the  internal  audit unit in  the  Ministry of Finance could carry out 
internal audit activities on its behalf, due to limited capacities of such small institutions. 
It is  further  important  to  establish  clear  accountability lines  in  the  organisation.  The 
internal  auditor  should  be  responsible  to  the  Minister  and,  in  the  mid  term,  to  the 
Secretary  of the  Ministry/other  state  organ,  giving  technical  advice  on  the  efficient 
management of resources without becoming involved in political questions. The internal 
audit  activity  should  be  free  from  interference  in  determining  the  scope  of internal 
auditing, performing work and communicating results.  Since the internal auditor is not 
completely  independent  of the  ministry  or  organization  in  which  he  functions  it  is 
essential that the internal audit function achieves an appropriate status and weight in the 
.  .  793  orgamzatIOn. 
Similar  to  internal  control  systems,  establishment of effective  internal  audit  units  III 
individual institutions will require strong coordination by the Ministry of Finance Central 
Harmonisation Unit.  In  this  sense,  the  current internal  control  unit of the  Ministry of 
793  Cf. PIFC Expert Group, Internal Control Systems in Candidate Countries,  Volume II, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
289 Finance should be strengthened to  be able to  provide standards  and methodologies of 
work for all internal audit throughout the Government. 
Finally, it needs to be stressed that the establishment of  an effective internal audit system, 
similar to other elements of financial accountability, will not be an easy exercise and that 
expectations of such a service should not be too high. This is due to underdevelopment of 
all  other elements that internal audit has  to  provide assurance of:  accounting systems, 
internal controls systems, managerial responsibility for overall control framework etc.  In 
such circumstances, the internal audit function should not aim for more advanced forms 
of internal audit, such as risk assessment or performance audit, but mainly focus on more 
basic  issues  of  regularity/legality  and  fraud  detection,  which  characterised  early 
development of  internal audit function in Western democracies.
794 Only when these basic 
elements  of accuracy  and  regularity/legality  are  put  in  place,  should  more  advanced 
formulas of  internal audit be sought. 
Possible ways to enhance the role of  the Parliament and its Committees 
As we could see in the previous chapter, the Serbian Parliament exercises little control 
over  public  finances.  Similar  to  the  French  Parliamentarians,  Serbian  MPs  are  still 
primarily  interested  in  the  legislative  process  and  are  not  accustomed  to  carry  out 
substantive supervisory and scrutiny role over the work of the executive. Most MPs are 
unfamiliar  with  their  role  in  reviewing  budgetary  estimates  and  holding  budgetary 
hearings and lack sufficient knowledge in the field of financial  monitoring and control. 
The fact  that the governing coalition is  comprised of many political parties with often 
opposing views reinforces the old tendency to make decisions behind closed doors, rather 
than in a transparent parliamentary setting. 
794 N.  Hepworth, "Is the modem UK/US approach to internal audit appropriate in all circumstances and 
especially for countries with less developed systems and less well trained public officials?," October 2004, 
pA, unpublished manuscript. 
290 Strengthening parliamentary oversight capacity is vital for establishing a viable system of 
financial  accountability in  Serbia.  This can be accomplished by increasing the  role of 
parliamentary  committees  and  establishing  strong  links  with  the  Supreme  Audit 
Institutions, once it is  established. As the new Supreme Audit Institution, as was pointed 
out in the previous chapter, will not have substantive sanctioning powers, it will need to 
rely heavily on the assistance from the National Assembly in order to be able to discharge 
its  duties  and  endorse  its  findings.  Based on  experience  of many countries,  political 
pressure  exerted  at  the  political  level  of Parliament  is  a  strong  lever  to  force  the 
Government to  comply with external audit recommendations.
795  Therefore it is essential 
that  MPs  take  an  active  role  in  financial  accountability  issues,  primarily  through 
strengthening the role of  Parliamentary Committees. 
Experience of other countries, primarily the UK, are very useful for providing food  for 
thought  on  what  is  needed  for  a  specialised  Parliamentary  Committee  dealing  with 
financial management to function properly. General recommendations are the following: 
1.  First, there is a need for establishing a special Parliamentary Committee that will 
deal solely with issues of financial  accountability, modelled on the British PAC 
(and  subsequently  French MEC  and  the  EU's COCOBU).  This  would require 
changes  of the  rules  of procedure  of the  Serbian  National  Assembly.  The 
Committee  members  should  be  extensively  trained  in  order  to  obtain  the 
knowledge  necessary  to  provide  support  to  the  SAl  and  the  Parliament  in 
exercising the financial accountability relationship. 
2.  It  is  important  to  ensure  that  the  composition  of once  established  Serbian 
Committee for Public Accounts reflects the political composition of all parties in 
795 F. Cazala, "The Supreme Audit Institution and Parliament: How Can their Relationship Support 
Implementation of  the Audit Reccommendations?", paper presented at INTOSAI 2
nd  International 
Conference on Internal Control, May 2000. 
291 parliament.796  However,  gIVen  that  Serbian  political  system  is  still  highly 
polarised on  two  major blocks  - parties  of ex  regime  and parties of so-called 
democratic block,797  potential strong disagreements between these parties could 
be very damaging to the newly established Committee. These partisan differences 
could  easily  reach  a  point  where  the  government  is  unwilling  to  accept  any 
criticism or to act on valid complaints, especially if  they come from the opposing 
political  block.  It  is  therefore  important  to  try  to  ensure  a  close  working 
relationship among members from  different parties and blocks, which will  also 
depend on the further development of  the political process in Serbia. 
3.  In order to reduce the political pressure from the work of the Committee it would 
be important to  focus  on accountability of civil servants for  administrative and 
financial  operations  rather  on  sole  political  accountability  of ministers,  as 
explained earlier. The focus should therefore be on implementation of policy and 
not  on  its  substance,  without  questioning  the  objectives  themselves.798  In  this 
sense, giving more explicit statutory responsibility to the Secretary of  the Ministry 
for  the  administrative  and  financial  affairs  of their departments  in  a  mid-term 
perspective  may  allow  committees  and  others  the  ability  to  assign  clear 
responsibility for problems to  either Ministers or Secretary Generals.  Secretary 
Generals would be obligated to account for their actions primarily to Parliament, 
rather than  explaining issues  to  them  while  still  primarily responsible  to  their 
Ministers  and  subject  to  their  discipline.  Therefore,  as  argued  above,  the 
796 SIGMA papers: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
CCNM/GOV/SIGMA (2002)1, OECD, pp. 28-34. available at 
www.eca.europa.eu/cooperation/publications/docs/sai  pari  136  en.pdf. 
797 A. Rabrenovic, "Politico-administrative relations under the coalition Government in Serbia", in G. 
Peters, T. Verheijen, L. Vass, Coalitions of  the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in Coalition 
Governments, NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2005, pp. 146-177. 
798 R. Stapenhurst, V.  Sahgal, W. Woodley, R. Pelizzo, "Scrutinizing Public Expenditures, Assessing the 
Performance of  Public Accounts Committees", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3613, May 
2005, p. 20. 
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Parliament for matters of administration would add potential clarity and focus for 
the Committee on Public Accounts. This would enable civil servants to be held 
more  to  account  to  Parliament  without  confusing  this  with  responsibility  to 
Ministers. 
4.  Another UK safeguard to ensure the Parliamentary Committees function in a non-
political way is to appoint the chair of the Committee from an opposition party. 
Although this principle has generally been applied in the Serbian parliamentary 
committees, the interesting example of  the Finance and Budget Committee shows 
that this principle can be circumvented in practice, simply due to the disinterest of 
the  President  of the  Committee  to  attend  its  sessions.  Therefore  it  is  very 
important  to  work  on  raising  the  awareness  of the  members  of the  future 
Committee  for  Public  Accounts  and  other  MPs  on  issues  of  financial 
accountability and stewardship of  public money. 
5.  The  Committee for  Public  Accounts  should have the  authority to  call  for  any 
person to testify in the Committees meetings and request any additional (written) 
information  from  any  person  relevant  to  the  audit  issue.  In  this  way,  the 
Committee would indeed hold government to  account for its actions. It is  hoped 
that appearance before the Committee will not taken lightly by public servants 
and  will  provide  powerful  and  transparent  follow-up  of the  Supreme  Audit 
Institution investigations. 
6.  It would be helpful to allow media to  follow the hearings, as it has already been 
done in the case of several ad hoc established committees. This is to  encourage 
transparency and awareness of the general public of the matters being addressed. 
If hearings are public and open, they provide a powerful opportunity to hold the 
executive to  account by testing the  audit results  in  the  testimony of executive 
officials and other experts.  Hearings also can build public interest in important 
293 policy issues.  In addition, hearings create greater understanding of the Supreme 
Audit  Institution  function  and  of oversight  more  generally  and  alert  interest 
groups, the rest of parliament and the public to  the issues that might arise in the 
future. 799 
Achievement of effective parliamentary support for  financial  accountability issues will, 
however, ultimately depend on further consolidation of political and stable parliamentary 
life in Serbia. Namely, around 80% of the current MPs in the Serbian parliament have 
obtained a MP's status for the first time at the last elections of 2003 and therefore have 
obtained their knowledge of Parliamentary work and procedures only in the course of  the 
last couple of years. MPs in Serbia usually perform various duties and are in rare cases 
devoted  only  to  Parliamentary  work  and  therefore  the  general  attendance  of 
Parliamentary sessions is low. The political party process in Serbia is still in the process 
of gradual  consolidation of political parties and overcoming the overt fragmentation of 
political  system  which  occurred  in  2000,  (when  the  coalition  of 18  parties  of fairly 
different political ideology united in order to  defeat Milosevic). It is  expected that the 
gradual  consolidation  of political  parties  will  bring  about  more  stable  Parliamentary 
membership which will be able to devote itself primarily to issues of Parliamentary work 
which  will  be  necessary  for  building  any  kind  of expertise,  including  the  financial 
accountability issues. 
In the view of the above, we again underlie the need to inform and educate not only the 
members of the Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts but also all the MPs on 
financial  accountability  issues.  Special  focus  of such  training  should  be  laid  on 
functioning  of SAIs  in  other  countries,  their  relations  with  Parliaments  and  overall 
799 W. Krafchik, "What role can civil society and Parliament pay in Strengthening the external auditing 
function?", The International Budget Project, http://www.internationalbudget.orgiauditorgeneraI.htm. p. 2. 
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Creating an effective Supreme Audit Institution 
In accordance with our previous general conclusion, a solid, stable and applicable legal 
framework  is  an  indispensable  prerequisite  for  institutional  strength  and  long-term 
development of  external audit in Serbia. Importance of stability of  the legal framework of 
the Supreme Audit Institutions has also been stressed by the Lima Declaration and the 
INTO  SAl auditing  standards.
80l  In  order  to  enable  stability  and  coherence,  the  legal 
framework  of  a  SAl  should  be  defined  at  different  levels  - Constitution,  laws, 
regulations, rules and procedures. The Constitution and laws form the institutional base 
while  the  regulations,  rules  and  procedures  have  the  objective  of ensuring  that  the 
responsibilities of the SAl (as defined in the Constitution and laws) are exercised in the 
most effective way. 
An important question to  be posed in this respect is what level of regulation should be 
reserved for different hierarchy of legal norms to  ensure stability, but in the same time 
allow sufficient flexibility for evolving nature of  any institution. Some practitioners argue 
that  the  Constitutional  provisions  should  comprise  the  following  elements:  the 
establishment of the SAl and its  independence, its status and type (an audit office or a 
court of auditors, a single executive or collegiate leadership); nomination, removal and 
dismissal  of its  Head;  basic  auditing  powers  and  duties;  reporting  responsibilities, 
including a clear definition of its relations with parliament and government.
802  We are, 
800 SIGMA papers: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
op. cit, p. 33. 
801  Cf Lima Declaration of  Guidelines on Auditing Precepts, available on the INTOSAI web site, 
www.intosai.org . 
802 Cf. Resolution of  the Presidents of Supreme Audit Institutions of  Central and Eastern European 
Countries, Cyprus, Malta and the European Court of  Auditors, "Recommendations concerning the 
295 however,  of the  opmIOn  that  such  detail  regulation  would  not  be  appropriate  for 
Constitutional provisions  as  it  would freeze  any attempts of potential  reform  of once 
established SAL  We  would,  instead,  opt for  more general reference to  the  SAl in  the 
Constitution, in line with the French solution, which would refer to  establishment of an 
independent institution that is  to  assist the Government and Parliament to  ensure legal, 
efficient  and  effective  use  of public  financial  resources.  All  other  issues  should  be 
reserved, in our opinion, for primary and subsequently secondary and tertiary legislation. 
Ensuring the independence of SAl is  definitely an area to  be regulated by the primary 
legislation.  As  we  could  see  in  the  previous  chapter,  personal,  organisational  and 
financial  independence  is  indeed  governed  by the  Law  on  SAl,  which  requires  that 
members  of the  SAl's  Council  be  elected  by the  Parliament.  The  requirements  for 
election  of the  SAl's  members  are  also  quite  demanding  (in  terms  of education, 
professional  experience and request that have not been employees of any Government 
body in the last two  years)  which should secure professionalism and prevent possible 
political interferences in the work of this important institution. The democratic elements 
in the work of the SAl are secured by the role of the Parliament in its election, which 
points out the importance of the link between the SAl and the Parliament. However, we 
have already seen that in practice that even well defined legal provisions are subject to 
difficulties in their implementation and are not immune to political interferences, which 
has prevented the election of the SAl Council so  far.  Therefore, although establishment 
of a proper legal entrenchment of this body is important, it cannot be perceived as  only 
and  ultimate guardian of the real  independence and professionalism of this institution. 
Lots of efforts and time will need to be invested in the work of this institution when it is 
established in order to  achieve the prestige that their Western counterparts enjoy in their 
own institutional settings. 
functioning of  Supreme Audit Institutions in the context of  European integration,", 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/cooperation/publications/docs/recommendations  en.pdf, pp. 1-3. 
296 The  adoption of a  collegial  approach  to  deciding  important issues,  with considerable 
central direction and management of  the institution, may be considered as appropriate for 
the new institution such as this one. The UK model ofNAO, as headed by a single officer 
of  the  Parliament,  (Comptroller  and  Auditor  General)  would  place  too  much 
responsibility  on  one  person  for  performing  duties  of new  institution.  The  French 
collegiate  model  therefore  appears  to  be  better  applicable  in  the  Serbian  context. 
However,  it  should not be expected that the French model  of separate components of 
"chambers'  which  operate  to  a  great  extent  independently  of  each  other  will  be 
applicable,  especially  in  the  first  years  of SAl's  operation.  In  the  beginning  of the 
operation of the new SAl it would be important to secure unified audit approach through 
stronger management, which would later be possible to decentralise to specialised audit 
units, headed by High Supreme Auditors. 
Another important issue that should be discussed is ensuring that conclusions which arise 
from  SAl's audit findings  and the subsequent actions taken by the auditee are properly 
followed up. The natural response in this respect in the Serbian context is to provide the 
SAl  with  sanctioning  quasi-judicial  powers,  similar to  those  exercised  by the  Social 
Accounting Service and the budgetary inspection. The logic behind this is very simple: if 
this institution does not have firm enforcement powers, there is a risk that it will be just a 
passive observer of financial irregularities with no possibilities to intervene in any way, 
except to refer it to  other organs with sanctioning powers. As Serbian civil servants are 
accustomed to  various  forms  of judicial and  quasi-judicial  accountability,  establishing 
another body with quasi-judicial powers would not be perceived as a big novelty. 
However,  the  historical  development  of supreme  audit  institutions  point  out  gradual 
loosing  of powers  of sanction  auditees  and  instead  development  of advisory  and 
partnership  role  between  external  auditor  and  the  executive.  The  British  Court  of 
Exchequer lost its  sanctioning powers in the  end of XIX century,803  while the  French 
803 1. Molinier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes (eds.), The Power of  the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin ltd), 1976. p.  172. 
297 Cour  des  Comptes,  although  it  does  judge  accounts,  has  lost  its  power  to  impose 
sanctions  to  comptables,  leaving this  authority to  the  Conseil d' Etat.  Creation of an 
external  audit  institution with  sanctioning  quasi-judicial  powers  in  Serbia  may create 
adversarial relations between the executive and auditees, which would perceive the SAl 
as formidable sanctioning body rather than a partner in securing financial accountability. 
Therefore, we support the current solutions of the new Law on SAl with fairly restricted 
sanctioning  role,  which  comprises  merely  in  referring  more  serious  mismanagement 
cases  to  other  bodies  (such  as  misdemeanour  court  and  Criminal  court)  and  calling 
officials responsible for serious irregularities to resign from their functions. 
In  the  absence of clear sanctioning powers  of the  SAl,  we  reiterate  the need for  the 
establishment of a proper relationship between the SAl and the Parliament. Once the SAl 
in Serbia is established, it should give appropriate attention to parliamentary concerns in 
setting its audit priorities. It would be desirable that the SAl is aware of parliament and 
the Executive's needs and interests and should take them into account in setting priorities. 
However,  it  is  important  that  the  SAl  would retain  its  discretion  to  accept  or reject 
suggestions from  parliament and to  perform audits on its own initiative.
804  The French 
Cour des  Comptes clearly demonstrates that high degree of independence from both the 
executive and the Parliament is possible to  be attained. However, this is not to  suggest 
that the  French fairly adversarial  model between the  external audit institution and  the 
Parliament should be applied, but just that the SAl should primarily keep its focus on its 
own long-term issues of improvement of financial management. The danger is that if the 
SAl becomes  too  focused  on  responding  to  parliamentary interests,  its  work  may be 
undermined by partisan short-term concerns in ways that would put its independence and 
credibility in jeopardy. 
Finally we would like to address concrete issues related to the actual establishment of  the 
SAl in  Serbia in  the  near future.  In  this  sense,  there  is  an  urgent need to  create  and 
804 SIGMA paper: No. 33, Relations between Supreme Audit Institutions and Parliamentary Committees, 
op. cit. p. 30. 
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provisions on gradual establishment of  its functions, much more detail strategy is needed, 
as it is clear that the institution will not be operational over-night. It is  obvious that the 
institution will not be able to fulfil its mandate as currently spelled out in the text in the 
short term,  not even in the middle term.  The issue here is  to plan for  the progressive 
installation of this new public body and what it implies in terms of resources,  human, 
material and financial and how to take a prompt but step-wise start while developing the 
institution building aspects of the implementation of the law.  It is  further important to 
provide information to future audited subject and stake-holder's awareness in general and 
coordination  and  harmonisation  with  other  laws  or  law  drafting  processes  and  very 
specifically the progress with the development and progress of internal financial control 
and audit. 
Even  once  the  SAl  is  established,  it  will  need  a  whole  range  of detailed  planning 
mechanisms,  that  should help  it deal  with its  heavy workload.  These  include  various 
instruments  such  as:  mission  and  vision  statements,  corporate  plans  (to  outline  the 
business mid-term plans and targets of work), strategic plans for each of its major work 
components, operational plans,  appropriate information systems and internal follow-up 
and results analysis.  80S  It will be therefore important for the new institution to share the 
experience of other relatively young SAIs in the region as well as  with its more mature 
and experienced counterparts in the EU Member States. 
Cooperation with EU financial accountability institutions 
Cooperation between Serbian emerging financial  accountability institutions and the EU 
institutions  is  still  at  the  very  early  stage  of development.  As  pointed  out  earlier, 
European Union funds  in Serbia are at the moment managed centrally by the European 
805 SIGMA paper: No. 34, Achieving High Quality in the Work of  Supreme Audit Institutions, 
OEeD/SIGMA, 2004, p. 21, available at http://appJi 1.oecd.org/olisI2004doc.nsf/linkto/gov-sigma(2004)  1. 
299 Agency for Reconstruction and there is still no decentralised management of EU funds. 
Therefore,  except  for  the  technical  advice  provided  by  SIGMA/OECD  on  how  to 
establish a sound financial accountability framework in Serbia, there seem to be no direct 
cooperation between the Serbian and the EU financial accountability actors. 
However, if Serbia becomes a member of the EU,  it will need to  set out a clear legal 
framework  for  cooperation  with  the EU financial  control  and  audit bodies.  Thus,  for 
example, the Serbian Supreme Audit Institution will need to be obliged to cooperate with 
the  European  Court of Auditors,  as  pointed  out  in  Chapter  IV.  The  Supreme  Audit 
Institution will also be asked to nominate a liaison officer to act as a contact point with 
other  EU  national  audit  bodies  and  the  European  Court of Auditors.  It will  be  also 
necessary to provide the European Court of Auditors explicit rights of access to ultimate 
beneficiaries of  the EU funds, etc.
806 
It is further expected that more specific obligations in area of financial control will arise 
from  the membership,  such as  the need to  establish a separate body for  managing the 
agricultural and structural funds, in accordance with the EU financial regulations outlined 
in  the  chapter  IV.  Serbia will  be obliged to  set  up  one  or more paying agencies  for 
disbursement to beneficiaries of monies from these funds and select a certifying body to 
audit the  annual  accounts of each paying agency.  Such a paying agency will  also  be 
subject to audit by the European Court of  Auditors. 807 
Whereas at this point of the accession process it is too early to get into all the details of 
future  more specific requirements of management of EU funds,  it is  important to  bear 
these issues  in mind and gradually prepare the ground for their introduction when the 
time  is  right.  At the  moment,  it would be important  for  Serbia to  establish  working 
806 SIGMA papers: No. 20, Effects of  European Union Accession, Part 2: External Audit, OCDE/GD(97) 
164, OECD, Paris, 1997, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/38/36953294. 
807 SIGMA papers: No. 19, Effects of  European Union Accession, Part J: Budgeting and Financial 
Control, OCDE/GD(97) 163, OECD, Paris, 1997, p. 45, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/59/36975642.pdf. 
300 relationships  with  the  EU  anti-fraud body,  OLAF.  Establishment of a  formal  contact 
point for cooperation and coordination with OLAF will enable sharing of experience and 
joint efforts in combating fraud and corruption in Serbia and facilitate meeting general 
EU financial accountability requirements. 
Conclusion 
The  final  conclusion  of this  dissertation  is  that  Serbia  is  still  far  from  meeting  the 
financial accountability conditions for EU membership. Whereas significant progress has 
been made in establishing a sound internal financial  accountability framework,  external 
accountability mechanisms have not been set up yet, giving Serbia the unfortunate status 
of the only European country in the region without an institution of independent public 
external audit. 
The comparison between the UK,  French and the EU model of financial  accountability 
has  proven that neither of these  systems  would work well  in the transitional  Serbian 
environment.  However,  specific  elements  of all  these  systems,  exemplified  in  the 
emerging European system, could be applied, but with a considerable sense of caution. It 
is therefore important not to have unrealistic and high expectations of newly established 
financial accountability system, especially in the next couple of years, until the external 
audit institution is properly established. 
Once Supreme Audit institution is established, it will be important to link and support its 
work  by the  Serbian  Parliament.  Although  lots  of ink has  been  spelled  out  on  the 
deteriorating role of Parliaments in holding the executive to account for  stewardship of 
public  money,  recent  developments  of state  audit  in  France  and  in  the  EU  reiterate 
importance of role of the Parliament and its Committees for improving effectiveness of 
financial  accountability  systems,  especially  as  far  as  the  follow-up  of  audit 
recommendations is concerned. Therefore, it would be important to  create a specialised 
Parliamentary Committee for Public Accounts in Serbia and provide it with necessary 
301 powers  to  follow  up  on  implementation  of recommendations  of the  Supreme  Audit 
Institution.  Furthermore,  it  will  be  important  to  establish  clear  accountability  lines 
between parliament and the executive, through gradual adoption of the UK accounting 
officers  model  in  Serbia.  However,  this  process  will  have  to  go  hand  in hand  with 
depoliticisation of the Serbian administration,  which in itself will be not an  easy and 
smooth process. 
Lastly, there is no doubt that a creation of a sound financial accountability system will 
take a  significant amount of effort and time on the part of all  financial  accountability 
actors:  the Government and especially the Ministry of Finance, the new Supreme Audit 
Institution and the Parliament and its  Committees.  It will be essential that roles of all 
these  actors  be  enhanced  simultaneously  so  that  the  balance  of  the  financial 
accountability system and its mechanisms is achieved. The aim is therefore to establish a 
balanced  partnership  between  all  financial  accountability  actors,  sharing  a  common 
objective  of stewardship  of public  money.  Only  once  a  sound  partnership  between 
Serbian actors of financial accountability is established will the Serbian citizens be able 
to call the Serbian Government to account for the use of their money and Serbia will be 
ready to  enter the complex and intricate network of financial accountabilities spreading 
throughout the veins of  the EU. 
302 Annex 1 
History of the Development of Financial Accountability Arrangements 
in the UK 
The  historic  development of British financial  accountability arrangements  is  in  many 
ways  exceptional.  The  continuous  struggle  over  finances  between  Parliament  and 
Monarch has given strong and crucial impetus for overall constitutional development.  808 
Unlike other countries where power of parliaments was  being built on broader social 
movements requesting various political rights - independent justice and administration, 
freedom from alien domination, freedom of speech, etc., the English parliament owes its 
origin and existence almost entirely to the English age-old determination not to be taxed 
without their consent.  809 Interestingly enough, it was through the achievement of  this end 
that British representative institutions secured political freedoms for British citizens much 
earlier and much more  effectively than the  Parliaments which had originated through 
fight for political freedoms.
810 
The right  of imposing  taxes  and  controlling  public  expenditure  has  for  a  number of 
centuries  been the  common and most convenient test of parliament's power over the 
Monarch.
811  While this power was on more or less regular basis exercised by the English 
Parliament, the Scottish Parliament, in the early times, has never had the exclusive right 
808  S. Walkland, "Parliamentary control of  public expenditure in Britain", in D. Coombes, The Power of  the 
Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.), pp. 179-198. 
809 P. Einzig, The Control of  the Purse - Progress and Decline of  Parliament's Financial Control, 
(London, Seeker & Warburg, 1959), p.  17. 
8!0 Ibid. 
8!! C. Innes, Lectures on Scotch Legal Antiquities, (Edinburgh, 1872), 111. Cf I.E. O'Brien, The Scottish 
Parliament in the 15
th and 16
th  Centuries, Ph.D. Thesis (Glasgow, 1980), p. 180. 
303 to  levy  taxation.
812  Its  power of controlling the  spending of public  monies  was  even 
weaker.  This  should  not  be  surprising,  having  in mind  that  the  development  of the 
Scottish central administration was  considerably slower than it its counterparts of that 
time.
813  This is usually explained by the disruptive effect which the war of independence 
had on the political and economic life of  the country as well as the subsequent weakness 
of  the  Scottish  crown  following  the  death  of  Robert  I  to  reorganise  the  royal 
administration.
814 
Early  medieval  history  of British  financial  control  mechanisms  is  marked  by  two 
coinciding  tendencies.  While  representative  institutions  were  struggling  to  keep  the 
Monarch  accountable  for  its  finances,  at  the  same  time  Monarchs  were  working  on 
strengthening financial scrutiny within the administration of their Courts. 
The origins of public expenditure control in England could be traced back to XII century. 
During the reign of Henry I (1100-1135) the royal administration was expanded and the 
rule  of law  solidified.  The  key  Royal  institution  dealing  with  financial  matters,  the 
medieval  Exchequer,  was  established.  The  Exchequer  was  the  most  powerful  and 
prestigious of  all Royal offices.
8lS It not only had the role ofrecording and controlling the 
Royal revenue, but also provided a forum for settling financial matters and disputes.
816 
The  Exchequer  was  structured  into  two  levels  - lower  and  higher.  In  the  Lower 
Exchequer, which was also called the Receipt, the money was handed over to be counted, 
and was put down in writing and on tallies, so  that afterwards, at the Upper Exchequer, 
812 I.E.O'Brien, ibid. 
813 C. Madden, The Finances of  the Scottish Crown in the Later Middle Ages, (Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow, 
1975), p. 2. 
814 Ibid. 
815 N. Richard, The Course of  the Exchequer, (London: Nelson), 1950, p. 33; R. Poole, The Exchequer in 
the Twelfth Century, (Oxford, Clarendon Press), 1912. 
816 N. Richard, op. cit., p.34. 
304 an account may be rendered of them.817  Everyone holding king's money was under the 
legal obligation to render account for it and to answer for what was then found to be due. 
Enforcement  of such  obligation  was  enabled  through  establishment  of the  Court  of 
Exchequer. 
The  Court  of the  Exchequer  evolved originally as  the  court concerned with  tax  and 
revenue matters,  deciding cases between the  Crown and taxpayers.  By the Fourteenth 
Century the Court had acquired a jurisdiction to deal with ordinary civil claims between 
one subject and another.818  The Court has also performed a function of control of Royal 
expenditure,  which was of judicial and non-administrative nature.  Through its  ancient 
audit, the debts of accountants were ascertained and enrolled on the record, followed by 
the judicial process and enforcement of payment through the agency of the sheriffs.819 
The Treasurer and Barons, leading officers of the Upper Exchequer or Court Side, were 
judges and their discharge of an accountant was full  and sufficient in law. Through its 
practice, the Court of  the Exchequer developed numerous rules and courses which gained 
the status of non-statute law. The rolls of the Court were considered the unchallengeable 
authority in law, unless it was proved they suffered from manifest error.820 
The administrative aspect of  the work of Exchequer was based on numerous hierarchical 
accountability relationships, starting with the scribes and the clerks at the bottom, up  to 
the  chief Exchequer Justiciar and ultimately the King.  The Exchequer functioned as  a 
bureaucratic  organization  with  records  being  written  and  taxes  collected  in  a  fairly 
organised way.821 It represented quite an advanced institution of  the feudal system, which 
817 P. Halsall (eds.), Internet Medieval Source Book, (Fordham University Center for Medieval Studies), 
www.fordham.edu/halsalllsbook.html. 
818 A.1.H. Morris, WS Gillbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan's Trial by Jury - A Legal Commentary, 
www.lexscripta.comlpdf/TrialByJury.pdf 
819 J.E.D. Binney, British Public Finance and Administration 1774-92, (Oxford Clarendon Press), 1958, pp. 
4-5. 
820 Ibid. 
821  N. Richard, ibid. 
305 basic concepts are preserved to modem times. It should be noted that the earliest found 
reference to the Auditor of the Exchequer, as a public official specifically charged with 
administrative auditing of government expenditure, goes back to 1314.822  The Auditor of 
the Exchequer function was the one of the general comptroller, consisting of authorizing 
the issue of  public money. 
The period of XIII and XIV century in England was marked by the rise of the power of 
the Parliament, which on a number of  occasions challenged the ancient Royal prerogative 
to unlimited public monies spending. Although the English Parliament still did not have 
strong enough power to  actually enforce its appropriations,  its  right to  criticize public 
spending represented quite an important limitation of the powers of Monarchs  at  that 
time.823 
The Parliament used a number of different means to control excessive Royal spending. It 
required that the accounts be audited by institutions outside the Court,824 or that special 
Parliamentary committees or commissions be established to  audit the  accounts of the 
Monarch and its agents.825  Although Monarchs on many occasions resisted the demands 
of rendering the accounts before such bodies, they would in the end comply with these 
requests, often frightened by the Parliament's threats to withhold supply. 
822  Cf The History a/the National Audit Office, UK National Audit Office web site, www.nao.gov.uk. 
823 P. Einzig, op. cit. p. 87. 
824 For example, the Great Council audited the Royal accounts in 1216, when grants contained provisions 
for a special audit independently of  the annual audit by the Court of  the Exchequer, on the assumption that 
the influence of  the Royal court was liable to be too strong there. 
825 For example, in 1340, the Joint Committee of Lords and Commons for the examination and auditing of 
the financial transactions of  Kings agents was established; in 1341  Parliament appointed another 
commission to examine the state accounts (to which Edward III agreed under certain conditions); in l379, 
at the request of Commons, a Committee of  Barons was set up to examine the accounts' of  estates of 
Edward III. Cf. P. Einzig, op. cit., pp. 87-90. 
306 The next important step in strengthening financial  accountability of the Monarchy was 
the establishment of the accountability relationship between Royal officers, responsible 
for handling of  public funds, and Parliament. On a number of occasions, misuse of  public 
monies was one of  the key reasons for the initiation of impeachment procedures~ with the 
main objection being that funds intended for financing wars were diverted into the King's 
household.
826 Alleged maladministration of  public funds at times provided a good excuse 
for  calling  Royal  officers  to  account  when  both  Monarch  and  Parliament  wished  to 
remove Royal officers for political and personal reasons. Nevertheless, even though the 
weapon  of impeachment  for  misuse  of public  moneys  was  at  times  abused,  the 
establishment of  the principle of  the accountability of Royal officers to Parliament was of 
great constitutional importance. 
The  English  Parliament's  efforts  to  achieve  control  of public  finances  were  greatly 
undermined  during  the  Tudor  reign  (1485-1603).  Although  Parliament  criticized  the 
expenditure occasionally, no attempts were made to actually obtain accounts. Thus, the 
King acquired the full control of  the proceeds of  taxation. Financial control was exercised 
by Committees  set  up  by the  Executive  and  proved to  be  quite  efficient.  However, 
Parliament was fully excluded from this process.  827 
It should be noted that under Queen Elizabeth I,  in  1559,  the Auditors of the  Imprest 
Office was created, as  a predecessor of the today's National Audit Office. The formal 
function of  the Imprest Office was audit of  Exchequer payments. The accounts audited by 
the  Imprest Office were those of all persons to whom money was issued by imprest and 
upon  account  for  the  services  of Crown  and  Public.  In  addition,  the  Imprest  Office 
audited the accounts of an important group of  revenue accountants such as those handling 
the duties of Customs,  Stamps,  Salt, Postage etc.
828  It should be stressed that all  audit 
826 Ibid. 
827 Ibid. 
828 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit., pp. 195-197. 
307 conducted in this division was administrative and not judicia1.
829 This system gradually 
lapsed two  centuries later, when the new Office for  Auditing the Public Accounts was 
established. 
Financial accountability mechanisms in neighboring Scotland throughout the XIV,  XV 
and XVI century were rather underdeveloped in comparison to its English counterpart. 
The power of the Parliament over public  finances  was  much weaker than the  English 
Parliament had at that time.
83o  The Scottish Parliament did not have exclusive right to 
impose taxes, mostly due to the fact that taxation in Scotland was exceedingly irregular, 
which had undoubtedly weakened the bargaining position of the estates.
83
!  Furthermore, 
it seems that Parliament itself lettpublic finances be taken out of its control and given to 
other institutions such as general councils and convention of estates. It appears that at that 
time there was an accepted awareness of the need for the estates to give their consent to 
matters of public revenue and expenditure, while there is no record of parliament ever 
having expressed the view that it alone should be accorded this privilege.  832 
The turning point in the development of Scottish financial administration was the return 
of James I from captivity in England. His first hand experience of the highly developed 
English  administrative  system  enabled  him  to  start  to  reform  the  existing  governing 
system into the new style bureaucratic government, which would restore the power and 
prestige  of the  Scottish  crown.
833  The  first  steps  undertaken  by  James  I  were  the 
829 Ibid. 
830 The first trails of  the Scottish Parliament can be traced back to the second half of  the XIII century. At 
first, a parliamentum was most probably a full and formal meeting of  the King's advisors (the council), 
where they were able to discuss matters of  particular importance. The parliament, however, carried out 
other functions, being in the same time the supreme court oflaw, with a power of  declaring the law.
830 
However, the actual power of  the Parliament in state affairs was scarce. Cf W.e. Dickinson, Scotland from 
the Earliest Times to  1603, (Oxford at the Clarendon Press), 1977, p. 99-100. 
831I.E. O'Brien, op. cit., p.  180. 
832  Ibid. pp.  180-184. 
833 e. Madden, op. cit. p. 2. 
308 establishments of the new offices of exchequer and comptroller, as  well as  the gradual 
formation of  the body of  professional civil servants.
834 
The Exchequer was at the centre of Scottish financial  administration. In contrast to  the 
system employed in Mediaeval England, the Scottish Exchequer was the sole organ of 
financial government, corresponding to  the English Upper Exchequer. However, despite 
certain  similarities,  it  may  be  argued  that  the  Scottish  Exchequer  was  quite  an 
underdeveloped institution, using only a few methods of the English Upper Exchequer.
835 
Furthermore, until the second half of the XI century, the  Scottish Exchequer was not a 
permanent institution. The Lords Auditors, drawn from the larger body of the Lords of 
the Council, were appointed only for the duration of the audit and were relieved of their 
duties after completion of  their tasks.
836 The actual number of auditors appointed for each 
year varied significantly. 
The actual organization of the annual audit of the Exchequer in the XIV and XV century 
was  also  unsystematic  and  unprofessional.  837  The  date  of the  commencement of the 
annual audit of accounts was fixed at least six weeks in advance and accountants were 
entitled to receive a prior warning of proceedings of forty days. Accountants who failed 
to  appear on the appointed day were liable for  a fine,  which was irregularly enforced. 
Many royal  financial  officials  remained  absent  from  the  Exchequer  for  long  periods 
without incurring massive fines.
838  The main function of the traditional exchequer was 
the prevention of  fraud.
839 
834 Ibid. 
835 A. L. Murray, "The Procedure of  the Scottish Exchequer in the early Sixteenth Century", The Scottish 
Historical Review No. 130, Vol. XL, (1961), pp. 95-97. 
836 Ibid, p. 91. 
837 C. Madden, op. cit. pp. 12-40. 
838 Ibid. 
839 1. Goodare, State and SOCiety in Early Modern Scotland, (Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 104-105. 
309 During the XVI century, despite temporary setbacks, the revenue of  the Scottish state was 
increasing and fiscal administration was becoming more sophisticated. Unlike the earlier 
system of income driven expenditure, where all the raised revenue was spent and almost 
no limitations of expenditure existed, the XVI century witnessed a tendency to  realign 
expenditure  towards  desirable  ends.84o  The  struggle  for  the  royal  signature,841  fought 
between the royal  Court on the  one hand and privy council  (a body of administrators 
collecting the revenue)  and Parliament on the other hand,  demonstrated the increasing 
opposition  to  unlimited  financial  Royal  power and  gradual  establishment  of efficient 
expenditure controlling mechanisms. The traditional exchequer, as ad hoc passive body 
which  met  annually  to  receive  accounts,  became  a  permanent  institution  in  1584. 
Although the main initial function of the permanent exchequer was judicial, his financial 
administrative aspect was  gradually evolving,  especially after  1590.842  The permanent 
exchequer eventually became an  active  administrative department,  with auditors  freed 
from personal liability of treasurer and comptroller.
843  Under the Act of Union between 
Scotland  and  England  (1707),  the  Scottish  Exchequer  underwent  legislative 
reorganization and became known as  "The Court of Exchequer in Scotland", continuing 
to carry out most of  the functions it had traditionally performed.844 
While  the  financial  accountability mechanisms did not undergo  significant changes  in 
Scotland  during  the  XVII  century,  the  English  financial  control  system  experienced 
genuine  reform,  mainly due  to  urgent needs  to  resolve  burning political  issues.  This 
enabled the gradual establishment of "public" financial accountability system in England, 
which main features are preserved to modem times. 
840 Ibid. 
841  The royal sign was a means of  granting land and other forms of  patronage. 
842 Cf. A. L. Murray, "Sir John Skene and the exchequer, 1594-1612", Stair Society Miscellany, (1971), p. 
126. 
8431. Goodare, op. cit., p.  121. 
844 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit. pp.233-237. 
310 The Revolution of 1688 is generally recognized as  the landmark between the period of 
autocratic Monarchy and that of constitutional Monarchy in England. Applied to the area 
of financial accountability, the Revolution is assumed to mark the beginning of  the period 
of full  Parliamentary  control  over  the  public  purse.
845  The  Revolution  undoubtedly 
removed the main obstacle of efficient Parliamentary control.  Its  most important result 
was  that  it became necessary to  summon  Parliament  every  year,  which provided the 
Commons with a good position in the financial control process. 
However,  apart  from  some  early progress under William  III, it took almost a century 
before even a beginning was made with real and lasting progress towards a genuine and 
well-established Parliamentary control of public finance.
846  During the reign of William 
III  annual  accounts  of  public  revenue  and  expenditure  were  examined  by  the 
Parliamentary  Commissioners  who  were  appointed  under  several  successive  Acts  of 
Parliament. The first Public Accounts Committee in modem times was appointed shortly, 
in  1690.
847  However,  Parliament's  strong  efforts  to  control  public  expenditure  by 
supervising public accounts were not long lasting. After a while the Commons lost their 
power of ensuring accountability and under the Hanoverian Kings no  Public Accounts 
Committees  were  appointed  until  1780,  nor  were  accounts  presented  any  longer 
systematically to Parliament, even though they continued to be systematically audited by 
officers of  the Exchequer.  848 
It took considerable efforts during the last quarter of  the century and during the first half 
of  the XIX century to re-establish and apply financial accountability even to the extent to 
which it was  actually applied during the last decade of the  XVII century.  The British 
defeat  in  the  American  war  of independence  brought  existing  criticisms  of British 
financial control system to the fore. The Exchequer's constitutional monopoly, excessive 
845 P. Einzig, op. cit. pp.l17  -13l. 
846 Ibid. 
847 Ibid. 
848 Ibid. 
311 centralization  of audit  with  still  survlvmg  judicial  fonns  were  criticized  for  their 
malfunctioning  and  rigidity.849  Members  of the  political  opposition  took  the  lead  in 
calling for refonn of financial administration. First effective movements towards refonn 
were taken in 1780, when the statutory Commission for Examining Public Accounts was 
set up.  It is  interesting to  note that the Commissioners were  concerned not only with 
regularity of expenditure, but also with its economy and efficiency, avoidance of waste, 
extravagance and better management of resources.850  In  this  way,  a  basis  for  broader 
understanding of  the financial accountability in Britain was established. 
First few  decades of the XIX century have announced substantial changes in assuring 
financial  accountability.  The Office  for  Auditing the  Public  Accounts,  a  successor of 
Auditors of  the Imprest Office, underwent significant changes.851  The size of the office in 
both  structural  and  functional  sense  greatly  expanded.  The  most  important  change, 
however,  was  the  shift  from  reporting  its  findings  from  executive  to  the  House  of 
Commons, which occurred in 1832. 
In 1834 the Office of Comptroller General of His Maj esty' s Exchequer was created. The 
head of this office was the Comptroller General of the Exchequer. Although his main 
function, responsibility for authorizing the issue of  public money, was basically the same 
as  one  the  medieval  Exchequer,  it  was  for  the  first  time  perfonned  on  behalf of 
Parliament and not the "Crown".852 These changes undoubtedly marked the beginning of 
the modem period of financial accountability in the United Kingdom. 
The most important figure  of the modem period of financial  accountability is  William 
Gladstone,  who  was  the  Chancellor of the  Exchequer from  1852  to  1866.  Gladstone 
849 J.E.D. Binney, op. cit., pp. 7-19. 
850 D. Dewar, "Value for Money Audit: the first 800 years", Public Finance and Accountancy, 1985. 
851  Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, Audit, Accountability and Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1999), p. 35. 
852 Cf. E. L. Nonnanton, Accountability and Audit in  Governments (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1966), p.20. 
312 introduced a number of substantial reforms of the control of public expenditure. In 1854 
Parliamentary control was expanded over the expenditure of the Revenue Departments. 
In 1861  the Public Accounts Committee was set up, becoming fully effective only after 
the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was enacted five years later.  853 
In 1866 the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act created the post of Comptroller and 
Auditor General (C &  AG), who was given two main functions: to authorise the issue of 
public money to government from the Bank of England and to audit the accounts of all 
Government departments and report to  Parliament accordingly.854  C  &  AG was to be 
appointed by the Monarch, on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Act also established 
the Exchequer and Audit Department, as a merger of the office of Comptroller of the 
Exchequer  and  Office  for  Auditing  Public  Accounts.  Its  task  was  to  assist  the 
Comptroller and Auditor General in auditing of  the accounts and providing support to the 
Public  Accounts  Committee  in  holding  the  executive  to  account  for  public  money 
stewardship. In this way, in Gladstone words, the 'circle of  control' was closed.855 
The 1866 Act is considered to be a vast improvement to the system of audit which had 
existed  previously  in  Britain.856  The  Act  stipulated  the  obligation  of  government 
departments to produce appropriation accounts for independent audit.  857 It was the task of 
the Treasury to determine which departments shall actually prepare and render accounts 
to  the Comptroller and Auditor General. Section 27  provided the C  &  AG the right to 
examine every appropriation account and verify whether payments were supported by 
vouchers (proofs of payment) and whether the money has been spent for the purposes 
intended by Parliament.  858 
853 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, pp. 35-36. 
854 Cf. The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. 
855 1.  Mo1inier, "Parliament's Financial Powers: A Comparison between France and Britain", in D. 
Coombes D. et aI,  The Power a/the Purse, (London George Allen & Unwin Ltd), 1976, p.  173. 
856 Cf. F. White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit., p. 37. 
857 Section 22 of  the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. 
858 Cf. F.  White, K. Hollingsworth, op. cit. p. 37. 
313 In the first decades of the XX century, the system of audit established by the  1866 Act 
was already out of date.  During several decades in the end of XIX and beginning of the 
XX  century,  public  expenditure  greatly  increased,  necessitating  changes  in  public 
accounting and audit. Therefore, in 1921 The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act was 
enacted, repealing and amending a number of the 1866 Act's provisions. 
The  1921  Exchequer  and  Audit  Departments  Act  gave  C&AG  greater  discretion  in 
conducting  of audit.  Since  the  increase  of expenditure  made  the  checking  of every 
account  almost  impossible,  the  Act  allows  the  C&AG  to  rely  on  the  individual 
department's  checking  system  and,  instead  of examining  all  the  accounts,  test  only 
particular  transactions  to  ensure  the  effectiveness  of the  departmental  check,  without 
further evidence of payment in support of the charges to which the sums relate.859  The 
Act  also  extended  the  audit  of C&AG  to  new  types  of accounts,  which  emerged  in 
previous decades (trading accounts etc.).860  However, the  1921  Act did not address the 
key issue of C&AG independence towards the  Executive,  which still  exercised strong 
discretionary powers over the C&AG. 
Pressure for substantial reform of  the public audit system grew from the 1960s, following 
concerns  expressed by academics and Parliamentarians that the scope of public  audit, 
which  at  that  time  covered  only  around  half of public  expenditure,  needed  to  be 
substantially extended.  Furthermore, it was argued that there was a need for a specific 
power to allow the C&AG to report to Parliament at his own discretion on the value for 
money achieved by government departments.861  Reformers also argued that more robust 
arrangements should be put in place to ensure the independence of public auditors from 
government.  862 
859 Section 1(2) of  the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921. 
860 Section 4 of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921. 
861  The History a/the National Audit Office, UK National Audit Office web site, www.nao.gov.uk. 
862 Ibid. 
314 Continuous  reformist  pressures  resulted  in  the  enactment  of the  National  Audit  Act 
1983.
863  Under  the  Act,  the  C&AG  formally  became  an  Officer  of the  House  of 
Commons, and was given the express power to report to Parliament at his own discretion 
on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which government bodies have used 
public funds.  The Act also established the National Audit Office (NAO) to  replace the 
Exchequer and Audit Department in support of  the C&AG.
864 Staff of the National Audit 
Office  was  placed  outside  of the  civil  service,  which  provided  conditions  for  fuller 
independence from the Executive. 
As we could see in chapter II, these financial accountability arrangements, although with 
some  important  changes  along  the  way,  remain  relevant  to  this  day.  Historical 
development of the UK parliamentary system  and reforms  undertaken  to  firm  up  the 
position of external auditor, laid the foundations of Parliament's full  scrutiny of public 
money  and  established  a  firm  platform  of financial  accountability,  which  enables 
additional improvements and adaptations to be made without risks of  a systematic failure. 
Such robust financial accountability arrangements have served as an inspiration not only 
for  other  countries  of the  Westminster  tradition,  but  also  for  European  continental 
countries and the supranational EU system, which have already been 'infected' by UK 
financial  accountability  concepts,  attempting  to  entrench  and  attain  the  Gladstone 
sparkling 'circle of  control'. 
863 Cf. F. White, K.  Hollingsworth, ibid, pp. 41-46. 
864 The National Audit Act 1983. 
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List of key persons interviewed (in alphabetical order) 
Alventosa Jean-Raphael, Conseiller-maitre at the Cour des Comptes, Paris 
Andrews  Matthew,  Lecturer  at  the  Harvard  University,  former  semor  financial 
management specialist of  the World Bank 
Arsic Vesna, Deputy Minister of  Finance of  the Serbian Government 
Barjaktarevic Mila, Head of  Internal Audit unit of  the Ministry of  Finance of  Montenegro 
Cazala Francois-Roger, Principal Administrator in the Audit and Financial Control unit 
of  the SIGMA Programme on secondment from the French Cour des Comptes 
Cho Junghun, Senior Financial Management Specialist, the World Bank 
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